JUDGMENT V.P. Gopalan Nambiyar, J. 1. These are a series of twenty-eight appeals arising out of land acquisition proceedings for the purposes of Periyar Valley Irrigation Project and the Phyto Chemicals Project. The twenty-three appeals relating to the acquisition for the purposes of the former are: A.S. Nos. 487, 489, 491 to 493, 497 to 500, 502 to 504, 506, 507, 509, 510 to 513, 515, 521 and 523 of 1969 and the five appeals relating to the latter are: A.S. Nos. 490, 495, 501, 505 and 514 of 1969. The acquisition for both was under the provisions of Travancore Land Acquisition Act XI of 1089. The section 6 declaration with respect to which the market value of the lands has to be adjudged under the said Act, was on 22nd March 1962 with respect to the former set of acquisitions, and on 31st October 1961 with respect to the latter. The cases relating to these acquisitions were eventually tried together in the court below; and despite the slight difference in point of time in regard to the section 6 declaration, it was agreed before that court that the land value in respect of both the sets of acquisitions had to be assessed on the basis of the same evidence and that a separate valuation of the properties was unnecessary (See paragraph 33 of the trial court's judgment). Although the proceedings relating to the two acquisitions were originally tried separately, there was later, a joint trial. This had resulted in a duplication or multiplication of evidence already recorded in some cases, and to some confusion in the marking of the exhibits and reference to the witnesses. Eventually the exhibits were re-marked and the witnesses re-numbered (Vide paragraph 31 of the trial court's judgment). But we do not think that the confusion has altogether been eliminated. 2. The extent of land acquired for the Periyar Valley Irrigation Project is about 15 acres and 37 cents, and for the Phyto Chemical Project, about 19 acres 37 cents. The acquisitions in both cases were from an extensive Rubber Estate belonging to the petitioner stretching for a distance nearly seven miles long along the banks of the Periyar River in the Moovattupuzha taluk, and permeated almost through its middle, by the Alwaye-Munnar Road. The acquisitions in both cases were from an extensive Rubber Estate belonging to the petitioner stretching for a distance nearly seven miles long along the banks of the Periyar River in the Moovattupuzha taluk, and permeated almost through its middle, by the Alwaye-Munnar Road. The properties on the west of the road are acquired for the Periyar Valley Irrigation Scheme and those on the east, for the Phyto Chemical Project (See the Plan Ext. C-22). In respect of Periyar Valley Irrigation Scheme acquisitions, land value was awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer at Rs. 10 per cent as against the claimant's claim of Rs. 40 per cent. On reference, the enhancement claimed was allowed by the lower court. Some confusion has crept; in, on this part of the judgment also. The early part of paragraph 34 notes that the claimant had claim that land value at Rs. 40 per cent, but lower down, the court observes "that the claim for paddy land at Rs. 50 per cent is quite fair ; and at the end of the paragraph, it records the finding that the market value of the acquired paddy lands is to be fixed at Rs. 50 and that the petitioner is entitled to claim additional compensation at the rate of Rs. 40 per cent for paddy land in the acquired cases. But in the decretal portion to the judgment (paragraph 88), enhanced compensation has been awarded in all these cases relating to Periyar Valley Irrigation Project only at Rs. 30 per cent, which is correct, having regard to the claim. In the cases relating to acquisition for Phyto Chemicals the Land Acquisition Officer awarded land value at Rs. 12 per cent. The claimant claimed at Rs. 50 per cent. This enhancement was allowed by the Court. 3. In regard to rubber trees the award generally gave at the rate of Rs. 30 per tree for trees aged 16, Rs. 40 per tree for those aged 17, Rs. 10 per tree for those aged 55, and value according to age for the non-yielding trees. The petitioner claimed at rates ranging from Rs. 12 to Rs. 50 per tree depending upon the age of the trees. The court below discussed the value to be awarded in paragraphs 60 to 64 (there are two paragraphs marked 64 and the discussion concludes with the latter of these) of its judgment. The petitioner claimed at rates ranging from Rs. 12 to Rs. 50 per tree depending upon the age of the trees. The court below discussed the value to be awarded in paragraphs 60 to 64 (there are two paragraphs marked 64 and the discussion concludes with the latter of these) of its judgment. It accepted the Commissioners' report, Ext. C-21 regarding the annual yield from the rubber tree as Rs. 9.14; and following the pattern adopted by the Commissioners, applied the Park's Principle to arrive at the value of the rubber trees. Briefly stated, on this mode or principle of valuation, the Commissioners (two members of the Bar) reckoned the annual income from one tree at Rs. 9.14 on the basis that 40 years was the average economic life of a rubber tree, and thereafter applied the Park's Principle to determine the compensation payable for each tree. In the Commissioners' report, as supplemented by a statement filed by the claimant on 9th August 1968 as directed by court, and referred to in paragraph 63 of the trial court's judgment, the economic value of a 25 year old rubber tree is Rs. 94.87, of a 19 year old one, Rs. 110.45 and so on. The court below accepted the principle of valuation and the statement filed by the claimant on 9th August 1968 showing the economic value of the rubber trees of different growth and age. The value of 55 year old trees in portions of the land acquired for the Phyto Chemicals was also calculated by the lower court by applying the Park's Principle and on the basis of the annual yield found by the Commissioners. It was submitted for the claimant that even such trees were capable of being tapped for an additional four years. Despite the Commissioners having estimated the economic life of a rubber tree at only 40 years, the rubber trees of 55 years of age and over, were valued by the Commissioners at the rate of Rs. 10 per tree. The court below went to one step further and fixed the yield even from these trees at half the rate adopted by the Commissioners, viz., at Rs. 4.57, and assessed the value of a 55 year old rubber tree on the basis of a further yield for a period of 4 years, at Rs. 16.20 per tree applying again, the Park's Principle. 4.57, and assessed the value of a 55 year old rubber tree on the basis of a further yield for a period of 4 years, at Rs. 16.20 per tree applying again, the Park's Principle. These are the main principles on the basis of which compensation was awarded by the court below for rubber trees. 4. The court below also found that as a result of the acquisition for the Periyar Valley Irrigation Scheme, the petitioner's estate to the west of Alwaye-Munnar Road, had suffered severance at various places. The estate left over after acquisition, which was of an extent of 672.50 acres, was adjudged to be entitled to compensation on the ground of severance at Rs. 200 per acre, the total compensation under this head amounting to Rs. 1,34,000. It was held that as the entire estate to the east of the Alwaye-Munnar Road was acquired, there was no breaking up of the contiguity of the estate and hence the western portion was not entitled to damages for severance on this account (Vide paragraphs 37, 38 and 59 of the judgment). 5. Compensation was also awarded for injurious affection as a result of the acquisition. These four heads of compensation, viz., land value, value for Rubber trees, compensation for severance and compensation for injurious affection have been attacked by the Advocate-General in these appeals. In addition, he has raised a point that the decree of the lower court has awarded interest on solatium which was wrong and unjustified. 6. Dealing first with the land value awarded, the learned Advocate-General stressed the principle that the same had to be fixed with reference to the price for similar lands in the vicinity in the course of normal sales at or about the time of the section 6 declaration in these cases. When this method of valuation fails or is not dependable, resort may be had to capitalizing the net annual income from the property at so many years' purchase, the multiple traditionally adopted being round about 30, having regard to the income yielded by gilt edged security. Our attention was called to the decision of a Division Bench of this court in the State of Kerala v. Mariamma Abraham A.I.R 1969 Kerala 265 where the above principles were affirmed. In this case Exts. P-1 to P-10 were the documents filed on the side of the claimant, and Exts. Our attention was called to the decision of a Division Bench of this court in the State of Kerala v. Mariamma Abraham A.I.R 1969 Kerala 265 where the above principles were affirmed. In this case Exts. P-1 to P-10 were the documents filed on the side of the claimant, and Exts. D-1 and D-3 to D-5 on the side of the State, to evidence the value of sales of similar lands in the locality at or about the same time. The court below has made the sale deed Ext. P-7 the basis for awarding the enhancement. Ext. P-7 is on 9th March 1951 for Rs. 19,000 in respect of 3 acres and 4 ½ cents of land, of which 34 ½ cents are parambas (garden land) and the rest, wet lands. The lower court found that the average price per cent on the basis of the consideration stated in Ext. P-7 would work out to Rs. 62.50. Apparently accepting the submission of Counsel for the claimant that the garden portion of the lands may be valued at Rs. 100 per cent, it calculated the price of paddy lands at Rs. 52.50, which was below the rate of Rs. 50 per cent at which the higher claim was made, and therefore awarded the amount claimed. The executant of Ext. P-7 was examined as P.W. 6. It has come out in his evidence that the sale was at a time when there was scarcity of paddy, and that the properties comprised in Ext. P-7 are favourably situated, being by the side of an irrigation channel. Ext. P-7 lands are about four furlongs away from the acquired lands. Having regard to these consideration we cannot regard Ext. P-7 sale as a normal sale of similar lands in the locality. It was more than ten years from the section 6 declarations, and despite the Government Pleader's submission recorded in para 34 that the document was relevant, we cannot accept it for the purpose of fixing the price as in 1961 or 1962. It was submitted on behalf of the claimant that the land value has been steadily rising since 1951 and that judicial notice could be taken of this. Evidence as to the steady price-rise since 1951, there is none. On the contrary, the claimant's own document, Ext. P-9, not to mention others, belies this theory. Ext. It was submitted on behalf of the claimant that the land value has been steadily rising since 1951 and that judicial notice could be taken of this. Evidence as to the steady price-rise since 1951, there is none. On the contrary, the claimant's own document, Ext. P-9, not to mention others, belies this theory. Ext. P-9 is a sale deed dated 5th April 1957 in respect of 1 acre and 38 cents of paddy land for Rs. 6,000 which works out to Rs. 43.50 per cent indicating a downward trend from 1951 to 1957. In paragraph 34, the court below remarked that the price had to be fixed on the basis of Exts. P-7 and P-9 (apparently at that stage it was prepared to ignore the other documents filed by the claimant) and that, as between the two, it accepted Ext. P-7 as the claimant "is entitled to get the highest value for his land." But in paragraph 36 of the judgment it was prepared to find that Exts. P-1, P-2, P-3, P-4 and P-6 sale deeds tendered as evidence of sales in respect of small extents of garden land were relevant to give an indication of the general price of the acquired properties and to show that the price fixed by the Land Acquisition Officer was low. Exts. P-1 to P-6 are not in respect of plots of comparable extent, as stressed even recently, by the Supreme Court in Radhakisan Laxminarayan v. The Collector of Akola 1968(1) S.C.W.R 692 and we are of the opinion that these documents cannot afford a satisfactory criterion for valuation. (Ext. P-1 is for 2 ½ cents, Ext. P-2 for four cents, Ext. P-3 for 3 cents, Ext. P-4 is for 5 cents, and Ext. P-6 for 3 cents). Ext. P-10 is a judgment of the Sub Court, Ernakulam in certain Land Acquisition proceedings in respect of lands in the vicinity acquired for the Phyto Chemicals Project. Rs. 80 per cent for paddy lands and Rs. 41 per cent for garden land was found to be the proper basis for valuation. But the claimant had claimed only at the rate of Rs. 50 and Rs. 40 per cent respectively for these lands which was upheld. Rs. 80 per cent for paddy lands and Rs. 41 per cent for garden land was found to be the proper basis for valuation. But the claimant had claimed only at the rate of Rs. 50 and Rs. 40 per cent respectively for these lands which was upheld. We have gone through the judgment, and it is enough for us to state that the conclusion was rested on the materials placed before the court, and sale deeds accepted by it. 7. The learned Advocate-General pressed before us that the court below was wrong in discarding Ext. D-1 sale deed dated 23rd August 1961 tendered by the State as the basis for valuation and proved by its executant C.P.W. 3. The sale was of 28 cents of paddy land for a consideration which works out to Rs. 28.50 per cent. The court below discarded the document on the ground that C.P.W. 3 admitted that it was executed by him in favour of his wife as security in lieu of the 'sthredhanam' amount, which had been utilised by him, and, therefore, it cannot be taken as reflecting the true market value. The document has the merit of proximity to the date of the section 6 declaration. But we find the property was nearly 1 ½ or 2 ½ miles away from the lands acquired, and has also no road frontage, (as in the case of the acquired properties), the D-1 property being nearly ½ mile away from the road. In view of these considerations, we are not inclined to disturb the assessment of the evidentiary value of Ext. D-1 by the trial court. Ext. D-3 to D-5 are in respect of parambas. Ext. D-3 is dated 18th July 1968 for 60 ¼ cents of land for a total consideration of Rs. 200 which works out only to about 3 per cent. It is proved by C.P.W. 5, who executed it in favour of his cousin brother. Ext. D-5 is the sale deed dated 16th July 1970 by C.P.W. 5 for 1 acre and 3 cents of garden land and paddy lands together for a sum of Rs. 1000 the average price working out to a little above Rs. 9 per cent. Ext. D-5 dated 18th July 1960 is again a sale deed by C.P.W. 5 of 21 ½ cents of lands for Rs. 1000 the average price working out to a little above Rs. 9 per cent. Ext. D-5 dated 18th July 1960 is again a sale deed by C.P.W. 5 of 21 ½ cents of lands for Rs. 100 the average price working out to less than Rs.5. The court below rejected Ext. D-3 on the ground that it was executed by C.P.W. 5 to his cousin brother. It discarded Ext. D-4 and D-5 on the ground that they were executed in favour of workmen and dependants of C.P.W. 5. Although the recitals in Ext. D-4 and D-5 themselves do not furnish proof of any such dependence, there is some basis for it in the evidence of C.P.W. 5. He stated that the lands covered by these documents are fairly far away from the acquired lands, and (at least in regard to some of the transactions evidenced by D-3 to D-5) that the proper price had not been received. We are not, therefor, inclined to attach much value to Exts. D-3 to D-5. 8. We notice that the Government Pleader in the court below submitted that the price may be fixed by reference to Ext. P-9. (See paragraph 34 of the judgment). We cannot readily pass this on the ground that the Government Pleader was accepting the lesser evil than fixing the value on the basis of Ext. P-9, as, on either basis, the rate claimed by the claimant would be exceeded in regard to the Periyar Valley acquisition. But Ext. P-9 was sprung upon, and proved through C.P.W. 5 in the course of cross-examination, and his evidence in regard to Exts. D-3 to D-5 and P-9 has not altogether impressed us as credible enough for acceptance. Besides, he stated that the lands in Ext. P-9 were close to those in Ext. D-4, which were fairly far away from the acquired lands. Ext. P-9 is of the year 1957 also. We would not therefore accept Ext. P-9. 9. Although the documents tendered on the side of the State, despite the proximity in date of Ex. D-1 to the section 6 declaration, are not quite helpful to assess the land value, we find that the documents tendered by the claimant are equally unhelpful. The result is that the claimant cannot be said to have substantiated his claim for enhanced land value. 10. D-1 to the section 6 declaration, are not quite helpful to assess the land value, we find that the documents tendered by the claimant are equally unhelpful. The result is that the claimant cannot be said to have substantiated his claim for enhanced land value. 10. The basis of valuation with reference to normal sales of similar lands in the locality at or about the relevant date being unavailable or unsatisfactory, we specifically asked Counsel for the claimant whether he could put his case with advantage on the alternative basis of capitalisation of the land value with reference to income, as pointed out in the Division Bench ruling in State of Kerala v. Mariamma Abraham A.I.R. 1969 Ker: 265. The Counsel stated that he could not. 11. We then proceed to consider the valuation in regard to the rubber trees. We have earlier indicated the paragraphs of the trial court's judgment where the matter is dealt with, and the data with reference to which the discussion is made. Ext. C-21 is the Commissioner's report; and P. W. 8 was one of the two Commissioners who submitted the same. The report assessed the annual income of each rubber tree at Rs. 9.54. This was by reference to test tapping done by the Commissioners of the trees in four blocks marked out by the Commissioners in the unacquired portions of the lands. The trees in the acquired portions were not available for test tapping as they had been cut down by the State in respect of the area acquired for Phyto Chemicals, and given for slaughter tapping in respect of the area acquired for the Periyar Valley Irrigation Scheme. Park's principle was applied to the net annual yield thus arrived at, and the value of the trees was capitalised as noticed earlier. As rightly pointed out by the learned Advocate-General, the basis of valuation is fallacious. The claimant having been awarded the full land value, is not entitled to an award of the value of the rubber trees on the basis of income, in addition to the land value. He would be entitled only to the fuel or timber value of the tree. The court below relied on the ruling of a Division Bench of this Court in. Kerala State Electricity Board v. Varghese Thomas 1961 K.L.T 238. He would be entitled only to the fuel or timber value of the tree. The court below relied on the ruling of a Division Bench of this Court in. Kerala State Electricity Board v. Varghese Thomas 1961 K.L.T 238. But the decision itself at page 243 of the Report points out that the learned Judges were not concerned with an acquisition under land Acquisition Act, and did not, by their judgment, intend to lay down or unsettle any principle, which has established itself in such cases. Again at page 245 of the report the learned Judges noticed that for valuing improvements such as rubber trees and pepper vines a different rule of capitalisation was in vogue under the Land Acquisition Act. In State of Kerala v. Mariamma A.I.R. 1969 Ker. 265 this Court observed that where the lands had been planted or built upon to the best advantage, capitalisation of the net annual income derived from the trees might be a safe mode of arriving at the market value. The court proceeded to observe: "But this method must fail where, as in the present case, the plantations are scattered here and there and the bulk of the land is bare land. In such cases, where the improvements yield an income, a fair way of assessing the value of the impugned land would be to deduct from the total area, the area necessary for, or occupied by, the improvements since that area would not be available for any other purpose, value the balance as bare land, and add to that the capitalised value of the income derived from the improvements. However, even non-yielding improvements (unless they are worthless and cannot really be regarded as improvements) would add to the market-value of bare land, and, in case of such improvements, their present cost less depreciation might be a proper addition. And, where the improvements consist on non-yielding trees, their fuel or timber value must, it is apparent, be added to the value of the land as bare land without any deduction made for standing space. For, if the trees are felled and sold, the entire area without any deduction in area would be available for sale as bare land. And, where the improvements consist on non-yielding trees, their fuel or timber value must, it is apparent, be added to the value of the land as bare land without any deduction made for standing space. For, if the trees are felled and sold, the entire area without any deduction in area would be available for sale as bare land. Of course, the minimum would be the value of the entire land as bare land, plus the fuel or timber value of the trees whether yielding or non-yielding standing on it, and the deductions made on account of standing space for yielding trees should not have the result of reducing the land value below this minimum. (If no deduction is to be made on account of standing space even yielding trees can be valued only on the basis of what they would fetch if cut and removed thus releasing the land occupied by them, and we are unable to appreciate the logic behind the claim of the plaintiffs before the Collector and in the Court below that they would be allowed a fourth of the capitalised value of the income of the yielding trees in addition to the value of the entire land as bare land with no deduction made on account of the land occupied by the trees although that seems to have been allowed in one of two Travancore cases in the special circumstances of the case)". In State of Kerala v. Sulaiman Salt 1972 K.L.T 484 a Division Bench of this Court observed that where the entire area of land was valued on a centage basis as vacant land, valuation of trees separately on a capitalised value without deducting the value of the space occupied by such trees could not be made, and the only correct method was to determine the true market-value on the basis of centage and the timber value of the trees whether yielding or non-yielding standing on it, and to add the same to the land value on the basis of centage. This principle was followed by another Division Bench of this Court in an unreported judgment in A. S. 365 and 368 of 1967 which related directly to the acquisition of portions of a rubber estate for the purpose of the Kuttiadi Project. This principle was followed by another Division Bench of this Court in an unreported judgment in A. S. 365 and 368 of 1967 which related directly to the acquisition of portions of a rubber estate for the purpose of the Kuttiadi Project. In the light of the principles thus laid down, it is plain that the principle of valuation adopted by the court below is wrong and unjustified. 12. But it was contended for the claimant that the award itself gave the claimant the land value and super added to it the value of the rubber trees capitalised on the basis of income, both on a lower scale than was adopted by the Court. The Government itself having adopted this principle of valuation in the award, was precluded so the argument proceeded from contending for a different principle of valuation. It was pointed out that no ground had been raised even in the memorandum of appeal to this court that the principle of valuation adopted was wrong. It is enough to record that we had to point out to Counsel for the claimant that while the memorandum of appeal was as bad as it possibly could be, he need not attempt the unprofitable, if not impossible, task, of making it appear worse. But as a question of the basic principle of valuation is involved, we are not disposed to preclude arguments on the technical ground that the memorandum of appeal is not sufficiently voluble. And the contention of the learned Advocate-General was that while he could not possibly attack the amount of compensation adjudged by the award although based on a wrong principle, he was entitled to resist the claim for enhancement of compensation on the continued application of the same wrong principle, especially in a case where the enhancement had been ordered in, all, to an extent of over two lakhs of rupees. Before leaving this aspect we would add, that if the income from rubber trees were relevant, the best evidence would have been the claimant's accounts. Before leaving this aspect we would add, that if the income from rubber trees were relevant, the best evidence would have been the claimant's accounts. These were not produced; and we are not prepared to underscore the omission, as the Trial Court was rather glibly inclined to do, in paragraph 63, by accepting what it characterised as the "frank" statement of the claimant's Counsel that as the estate was likely to be assessed to excise duty on production, the accounts are not likely to show the correct figures for production. 13. We do not think there is any force in the claimant's objection that having adopted a certain principle of valuation in the award, the State has precluded itself from contending for a different principle at the stage of reference or in an appeal from the judgment on reference. While the award may well be regarded as an offer of a fair price to the claimant by the State, there is neither reason nor equity in holding the State bound even by the principles underlying the price offered, when the claimant himself had rejected the offer by soliciting a reference to the Court. The matter appears stronger from the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. Section 12 of the Travancore Land Acquisition Act makes the award final and conclusive only in regard to " the true area and value of the land and the apportionment of compensation among the persons interested. '' Even this finality and conclusiveness are, by the very terms of the section, only "except as hereinafter provided." The provisions that follow may be noticed. Section 18 provides for a reference to the Court. Section 20 provides for a determination by the Court of the objections to the award. Section 21 defines the scope of the enquiry by the Court, which shall be restricted to a consideration of the interests of the persons affected by the objections. Section 22 enumerates positively the considerations which the court may take into account in determining the amount of compensation; and section 23 defines negatively the considerations which it shall not take into account. There is no provision which forbids the Court, in a reference, from considering a principle of valuation at variance with what was adopted by the award, even where an award is passed on a wrong principle of valuation. We should indeed be surprised to find any. There is no provision which forbids the Court, in a reference, from considering a principle of valuation at variance with what was adopted by the award, even where an award is passed on a wrong principle of valuation. We should indeed be surprised to find any. On making the reference to the Court, the question of the proper value of land to be awarded to the claimant is at large, and has to be decided by the Court within the scope of the enquiry fixed by section 21, and subject to the considerations and injunctions fisted in sections 22 and 23. We are, therefore, unable to hold that the State is precluded from questioning the basis or the principles of valuation adopted by the award. 14. We shall next turn to the amount of compensation awarded to the claimant on the basis of severance. The matter is dealt with in paragraphs 37, 38 and 57 of the judgment of the trial court. The court below stated that the acquisition of lands was admittedly for the construction of the Periyar barrage which forms part of the Peryiar Valley Irrigation Scheme, that the barrage had been constructed across the Periyar river for diverting the water for irrigation purposes, and on account of its construction the level of water in the river on the upstream side of the barrage will rise higher during the major part of the year, resulting in submergence of the low lying areas adjoining the river and the low lying portions of the estate of the claimant. It is the adjoining low lying portions of the estate of the petitioner, thus getting submerged, that have been acquired by the State, as noticed in paragraph 37 of the judgment. The same paragraph has noticed that in eight different places in the estate there was severance owing to submergence of water. The court below thought that this would diminish the value of the unacquired portion of the estate for which the claimant was entitled to compensation for severance. The compensation under this head was awarded at the rate of Rs. 2 per cent in respect of unacquired portions of the estate of an extent of 672.50 acres, aggregating in all to Rs. 1,34,400. This claim for compensation for severance was allowed in respect of acquisition for the Periyar Valley Irrigation Project, but not for the Phyto Chemical Project. The compensation under this head was awarded at the rate of Rs. 2 per cent in respect of unacquired portions of the estate of an extent of 672.50 acres, aggregating in all to Rs. 1,34,400. This claim for compensation for severance was allowed in respect of acquisition for the Periyar Valley Irrigation Project, but not for the Phyto Chemical Project. This latter acquisition was of the entire estate east of the Alwaye-Munnar road, so that there was no question of breaking up the contiguity of the estate, and on that ground compensation for severance was disallowed in these cases. 15. The principle of award of compensation for severance is stated in Halsbury's Laws of England (third edition, volume 10, page 147) in paragraph 256 as follows: "256. Injury by severance and injurious affection. When part of an owner's land is taken, he may suffer damage in consequence of the injury thereby caused to his remaining land. It may, for instance, be cut into two parts, as when a road is made through an estate, or the alteration in its size or shape may render it less suitable for the purposes to which it is or could be applied. It may also be rendered less-valuable by reason of the construction, existence or carrying on the undertaking in its vicinity. " In Holditch v. Canadian Northern Ontario Railway Co. 1966 Appeals Cases 536. Lord Sumher, delivering the judgment of the judicial committee of the Privy Council explained the basis of the claim under the English Land Clauses Act as follows: "The basis of a claim to compensation for lands injuriously affected by severance must be that the lands taken are so connected with or related to the lands left that the owner of the latter is prejudiced in his ability to use or dispose of them to advantage by reason of the severance. The bare fact that before the exercise of the compulsory power to take land he was the common owner of both parcels is insufficient, for in such a case taking some of his land does no more harm to the rest than would have been done if the land taken had belonged to his neighbour. Compensation for severance therefore turns ultimately on the circumstances of the case. Compensation for severance therefore turns ultimately on the circumstances of the case. " The Travancore Land Acquisition Act, in the 3rd clause of section 22 (1) sanctions the taking into consideration for determining the compensation to be awarded, of the damage sustained by the claimant by reason of severing his lands from his other lands. In Baroda Tea Company v. The Secretary of State for India I.L.R 28 Cal. 685 the award of damages on account of severance of the lower and upper parts of the gardens of the Tea Company was sustained, as the Division Bench was satisfied, on the evidence, that "as direct consequence of the severance the cost of working the southern portion of the garden will be substantially and permanently increased". We would rather go by the principle of these decisions than by the professed or purported summary of the principles in paragraph 8 of the Commissioner's report, Ext. C-21, despite as we see from paragraph 59 of the judgment the Government Pleader not having disputed the correctness of the principles. We are not prepared to accept these principles as a correct summary of the judicial decisions. 16. Ext. C-21 is the Commissioner's report. It shows that the estate stretches for a length of 7 miles along the Periyar river and has a width which ranges from half to one furlong. Paragraph 5 of Ext. C-21 shows that the acquisition has completely severed the estate in 8 different places. But before the acquisition it self there has been acts of severance. One of the Commissioners, examined as P.W. 8, stated that at the time of inspection the Commissioners saw no sign of any interference with the working of the estate as a result of the acquisition and that if the acquired portions are left as they are, there will be no damage to the petitioner except in places where roads are acquired, and that if the roads are also left as they are, there will be no damage from the acquisition. He stated that at the lime of inspection the roads were lying contiguous with the unacquired portions, and there was neither obstruction nor inaccessibility nor difficulty for access. P.W. 8's evidence is quite unhelpful to substantiate the statement in Ext. C-21 which would justify the award of compensation for severance. He stated that at the lime of inspection the roads were lying contiguous with the unacquired portions, and there was neither obstruction nor inaccessibility nor difficulty for access. P.W. 8's evidence is quite unhelpful to substantiate the statement in Ext. C-21 which would justify the award of compensation for severance. We were pressed with the contention that no objections were filed to the Commissioner's report Ext. C-21. We do not overlook this omission, which we would regard as grave and serious. But despite these lapses and omissions on the part of the Government we find it impossible to uphold the award of the fabulous amount of Rs. 1,34,000 for severance. The earlier of the two section 6 declarations in this case was on 31st October 1961; and the power of attorney holder of the claimant's managing agent was examined as P.W. 9 only in 1966. If severance had entailed extra expense or expenditure in the working of the estate, the best proof would have been the claimant's accounts. These were not produced. While we are anxious that the claimant should obtain a fair value for his lands, we have a duty to ensure that the public exchequer is not unduly depleted in the matter of acquisition for public projects such as those involved in these cases. There is nothing to show that the submergence of the low lying portions of the estate during the major part of the year is a direct result of the acquisition. On the other hand such evidence as there is, points to the fact that it was only as a result of the construction of a dam rather away from the estate, we do not know how far. Paragraph 15 of Ext. C-21 states that fencing of the estate held, or left over after acquisition, would be necessary and would entail greater expenditure than before, for protection against straying cattle and wild animals. But this is when the water level recedes in the channel or dries up. The need for barbed wire fencing is not spoken to by P.W. 8, and the portions of his evidence that we have referred to, are inconsistent with it. Nor did P.W. 9 speak about it. P.W. 7 is an Executive Engineer deputed as Commissioner at the claimant's instance and who filed his reports Ext. C series. The need for barbed wire fencing is not spoken to by P.W. 8, and the portions of his evidence that we have referred to, are inconsistent with it. Nor did P.W. 9 speak about it. P.W. 7 is an Executive Engineer deputed as Commissioner at the claimant's instance and who filed his reports Ext. C series. (See paragraphs 39 to 58 of the judgment.) In cross-examination P.W. 7 admitted that the acquired portions are liable to submergence consequent on the construction of the barrage, and that during rainy season also they are likely to be submerged, though not to the same extent. The evidence of P.W. 7 and his reports are unhelpful to substantiate the claim for compensation for severance. We find there is neither legal basis nor factual foundation for the claim. 17. We are also unable to hold that the claimant has made out his case for award of compensation for injurious affection. The legal basis for the claim is the 4th clause of section 22 of the Act. The lower court accepted Ext. C-1 series reports submitted by the Engineer, Commissioner, P.W. 7, and found that the cost of additional constructions which the petitioner will have to make as a result of the acquisition would be as estimated in these reports subject to minor modifications made in some cases, as seen from paragraphs 39 to 58 of the judgment. We do not think it necessary to notice the details of the reports made by the Commissioner. It is enough to state that his evidence as P.W. 7 is not only unhelpful, but belies the claim for injurious affection. C.P.W. 1 is the Superintending Engineer, Irrigation, South Zone. (His age, etc., are left unfilled in his deposition by the lower court, He has spoken that no kayyalas (walls) have been constructed by the claimant, and that no bridges are necessary as a result of the acquisition and that even raising of the embankment is not necessary. He stated that the continuity of the road is maintained even after acquisition and no barricade or obstruction is placed between the acquired and unacquired portions, and that the road was lying in the same way as prior to the acquisition. He stated that the continuity of the road is maintained even after acquisition and no barricade or obstruction is placed between the acquired and unacquired portions, and that the road was lying in the same way as prior to the acquisition. C.P.W. 2 the Assistant Engineer in the Periyar Valley Irrigation Scheme has spoken that none of the culverts and embankments in the acquired portion have been removed after the acquisition and that in two places of the acquired portion the road has been submerged. He also stated that there was no necessity for kayyalas or walls because of the acquisition. On the side of the claimant the power of attorney holder of its managing agents was examined as P.W. 9. We have been taken through his evidence and we find it unhelpful and unacceptable to substantiate the claim for the award of compensation for injurious affection of the land. As in regard to the claim for severance the best evidence to support the claim for injurious affection would have been the claimant's accounts, especially when evidence was let in nearly five years after the section 6 declaration; and not a scrap of account has been produced. 18. The Advocate-General's contention that interest awarded cannot cover the solatium is well founded in view of the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Sri Ram Mehar and another 1972-II S.C.W.R. 878. 19. Before closing we should place on record our dissatisfaction with the perfunctory way in which the proceedings have dragged on at almost every stage of the acquisition. The cavalierly way in which things are allowed to drift at the pre-award state, has been commented upon in State of Kerala v. Mariamma A.I.R.1969 Ker.265. In the unreported judgment in A.S. 365 and 368 of this Court while allowing the appeals preferred by the State, it was observed that the State was succeeding despite the remissness and lapses and laches on the part of its officers. 20. Thanks to the efforts and the able arguments of the learned Advocate-General, these appeals should succeed. We allow them, set aside the judgments and decrees of the court below, and direct that the claimant's applications for reference for enhanced compensation in the cases out of which these appeals arise will stand rejected. 20. Thanks to the efforts and the able arguments of the learned Advocate-General, these appeals should succeed. We allow them, set aside the judgments and decrees of the court below, and direct that the claimant's applications for reference for enhanced compensation in the cases out of which these appeals arise will stand rejected. In view of the lapses and laches on the part of the Government which we have noted in the appropriate context we direct the State and the claimant to bear their respective costs throughout.