Judgment :- 1. The State has come up in appeal against the acquittal of the accused, 2 in number, who were prosecuted under S.14 and 16 (1-C) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, hereinafter referred to as the Act, convicted and sentenced by the trial court, but acquitted by the Sessions Judge in appeal. 2. The facts leading to this appeal briefly stated are as follows;- PW.1 on 25 91971 purchased 600 grams of what is purported to be 'Deccan sweets' from PW. 2 who is said to be a person selling beedy and stationeries. At the time of PW.1 taking the sample PW. 2 gave him a statement, marked for identification as Ext, P-6. Ext. P-7 notice was issued by PW.1 to the accused, the first accused being the proprietor of the shop, and the second accused being his son. In Ext. P-6 statement, PW. 2 had stated that the sweets, out of which PW.1 had taken the sample, was purchased by him from the second accused, who was then at the shop of A-1. The prosecution was on the basis that the sale by the accused was without a warranty. It may incidentally be noted that on analysis, it was found that the sample was non-adulterated. Reversing the finding of the trial court, the learned Sessions Judge held that no case for conviction was made out, and in arriving at his decision, be relied on three circumstances, namely (1) in Ext. P-5 bill under which the purchase is stated to have been made by PW. 2 from the 2nd accused, there is no indication that the purchase was by a vendor for sale, (2) the quantity purchased under Ext. P-5 is rather small, so much so one need not necessarily take it that the purchase was by a vendor for resale, and (3) Ext. P-6 statement and Ext. P-7 notice do not indicate that there was a representation by PW. 2 that the purchase by him was as a vendor for sale, ors at least that the accused had known that the purchase by PW. 2 was as a vendor for the purpose of sale. 3. S.14 has been inserted in the parent Act by amending Act 49 of 1964 which came into force on 131965. The section reads as follows; "14. 2 was as a vendor for the purpose of sale. 3. S.14 has been inserted in the parent Act by amending Act 49 of 1964 which came into force on 131965. The section reads as follows; "14. Manufacturers, distributors and dealers to give warranty No manufacturer, distributor or dealer of any article of food shall sell such article to any vendor unless he also gives a warranty in writing in the prescribed form about the nature and quality of such article to the vendor." Rule 12 A prescribes that the warranty referred to in S.14 is to be given in Form VI-A. It may be noted that under R.12A as it originally stood before the substitution by the present rule as per GSR.1533 of 8-7-68, the requirement was as follows: 12A Warranty Every dealer selling an article of food to a vendor shall if the vendor so requires deliver to the vendor a warranty in Form VIA Explanation: The term 'trader' shall mean an importer, manufacturer or an authorised agent of an importer, manufacturer or whole sale dealer." The vital distinction between the previous rule and the provisions now in force is that before the substitution of the rule in 1968, the obligation of the manufacturer, dealer or distributor was to give the warranty only if the vendor so required. Now under S.14, it is the legal duty of the manufacturer, distributor or dealer to give the warranty when the sale is to a vendor, whether he demands for the warranty or not. The other distinction seems to be that in the category of 'traders' under the previous rule only the wholesale dealer was included, whereas now a dealer also falls within the mischief of S.14 of the Act. 4. We have to examine whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the accused in this case have committed an offence under S.14 of the Act. At the outset, it could be pointed out that on the prosecution's own showing the second accused is not liable to be prosecuted inasmuch as a reading of the section shows that it is only the manufacturer, distributor or dealer who is liable to be proceeded against; not anybody else. It is not the case of the prosecution that the second accused is the manufacturer, dealer or distributor. It is not the case of the prosecution that the second accused is the manufacturer, dealer or distributor. Therefore, I have no hesitation in confirming the order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge in respect of the second accused. 5. The question now surviving for decision is with respect to the alleged commission of the offence by the first accused. In this context, we have to consider both the oral evidence as well as the documentary evidence. Ext. P-5 bill, as has been rightly observed by the learned Sessions Judge, does not indicate that either the sale is to a vendor (inasmuch as only the name of one Hamsa is shown as the purchaser, without showing any shop name, or anything like that, to give even a doubt that the purchase was by a vendor) or that the purchase was for sale. In Ext. P-6, there is no mention by PW. 2 that the purchase was on a representation that it was for sale. All that he stated in Ext. P-6 is that the sample taken by PW.1 on 25 91971 was out of the toffee purchased by him on 24 91971 as per bill No. 489 given by Whiteway Stores at Chowghat and that the sale was by A. T. Sayed Mohammed, the son of the proprietor. It is also stated in Ext. P-6 that no warranty as required under S.14 was given to him. A. T. Sayed Mohammed, referred to in Ext. P-6, is the second accused. The averment in Ext. P-6 is conspicuous for the absence of any mention of the accused having known that PW. 2 was a vendor or that the purchase made by him was for sale. Even in Ext. P-7 which is a notice issued by PW.1 to the first accused, there is no mention that the purchase by PW. 2 was as a vendor and for resale. What it highlighted was that there was failure on the part of the accused to give warranty as required under S.14 of the Act. It may also be noted that, as pointed out by the learned Sessions Judge, the quantity purchased namely 1 Kg. 2 was as a vendor and for resale. What it highlighted was that there was failure on the part of the accused to give warranty as required under S.14 of the Act. It may also be noted that, as pointed out by the learned Sessions Judge, the quantity purchased namely 1 Kg. of toffee is so small that one may not be tempted to think that the purchase as a matter of fact was necessarily for resale by the vendee, ruling out the possibility of the purchase being for consumption by the vendee. 6. The learned State Prosecutor has' argued that the sale in terms of S.2(13) of the Act includes sale of any article of food whether for cash or on credit or by way of exchange and whether by wholesale or retail for human consumption or use or analysis. The contention based on this definition is that when a sale has been effected irrespective of the fact whether the sale is for consumption or for resale, the offence is committed if there is any violation of the provisions of the Act. There can be no dispute regarding this proposition. The question, however, is whether in this case, there is any violation of the provisions of the Act or Rules. The only section that is applicable, and the only section under which the accused has been prosecuted is S.14 of the Act. S.14 of the Act in terms makes it abundantly clear that it is only in cases where the sale is by the manufacturer, distributor or dealer to any vendor that he is required to give a warranty in writing in the prescribed form about the nature and quality of such article to the vendor. The Act draws a distinction between the sale by the manufacturer, dealer or distributor to vendor on the one hand, and to anybody else on the other. Therefore, the crucial point is whether in this case, the sale by the accused to PW. 2 was consciously that PW.2 was a vendor and the purchase of one Kg. of toffee involved in the case was for resale. PW. 2's evidence lends no support to take the view that the accused had any Knowledge about his being a 'vendor, or that the particular purchase was for resale. 2 was consciously that PW.2 was a vendor and the purchase of one Kg. of toffee involved in the case was for resale. PW. 2's evidence lends no support to take the view that the accused had any Knowledge about his being a 'vendor, or that the particular purchase was for resale. All that PW.2 would say in the witness box is that the accused must have known that be was a 'vendor' in toffee, and that the purchase was for sale. There is no evidence in support of the rather bald statement made by PW. 2. His own evidence is that some three weeks ago, he had purchased cigarette and book from the shop of the accused. He also says that sometimes he used to purchase biscuits and sweets from hisshop. Purchase of cigarette, books, sweets or biscuits by a person does not necessarily mean that the seller knows that the purchaser is a 'vendor' or that the purchase is for resale. In this view, I find no legal basis to hold that merely because there has been a sale by the accused to PW. 2, and Pw.2, who is a beedy vendor, in his turn has chosen to sell the toffee purchased from the accused, such sale by the accused to PW. 2 would become a sale to a 'vendor' so as to attract the provisions of S.14 of the Act. At any rate, there is absolutely no acceptable evidence to hold that at the time of sale, the accused had known that the sale to Pw.2 was a sale to a'vendor'. 7. The learned counsel for the respondent has argued that a distinction has to be drawn between a retail dealer on the one hand and the wholesale dealer on the other. He would argue that the provisions of S.14 are primarily intended to safeguard the interests of a retail vendor in order that he may seek protection under the warranty granted to him by the wholesaler who had sold the article to him, in the event of his being prosecuted for offences under the Act. It is pointed out that in the complaint the accused's shop is described as a "retail shop", and that such retailer cannot be treated as equivalent to manufacturer, distributor or dealer to fall within the ambit of S.14 of the Act. It is pointed out that in the complaint the accused's shop is described as a "retail shop", and that such retailer cannot be treated as equivalent to manufacturer, distributor or dealer to fall within the ambit of S.14 of the Act. True it is, though in common parlance the expressions 'vendor' and 'dealer' are often used as if they are synonymous, considering the scheme of the Act, different connotation appears to have been intended to each of them, dealer implying something more than'vendor'. Even then, the question, in my opinion, has to be viewed from an angle different from the one from which the issue is looked at by the counsel for the respondent; not so much to find out whether the seller was a retailer or wholesaler, which, being relative terms, would shift from case to case, but to find out whether the sale was to a 'vendor' or to a consumer. In case the sale by the manufacturer, distributor or dealer, whatever be the dimension of his business, is for resale, not for consumption, S.14 of the Act is attracted. In other words, the decisive factor fin determining whether the transaction falls within the purview of S.14 of the Act is the purpose for which the article of food is sold to the buyer; not so much the appellation ('retailer' or 'wholesaler)' given to the "seller'. If the sale is not proved to be to a 'vendor', and if it could be a sale for consumption or otherwise than for resale, the provision of S.14 is not attracted. Considering all these aspects of the matter, and in the light of the fact that on analysis the sample taken from PW. 2 out of the toffee sold to him by the accused under Ext. P-5 bill was found to be not adulterated I should hold that no offence has been proved against the accused, and the order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge is only to be confirmed. The appeal is without merit and is, therefore, dismissed.