JUDGMENT : G.K. Misra, C.J. - The suit is for declaration of title, confirmation of possession and injunction and in the alternative for recovery of possession. The disputed land constitutes 1. 69 acres as described in Ka schedule to the plaint. Admittedly it belonged to the Plaintiff. It is Bramhotar Bahel land. For nonpayment of arrears of road cess it was sold in auction for Rs. 13/on 25-2-1941. Plaintiff?s case is that the first Defendant was working as the Gumasta of Plaintiff?s maternal uncle (p.w. 6). Plaintiff had no money to pay the arrear of road cess and accordingly on his request p.w. 6 paid the money to be deposited by the first Defendant towards arrear of road cess. Without depositing that amount the first Defendant acted treacherously and purchased the disputed property in his own name in auction sale on 25-2-1941. He also took a paper delivery of possession on 10-4-1942 as per Ext. B. Some time after, the Plaintiff came to know of this. The first Defendant promised to execute a release deed in favour of the Plaintiff. He gave up service under p.w. 6 in 1955 as a suit for account was filed against him for misappropriation of money. There was a compromise in between p.w. 6 and the first Defendant in 1956. Thereafter the first Defendant executed a registered sale deed (Ext. E) on 4-6-1958 without consideration in favour of the second Defendant. The second Defendant in his turn threatened to interfere with the possession of the Plaintiff and accordingly the suit was filed on 22-6-1960. Despite the auction sale and paper delivery of possession in favour of the first Defendant, the Plaintiff was all through in possession and has acquired a title by adverse possession. Both the Defendants contested the suit on identical grounds. Their case is that the auction purchase and the delivery of possession thereunder are genuine and the first Defendant was all through in possession till the date of the sale in favour of the second Defendant on 4-6-1958. 2. The trial Court held that the first Defendant did not, purchase the disputed property in auction sale on behalf of the Plaintiff. Despite the purchase, however, Plaintiff was all through in possession and has acquired a title by adverse possession. He accordingly decreed the Plaintiff?s suit for recovery of possession and granted a permanent injunction. 2. The trial Court held that the first Defendant did not, purchase the disputed property in auction sale on behalf of the Plaintiff. Despite the purchase, however, Plaintiff was all through in possession and has acquired a title by adverse possession. He accordingly decreed the Plaintiff?s suit for recovery of possession and granted a permanent injunction. Against the trial Court decree, Defendant No. 2 filed an appeal which was dismissed by the learned Subordinate Judge on findings that the purchase by the first Defendant in Court auction was on behalf of the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff was in possession within twelve years of the suit. In terms he did not record a finding that the Plaintiff had acquired a title by adverse possession. The second Defendant has filed this second appeal against the confirming judgment. 3. Mr. Das for the Appellant advanced two contentions: (i) The finding of the lower appellate Court that the auction purchase by the first Defendant on 25-2-1941 was on behalf of the Plaintiff, is contrary to law. (ii) In the absence of a finding by the lower appellate Court that Plaintiff has acquired a title by adverse possession, Plaintiff?s suit could not be decreed on the mere finding that Plaintiff was in possession within twelve years of the suit. Both the contentions require careful examination. 4. The disputed property was purchased by the first Defendant in auction sale on 25-2-1941 in a certificate proceeding for arrear of road cess. Section 27(1) of the Bihar & Orissa Public Demands Recovery Act, 1914 lays down that no suit shall be maintained, against any person claming title under a purchase certified by the Certificate Officer in such manner as may be prescribed, on the ground that the purchase was made on behalf of the Plaintiff or on behalf of some one through whom the Plaintiff claims the section is clear and categorical that Plaintiffs suit for a declaration that title vested in him as Defendant No. 1 was entrusted with money to purchase on his behalf is untenable. It is, therefore. unnecessary to examine the factual basis of the Plaintiff?s? ?case that on his request P.W. 6 paid money to the first Defendant to deposit the arrears of road cess in respect of which the certificate sale was to be held on 25-2-1941. It is, therefore. unnecessary to examine the factual basis of the Plaintiff?s? ?case that on his request P.W. 6 paid money to the first Defendant to deposit the arrears of road cess in respect of which the certificate sale was to be held on 25-2-1941. Thus, the first Defendant had title to the disputed property by his auction purchase and Plaintiff?s title was extinguished. The learned Subordinate Judge acted contrary to law in overlooking this legal provision. The learned Advocates for both the parties are mainly to blame for not bringing this provision to the notice of the learned Subordinate Judge. 5. The next question for consideration is whether Plaintiff has acquired title by adverse possession by continuing in possession in his own right, title and interest from 1941 to 1958 when the registered sale deed Ext. E for Rs. 400/- was executed by the first Defendant in favour of the second Defendant. On this point, the learned lower appellate Court after analysis of the evidence held that the oral evidence regarding possession was equally unsatisfactory on either side. Both the Courts, however, strongly placed reliance on three letters written by the first Defendant to the Plaintiff. Those letters are Ext. 2(a) dated 1.6.1954, Ext. 2(b) dated 26-6-1954 and Ext. 2 dated 7-10-1957. In these letters the first Defendant unequivocally admitted that Plaintiff was all along in possession of the suit lands even after the auction sale and was appropriating the usufructs of the lands to himself without giving any portion to him. The circumstances in which the letters were written were that after the auction purchase the disputed property stood recorded in the name of the first Defendant. Consequently, notices were issued to the first Defendant to pay up the arrears of cess; in default, certificates were issued to him. He rightly gauged the situation for the simple reason that Plaintiff was continuing in possession and enjoying the usufructs but the first Defendant was feeling oppressed by the certificate notices being issued to him. In these letters he intimated the Plaintiff at different times that unless the Plaintiff himself deposited money towards road cess, would be compelled to sell away the land as It stood in his name and thereby he would save himself from harassment. In these letters he intimated the Plaintiff at different times that unless the Plaintiff himself deposited money towards road cess, would be compelled to sell away the land as It stood in his name and thereby he would save himself from harassment. These letters are, therefore, consistent with only one conclusion, namely, that despite the auction purchase the first Defendant was not in possession of the land; Plaintiff continued in possession in exercise of his own right, title and interest as before; he enjoyed the usufructs and did not pay the road cess dues. These documents taken along with the oral evidence weighed with the trial Court that Plaintiff had acquired a title by adverse possession. The learned lower appellate Court did not record a clear finding that Plaintiff had acquired title by averse possession; but all the same, from the tenor of his judgment it is clear that it believed the Plaintiff to be throughout in possession in his own right from 1941 to 1958, which is more than the prescriptive period. On such a finding, conclusion is irresistible that Plaintiff had acquired title by adverse possession. Thus, the concurrent finding can be taken to be that Plaintiff has acquired title by adverse possession. The conclusion is also consistent with the broad facts of the case which the first Defendant admitted in his own evidence and was fully taken notice of by the appellate Court. The house of the first Defendant is at a distance of 17 to 18 miles from the suit lands. He has no other lands in the village Balihadi where the suit lands are situate. He has no lands also in the near about villages. Even at the time of purchase he had no idea of the land. He did not see it even. The Courts below were, therefore, justified in holding that the Plaintiff was in uninterrupted possession of the disputed land from 1941 to 1958. 6. Mr. Das, however, relies upon a statement of the Plaintiff that he was paying road cess in respect of the disputed land in the name of Defendant No. 1 and as such, he admitted the title of Defendant No. 1 and cannot set up acquisition of title by adverse possession. This contention is based upon Endumuru Nagaya Boitharu v. Pofaju Raghunath Boitharu and Anr.10(19M) C.L.T. 586. This contention is based upon Endumuru Nagaya Boitharu v. Pofaju Raghunath Boitharu and Anr.10(19M) C.L.T. 586. In that case certain house tax demand notices and house tax receipts had been filed which showed that the Defendant was paying house tax and was obtaining receipts therefor. The receipts stood in the name of the Plaintiff. The learned Single Judge, Mohapatra, J. held that the receipts dearly indicated that the Defendant by obtaining at the time of payment of house tax the, receipts in the name of the Plaintiff acknowledged Plaintiff?s title. With great respect, I am unable to agree with this wide proposition. Merely because a party files receipt in support of his? case that he made payment in the name of the person in whose name the record stands, it does not follow that the title of the other party has been acknowledged. On the other hand, there are high authorities giving strong caution against such a view. In Probhahati Dasi v. Taibaturinessa Chaudhurani AIR 1914 Cal. 196, Jenkins, C.J. and Mookerjee, J. observed thus: I am inclined to think that Courts have yielded too freely to the temptation of being blinded to realities by the words "marfatdari" and "gujratdar" and so the true facts have suffered. At the same time I am bound to admit that there are expressions in the cases which would suggest that where these words appear no recognition can be inferred. It must be stated at the same time that the case was not ultimately decided on those observations. This decision was, however, referred to by Agarwala J., as he then was, in Raja Rajendra Narayan Bhunj Deo v. Nilamani Behera AIR 1917 Pat. 593. wherein his Lordship observed: The existence of marfatdari receipts is not necessarily evidence of an intention to conceal from,the landlord the real state of affairs, for while in some cases that is the object of paying rent in the name of the original tenant, in other cases the reason for the existence of such receipts is that the landlord knows the real facts but is not willing to give to the transferee a receipt which may be an effective recognition of the transfer. In my opinion, therefore, the existence of the marfatdari receipts did not by themselves evidence an intention to conceal a transfer from the landlord. In my opinion, therefore, the existence of the marfatdari receipts did not by themselves evidence an intention to conceal a transfer from the landlord. Though the facts are not identical, the principle discussed here equally applies to the present case. In Bhagaban Das and Ors. v. Jagabandhu Jena and Ors. 34 (1958) C.L.T. 345 P.V.B. Rao, J. observed: The rent or revenue is collected on the basis of the collection to be made from the person in possession of the property. The revenue authorities look only to the person in possession for his liability to pay rent. The aforesaid decisions are cited only to show that the wide conclusion drawn by Mohapatra, J. in Endumuru Nagaya Boitharu v. Potaju Raghunath Boitharu and Anr.10 (19M) C.L.T 586, cannot be indiscriminately applied to all cases. What inference is to be drawn in a particular case, would depend upon the facts and circumstances of that case. 7. In this case the chalans Ext. I-series showing payment of rent in the name of the Plaintiff have been produced by the Defendants. Obviously. after the auction purchase the records stood in the name of the first Defendant. Any deposit of arrear road cess must be in the name of the first Defendant; otherwise, it would not be accepted. Ext. I-series establish that the Plaintiff was depositing road cess though records were not in his name and this he was doing to protect his own interest, otherwise the disputed property would have been sold away again for arrears of road cess. Ext. 1. series rather support the case of the Plaintiff that he was possessing the disputed land and was paying the road cess even though the disputed property stood recorded in the name of the first Defendant. I reject the contention of Mr. Das. 8. On the aforesaid analysis, the appeal has no merit and is accordingly dismissed; but in the circumstances, without costs of this Court. Final Result : Dismissed