JUDGMENT P. Govindan Nair, C.J. 1. A common question arises for decision in these Appeals and the question is whether clause 5 of the Paraffin Wax (Supply, Distribution and Price Fixation) Order, 1972, for short, the 'Order', passed by the Central Government in exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 is bad for excessive delegation to the competent authority of the area who has been authorised by clause 5 of the Order to pass an allotment order specifying the quantity of paraffin wax that can be sold by a dealer. Isaac, J. dealing with three Original Petitions O.P. Nos. 1319, 1936 and 2071 of 1972 by a common judgment (appears from these Original Petitions are W.A. Nos. 265, 266, 267 of 1972 filed by the Central Government and W.A. Nos. 293, 294 and 297 of 1972, filed by the State Government) declared that clause 5 of the Order is unconstitutional and void. Following this decision, the other Original Petitions, O.P. Nos. 3233, 3234, 3060 and 3313 of 1972 (appeals from these Original Petitions are W.A. Nos. 268, 269, 273 and 274 of 1972 filed by the Central Government and W.A. Nos. 286, 289 and 295 of 1972 filed by the State Government) have also been allowed. 2. The necessary facts have been succinctly summarised by Isaac, J. in paragraphs 1 to 5 of the judgment which we may extract: "The petitioners are manufacturers of candles among other thing. The main raw material for the manufacture of candle is paraffin wax which is a petroleum product. Section 2 (a) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) defines 'essential commodity'. 'Petroleum and petroleum products' is item (viii) in the above definition. So paraffin wax is an essential commodity as defined in the Act. The only source of supply of paraffin in this country is from Digboi Refinery in Assam State. Burmah-Shell and Esso Standard Eastern are its agents for distribution of the said commodity in India. As regards Kerala, Burmah-Shell makes practically, the whole distribution through its sub-agent, Parry and Co., Cochin Users of paraffin wax used to buy it mainly from Parry and Co., Cochin and also from other stockists. The petitioners herein were buying paraffin wax from Parry and Co. according to their requirements. 2. As regards Kerala, Burmah-Shell makes practically, the whole distribution through its sub-agent, Parry and Co., Cochin Users of paraffin wax used to buy it mainly from Parry and Co., Cochin and also from other stockists. The petitioners herein were buying paraffin wax from Parry and Co. according to their requirements. 2. In 1971, the production in Digboi Refinery was considerably affected due to floods and other calamities. Paraffin wax became scarce; and its price went up very much. Paraffin is a commodity used not only for manufacture of candles, but in many other industries. Black-marketeers began to exploit the situation; and it created real difficulties for the actual users of the commodity. The Central Government immediately recognised the position; and it took steps to bring the commodity under statutory control with a view to secure its equitable distribution and availability at fair prices. It drew up a scheme for that purpose and circulated the same to the State Governments, with instructions to be ready to implement the scheme pending issuance of the necessary statutory order. Ext. R-1, dated 2nd November 1971 is copy of a D.O. letter sent by the Central Minister of Petroleum and Chemicals to the Chief Minister of this State. Pursuant to the instructions contained therein, the State Government directed the Director of Industries and Commerce to take necessary action. It is said that the Director of Industries and Commerce convened a meeting of the State Raw Material Advisory Committee on 4th December 1971 to consider the matter, and that the Committee fixed an order of priority regarding the distribution, and further decided not to make any supply to candle manufacturers who established their business after 1st January 1972, unless there was surplus quantity. According to the decision alleged to have been taken by the Committee, candle manufacturers established prior to 1971 would get only 60 per cent of their average consumption of paraffin wax during the previous three years. It is further said that on the basis of the Committee's decision, a list of the persons permitted to purchase paraffin wax, and the quantity that each of them is entitled to buy was prepared and forwarded to Parry and Co., with a direction not to supply the said commodity to any person not included in the list and beyond the quantity mentioned therein. The counter-affidavit filed by the State does not disclose when this list was prepared, by whom it was done, or who sent it to Parry and Co. and under what authority. 3. The petitioner in O.P. 1319 has established his business long before 1971. All the same he was refused any supply by Parry and Co., for the month of February 1972, on the ground that his name was not in the list. The petitioner in O.P. 1936 was not entitled to be included in the list according to the alleged decision of the Committee; and he was also refused supply by Parry and Co. The petitioner in O.P. 2071 alleges that he used to buy on an average 20-50 tons of paraffin wax per year from Parry and Co., but he was informed by the Director of Industries and Commerce by his letter dated 14th February 1972 that he had been allotted only 3.80 tons of wax for the year 1972. The petitioners were seriously affected by the above situation. 4. In the meanwhile, the Central Government, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 made the Paraffin Wax (Supply, Distribution and Price Fixation) Order, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Paraffin Control Order) and published it on 4th February 1972 in the Gazette of India, Extraordinary. Clause 3 of this Order empowers the State Government to fix a declared price for paraffin wax; and clause 4 penalises sales in excess of the declared price. Clause 4 penalises sales in excess of the declared price. Clause 5, which is under attack in these petitions, reads” '5. Paraffin wax not to be sold except under an allotment order issued by the competent authority. ”No dealer shall sell or cause to be sold paraffin wax to any person except in pursuance of an allotment order issued to such person by the competent authority of the area in which the dealer has his place of business nor shall the dealer sell or cause to be sold paraffin wax in excess of the quantity specified by the competent authority in the allotment order.' Clause 6 of the Order provides for declaration of stock by persons in possession of paraffin wax. Clauses 7, 8 and 9 deal with licensing of dealers. Clause 10 provides for appeals from certain orders of the competent authority. Clauses 7, 8 and 9 deal with licensing of dealers. Clause 10 provides for appeals from certain orders of the competent authority. Clauses 11 and 12 confer certain powers on the Central Government to issue directions regarding production, maintenance of stocks, storage, sale, transport, etc. of paraffin wax. Clause 13 provides for return of stock and particulars of sale. Clause 14 provides for display of particulars of stock, price etc.; and clauses 15, 16 and 17 of the Order deal with incidental matters. This in short is the scheme of the Paraffin Control Order. The counter-affidavit of the State has stated that the Government has, by a notification dated 28th March 1972 authorised the Director of Industries and Commerce to perform the powers and functions of the competent authority under the Order. 5. O.P. No. 1319 was filed on 29th February 1972 without knowing about the Paraffin Control Order. In fact, the petitioner in that case had no information at that time why a list of persons permitted to buy paraffin wax was prepared or his name was not included therein. All that he knew was what Parry & Co. told him, namely it had been directed by the Deputy Director of Industries and Commerce, Trivandrum and the District Industries Officer, Ernakulam not to sell the above commodity to persons not included in a list furnished by them to the company. So, that writ petition was filed challenging the said list as offending the petitioner's fundamental right to carry on business. Subsequently, the said petition has been amended incorporating new grounds and additional reliefs. O.P. No. 1936 was also filed without any information regarding the circumstances under which the petitioner therein was not included in the list supplied to Parry & Co. He also sought to quash the said list on the same ground as raised in O.P. No. 1319. There is a further attack in that O.P. against the Paraffin Control Order as a whole on the ground that it is violative of Article 14 and clauses (f) and (g) of Article 19(1) of the Constitution. This petition has also been subsequently amended by adding new grounds and seeking more reliefs. O.P. No. 2071 is an improvement over the other two petitions. This petition has also been subsequently amended by adding new grounds and seeking more reliefs. O.P. No. 2071 is an improvement over the other two petitions. The petitioner therein has challenged only clause 5 of the Paraffin Control Order, and the list of allotment furnished to Parry & Co., in so far as he has given a much lesser quota than what he used to purchase formerly from the company." 3. Reliance has mainly been placed by the learned Judge on the decision of the Supreme Court in Dwaraka Prasad v. The State of U.P., (1954 S.C.R. 803). Mukherjea, J. in delivering the judgment of the Court stated: "The more formidable objection has been taken on behalf of the petitioners against clause 4(3) of the Control Order which relates to the granting and refusing of licences. The licensing authority has been given absolute power to grant or refuse to grant, renew or refuse to renew, suspend, revoke, cancel or modify any licence under this Order and the only thing he has to do is to record reasons for the action he takes. Not only so, the power could be exercised by any person to whom the State Coal Controller may choose to delegate the same, and the choice can be made in favour of any and every person. It seems to us that such provision cannot be held to be reasonable. No rules have been framed and no directions given on these matters to regulate or guide the discretion of the licensing officer. Practically the order commits to the unrestrained will of a single individual the power to grant, withhold or cancel licences in any way he chooses and there is nothing in the Order which could ensure a proper execution of the power or operate as a check upon injustice that might result from improper execution of the same." 4. The validity of clause 11-B of the Iron and Steel (Control of Production and Distribution) Order, 1941 was considered by the Supreme Court in Union of India and others v. M/s Bhanamal Gulzarimal Ltd. and others, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 475. Under clause 11-B, notifications had been issued from time to time giving a schedule of basic prices in respect of iron and steel. Under clause 11-B, notifications had been issued from time to time giving a schedule of basic prices in respect of iron and steel. The Supreme Court observed: "It is obvious that by prescribing the maximum prices for the different categories of iron and steel clause 11-B directly carries out the legislative object prescribed in section 3 because the fixation of maximum prices would make stocks of iron and steel available for equitable distribution at fair prices." It was therefore concluded by the Court: "In our opinion, the analogy of the two statutes cannot effectively sustain the argument that in the absence of a corresponding provision in clause 11-B it must necessarily be held to be unconstitutional. In deciding the nature and extent of the guidance which should be given to the delegate Legislature must inevitably take into account the special feature of the object which it intends to achieve by a particular statute. As we have already indicated the object which was intended to be achieved and the means which were required to be adopted in the achievement of the said object have been clearly enumerated by the Legislature as a matter of legislative decision. Whether or not some other matters also should have been included in the legislative decision must be left to the Legislature itself. The question which we have to consider is whether the power conferred on the delegate is uncanalised or unguided. The answer to this question must, we think, be in favour of the appellants. Having regard to the nature of the problem which the Legislature wanted to attack it may have come to the conclusion that it would be inexpedient to limit the discretion of the delegate in fixing the maximum prices by reference to any basic price. Therefore, we must hold that clause 11-B is not unconstitutional on the ground of excessive delegation." 5. In Union of India and others v. M/s Bhanamal Gulzarimal Ltd. and others, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 475 and of the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Harishankar Bagla v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, (1955) 1 S.C.R 380 =A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 465 wherein the Supreme Court upheld the validity of clauses 3 and 4 of the Cotton Textiles (Control of Movement) Order, 1948 was referred to with approval. The decision in Dwaraka Prasad v. The State of U.P. reported in (1954) S.C.R. 803 had been relied on by the respondents before the Supreme Court in Harishankar Bagla's case, (1955) 1 S.C.R. 380 =1954 S.C. 465, and it was contended that clauses 3 and 4 of the Cotton Textiles (Control of Movement) Order, 1948 suffered from the same vice as clause 4(3) of the Uttar Pradesh Coal Control Order, 1953 which had been struck down by the Supreme Court in Dwaraka Prasad's case. This arguments was rejected and it was observed that the impugned clauses were not at all similar to clause 4(3) of the Uttar Pradesh Coal Control Order, 1953 with which the Supreme Court was concerned in Dwaraka Prasad's case. 6. Isaac, J. referred to the decisions in Dwaraka Prasad's case, (1954) S.C.R. 803, Harishankar Bagla's case, (1955) 1 S.C.R. 380 =A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 465 and Bhanamal Gulzarimal case, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 475 and came to the conclusion that it is the principle of the decision in Dwaraka Prasad's case that would apply to the facts of this case. Unlike in the case of the authority under the Uttar Pradesh Coal Control Order (the subject matter in Dwaraka Prasad's case) clause 5 of the Order does not even require the competent authority to state any reason in making an allotment order. He has been permitted to act according to his will; he can choose the persons as he likes. He has an equally wide power to refuse an allotment. No principle or policy to guide the exercise of this naked power is discernible. Fixation of fair price dealt with in Bhanamal Gulzarimal's case, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 475 and regulation of transport of an essential commodity stand on a different footing from an absolute uncontrolled power to decide the persons who can deal in paraffin wax. The policy underlying the Essential Commodities Act which must be read into every clause of the order does not provide sufficient or for that matter, any guidance in this regard as the choice of persons must depend upon criteria that have to be indicated." 7. The narration of the facts of the case clearly indicates the whimsical manner in which the power has been exercised by the competent authority. The view expressed by Isaac, J. appears to us, with respect, to be the correct view. We dismiss these appeals with costs.