( 1 ) THE above interlocutory application is by the respondent-landlord. It is preferred pursuant to S. 29 (4) of the Mysore Rent Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). ( 2 ) THE relevant allegations are that when the matter had been pending in the Court of the first instance an application under S. 29 (4) of the act was preferred on 25-6-1969 by the landlord. During the pendency of that application the tenant (petitioner herein) paid up all the rents in arrears by 15-7-1969. Thus the tenant had availed himself of the opportunity to pay up all the arrears up to the date of payment in accordance with the provisions of S. 29 of the Act. Thereafter the main petition for eviction was allowed, and later on affirmed by the learned District Judge in an appeal by the tenant under S. 48 of the Act. The latter came to be disposed of on 28-9-1972. Thereafter, the tenant has preferred the present revision under S. 50 of the Act on 22-11-1972. ( 3 ) BUT, between the date of disposal of the aforesaid appeal and the presentation of the revision, the tenant has defaulted in payment of rents for the months of August to November 1972. The rent for the month has to be paid on or before the 7th of it. The rents have not been paid inspite of repeated demands of the landlord. This in substance is the case of the landlord. ( 4 ) IN the counter filed on behalf of the tenant, it Is clearly alleged that all the rents up to date have been deposited by 16-11-1972, i. e. , before the presentation of the revision petition before this Court. That all the rents have been so deposited is not disputed on behalf of the landlord by any rejoinder affidavit filed for the purpose. Indeed on behalf of the tenant certain letters have been produced, which are copies of letters sent to the landlord intimating him of the fact of such deposits. The relevant certificates have also been produced. But significantly enough, no cause worth the name has been shown against the stoppage of proceedings bar the fact of the aforesaid deposits. Indeed on behalf of the tenant certain letters have been produced, which are copies of letters sent to the landlord intimating him of the fact of such deposits. The relevant certificates have also been produced. But significantly enough, no cause worth the name has been shown against the stoppage of proceedings bar the fact of the aforesaid deposits. ( 5 ) BUT it is pointed out on behalf of the landlord that the rent payable on the 7th of September 1972 had been in fact deposited, on the very showing of the tenant, only on 29-9-1972. that is clearly 7 days bevond the 22nd which is the last date even according to the 15 davs concession allowed by law. This is no doubt a clear case of default. It is this fact that has been made the foundation for the present application I A. No. II. On the above facts the question that arises for consideration is: whether a default, committed in regard to the payment of rents bv a tenant when no case was pending, or during the interregnum between the date of conclusion of an appeal and the date of the filing of a revision, could be made the basis for stoppage of proceedings under S 29 (4), read with sub-sec. (1) thereof of the Act, notwithstanding the fact the rents had been paid up to date before the presentation of a revision under section 50 of the Act? ( 6 ) THE argument of Sri S. C. Javali, the learned Advocate for the landlord, is that in the light of the decision of this Court in Narayana Hebbara v. Radhakrishna, (1969) 2 Mys. L. J. 207, a tenant would not be entitled to a second chance to avail himself of the opportunity to pay all arrears upto the date of payment in the light of the provisions of S. 29 (1) of the Act. His specific argument is that the tenant having had an opportunity once before the trial Court to deposit all arrears upto the date of payment within the meaning of S. 29 (1) of the Act, could not have a second chance to do the same. His specific argument is that the tenant having had an opportunity once before the trial Court to deposit all arrears upto the date of payment within the meaning of S. 29 (1) of the Act, could not have a second chance to do the same. By way of further clarification, and in reply to an argument advanced on behalf of the tenant, it is contended by Sri Javali that proceedings in appeal and revision were all a continuation of one and the samp proceeding originating the petition before the trial Court. ( 7 ) SRI B. Vedantha Iyengar, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the tenant, by way of reply contended that all the proceedings were distinct and separate and are not one continuous proceeding. He further submitted that the decision in Narayana Hebbaras's case (1) would not apply to the facts of this case and is clearly distinguishable. On a careful examination of the matter, I am clearly of the view that all 1he contentions urged on behalf of the landlord have no merit and the application I. A. No. II, therefore, deserves to be dismissed. ( 8 ) ON a careful perusal of the decision in Narayana Hebbara's case (1), which was rendered by me, it is no doubt true that it lays down a proposition that a tenant cannot have a second chance to deposit rents upto the date of payment within the meaning of S. 29 (1) of the Act. But what it further lays down is that the second chance must be one arising in the course of a single pending proceeding. It is exactly the latter element that is wanting in the case on hand. In the present case there was no proceeding pending at all when the default was said to have occurred. Further, it is to be noted that it was not a default which can be said to have occurred in the course of the pendency of the proceedings in the Court of the first instance, only during which the first default is stated to have occurred. Hence the decision relied on is clearly distinguishable and is of no help to the landlord. Hence the decision relied on is clearly distinguishable and is of no help to the landlord. ( 9 ) THE next contention is that all the later proceedings are a mere continuation of the original proceeding, and, therefore, the default in question must be deemed to have occurred in one and the same proceeding. Without expressing a concluded opinion on the first part of this contention, i shall assume the proposition as formulated therein as correct. Even on the basis of such an assumption, the further proposition that the proceedings could be said to be pending on the date of the so called second default would not necessarily follow. It seems to me that in the interregnum between the conclusion of an appeal and the presentation of the revision, when in fact no proceedings were pending, the proceedings as originally instituted in the trial Court and later concerned in the appeal, could not at all be said to be pending. Indeed, after the judgment in appeal the proceedings had attained finality, subject only to a revision by this Court. The latter contingency may or may not arise at all. In this view, the matter stood concluded at the stage of the appeal. In any event, only when a revision is brought up before this Court, such a revision, and only such a revision, could, if at all, be treated as a continuation of the appeal. Hence,, this argument also must fail and the decision, once again, in narayana Hebbara's case (a) will be of no assistance to the landlord. Before parting with the matter, it is necessary to notice one other argument of Sri Javali based on the decision in K. Janaradhanacharya v. Ravindra, (1865) 1 Mys. L. J. 221. The case, no doubt, has laid down that a deposit of rent made without a further deposit of fee for the issue of notice to the landlord will not be one made in due compliance with the relevant rules. This has relevance to a question whether or not there has been a default in the facts of a given case. Such a question does not arise on the facts of the present case. Indeed, it is clearly held that there was in fact a default in the payment of rent which was due on 7-9-1972. For the above reasons, the application, I. A. No. II, fails and is accordingly dismissed. Such a question does not arise on the facts of the present case. Indeed, it is clearly held that there was in fact a default in the payment of rent which was due on 7-9-1972. For the above reasons, the application, I. A. No. II, fails and is accordingly dismissed. In the circumstances, no costs. --- *** --- .