Judgment :- 1. The matter arises in execution. The short question that falls for decision is whether E. A. No. 1447 of 1963 filed by the appellants who are the legal representatives of the original decree-holder is barred by limitation. 2. The facts are short and not in dispute. In execution of the final decree for sale the properties were sold in court auction and were purchased by the decree-holder himself on 21-11-1955. The sale was confirmed on 19-12-1959. The decree holder filed E.A. 1090/61 on 16-12-1961 for delivery of possession which was allowed by the executing court; and for delivery the case was posted to 17-1-1962. Due to non-payment of batta the execution application was adjourned to 14-2-1962. On the adjourned date also no batta was paid, and consequently, E.A. 1090/61 was dismissed. Thereafter on 7-10-1963 the E.A. which gave rise to these proceedings was filed. The prayer in the E.A. was for delivery of property and it set out the circumstances under which batta was not paid and there was a prayer for treating the relevant E.A. as a revival of E.A. 1090/61. The executing court found that the execution application was barred by limitation by virtue of Art.180 of the Indian Limitation Act. 1908. 3. The appellants contended that it is Art.182 and not Art.180 that applies and that since E.A. 1090/61 should be deemed to be a step in aid of execution, the present E.A. filed within three years of the disposal of E.A. 1090/61 is well within time. We may read Art.180 and 182 of Schedule I to the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. Table:#1 There cannot be any doubt that the argument of the appellants that E.A. 1090/61 must be treated as a step in aid of execution could prevail only if Art.182 applies. There is also no dispute that this is an application by a purchaser of immovable property at a sale in execution of a decree for delivery of possession. If that be so, the application squarely falls under the special provision contained in Art.180 extracted above. The question whether an application of this kind will fall under Art.180 or 182 came up for the consideration of a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Abdul Aziz v. Chokkan (AIR. 1935 Madras 803). If that be so, the application squarely falls under the special provision contained in Art.180 extracted above. The question whether an application of this kind will fall under Art.180 or 182 came up for the consideration of a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Abdul Aziz v. Chokkan (AIR. 1935 Madras 803). In that case the court held that the meaning of Art.180 is plain because the word 'purchaser' in the article includes cases of a decree-holder-purchaser and a purchaser who is not a decree-holder. It was further observed: "Article 180 therefore applies to both kinds of purchasers. The attempt of the respondent to confine Art.180 to non-decree-holder-purchasers therefore fails. And if Art.180 applies, the residuary Art.181 does not apply. Nor can the application for delivery be regarded as an application for execution. So, Art.82 cannot apply. Art.180 being the more specific Article must therefore apply." In Sankara Menon v. Sundara Ayyar (AIR. 1943 Madras 129) relied on by the appellants the question whether in an application of this kind it is Art.180 or 182 that applies did not directly arise. In that case one of the items liable to be sold in execution of the decree was sold and possession was handed over to the decree holder by the judgment-debtor himself. When the decree holder attempted to proceed against other items by sale it was contended by the judgment-debtor that the execution was barred by limitation. The court held that the proceedings in relation to one item can be deemed to be a step-in-aid of execution and it is Art.182 that applies. The question as to which article should apply if the application by the auction purchaser is one for delivery of possession did not directly arise for consideration. On the other hand, the decision in Abdul Aziz v. Chokkan (AIR. 1935 Madras 803) which specifically dealt with the question was referred to in that case, and the court observed as follows: "In the Full Bench case in 58 Madras 893 (AIR. 1935 Madras 803), this Court held that an application for delivery could not be regarded as an application for execution and so far as we are concerned the decision must be regarded as final." It is not, therefore, possible to hold that the later Full Bench decision in Sankara Menon v. Sundara Ayyar (AIR. 1935 Madras 803), this Court held that an application for delivery could not be regarded as an application for execution and so far as we are concerned the decision must be regarded as final." It is not, therefore, possible to hold that the later Full Bench decision in Sankara Menon v. Sundara Ayyar (AIR. 1943 Madras 129) has shaken the ratio is Abdul Aziz v. Chokkan (AIR. 1935 Madras 803). The whole question again came up for the consideration of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Shanbagavalli Ammal v. Damodaran (ILR.1964-2 Madras 10). That was also a case where due to the laches of the decree-holder an earlier application for delivery of possession was dismissed and a subsequent application was filed with a prayer to treat it as a continuation of the earlier application. The court held that the application for delivery of possession by the auction-purchaser will be governed only by Art.180 and that where an earlier application was not proceeded with on default of the auction purchaser himself there would be no scope for the application of the theory of continuation. 4. The contention of the appellants finds some support in a decision of the Nagpur High Court reported in Balaji Kashinath v. Anandrao (AIR. 1927 Nagpur 294). In support of the conclusion that in applications of this kind it is Art.182 that applies the court observed as follows: "In a sense it seems to me that the auction-purchaser being the decree-holder himself, who presented an application for possession like the one we are concerned with, occupies therein in reality a dual position. He is from one point of view the auction-purchaser apply ing to be put in possession of his property, while from another point of view he is the decree-holder claiming to have his decree fully satisfied by having, so to speak, the proceeds of the decree made over to him." It is difficult to read through the words used in column (1) of Art.180 any intention to exclude a decree-holder auction-purchaser from the ambit of the expression 'purchaser' used therein. 5. Yet another decision cited before us by the appellants is Seshi Ammal v. Lakshmanan Pillai (1945 TLR. 393). 5. Yet another decision cited before us by the appellants is Seshi Ammal v. Lakshmanan Pillai (1945 TLR. 393). In that case the court held that when once an order for delivery has been passed under 0.21 R.92 there is no provision in the Code for a further application to put through the order by a warrant to the Amin and that if the decree-holder is unable to take advantage of that order on a particular date be is not prevented from taking advantage of it on a future occasion. The court proceeded on the basis that the application which led to the proceedings was substantially a reminder to the court, of the earlier application for delivery which was pending for all legal purposes. The court observed: "It is unnecessary for the purpose of this case to consider whether when once an order for delivery has been made a subsequent dismissal of the petition on the g round of default of the decree holder to pay batta or otherwise would entail the setting aside of the original order to deliver in its entirety," That exactly is the position obtained here, and consequently, this decision is not of much assistance in resolving the controversy. We are persuaded to accept the view consistently taken by the Madras High Court, especially when no decision of this court was placed before us taking a different view. It follows, therefore, that it is Art.180 of Schedule I to the Indian Limitation Act 1908 that applies to the relevant execution application. 6. The only other aspect that survives for consideration is whether the relevant execution application is only a continuation or a reminder to E. A. 1090/61. The earlier execution application was dismissed for default of the decree-holder, and consequently, it was a judicial disposal, and there is no question of reviving that petition. The present execution application which was filed beyond three years from the date of the confirmation of the sale is obviously hit by Art.180 of Schedule I to the Indian Limitation Act 1908, and the order passed by the executing court has only to be confirmed. In the result, the appeal fails and it is hereby dismissed. In the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs.