Judgment Madan Mohan Prasad, J. 1. This application in revision is directed against an order passed by the courts below refusing to grant injunction. 2. It appears that opposite party No. 1 instituted a suit (Title Suit No. 153 of 1964 in the court of Munsif Second Court, Dhanbad) against the petitioner for declaration of her title to certain lands and recovery of possession thereof, on the ground that she had purchased lands in question from one Bibhuti Dutt who had got the same on partition amongst the co-sharer-owners of the lands and the petitioner had dispossessed her from .06 acres out of the aforesaid lands and made constructions thereon. The opposite party had also prayed for possession to be given after demolishing the construction made by the petitioner. It appears that the petitioner did not appear in the suit and an ex parte decree was passed. The opposite party levied execution thereon. While the execution was proceeding, the petitioner filed Title Suit No. 197 of 1968 in the court of the second Munsif of Dhanbad, for a declaration that the decree passed is illegal, null and void, without jurisdiction and fraudulent. After filing of the suit, he filed an application for grant of ad interim injunction restraining the opposite party from proceeding with the execution of the decree aforesaid. The learned Munsif granted such an injunction at the initial stage but vacated the same after hearing both the parties. The petitioner went up in appeal before the Subordinate Judge who confirmed the order passed by the learned Munsif, Hence this application. 3. Both, the courts below have come to concurrent findings on the questions whether there is a prima facie case made out by the petitioner, whether the balance of convenience is in his favour and whether he suffered irreparable loss. The findings on these questions are against the petitioner. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has made two grievances before me. Firstly he has urged that the courts below ought to have considered whether the prayer of the petitioner could be allowed under Order 21, Rule 29 of the Civil Procedure Code, hereinafter to be referred to as the Code and the omission to consider this amounts to a refusal to exercise jurisdiction in this behalf. Firstly he has urged that the courts below ought to have considered whether the prayer of the petitioner could be allowed under Order 21, Rule 29 of the Civil Procedure Code, hereinafter to be referred to as the Code and the omission to consider this amounts to a refusal to exercise jurisdiction in this behalf. Secondly, he has urged that the courts below have not considered the case of the petitioner to the effect that the service of summonses in the earlier title suit was directed against a wrong person with wrong description and wrong address and the substituted service was, therefore, not valid at all. He has further urged in this connection that the courts below have erred in negativing the entire case of the petitioner without there being any evidence on record at this stage. Learned counsel has not sought to urge before me that the orders passed by the courts below regarding the application of Order 39. Rules 1 and 2 of the Code are wrong. 5. The question, therefore is whether the learned Munsif ought to have considered the application as one under Order 21, Rule 29 of the Code and whether his failure to consider that aspect of the matter has resulted in his refusal to exercise his jurisdiction. It appears from the petition filed by the petitioner for grant of ad interim injunction that no provision of law whatsoever has been mentioned in that application. The words used are "the defendants be restrained from taking delivery of possession" and "ad interim injunction be issued against the defendants". It appears that in view of the wordings aforesaid the courts below considered the question as to whether Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code would apply to the circumstances of the present case and held against the petitioner. The court of appeal below also considered the case in that perspective. It appears that because reliance was not placed in the courts below on the provisions of Order 21 Rule 29 of the Code, there was no consideration of the matter. 6. Learned counsel has placed reliance on a decision in the case of Shaukat Hussain alias Ali Akram V/s. Smt. Bhuneshwari Devi, 1972 Pat LJR 535 = ( AIR 1973 SC 528 ). 6. Learned counsel has placed reliance on a decision in the case of Shaukat Hussain alias Ali Akram V/s. Smt. Bhuneshwari Devi, 1972 Pat LJR 535 = ( AIR 1973 SC 528 ). In this case their Lordships observed that a court may grant an injunction against a party not to prosecute a proceeding in some other court, but ordinarily courts do not have the power to stop proceedings in other courts by an order directed to such courts and for this specific provisions of law are necessary. Their Lordships next held that Rule 29 of Order 21 clearly shows that the power of the court to stay execution before it flows directly from the fact that the execution is of the instance of the decree-holder whose decree had been passed by that court only. There is no denying the fact that where a suit is pending in any court against the holder of a decree of suck court on filing of an application by a person against whom the decree was passed, the court is entitled to stay the execution of the decree until the pending suit has been decided. In view of Order 21. Rule 29 of the Code it is open to the court to pass such an order on such terms as to security or others wise as deemed proper. 7. In the instant case the earlier decree passed against the petitioner was by the same court namely. Munsif second court of Dhanbad, who is in seisin of the present case. Title Suit No. 197 of 1968. The very same court is also executing the decree passed in the earlier title suit. The petition directed against the continuance of the execution proceeding was filed in the suit itself before this court. The requirements of Rule 29 of Order 21 of the Court, were, therefore, fulfilled. In this view of the matter, the learned Munsif had jurisdiction to pass an order if he considered it proper under Order 21. Rule 29 of the Code. 8. Learned counsel has next con-tended in this connection that the petition for injunction filed by the petitioner before the learned Munsif could have been and ought to have been treated as an application under Order 21. Rule 29 of the Code for the stay of the execution proceeding. Rule 29 of the Code. 8. Learned counsel has next con-tended in this connection that the petition for injunction filed by the petitioner before the learned Munsif could have been and ought to have been treated as an application under Order 21. Rule 29 of the Code for the stay of the execution proceeding. It is quite obvious that the prayer was in essence, for a stay of the execution proceeding. There was no label either on the petition in respect of the provision of law. In such circumstances, the learned Munsif ought to have considered whether the petition could be allowed in view of Order 21, Rule 29 of the Code Learned counsel has placed reliance on the decisions in the cases of Naubindlal Singh V/s. Mst. Bhikhani Devi. 1957 BL JR 534 and Muthuswami Naicker V/s. V. Ramalinga Naicker, AIR 1958 Mad 366 . In the first case which is of this court, a learned Single Judge held that the mere fact that a wrong label of section has been mentioned in the petition, the court is not powerless to give relief to the judgment-debtor if the judgment-debtor has made out a case for interference by the court. That was a case where an application was labelled as one under Sec.147 of the Code and it was held that it should have been treated as a petition under Sec.144 of the Code. In the Madras case a petition had been filed under Sec.151 of the Code and not under Order 41, Rule 6 of the Code. The learned Judge held" that the mere fact that a section of law rightly applicable to a matter as not quoted and another section of law not clearly applicable to the matter is quoted, will not bar the party from relying on the right section of law if it is not totally irrelevant or unconnected with the provisions of that section, 9. As I have already stated above, the provision of law itself was not given in the petition filed in the instant case but the words "ad interim Injunction" had been mentioned and the prayer was to restrain the opposite party from taking delivery of possession. The courts below were not unjustified in considering the provisions of Order 39. As I have already stated above, the provision of law itself was not given in the petition filed in the instant case but the words "ad interim Injunction" had been mentioned and the prayer was to restrain the opposite party from taking delivery of possession. The courts below were not unjustified in considering the provisions of Order 39. Rules 1 and 2 of Code in this connection and coming to the conclusion that the petitioner was not entitled to a relief under those rules. It appears to me, however, clear that the trial Court ought to have considered the case from the point of view as to whether ft was a fit case where the execution ought to have been stayed under Order 21, Rule 29 of the Code. The failure to consider this aspect of the matter has eventually resulted in his failure to exercise jurisdiction vested in him by law. 10. There is also some justification in the grievance of learned counsel that both the courts below have gone by the fact that there was a substituted service in this case which in law had the effect of personal service. The courts below have not considered at all whether there was prima facie any ground for the complaint that the summonses were directed against a wrong person with wrong address. It appears from the plaint that the petitioner has denied that he was either the officer-in-charge of Jaridhi Police Station or was in police service at all. It is said that the summonses were addressed to him with the description aforesaid and sent to the place aforesaid. This point had to be considered in order to find out whether the petitioner had made out a prima facie case which would require consideration by the court. I have merely indicated this in order that the learned Munsif approaches the case in its proper perspective and considers the relevant points which arise. 11. For the reasons mentioned above. I would set aside the orders passed by the two courts below and send the case back to the learned Munsif for a consideration of the question as to whether it is a fit case in which he should act under the provisions of Order 21. Rule 29 of the Code and for disposal of the application in the light of aforesaid observations and in accordance with law. Rule 29 of the Code and for disposal of the application in the light of aforesaid observations and in accordance with law. The application is accordingly allowed. As there is no appearance on behalf of the other side, there will be no order as to costs.