JUDGMENT P. Subramonian Poti, J. 1. Section 81 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969, as it stood when the Act came into force on 11th April 1969, provided for the constitution of a Tribunal consisting of three members to exercise the powers and discharge the functions conferred on the Tribunal under the Act. The Government constituted such a Tribunal and the three petitioners in the petition were appointed members of the Tribunal by Ext. P-1 Government Order dated 21st July 1969, with the 3rd petitioner as its Chairman. Section 109 of the Act empowers the Government to issue rules generally to carry out the purposes of the Act and accordingly rules have been framed. Rule 95 deals with the appointment and conditions of service of the Chairman and other members of the Tribunal. According to rule 95 (3) (a), the Chairman and members of the Tribunal shah hold office ordinarily for a period of five years and any vacancy arising by reason of termination or resignation or any other causes shall be filled up by the Government for the remaining period. While the petitioners were functioning as members of the Tribunal, the Kerala Co-operative Societies Amendment Ordinance 19 of 1971 was passed amending the principal Act by substituting a new section 81 in place of the original section 81. By reason of the amendment, the Tribunal was to be constituted with a single member and further a person was not to be qualified for appointment as a member of the Tribunal unless 'he is or has been' holding the post of a District Judge in the State. Under the section prior to its amendment any Advocate could be appointed as a member of the Tribunal. 2. Consequent upon the amendment of section 81 the petitioners could not continue in office as members of the Tribunal and apprehending that they would be removed from such office, they have moved this Court challenging the validity of Ordinance No. 19 of 1971 and particularly clause 5 thereof which related to the substitution of new section 81 and also the incorporation of section 81-A relating to pending proceedings. They also seek appropriate orders from this Court to permit them to continue for the full term of five years. 3. They also seek appropriate orders from this Court to permit them to continue for the full term of five years. 3. The main ground taken in the petition by way of challenge to the Ordinance is that in the parent enactment, the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, as also in the amending enactment, the Ordinance, there are several matters which are in conflict with the Central Statutes on subjects covered by the concurrent list in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and though the parent Act received the assent of the President of India, the Amending Ordinance had not received such assent. It is contended that the Arbitration Act, 1940 covers the entire field of arbitration and in as much as in the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act there are provisions dealing with arbitration and appeals in regard to decisions or orders of arbitrators the Act must be considered to be in conflict with the Central enactment and necessarily therefore the Amendment Ordinance should have received assent of the President. It is said that for that reason the Ordinance should be struck down as illegal and incompetent. 4. The petitioners also contend that since a term of five years is provided in the rules in force and there is nothing in the Ordinance which curtails that period, they should have been allowed to continue in office for a period of five years. There is also a plea of mala fides on the part of the Minister in charge of Co-operation, Sri N. K. Balakrishnan. According to the petitioners, the consideration which have led to the passing of the Ordinance was corrupt motive on the part of Sri N. K. Balakrishnan to whose pressure the other Ministers in the Council of Ministers must have submitted because of political exigencies and also because of the coalition nature of the Government. Ext. P-14 is attacked as a colourable piece of legislation. 5. That the petitioners are no longer in office they, having been divested of the office pursuant to the Ordinance, is not now in dispute. The Ordinance has been replaced by the Kerala Co-operative Societies (Amendment) Act, 1971. Thereupon the petitioners have sought amendment of the Original Petition to include the prayer for the issue of a writ of certiorari to strike down the said enactment and particularly section 4 thereof. Section 4 is the section corresponding to clause 5 of the Ordinance. The Ordinance has been replaced by the Kerala Co-operative Societies (Amendment) Act, 1971. Thereupon the petitioners have sought amendment of the Original Petition to include the prayer for the issue of a writ of certiorari to strike down the said enactment and particularly section 4 thereof. Section 4 is the section corresponding to clause 5 of the Ordinance. The amendment has been allowed. The petitioners also sought to implead the District Judge who was appointed as the Single Member Appellate Tribunal as additional second respondent and that petition also has been allowed. By C.M.P. 12702 of 1971 the petitioners sought further amendment of the Original Petition seeking to challenge the appointment of the second respondent as a Single Member Co-operative Tribunal. Ext. P-16 is the order by which the second respondent was so appointed as the Kerala Co-operative Tribunal. The complaint against the appointment of the second respondent is that he was already functioning as a full time Chairman of the Kerala University Tribunal and therefore his concurrent appointment as Kerala Co-operative Tribunal would be violative of section 51A of the Kerala University Act, 1969 under which the Chairman of the University Appellate Tribunal must be full time. The amendment so sought also has been allowed. 6. The plea of mala fides has been denied by the Minister for Health and Co-operation in a separate affidavit filed in the case. In view of this counter-affidavit the petitioners have not been serious about the plea of mala fides taken up in their petition. There is no material placed before me to infer any mala fides on the part of the Minister for Health and Co-operation. 7. The question whether the second respondent has been appointed as the Kerala Co-operative Tribunal properly and is accordance with the provisions of law is really foreign to the scope of this petition, for, irrespective of the question of appointment of the second respondent, the question raised by the petitioners has to be decided. Even if the second respondent's appointment is, for any reason, irregular, that will not, in any way, promote the case of the petitioners. There is also no merit in the contention that petitioners should function for five years because the Ordinance does not provide for cancelling the petitioners' term. If the three member Tribunal stands abolished by reason of the amendment there is no scope for such a contention. There is also no merit in the contention that petitioners should function for five years because the Ordinance does not provide for cancelling the petitioners' term. If the three member Tribunal stands abolished by reason of the amendment there is no scope for such a contention. Accordingly, the only question seriously urged at the hearing by counsel for the petitioners concerned the constitutional validity of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Amendment Act 38 of 1971. 8. Item 13 in List III in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India is” "13. Civil procedure, including all matters included in the Code of Civil Procedure at the commencement of this Constitution, limitation and arbitration." Therefore the power to legislate on matters relating to arbitration is with the Parliament and also with the Legislature of the State, but in the case of the latter subject to the exclusive power of Parliament. The Arbitration Act, 1940 is enacted by the Parliament and it extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir. In as much as arbitration is therefore an occupied field, it is contended that any law made by the State touching arbitration would be incompetent unless it had been reserved for the consideration of the President of India and had received his assent under Article 254 (2) of the Constitution of India. Otherwise the law made by the Parliament shall prevail and the law made by the Legislature of the State shall, to the extent of the repugnancy be void. The case of the petitioners is that the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act embodies provisions relating to arbitration of disputes and further it provides for the forum for arbitration as also the forum for appeal and revision therefrom and all these provisions being essentially on the topic of arbitration would derive their legislative competency only from item 13 in the Concurrent List. If there is an existing law made by the Parliament on arbitration, any law by the State which is repugnant to the law made by the Parliament must necessarily be held to be void to the extent of the repugnancy unless it be that before making the law it had been reserved for assent of the President of India and had received such assent. It is said that when the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969 was enacted it was reserved for the assent of the President and it got such assent and therefore it could not be said to be incompetent. But when the provisions of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act and in particular section 81 there of which related to the constitution of the Tribunal to hear appeals against decisions of arbitrations were amended, the amending Act was not reserved for the assent of the President and had not received such assent. Therefore the amendment to section 81 is said to be not legislatively competent and to that extent, it is said, the amendment must fail. This, according to the petitioners, would be sufficient to grant them relief as that would mean that section 81 as it stood before the amendment would be the law and the petitioners appointed as members of the Tribunal under section 81 of the Act as it stood unamended would be entitled to their offices. 9. The question of the amending enactment requiring the assent of the President would arise only if there is anything in the provisions of the Act which is in conflict with or repugnant to the Act of the Central Legislature. Of course, it is not disputed that certain provisions in the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act relate to the field of arbitration and section 81 is one of those provisions. It is also therefore not disputed that if there was anything repugnant to the Arbitration Act in the provisions of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, to that extent the State enactment will have to fail. 10. The Arbitration Act provides for arbitration with and without intervention of a court, deals with the procedure relating to arbitration, the power of the court, to modify the award or to remit the award and the power of the court to pass judgment in terms of the award. Appeals are provided against certain orders passed under the Act. Section 46 relates to the applicability of the Act to statutory arbitration. It is necessary to refer to sections 46 and 47 here: "46. Appeals are provided against certain orders passed under the Act. Section 46 relates to the applicability of the Act to statutory arbitration. It is necessary to refer to sections 46 and 47 here: "46. The provisions of this Act, except sub-section (1) of section 6 and sections 7, 12, 36 and 37, shall apply to every arbitration under any other enactment for the time being in force, as if the arbitration were pursuant to an arbitration agreement and as if that other enactment were an arbitration agreement, except in so far as this Act is inconsistent with that other enactment or with any rules made thereunder. 47. Subject to the provisions of section 46, and save in so far as is otherwise provided by any law for the time being in force, the provisions of this Act shall apply to all arbitrations and to all proceedings thereunder: Provided that an arbitration award otherwise obtained may with the consent of all the parties interested betaken into consideration as a compromise or adjustment of a suit by any court before which the suit is pending." It may be noticed that the provisions of the Arbitration Act except certain specified provisions apply to every arbitration under any other enactment for the time being in force except in so far as the Act is inconsistent with that other enactment or with any rules made thereunder. This necessarily indicates that the provisions of other enactments relating to arbitration which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940 are specifically saved by section 46. Section 47 similarly provides that save in so far as is otherwise provided by any law for the time being in force, the provisions of the Arbitration Act shall apply to all arbitrations and to all proceedings thereunder. The saving provisions make it clear that there will be no conflict between any other law and the provisions of Arbitration Act, 1940 in matters relating to arbitration merely because the provisions are of a different nature and any statute other than the Arbitration Act providing for a different procedure for arbitration or dealing with the question of arbitration in a different manner will not, for that reason, come into conflict with the Arbitration Act, 1940. In other words, that would not, for that reason, be repugnant to the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940. 11. In other words, that would not, for that reason, be repugnant to the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940. 11. There has been some controversy at the bar as to the meaning of the words "for the time being in force" occurring in sections 46 and 47 of the Arbitration Act. According to Sri Chandrasekharan, counsel for the petitioners, the words "for the time being in force" must he construed with reference to the time when the Arbitration Act, 1940 came into force and not with reference to any later date or dates. That would mean reading the words "any other enactment for the time being in force" in section 46 and "any law for the time being in force" in section 47 as meaning the same as "any other enactment now in force" and "any law now in force". The words "for the time being in force" may have, in some context the narrow or limited meaning of 'law in force at the moment' that moment being the point of time when the enactment come into force. But these words can also read to mean as the law that is in force at the time when it is sought to be applied. It need not refer to a particular point of time so as to refer to existing laws but may refer to several periods of time. The meaning will have to be gathered from the context of the enactment and it may not be possible to lay down any uniform rule. It therefore logically follows that the meaning given to these words in the context of anyone statute may not, as such, be applicable to another statute. 12. That the expression "for the time being in force" may have these different meanings could well be deduced by reference to decided cases. This was noticed by the High Court of Calcutta in E.I. Film Studios v. P. K. Mukherjee, A.I.R. 1954 Cal. 41. That concerned the expression "for the time being in force" of section 19 (1) (g) of the Defence of India Act, 1939 and in the context of that enactment the Calcutta High Court held that the expression refers only to laws which were actually in existence at the time the Defence of India Act came into force. 41. That concerned the expression "for the time being in force" of section 19 (1) (g) of the Defence of India Act, 1939 and in the context of that enactment the Calcutta High Court held that the expression refers only to laws which were actually in existence at the time the Defence of India Act came into force. The High Court of Patna has dissented from the view taken by the Calcutta High Court as to the construction of the words "for the time being in force" occurring in section 19 (1) (g) of the Defence of India Act. The Patna Judges noticed that there may be no dispute that the expression "for the time being in force" may refer either to a particular point of time or to several periods of time, and the interpretation that has to be adopted in any particular case must depend upon the context in which the expression occurs. Reference was made to Burrow's Words and Phrases, Volume 2, at page 326 and Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, Volume 4 at page 3030. The learned Judges in that case ultimately held that the words "for the time being in force" refer to enactments existing at the commencement of the Defence of India Act, 1939, as well as those made thereafter. This was in Union of India v. Ramdas Oil Mills, A.I.R 1968 Patna 352. 13. Though the words "for the time being is force" may mean the time present denoting a single period of time, in the general sense, it refers to time indefinite. The question whether the provisions of the Arbitration Act are to be applied to any particular arbitration may arise from time to time and it is then that the question of applying sections 46 and 47 may have to be considered. It is then that one has to consider whether such arbitration is under the provisions of any enactment then in force which is inconsistent with the Arbitration Act. If it nevertheless is the Arbitration Act permits that enactment to operate. This is quite understandable because while the Central Legislature has provided for arbitration, it can only be to cover the field where special statutes have not made provision in regard to the same matter. 14. If it nevertheless is the Arbitration Act permits that enactment to operate. This is quite understandable because while the Central Legislature has provided for arbitration, it can only be to cover the field where special statutes have not made provision in regard to the same matter. 14. I do not therefore think that the provisions of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Amendment Act, 1971 could be said to be repugnant to the provisions of Arbitration Act, 1940. Sections 46 and 47 are as much provisions of that Act, as are the other sections and therefore, if any piece of legislation comes within the saving provision such legislation cannot be said to be repugnant to the enactment. It is a legislation expressly saved by the enactment itself and that answers the plea of repugnancy. In the view I have taken, the Original Petition has to fail. Accordingly it is dismissed. But in the circumstances of the case, parties are directed to suffer costs.