JUDGMENT 1. This reference by the Additional Sessions judge, 2nd Court, Hooghly, under section 438 of the Code of Criminal procedure is for quashing an interim order passed by the Sub-Divisional executive Magistrate, Serampore in a proceeding under section 147 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The short point that falls to be determined in this Reference is whether the learned magistrate had authority to pass interlocutory order pending decision as to the right claimed in the proceeding. The facts leading upto the present reference may be briefly stated 2. The first party filed an application before the Sub-Divisional Executive magistrate, Serampore, inter alia, praying for drawing up of a proceeding under section 144 and sec. 107 of the code of Criminal Procedure against the second party petitioners on the allegation that he had a right to discharge water from his house into the tank recorded in plot No. 2834 of Mouza serampore, owned and possessed by the second party and the neighboring public similarly had a right to use the water or me tank for irrigating their lands. The first party alleged that the second party was trying to fill up the tank and this was likely to lead to a breach of peace and accordingly prayed for drawing up of a proceeding. The learned Magistrate asked the Officer-in-Charge, serampore Police Station to make an enquiry. The police recommended that a proceeding under section 145 of the Code of Criminal procedure be drawn up and the property be attached. The learned magistrate asked both the parties to show cause and at the same time, directed the parties to maintain status quo. Upon reading the police report and on consideration of the materials before him, the learned magistrate held that the right or the first party to discharge water of his house will not be interfered with, even if the tank in question was filled up. But from the record of rights the learned Magistrate found that the tank which was proposed to be filled up, was meant for the use of the local people and held that right will be interfered with, if the tank was filled up. As the police report recited that there was apprehension of breach of peace over the issue, he drew up a proceeding under sec. 147 Cr. As the police report recited that there was apprehension of breach of peace over the issue, he drew up a proceeding under sec. 147 Cr. P. Code against the second party asking them not to interfere with the rights of the petitioner and other people to draw water of the said tank by filling up the same. Against this order, the second party moved the learned Additional sessions Judge, Hooghly, for quashing the order and the learned Judge has made the Reference recommending that the order passed by the learned Magistrate was illegal as it was made without holding any enquiry and accordingly recommended that the order be quashed. 3. MR. Balai Chandra Roy, learned advocate appearing in support of the reference, contended that the learned magistrate was not empowered to pass an interim or interlocutory order in a proceeding under Sec. 147 Cr. P. Code and the Reference should, therefore, be accepted. Mr. Mrityunjoy Palit learned Advocate appearing for the first party, who opposed the Reference, inter alia, contended that Sec. 147 did not in terms prohibit the learned magistrate from making an interim order and at any rate, the Court in the absence of any express provisions to the contrary, must be deemed to possess as inherent in its very constitution all such powers as are necessary in the course of administration of justice. In support of this contention, he relied upon the decision in Pulin Behari Das v. King Emperor (16 C. W. N. 1105) Hariram, v. The State (A.I.R. 1956 madhya Bharat 17) and Sri Eswaraswamy Temple v. Jangam Nagaiah (1971 Cr. L. J. 433. The last of these three decisions, it is to be pointed out, does not really support Mr. Palit's contention. In that decision it was held that the inherent power was conferred on the High Court and not on any subordinate criminal court and was to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only where such exercise was justified by the tests specifically laid in the section itself. In pulin Behari Das's case, it was laid down by a Special Division Bench of this Court that the criminal courts had equally with the civil courts, inherent power to mould its procedure subject to statutory provisions, to enable them to discharge their functions as courts of justice. In pulin Behari Das's case, it was laid down by a Special Division Bench of this Court that the criminal courts had equally with the civil courts, inherent power to mould its procedure subject to statutory provisions, to enable them to discharge their functions as courts of justice. In Hariram's case, a Single bench of Madhya Bharat High Court laid down that it was an established proposition of law that the courts of: justice must possess inherent powers apart from the express provisions of law, which are necessary to their existence arid proper discharge of duties imposed upon them by law. Basing his case upon these decisions, Mr. Palit contended that since there was no prohibition in Sec. 147 of the Code of criminal Procedure, the learned Magistrate was entitled to make the interim order under his inherent powers in order to do justice between the parties. I regret I am unable to accept this connection, Sec. 147, as it now stands after the amendment of 1955, does not contain any provision similar to that in Sec. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowering the learned Magistrate to act in an emergency under the second proviso to clause (4) of sec. 145. Both the sections 145 and 147 occur in Chapter xii of the Code, under the heading "disputes as to the Immovable Property". Section 145 empowers the learned Magistrate to act in an emergency by attaching the subject-matter in dispute, pending his decision under that section, while section 147 does not contain any such comparable provision. On the contrary sec. 147, as it stood before the amendment, authorised the Magistrate in sub-section (1) "to enquire into the matter in the manner provided in section 145" and the provisions of that section as far as may be were made applicable in the case. This provision was amended by section 20 of Act 26 of 1955 and now stand thus : "and shall thereafter enquire into the matter in the manner hereafter provided. " 4. This provision was amended by section 20 of Act 26 of 1955 and now stand thus : "and shall thereafter enquire into the matter in the manner hereafter provided. " 4. A new provision, namely subsection (1a) was introduced by the act 26 of 1955 which required the magistrate to peruse the statement put in by the parties, hear the parties, receive all such evidence as may be produced by them respectively, consider the effect of such evidence and take such further evidence, if any, as he thought necessary, and if possible to decide whether such right existed and the provisions of sec. 145 as far as may be, were made applicable in the case of such enquiry. Sub-sec. (2) empowers the Magistrate to make a prohibitory order, only where it appears to him that such a right exists. All the provisions of sec. 145 were no longer available in the matter of an enquiry under sec. 147 of the Code and the effect Of this amendment, in my view, is to restrict the scope of the enquiry or in other words, the powers available to the learned Magistrate in the matter of an enquiry under sec. 147 prior to the amendment of 1955 were larger than the powers now available to him in an enquiry under sec. 147 of the Code. Mr. Palit also relied on the decision in Sk. Khoda Bux v. Mozharul Haque (44 C.W.N. 623) referred to by Mr. Balai Chandra Roy in support of the reference. This decision expressly laid down that an interim order prohibiting one party from interfering with the rights of the other party till the final decision of a proceeding under sec. 147 of the Code of Criminal procedure could not be passed under clause (2) of that section. That clause contemplated a final order made after due enquiry in the manner provided by the section. Their Lordships then proceeded to observe that an interim order, if necessary could be passed under section 145, Cl. (4), Proviso (2) of the code. In my view, the amendment of 1955 restricts the scope of such an interim order and the learned Magistrate is no longer entitled to act under cl. (4) Proviso (2) of Section 145 of the Code. For the reasons discussed above, the interim order passed by the learned magistrate in the above proceeding must be held to be illegal. In my view, the amendment of 1955 restricts the scope of such an interim order and the learned Magistrate is no longer entitled to act under cl. (4) Proviso (2) of Section 145 of the Code. For the reasons discussed above, the interim order passed by the learned magistrate in the above proceeding must be held to be illegal. The Reference is accordingly accepted and the order dated 30.10.72 passed by the learned Magistrate is set aside. Let the records be sent down as early as possible. The learned Magistrate will now proceed to determine the case. Reference accepted.