( 1 ) THE petitioner has prayed in this writ petition, for a declaration, that sub-rules (5) to (8) of Rule 111 of the Mysore Motor Vehicles Rules, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) added by the Mysore Motor Vehicles (2nd Amendment) Rules, 1972 are illegal, void, inoperative and ultra vires the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and violative of the petitioner's fundamental rights under Art. 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India. ( 2 ) THE petitioner is operating five contract carriages, the permits for which were granted under S. 51 of the Act. Of those, three permits were issued by the Regional Transport Authority, Bangalore valid for the entire state of Mysore. The fourth permit was granted by the State Transport authority, Mysore and counter-signed by the State Transport Authority, kerala which is valid for the inter-State route Bangalore to Cannanore. The fifth permit held by the petitioner is an All India permit issued by the state Transport Authority, Mysore. ( 3 ) THE expression "contract carriage" is defined in Sec. 2 (3) of the act as follows :" ' contract carriage' means a motor vehicle which carries passenger or passengers for nire or reward under a contract express or implied for the use of the vehicle as a whole at or for a fixed or agreed rate or sum- (i) on a time basis whether or cot with reference to any route or distance, or (ii) from one point to another, and in either case without stopping to pick up or set down along the line of route passengers not included in the contract; and includes a motor cab notwithstanding that the passengers may pay separate fares;"sec. 51 of the Act provides for grant of contract carriage permit. Sub-sec. (2) of the said section empowers the RTA to attach to the permit any one or more of the conditions speciled in the said sub-section. Among the conditions enumerated in sub-sec. (2), the 10th one refers to other conditions that may be prescribed. The word 'prescribed' as defined in S. 2 (21) of the Act means prescribed by the rules made under the Act Sec. 68 empowers the State Government to make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of Chapter IV in which is contained S. 51. (2), the 10th one refers to other conditions that may be prescribed. The word 'prescribed' as defined in S. 2 (21) of the Act means prescribed by the rules made under the Act Sec. 68 empowers the State Government to make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of Chapter IV in which is contained S. 51. Sec. 133 of the Act provides that all rules made under the Act shall be laid for not less than fourteen days before Parliament or the State Legislature, as the case may be, as soon as possible after they are made, and shall be subject to such modifications as Parliament or such Legislature may make during the session in which they are so laid. It also provides that the rules can only be made after previous publication and that they shall on publication in the Official Gazette come into force on the date of publication unless some date is appointed. It is in exercise of the powers conferred by s. 68 read with S. 51 that Rule 111 of the Rules was framed by the State government. The said rule prescribes the additional statutory conditions to be imposed in contract carriage permits. By the Mysore Motor Vehicles (2nd Amendment) Rules, 1972, Rule 111 was amended' by adding sub-rules (5) to (8 ). The amendment was published in the Mysore Gazette on the 3rd of August, 1972 and came into force on that date. The said rule prescribes the additional statutory conditions to be imposed in contract carriage permits. By the Mysore Motor Vehicles (2nd Amendment) Rules, 1972, Rule 111 was amended' by adding sub-rules (5) to (8 ). The amendment was published in the Mysore Gazette on the 3rd of August, 1972 and came into force on that date. ( 4 ) SUB-RULES (5) to (8) of Rule 111 added by the Mysore Motor Vehicles (2nd Amendment) Rules, 1972 which are challenged in this writ petition, read as follows :" (5) The holder of the permit shall, before the commencement of a journey prepare or cause to be prepared a list containing the name, address and signature of the person or persons who have entered into a contract, express or implied, for the use of the vehicle as a whole for the concerned trip and the name and address of the person or persons included in the contract and to be carried by the vehicle and furnish a copy of such list to the Secretary of the RTA concerned and another copy of such list duly attested by the said Secretary shall be carried by the driver in the vehicle and shall be produced on demand for the inspection by any police officer not below the rank of a Sub-Inspector of Police or by any officer of the Motor Vehicles Department not below the rank of an Inspector of Motor Vehicles, provided that where the contract is entered into and the journey is commenced either after office hours or on a holiday an unattested copy of such list shall be carried in the vehicle and another copy thereof shall be delivered to the Secretary of the RTA concerned on the next working day following the day of the commencement of the journey. (6) No person who is not included in the contract and whose name is not included in the list referred to in sub-rule (5) shall be carried by such vehicle. (7) Neither the holder of the permit nor the person or persons who have entered into a contract for the use of the vehicle as a whole shall enter into or cause or allow to enter into contract with individual passengers in respect of individual seats, or book or permit individual passengers to book individual seats in the vehicle. (7) Neither the holder of the permit nor the person or persons who have entered into a contract for the use of the vehicle as a whole shall enter into or cause or allow to enter into contract with individual passengers in respect of individual seats, or book or permit individual passengers to book individual seats in the vehicle. (8) No person who is not included in the contract and whose name is not included in the list referred to in sub-rule (5) shall be picked up or set down along the line of the route. " ( 5 ) ON the coming into force of the Mysore Motor Vehicles (2nd amendment) Rules, 1972 the petitioner and other contract carriage permit holders are required to obey the new conditions imposed by the rules. ( 6 ) THE petitioner has challenged the validity of these rules firstly on the ground that they conflict with the provisions of the Act and secondly on the ground that they impose unreasonable restrictions on the fundamental right of the petitioner guaranteed by Art. 19 (1) (g) of the Constn. ( 7 ) SUB-RULE (5) of Rule 111 requires the holder of the permit to prepare or cause to be prepared before the commencement of the journey, a list. The said list should contain: (1) the name, address and signature of the person or persons who have entered into the contract, express or implied, for the use of the vehicle as a whole for the concerned trip; and (2) the name and address of the person or persons included in the contract to be carried by the vehicle. It further provides that a copy of the list so prepared shall be furnished to the Secretary of the RTA concerned and another copy of such list duly attested by the Secretary shall be carried by the driver in the vehicle and produced on demand for inspection by any police officer not below the rank of a Sub-Inspector of Police or by any officer of the Motor Vehicle Department not below the rank of an Inspector of Motor Vehicles. But, where the contract is entered into and the journey is commenced either after office hours or on a holiday, the furnishing of the list to the Secretary of the RTA and securing attestation to a copy of the same before commencement of the journey is dispensed with. But, where the contract is entered into and the journey is commenced either after office hours or on a holiday, the furnishing of the list to the Secretary of the RTA and securing attestation to a copy of the same before commencement of the journey is dispensed with. In such cases, it is provided that an unattested copy of such list shall be carried in the vehicle and another copy thereof shall be delivered to the secretary of the RTA concerned on the next working day following the day of the commencement of the journey. Sub-rules (6) and (8) are complementary to sub-rule (5) and the same may also be considered along with sub-rule (5 ). Sub-rule (6) provides that no person who is not included in the contract and whose name is not included in the list referred to in sub-rule (5) shall be carried by such vehicle Sub-rule (8) provides that no person who is not included in the contract and whose name is not included in the list referred to in sub-rule (5) shall be picked up or set down along the line of the route. If sub-rule (5) is valid, it was fairly conceded by sri M. K. Nambiyar, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, that sub-rules (6) and (8) would also be valid, inasmuch as the validity of sub-rules (6) and (8) has been challenged only on the ground that sub-rule (5) is invalid. Hence, independent consideraton of the validity of sub-rules (6) and (8) has become unnecessary. ( 8 ) THE first contention of Sri Nambiar is that sub-rule (5) of R. 111 is ultra vires the Act in that it is in conflict with the definition of the expression 'contract carriage' contained in S. 2 (3) of the Act. He submitted that the contract contemplated by the definition of the expression 'contract carriage' can be either oral or in writing and that it includes even an implied contract. It was contended that sub-rule (5) requires the contract to be reduced into writing and is therefore in conflict with Section 2 (3) of the Act. It is clear from the language of sub-rule (5) that it comes into operation only after the contract contemplated by sub-sec. (3) of S. 2 has been entered into. It was contended that sub-rule (5) requires the contract to be reduced into writing and is therefore in conflict with Section 2 (3) of the Act. It is clear from the language of sub-rule (5) that it comes into operation only after the contract contemplated by sub-sec. (3) of S. 2 has been entered into. The sub-rule requires the preparation of a list giving name, address and signature of the person or persons entering into the contract and the names of the persons included in the contract and to be carried by the vehicle. That list is required to be attested by the secretary of the RTA and carried by the driver of the vehicle with a further obligation to produce the same as and when required by the prescribed authority. As the list has to contain the names of the persons inccluded in the contract and to be carried in the vehicle, it is obvious that the list contemplated is not the contract. The list is neither a contract nor a document containing all the terms of the contract. None of the requiremerits of sub-rule (5) of Rule 111 can, therefore, be regarded as being in any way inconsistent with the definition of the expression 'contract carriage' given in S. 2 (3) of the Act. Hence, it is not possible to accept the first contention of Sri Nambiyar that sub-rule (5) of Rule 111 is ultra vires, the same being in conflict with S. 2 (3) of the Act. ( 9 ) THE next contention of Sri Nambiyar is that sub-rule (5) of R. 111 offends Art. 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution, which guarantees to the petitioner the fundamental right to carry on any occupation, trade or business. Clause (6) of Art. 19 of the Constitution enables the State to make any law imposing in the interest of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the, right conferred by Art. 19 (1) (g ). That, carrying on the business of transporting passengers with the aid of motor vehicles is a fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 19 (1) (g), is now well settled by the decision of the Supreme Court in Baquir Ahmed v. State of U. P. , AIR 1954 SC. That, carrying on the business of transporting passengers with the aid of motor vehicles is a fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 19 (1) (g), is now well settled by the decision of the Supreme Court in Baquir Ahmed v. State of U. P. , AIR 1954 SC. 728 , by imposing conditions specified in Rule 111, certain restrictions have been put on the right of the petitioner to carry on his business of contract carriage operator. The only question for consideration is, as to whether the restrictions imposed by sub-rule (5) of Rule 111 are reasonable restrictions imposed in the interest of the general public. The question as to whether the restriction imposed is reasonable or not would depend upon the nature of the business carried. Though restrictions can be imposed in the interests of general public, such restrictions must be reasonable and when the reasonableness of the restrictions imposed is challenged, it is for the Court to decide having regard to all relevant facts and circumstances as to whether the restrictions imposed are reasonable or not. ( 10 ) IT was contended by Sri M. P. Chandrakantharaj Urs, learned government Advocate appearing for the State, that the restrictions imposed by sub-rules (5) to (8) of Rule 111 are in the interest of the general public. It was submitted that the contract carriage permit holders are misusing the privilege granted to them under the permits and are using the contract carriages as stage carriages by carrying individual passengers by issuing separate tickets to them without there being any contract for the use of the vehicle as a whole for carrying the passengers. From the nature of the conditions imposed, it is clear that they have been prescribed with a view to prevent the evasion of the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder and to prevent the violation of the conditions imposed on the permit holders. Hence, I have to conclude that the restrictions imposed by sub-rules (5) to (8) of Rule 111 are in the interest of the general public. ( 11 ) THE requirements of sub-rule (5) have to be fulfilled before the commencement of the journoy itself as expressly provided by the sub-rule. The submission was that the requirements of sub-rule (5) are onerous and impossible of performance in certain circumstances. ( 11 ) THE requirements of sub-rule (5) have to be fulfilled before the commencement of the journoy itself as expressly provided by the sub-rule. The submission was that the requirements of sub-rule (5) are onerous and impossible of performance in certain circumstances. It was contended that the restrictions imposed are unreasonable and out of proportion to the evil sought to be remedied. Before the commencement of the journey, the holder of the permit is required to prepare or cause to be prepared a list containing the name, address and signature of the person who has entered into the contract and the name and address of the persons included in the contract and to be carried by the vehicle. A contract carriage is a motor vehicle which carries passengers for hire or reward for the use of the vehicle as a whole for a rate or a, sum fixed or agreed, on a time basis, whether or not with reference to any route or distance, or from one point to another, subject to the condition that the vehicle shall not be stopped to pick up or set down passengers not included in the contract. But a stage carriage as defined in, S. 2 (29) of the Act is a motor vehicle carrying or adapted to carry more than six persons excluding the driver which carries passengers for hire or reward at separate fares paid by or for individual passengers, either for the whole journey or for a, stage of the journey. The important difference between the contract carriage and the stage carriage is, that whereas in the case of the contract carriage the motor vehicle as whole is hired under a contract, in the case of a stage carriage the contract is only with the individual passenger. The second difference is that whereas the stages carriage can stop for picking up or setting down any passengers, the contract carriage is prohibited from stopping to pick up or set down ajong the line oi the route, passengers not included in the contract. The second difference is that whereas the stages carriage can stop for picking up or setting down any passengers, the contract carriage is prohibited from stopping to pick up or set down ajong the line oi the route, passengers not included in the contract. If there is no contract to hire the motor vehicle as a whole, and passengers are carried for hire or reward at separate fares paid by or for the individual passengers, in a motor vehicle in respect of which only a contract carriage permit is granted, it would be operating not as a contract carriage, but really as a stage carriage, if the motor vehicle is adapted to carry more than six persons excluding the driver. If the contract carriage stops to pick up or set down passengers not included in the contract its operation cannot be regarded as legal a,s the very definition of the expression 'contract carriage' contains such a prohibition. Before the contract carriage carries the passengers, the contract must have been entered into. It is only those that are included in the contract hiring the vehicle as a whole that can be carried by the vehicle. In view of the prohibition against stopping for picking up and setting down the passengers contained in S. 2 (3) of the Act, it is not possible to accept the contention of Sri Nambiyar that it is enough if there is a contract hiring the vehicle as a whole and that the person contracting is entitled to carry any passenger in the vehicle, so long as the number of the passengers agreed upon is not exceeded. It was submitted that it will not be possible in majority of cases to know who are all the passengers that will actually travel in the contract carriage. If a person hires a contract carriage for taking a marriage party the only indication available at the time of entering into the contract is that passengers to be carried are only the members of the marriage party, and persons who will actually join the marriage party and travel in the vehicle may not be known at that time. In such cases, the persons included in the contract are the members of the marriage party, even though the names of all the members of the marriage party are not known on the date the contract is entered into. In such cases, the persons included in the contract are the members of the marriage party, even though the names of all the members of the marriage party are not known on the date the contract is entered into. But the expression 'marriage party' is sufficient to indicate as to who are the persons that are included in the contract. In a case like this, a person who is a member of the marriage party is included in the contract and a person unconnected with the marriage cannot be regarded as included in the contract. When the contract for hiring a contract carriage is entered into, the contract must indicate as to who are the passengers to be carried in the, vehicle. That may be done either by giving the names of the persons or by giving particulars from, which it can be ascertained as to who are included in the contract. But before the commencement of the journey, the names of the passengers included in the contract and who are travelling in the vehicle will be known. Therefore, a list containing their names can be prepared before the commencement of the journey. Preparing the list and carrying the same in the vehicle does not unduly interfere with the business of the contract carriage operator. If the list is carried, it will facilitate the prescribed authorites to check the vehicle at any time to find out if any passengers not included in the contract and the list are being carried in the vehicle. ( 12 ) SR; Nambiar contended that the requirement of getting the list attested by the Secretary of the RTA is an unreasonable restriction. The contract carriages are normally hired for carrying a group of persons, for special occasions such as marriages, picnics, excursions, sight seeing etc. The contract for hiring the contract carriage may be entered into well in advance or within a, short time before the actual commencement of the journey. After preparing the list before the commencement of the journey in accordance with sub-r. (5) it has to be taken to the Secty. of the RTA concerned and got attested by him. It is the attested copy of the list that the driver is required to carry with him. Having regard to the normal duties of the Sectys. After preparing the list before the commencement of the journey in accordance with sub-r. (5) it has to be taken to the Secty. of the RTA concerned and got attested by him. It is the attested copy of the list that the driver is required to carry with him. Having regard to the normal duties of the Sectys. of the RTAs it may not be possible for them to attest the lists brought to them promptly. The persons who bring the lists for attestation may have to wait for considerable length of time, with the result, it may become impossible for the contract carriage operator to commence the journey on the date and time desired by the contracting party. If the contracting parties are not assured of commencement of the journey at a time when they desire to commence the journey, they will not be interested in hiring a contract carriage. The Secretaries of the RTAs are stationed in places where the Regional Transport Authorities are functioning. It is obvious that the Secretaries will not be available in all the places in the State. The contract carriage operators may have to commence journeys from places where no Secretaries of the RTAs are posted. In many of the places of tourist interest like Nandi Hills, Belur, Halebeedu, Shravana belogala, jog Falls etc. , no Secretaries of the RTA are stationed. If the journeys have to commence from such places in respect of which contracts are concluded in those places, and if the requirement of sub-rule (5) has to be satisfied, one has to travel all the way from those places to the place where the concerned Secretary of the RTA is stationed to secure the attestation of the list. All this involves spending of considerable time as well as money. A party who is interested in commencing the journey within a short time will therefore be precluded from doing so if the requirements of sub-rule (5) of Rule 111 have to be fulfilled before the commencement of the journey. The resultant position would be that the intending users of the contract carriages may not hire them as they cannot commence the journey according to their own convenience. The resultant position would be that the intending users of the contract carriages may not hire them as they cannot commence the journey according to their own convenience. As in many cases contracts for hiring contract carriages are entered into within a short time before the commencement of the journey, the business of the contract carriage operators will be adversely affected in substantial degree. Having regard to all these factors, I have no hesitation in corning to the conclusion that the requirement of sub-rule (5) of securing attestation of the list before the commencement of the journey is an unreasonable restriction out of proportion to the evil sought to be remedied. ( 13 ) THE next question for consideration is as to whether it is possible to strike down only the offending part of sub-rule (5) which requires attestation of the list and to retain the other part of the sub-rule. Sri chandrakantaraj Urs, learned Government Advocate appearing for the State, submitted that the offending part of the rule is severable and that therefore the other part could be retained. He submitted that only the following portion of the sub-rule may be declared as void, retaining the other portion in tact :" furnish a copy of such list to the Secretary of the RTA concerned and another copy of such list duly attested by the said Secretary. . . . . . . . , provided that where the contract is entered into and the journey is commenced either after office hours or on a holiday an unattested copy of such list shall be carried in the vehicle and another copy thereof shall be delivered to the Secretary of the RTA concerned on the next working day following the day of the commencement of the journey. "after deleting the portion suggested by Sri Chandrkantaraj Urs, sub-rule (5) of Rule 111 will read as fouows : " The holder of the permit shall, before the commencement of the journey prepare or cause to be prepared a list containing the name , address and signature of the person or persons who have entered into a contract, express or implied, for the use of the vehicle as a whole for the concerned trip and the name and address of the person or persons included in the contract and to be carried by the vehicle and shall be carried by the driver in the vehicle and shall be produced on demand for inspection by any police officer not below the rank of a sub-Inspector of Police or by any officer of the Motor Vehicles Department not below the rank of an Inspector of Motor Vehicles. " ( 14 ) BUT it was contended by Sri Nambiyar that this is not a case where the principle of severability can be applied, as the rule making authority could not have framed the sub-rule without the offending portion. In support of his contention, he relied upon the decision of the Supreme court in Kunhi Koman v. Stale of Kerala, AIR 1962 SC 723 , wherein it is laid down that in order to apply the principle of severability, what has to be ascertained is whether the authority could have made the provision without the offending portion of the same. It was contended by Sri Nambiyar that the core of sub-rule (5) lies in requiring the list being attested by the Secretary of the RTA and if that requirement is bad as imposing an unreasonable restriction on the petitioner's fundamental right, it is impossible to infer that the rule making authority would have made the sub-rule without the offending portion of the same. The latter part of the rule which says that the journey can commence without securing the attestation from the secretary of the RTA in cases where the contract is entered into and the journey is commenced either after office hours or on a holiday and that it is enough if an unattested copy of the list is carried in the vehicle itself, suggests that the rule making authority would have made the rule without the offending portion of the same pertaining to the attestation of the list by the Secretary of the RTA. Hence, I do not accept the contention o. C Sri nambiyar that the offending portion of the rule is not sever able in this case. It is therefore enough to declare only the offending portion of sub-rule (5) as void retaining the remaining portion of the same. ( 15 ) AS only the offending portion of sub-rule (5) is declared as void retaining the remaining portion, the challenge to sub-rules (6) and (8) has to fail for the reasons already stated. ( 16 ) THE next contention of Sri Nambiyar is that sab-rule (7) of rule 111 is ultra vires, it being in conflict with, the definition of the expression 'contract carriage'. Sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 2 only defines the expression 'contract carriage'. But, sub-rule (7) of Rule 111 imposes certain restrictions on the holder of the permit and the; person who has entered into a contract with the permit holder for the use of the vehicle as a whole in the matter of entering into further contract with individual passengers in respect of individual seats or in the matter of booking or permitting individual passengers to book individual seats in the vehicle. The stage for operation of sub-rule (7) of Rule 111 conies after the contract contemplated by S. 2 (3) of the Act is entered into. The requirement of sub-rule (7) therefore does not, in any way, conflict with the provisions of S. 2 (3) of the Act. Hence, it is not possible to accede to the contention of Sri Nambiyar that sub-rule (7) of Rule 111 is ultra vires of the Act. ( 17 ) IT was next contended by Sri Nambiyar that sub-rule (7) of rule 111 is void as offending the petitioner's fundamental right to carry on his business conferred by Art. 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. ( 17 ) IT was next contended by Sri Nambiyar that sub-rule (7) of rule 111 is void as offending the petitioner's fundamental right to carry on his business conferred by Art. 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. It was contended that the restriction imposed by the said sub-rule is an unreasonable restriction. Sub-rule (7) of Rule 111 is directed against the holder of the permit as well as the person entering into a contract for the use of the vehicle as a whole. The prohibition contained in sub-rule (7) becomes operative only at a stage after the contract to use the vehicle as a whole has been entered into. Once such a contract is entered into, the sub-rule prohibits entering into contract with individual passengers in respect of individual seats. It also prohibits booking or permitting individual passengers to book individual seats in the vehicle. It was submitted by Sri chandrakaniaraj Urs that this sub-rule has been introduced to prevent contract carriage operators from operating their service as stage carriage services. It was submitted that the holders of contract carriage permits are mis-using the privilege given to them by entering into contract with individual passengers in respect of individual seats, as is done in the case of stage carriage services. It is in order to prevent contract carriage services being mis-used as stage carriage, services contrary to the conditions of the permit that this sub-rule has been introduced. If a person has entered into a contract for the use of the vehicle as a whole with a permit holder for carrying a group of persons included in the contract, he cannot in turn enter into contract with individual passengers in respect of individual seats to carry whom alone the contract was entered into with the permit holder. It follows that if a person enters into a contract with the permit holder to carry a group of persons included in the contract, he cannot thereafter collect fare from individual passengers for carrying them in the vehicle in accordance with the contract entered into by him. If for example the headmaster of a school enters into a contract with the permit holder to carry 50 students of his school for excursion, he will be precluded from entering into a contract with his students for giving seats in the said vehicle on payment of particular amount. If for example the headmaster of a school enters into a contract with the permit holder to carry 50 students of his school for excursion, he will be precluded from entering into a contract with his students for giving seats in the said vehicle on payment of particular amount. Similarly, a travelling agent who has entered into a contract with the permit holder hiring the vehicle as a whole for taking a group of tourists included in the contract to a place of sight seeing, cannot, after he has entered into the contract with the permit holder, enter into a contract with the tourists included in the contract and give seats on payment of a particular amount as consideration. If the prohibition contained in sub-rule, (7) of Rule 111 is given effect to neither the headmaster nor the travelling agent in the illustrations given above, would be able to reimburse themselves from the students or tourists carried by them in the vehicle. The prohibition contained in sub-rule (7) is directed against those who are included in the contract as well as those who are not included in the contract. As there are specific provisions in sub-rules (6) and (8) prohibiting carrying of persons who are not included in the contract, the, prohibition contained in sub-rule (7) really operates against persons who are included in the contract. A person will be precluded from booking a seat in the vehicle hired as a whole, even though the contract was entered into to carry him along with others. If the headmaster of a school hires a contract carriage as a whole to take the students of his school for excursion to a particular place, and only some students of the school are actually carried by the vehicle, it cannot be said that the students carried were not included in the contract merely because the contract refers to the students of the school without mentioning the names of the particular students. The headmaster in such a case is prohibited by the rule from giving seats to the students of his school on payment of a particular amount. The headmaster in such a case is prohibited by the rule from giving seats to the students of his school on payment of a particular amount. Even if in the contract entered into by the headmaster with the permit holder the names of the students to be carried in the vehicle are specifically included, the headmaster is prohibited by the rule from entering into contracts with those students for giving seats to them on payment cf a particular amount. It is unreasonable to expect that the headmaster should first enter into contract with the student: and thereafter only enter into a contract with the permit holder. The restriction imposed is clearly unreasonable which affects the petitioner's business. ( 18 ) BUT Sri Chandrakantaraj Urs submitted that allotting of seats and receiving consideration from persons to whom seats are allotted, by a person who has entered into a contract with the permit holder is permissible provided the persons to whom seats are allotted are those who have been included in the contract. But, the language employed in sub-rule (7) of Rule 111 is such as to prohibit entering into contract with individual passengers in respect of individual seats even though they are included in the contract. Besides, as sub-rules (6) and (8) of Rule 111 prohibit carrying of persons who are not included in the contract and the list. sub-rule (7) will become unnecessary if the interpretation suggested by sri Chandrakantaraj Urs is accepted. ( 19 ) IN the result, this writ petition is allowed and (a) the following portion of sub-rule (5) of Rule 111, viz. ," to the Secretary of the RTA concerned and another copv of such list duly attested by the said Secretary. . . . . . . provided that wnere the contract is entered into and the journey is commenced either after office hours or on a holiday an unattested copy of such list shall be carried in the vehicle and another copy thereof shall be delivered to the Secretary of the RTA concerned on the next working day following the day of the commencement of the journey. "and (b) sub-rule (7) of Rule 111 of the Mysore Motor Vehicles Rules, 1963, are declared void as offending Art. 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. No costs. --- *** --- .