JUDGMENT P. Govindan Nair, C.J. 1. The petitioner is a Head Sorter in the Railway Mail Service attached to the Sub Record Office, Cochin Sorting Air, Cochin. The punishment of recovery of a sum of Rs. 1,440 from the salary of the petitioner at the rate of Rs. 40 per mensem and the balance from the gratuity amount due to him had been imposed on him by Ext. P-3 order for the alleged negligence, dereliction of duty and slack supervision and disregard of instructions and rules. It is further alleged that as a result of the abovementioned conduct of the petitioner, theft of ten insured articles worth Rs. 6,100 occurred. 2. The procedure adopted before imposing the punishment was that prescribed by rule 16 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, for short, the Rules. This Rule only requires that the Government servant should be informed in writing of the proposal to take action against him and of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour on which it is proposed to be taken and further that he should be given a reasonable opportunity of making such representations as he may wish to make against the proposal. Ext. P-1 which is styled Memo was issued to the petitioner along with Ext. P-1 (a), statement of imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour. The petitioner made his representations Ext. P-2. It is admittedly after considering Ext. P-2 that the order Ext. P-3 had been passed. 3. Counsel on behalf of the petitioner contended that the order Ext. P-1 should not be allowed to stand in view of the fact that no specific notice had been issued to the petitioner regarding the imposition of the penalty of recovery from the pay and gratuity which, it is said, would involve pecuniary loss to the petitioner. According to him, before such punishment is imposed, there must be a specific notice stating that it is proposed to recover the amount from his salary. Counsel relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Gopalakrishna Naidu v. The State of Madhya Pradesh A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 240, B. D. Gupta v. State of Haryana, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 2472 and State of Punjab v. K. P, Erry and Sobhag Raj Metha A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 834. Counsel relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Gopalakrishna Naidu v. The State of Madhya Pradesh A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 240, B. D. Gupta v. State of Haryana, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 2472 and State of Punjab v. K. P, Erry and Sobhag Raj Metha A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 834. In the first of these cases, the question that arose for consideration was whether the order under rule 54 of the Fundamental Rules was validly passed without giving an opportunity to the Government servant to make his representations. The Supreme Court held that as an order under the Rule involved pecuniary loss to the Government servant such an order should not have been passed without affording a reasonable opportunity to the Government servant to make his representations. This is the same principle as what we stated in a case decided earlier in Assistant Educational Officer, Kuttipuram v. Mohammed 1967 K.L.T. 388 and in a more recent ruling in O. P. No. 1120 of 1969 and in that decision we have referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Gopalakrishna Naidu v. The State of Madhya Pradesh A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 240. The principle of these decisions will not enable the petitioner to contend that there should be a second show cause notice before punishment contemplated by rule 11 (iii) of the Rule is imposed. This is a punishment which can be imposed on a Government servant after complying with the procedure contemplated by rule 16 of the Rules. This Rule, as already stated, insists that the Government servant should be informed in writing of the proposal to take action against him and of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour on which it is proposed to be taken. Whether this rule has been complied with, I shall see presently but regarding the contention based on the decision of the Supreme Court in Gopalakrishna Naidu v. The State of Madhya Pradesh A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 240, it has to be stated that the principle has no application. The dicta of the Supreme Court in the decision in E. D. Gupta v. State of Haryana A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 2472 also is not helpful for deciding the question whether rule 16(1) (a) of ,the Rules had been complied with. That was a case where an enquiry commenced against a person was withdrawn by the Government. The dicta of the Supreme Court in the decision in E. D. Gupta v. State of Haryana A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 2472 also is not helpful for deciding the question whether rule 16(1) (a) of ,the Rules had been complied with. That was a case where an enquiry commenced against a person was withdrawn by the Government. One would normally have expected that by the withdrawal of the enquiry the allegations against the Government servant would be dropped. But on the 26th of October, 1966, a fresh show cause notice was issued against the Government servant stating that the reply given by him to the charges and allegations levelled against him had been found unsatisfactory by the Government and that Government proposed to censure his conduct. It was this procedure that had been commented upon by the Supreme Court and the observations in the case must be understood in the light of the peculiar facts. There were two charges and the Supreme Court styled them as charges 1 (a) and 1 (b) against the Government servant. Charge 1(a) had been found to be unsustainable before the show cause notice dated 26th October, 1966 was issued. Nevertheless in a compendious fashion the Government stated that the representations made by the Government servant were unsatisfactory. Whether charge 1 (b) also was relied on it was not clear. It was in these circumstances that it was observed by the Supreme Court that the procedure adopted was violative of the principles of natural justice. I do not think the decision has any application to the facts of this case. The decision in State of Punjab v. K. R. Erry and Sobhag Raj Mehta A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 834 is equally inapplicable. It arose out of a case where the Government informed the Government servant that though he was entitled to a superannuation pension of Rs. 423.05 per month and death-cum-retirement gratuity of Rs. 16,320 the Government had decided to impose a cut of 29 percent in the pension and Rs. 2,000 in the gratuity amount under rule 6.4 of the Punjab Civil Services Pension Rules, since, in the opinion of the Government, the service record of Shri Erry was not satisfactory. It was an admitted fact that before this cut was applied, Shri Erry had not been furnished the grounds nor had he been given an opportunity to show cause against the proposed cut. It was an admitted fact that before this cut was applied, Shri Erry had not been furnished the grounds nor had he been given an opportunity to show cause against the proposed cut. That is not the case here and this leads me to the question whether there has been compliance with rule 16 (1) (a) of the Rules. This clause insists that the Government servant must be informed in writing of the proposal to take action against him and of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour on which it is proposed to be taken. This, I think had been done in this case. The proposal to take action under rule 16 of the Rules is stated in Ext. P-1 and the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour had been detailed in Ext. P-1 (a). Further it has been stated in Ext. P-1 (a) that as a result of the negligence, dereliction of duty and slack supervision and disregard of instructions and rules, insured articles worth Rs. 6,100 were stolen and thereby a loss of Rs. 6,100 had been caused to the Government. Rule 11 (iii) of the Rules provides for imposition of the penalty of recovery of loss to Government, from the pay of a Government servant. This is a minor penalty� and this can be imposed in proceedings under rule 16 of the Rules. Details of misconduct had been furnished by Ext. P-1 (a). Reasonable opportunity had been afforded to the petitioner to make his representations regarding Ext. P-1 (a) and he did so by Ext. P-2. In these circumstances, it is not possible to contend that there has been violation of the principles of natural justice or that the procedure adopted had been so defective as to justify interference by this court in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. 4. Counsel then contended that only in cases where the Government had suffered losses that the penalty under rule 11 (iii) of the Rules can be imposed and he invited my attention to section 6 of the Indian Post Office Act, 1898. Section 6 of that Act is not the section that is applicable when an article that had been insured had been lost. There is another section providing for liability in the case of loss of an insured article, and that is section 33 of the Act. Section 6 of that Act is not the section that is applicable when an article that had been insured had been lost. There is another section providing for liability in the case of loss of an insured article, and that is section 33 of the Act. It is true that even under this section the compensation payable shall not exceed the value of the article lost or the amount of the damage caused as the proviso in the section indicated. But I am not concerned with that aspect in this case, for, the categorical statement in Ext. P-1 (a) that there has been a loss of Rs. 6,100 to the Government had not been disputed by the petitioner in Ext. P-2. 5. Counsel then contended that it was not part of the duty of the petitioner to be in custody of the mail bags in which the insured articles were kept and that those articles were to be in the custody of the mail sorters and he relied on Ext. P-4 produced along with C. M. P. No. 12978 of 1973 in support of his contention. Rule 48 in Part I of Chapter 3 of Posts and Telegraphs Manual, Volume VII, dealing with Railway Mail Services, details the duties and responsibility of a Head Sorter. Assuming that Ext. P-4 is a relaxation of the provision in this Rule, it is clear that even under Ext. P-4, the Head Sorter has to be in charge of the office and will be personally responsible for maintenance of strict discipline and general upkeep of the office and that he should attend to the overall supervision of work in the office. He should supervise the opening and closing of bags which should be in his presence and he should check the insured articles and get the bags containing insured articles closed. He should further complete the insured check list and file it along with the work papers. The case against the petitioner was that the 12 bags, some of them containing insured articles, were kept unopened throughout the night facilitating theft of two of those bags and thus some of the insured articles. He should further complete the insured check list and file it along with the work papers. The case against the petitioner was that the 12 bags, some of them containing insured articles, were kept unopened throughout the night facilitating theft of two of those bags and thus some of the insured articles. It is an admitted fact that the petitioner slept from 3-30 a.m. and continued to sleep till 6-15 a.m. though he was supposed to be on duty till 6 a.m. He gave permission to two of the Sorters to leave at 3 a.m. and two others left without permission, it appears, also at 3 a.m. This can hardly be said to be a proper supervision of the work nor can it be said that he had discharged the duties imposed on him. It is therefore, not possible to accept the contention that the petitioner had no responsibility nor am I impressed by the argument that the petitioner ceased to be on duty at 6 a.m. and that the discovery of the open bag from the latrine took place at 615 and therefore, it had not been established that the theft actually took place during the duty hours of the petitioner. The interval is almost insignificant and it is clear that the bag must have been removed long before dawn. 6. The only further contention to be considered in the case is that the order imposing recovery of the balance amount from the gratuity payable to the petitioner is unsustainable. I shall extract the decretal portion of the order first: Recovery of the full amount of loss is warranted in this case. But taking into consideration all aspects, I, C. G. Menon, Senior Superintendent, R.M.S. EK Division hereby order that an amount of Rs.1,440 (Rupees one thousand four hundred and forty only) be recovered from the pay of Sri N. N. Sekharan, L.S.G. Head Sorter at the rate of Rs. 40 (rupees forty only) per month commencing from the pay of August, 1973 payable on 1st September 1973 as part of the loss. The recovery could not be completed before 13th October 1975 the date of his retirement and the outstanding amount will be adjusted from the gratuity amount due to him. 7. The penalty permissible under rule 11 (iii) is only recovery from the pay of a Government servant. The recovery could not be completed before 13th October 1975 the date of his retirement and the outstanding amount will be adjusted from the gratuity amount due to him. 7. The penalty permissible under rule 11 (iii) is only recovery from the pay of a Government servant. No recovery from the gratuity is therefore, permissible and that part of the order cannot stand. Counsel on behalf of the respondents contended that the order will indicate that it directed the recovery of the entire amount of Rs. 1,440 from the salary of the petitioner and that if recovery of the entire amount of Rs. 1,440 at the rate of Rs. 40 per month is not possible, recovery at a higher rate per month is possible. I am not able to accept this contention, for, the order indicates that recovery from the pay must be only at the rate of Rs. 40 per mensem. Such a direction must have been given for the valid reason that recovery at a higher rate would be unjust. It is not possible for me to alter this rate and the authority concerned not having decided to recover any higher amount, I do not think, I should permit any fresh orders being passed directing recovery at a higher rate. The order read as a whole stems to have been passed under a misconception that recovery from the gratuity also is permissible. That part of the order directing recovery of the balance from the gratuity is severable from the rest of it. I, therefore, quash that part of the order leaving in intact the rest which indicates that recovery from the salary can only be at the rate of Rs. 40 per mensem. 8. Before closing this case, I would like to mention that counsel for the petitioner had taken pains to investigate all the aspects of fact and law pertaining to the cause and it was refreshing to listen to well-prepared arguments. 9. This petition is disposed of on the above terms mentioned in paragraph 7 above. There will be no order as to costs.