Judgment :- 1. There is neither any merit nor bona fides in the contentions advanced by the revision petitioner in this case. 2. O. S. No. 20 of 1951 on the file of the Subordinate Judge's Court, Palghat was a suit instituted by the Ist respondent heroin against the 2nd respondent for partition and recovery of possession of a half share in the plaint schedule properties which were admittedly owned in common by respondents 1 and 2. That suit which was instituted on 9-2-1951 resulted in a preliminary decree for partition rendered on 31-3-1952. Subsequently, a final decree was also passed allotting specific portions of the properties towards the half share claimed by the Ist respondent-plaintiff. When proceedings for delivery of possession in execution of that decree were initiated by the Ist respondent, the revision petitioner offered obstruction to the delivery contending that he had a leasehold right in respect of the property allotted to the plaintiff Ist respondent by virtue of an oral lease granted in his favour by the 2nd respondent on 6-2-1951 and a subsequent registered lease deed dated 20-6-1951 executed by the 2nd respondent. Since the order passed by the executing court on the application made before it by the Ist respondent for removal of obstruction was not favourable to him, the Ist respondent-instituted O. S. No. 401 of 1961 in the Munsiff's Court, Palghat seeking a declaration of his right to recovery of possession of the property from the present revision petitioner. Though that suit was dismissed by the court of first instance, its judgment was set aside on appeal by the District Court, Palghat which granted the Ist respondent a decree as prayed for by him. The matter was then taken up by the revision petitioner to this Court by filing S. A. No. 796 of 1965. In the meantime, the Kerala Land Reforms Act Act 1 of 1964 had come into force and taking advantage of the provisions contained in S.7 of the said Act, a contention was put forward by the revision petitioner appellant in the second appeal that he is entitled to be regarded as a deemed tenant under S.7 of the Act. In the meantime, the Kerala Land Reforms Act Act 1 of 1964 had come into force and taking advantage of the provisions contained in S.7 of the said Act, a contention was put forward by the revision petitioner appellant in the second appeal that he is entitled to be regarded as a deemed tenant under S.7 of the Act. He also put forward a further plea based on S.2(e) of -Act 5 of 1969 which provision corresponded substantially to the present S.7B of Act I of 1964 as amended by Act 35 of 1969 that he is entitled to the benefit of fixity of tenure by virtue of his having been in occupation of the land of the Ist respondent as on the 11th day of April 1957 on the basis of a registered document which purports to be a lease deed notwithstanding the fact that the person who granted the lease might not have been competent to lease out the land. Both these contentions were negatived by this Court and the second appeal was dismissed confirming the findings entered by the District Court. 3. Thereafter, when the 1st respondent decree-holder attempted to take delivery of the property, the revision petitioner moved the executing court with an application for stay of the proceedings under S.3 of the Kerala Cultivators and Tenants Temporary Protection Act, 1970 (Act 20 of 1970). The executing court having rejected that application, the petitioner again came up to this Court by filing C.R P. No. 33 of 1972. In that revision petition, he reiterated afresh his contentions based on S.7 as well as S.7B of Act 1 of 1964. The revision petition was heard by the very same learned Judge (T. S. Krishnamoorthy Iyer J.) who had previously disposed of S.A. No. 796 of 1965. After considering in detail the tenability of the contentions advanced by the petitioner based on S.7 and 7B of Act I of 1964, the learned judge held that the petitioner is not entitled to the benefit of either of those sections and dismissed the revision petition. 4. The next device adopted by the petitioner for further protraction of the proceedings for delivery was to move the executing court by an application E. A. No. 335 of 1972 praying for a review of the order passed by the court on 18121971 directing delivery of the decree-schedule properties to the decree-holder. 4. The next device adopted by the petitioner for further protraction of the proceedings for delivery was to move the executing court by an application E. A. No. 335 of 1972 praying for a review of the order passed by the court on 18121971 directing delivery of the decree-schedule properties to the decree-holder. The grounds mentioned in the application for justification of the prayer for review are that the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of S.7 and 7B of Act 1 of 1964, the provisions of which having been revived by reason of the inclusion of Act 1 of 1964 in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution. The court below held that the review petition was hopelessly time barred and that on the merits also there were no grounds at all justifying a review of the order for delivery passed on 18-12-1971. It relied on the judgments rendered inter parties by this Court in S. A. No. 796 of 1965 and C.R.P. No. 33 of 1972 for negativing the petitioner's contention based on S.7 and 7B of Act 1 of 1964. The petitioner has come up with this revision petition questioning the legality and correctness of the order passed by the court below rejecting his application for review. 5. As already indicated by me, there is no merit at all in any of the contentions put forward by the revision petitioner. Quite apart from the fact that the previous decisions rendered by this Court in S. A. No. 796 of 196S and CRP. No. 33 of 1972 clearly operate to debar the petitioner from reagitating the contentions which have already been turned down by this Court, there is no substance at all in the contention that the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of either of the aforesaid provisions namely S.7 and 7B of Act 1 of 1964. In O.S. No. 401 of 1961 the specific case put forward by the revision petitioner who was the defendant therein was that he obtained possession of the plaint schedule properties initially by virtue of an oral lease granted to him by the 2nd respondent on 6-2-1951 and that the said lease arrangement was subsequently continued under the registered document executed in his favour by the 2nd respondent on 20-6-1951. The oral lease which was set up by the defendant revision petitioner as the foundation of his right to possession of the property was found to be untrue by all the courts. The subsequent registered document was also found to be invalid by the District Court as well as by this Court as not conveying any right whatever in favour of the revision petitioner. That in such circumstances a person who has set up a specific lease and failed to establish that plea cannot turn round and contend that he should be treated as a deemed tenant under S.7 of the Act has been held by this Court in Kunhambu Nair v. Kunhammaru Amma (1973 KLT 1048), a decision which has been followed by me in a number of subsequent unreported judgments. There is therefore no scope at all for invoking the provisions of S.7 of the Act in aid of the petitioner. 6. Coming now to the plea raised by the petitioner based on S.7B, the petitioner can succeed only if be is able to make out that be was in occupation of the land of the Ist respondent on the 11th day of April 1957 on the basis of the registered deed purporting to be a lease deed. In this connection, it becomes highly relevant to remember that according to the case put forward by the petitioner, his occupation commenced not on the basis of the registered deed but on the basis of an oral lease which has been found by the courts to be false. So, the occupation originated from trespass and not under the registered deed. A person who has occupied a land by trespass and has thereafter purported to take a registered deed from another who is not competent or had no right whatever to grant the same will not, in my view, come within the ambit of S.7B because the said section is obviously intended to grant protection to persons who have bona fide entered upon the land on the basis of a document of lease granted in their favour by another who is ultimately found to be not competent to grant the lease, for which turn of events the grantee cannot be held responsible. The basic assumption underlying the said section is the absence of any collusion between the grantor and the grantee and the existence of bona fides on the part of the grantee even though the expression "bona fide" has not been specifically employed in the said section. The intention of the legislature is perfectly clear and the section has been introduced into the Act only with a view to grant protection to persons who may be in occupation of the lands belonging to others under documents purporting to be leases but which, for some technical or legal reasons, may ultimately be found to be lacking in validity but not in bona fides. The court below was therefore perfectly right in holding that the petitioner does not come within the scope of the benefit conferred by S.7B of the Act and that the said contention is also concluded against the petitioner by the pronouncement of this court in CRP. No. 33 of 1972. 7. The Civil Revision Petition therefore fails and is dismissed. The petitioner will pay the costs of the Ist respondent Advocate's fee Rs. 200/-.