Judgement SARMA, J. :- This application under Article 226 of the Constitution is directed against the judgement and order of the Assam Board of Revenue dated 7-12-1970 passed in Case No. 332 RA/68, by which it set aside the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Barpeta dated 13-8-1968 passed in R. A. No. 293/65-66, as well as that of the Assistant Settlement Officer, Baghbor Circle dated 29-11-1961 passed in Dispute Case No. 2, which was affirmed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Barpeta in the said appeal. 2. The Dispute Case No. 2 was initiated by the Assistant Settlement Officer, Baghbor Circle, during the last settlement operation on an application filed by the petitioner Mt. Fulbarunessa claiming mutation of her name in respect of 8 bighas and odd land in two dags, namely dag Nos. 213 and 233 of an annual patta of village Gobindapur, Mouzh Jabia, standing in the name of respondent No. 2 Pandit Ali. It was alleged by the petitioner in that petition that her mother Sarifunnessa along with her (Sarifunnessas) mother Mt. Jurfannessa and brother Pandit Ali jointly purchased the entire land of the patta from the original pattadar Isu Dewani under a registered sale deed dated 21-12-1934 and obtained possession, but the name of respondent No. 2 Pandit Ali alone was mutated in the patta after this purchase. All the same, it was alleged that the petitioners mother was in possession of her share (which is the disputed land) all along and later made a gift of the same in favour of the petitioner under an unregistered deed dated 3rd Falgoon. 1344 B. S. and accordingly the petitioner is in possession of the land since then by paying land revenue. 3. The respondent No. 2 resisted that petition. The Assistant Settlement Officer, after due inquiry allowed the application of the petitioner by his order dated 29-11-1961 and ordered issue of a separate patta in her name. Accordingly a separate patta, namely periodic patta No. 36 of village Gobindapur was issued in the name of the petitioner. Against the aforesaid order of the Assistant Settlement Officer, the respondent No. 2 filed an appeal before the Settlement Officer on 19-7-1962 with a footnote in the memorandum of appeal as below :- "N. B. Petition for certified copy of the order appealed against was submitted within a week of the order but copies could not be obtained in that petition. Certified copy of the order has been received on 16-7-1962 on a fresh petition submitted on 11-6-1962 and this appeal is not therefore time barred." The Settlement Officer admitted the appeal on that very day and it remained pending in his file till 9-9-1965, on which date he transferred the appeal to the Sub-Divisional Officer, Barpeta, as the settlement operation in Baghbor Circle was closed with effect from 1-3-1963. The learned Sub-Divisional Officer, on hearing both the parties, dismissed the appeal on merit as well as on the ground that it was barred by limitation. 4. Being aggrieved by the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer, the respondent No. 2 preferred an appeal before the Board of Re-venue under Section 147 of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation. In deciding the appeal, on the question of limitation the Board observed : "As regards the question of the appeal being time barred, as mentioned by the S.D.O., Barpeta, we are inclined to agree with the submission of the Advocate for the appellant that this point was already decided when S.O., Kamrup admitted the appeal in 1962." On merit also the Board reversed the finding of the Sub-Divisional Officer. In the result the appeal was allowed and the orders of both the Sub-Divisional Officer and the Assistant Settlement Officer were set aside. 5. Mr. N.M. Lahiri, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended before us that the learned Board of Revenue committed an error in law, apparent on the face of the record. In reversing the finding of the Sub-Divisional Officer on the question of limitation by holding that it was already decided by the Settlement Officer while admitting the appeal and that it acted without jurisdiction in setting aside the orders of the Sub-Divisional Officer and the Assistant Settlement Officer when admittedly the appeal against the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer was filed beyond time without any prayer for condonation of the delay. 6. Mr. Sulaiman, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 2, did not dispute the fact that the appeal against the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer was filed before the Settlement Officer, beyond time. 6. Mr. Sulaiman, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 2, did not dispute the fact that the appeal against the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer was filed before the Settlement Officer, beyond time. He advanced the same argument, as was advanced before the Board of Revenue, that the appeal having been admitted by the Settlement Officer, it is to be presumed that the delay was condoned and the Sub-Divisional Officer had no jurisdiction to reopen the matter. 7. We entirely agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Board fell into an error in holding that the question of limitation was finally decided, once the appeal was admitted by the Settlement Officer. It appears from the record that the Settlement Officer did not apply his mind to the question of limitation at all while admitting the appeal. Except the word "admitted" there is nothing in the order of admission. He must have admitted the appeal on the assumption that it was within time, as stated by the appellant in the footnote appended to his memo of appeal. Even if he had applied his mind and condoned the delay, ex parte, at the time of admission of the appeal, that could not have debarred the respondent-petitioner from agitating the question of limitation at the time of hearing. It is a settled law that where an appeal or application filed, beyond time is admitted, ex parte, after excusing delay, without notice to the opposite party, there is a violation of the principle of natural justice and the latter is entitled, at the hearing, to object to the admission and the Court can reopen the question and decide whether there is sufficient cause for admitting the appeal or application beyond time. The leading case on the point is Krishnasami v. Ramasami, AIR 1917 PC 179, where their Lordships of the Privy Council observed : "It has been argued that the admission of the appeal by Sankaran Nair, J., was final and that the Division Bench had no jurisdiction at the hearing of the appeal to re-consider the question whether the delay was excusable. But this order of admission was made not only in the absence of Ramasamy Chettiar, the contesting respondent, but without notice to him. But this order of admission was made not only in the absence of Ramasamy Chettiar, the contesting respondent, but without notice to him. And yet in term it purported to deprive him of a valuable right, for it put in peril the finality of the decision in his favour, so that to preclude him from questioning its propriety would amount to a denial of justice. It must, therefore, in common fairness be regarded as a tacit term of an order like the present that, though unqualified in expression, it should be open to reconsideration at the instance of the party prejudicially affected; and this view is sanctioned by the practice of the Courts in India." A similar view was taken in a recent unreported Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Malati Gogoi v. Kanaklata Datta Civil Rule No. 603 of 1970, decided on 23-4-1973 (Gauhati). 8. The expiration of the period of imitation for an appeal gives rise to a valuable right in favour of the respondent, to real the order appealed against as binding and beyond challenge, as between the parties. When sufficient cause for excusing the delay is shown, discretion is given to the Court to condone the delay and admit the appeal. The existence of sufficient cause, or not filing the appeal in time, is a condition precedent that must be satisfied before a Court or tribunal can exercise its discretion to grant or refuse extension of time. If this condition is not satisfied, there is no room for exercising that discretion to excuse the delay. In the instant case, as we have already pointed out, there is no dispute that the appeal before the Settlement Officer was filed beyond time. The respondent No. 2, while filing the appeal, gave an explanation to the Settlement Officer that it was within time, stating that he earlier filed an application for copy of the order appealed against but failed to get any copy on that application. No affidavit was filed to that effect and there was no application for condonation of the delay. It appears that this contention was not pressed either before the Sub-Divisional Officer or before the Board. Under the circumstances there was no basis for condonation of the delay. 9. No affidavit was filed to that effect and there was no application for condonation of the delay. It appears that this contention was not pressed either before the Sub-Divisional Officer or before the Board. Under the circumstances there was no basis for condonation of the delay. 9. As a result of the foregoing discussion, we have no hesitation to hold that the impugned order of the Revenue Board was illegal and without jurisdiction. We accordingly quash the said order in exercise of our powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. The petition, is allowed and the rule is made absolute. In the circumstances of the case. We, however, leave the parties to bear their own costs. P.K. GOSWAMI, C. J. :- I agree. Petition allowed.