JUDGMENT 1. MESSRS Bird and Co. (P.) Ltd. and Messrs F. W. Heilgers and Co. (P.) Ltd. were the Managing Agents of the petitioner company with several other companies. The Respondent No. 3, Sri Nityananda Ghosh at the material time was employed directly under the aforesaid Messrs Bird and Co. (P.) Ltd. and F. W. Heilgers and Co. (P.) Ltd. in their Statistical Quality Control Department. The office of the said department was situated in the petitioner's premises at Titagar. The service of the respondent No. 3 was under the control and supervision of the Chief Mill Manager of the said company having its office also at the petitioner's premises at Titagar. It is stated that the respondent No. 3 was dismissed from service on July 23, 1964 by the Chief Mill Manager after a charge sheet was issued and a departmental enquiry was held. It further appears that the workmen of the petitioner company took up the matter regarding the dismissal of respondent No. 3 through the mill Committee of the National Union of Jute Workers but due to some technical objection being raised regarding the capacity of the secretary of the Mill Committee, the said matter was not pursued and thereafter the respondent No. 3 personally continued to pursue the said matter. 2. BY the Industrial Disputes (Amendment Act), 1965 (Act 35 of 1965) Section 2-A was inserted in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act. The said section came into effect from December 1, 1965. The respondent No. 3 made certain representation to the Labour Directorate of the State Government in march 1966 and thereafter the State Government made the following reference under Section 10 read with Section 2-A of the Act on September 10, 1966 to the Fifth Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal: "whether the dismissal of Sri Nityananda Ghosh is justified? to what relief, if any, is he entitled?" it may be noticed that the said reference was made in view of the insertion of Section 2-A in the Act as the respondent No. 3 appeared individually without being represented by any Union or by any other workmen collectively. Before the Industrial Tribunal a preliminary objection was raised by the petitioner contending that the respondent No. 3 having been dismissed on July 23, 1964, the said act of dismissal took place prior to the introduction of Section 2-A of the Act. Before the Industrial Tribunal a preliminary objection was raised by the petitioner contending that the respondent No. 3 having been dismissed on July 23, 1964, the said act of dismissal took place prior to the introduction of Section 2-A of the Act. It was therefore contended that as the workman was not represented by any Union or by any group of workmen the dispute was an individual dispute and hence the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain such a dispute. The Tribunal overruled the said objection of the petitioner and held inter alia that as on the date of reference under Section 10 (1) of the Act Section 2-A has -already come into operation, the dispute was an industrial dispute and hence the reference was not incompetent. The petitioner has challenged the said decision of the Tribunal in this application. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has reiterated the same contention which was urged before the Industrial tribunal. It was contended that as the respondent No. 3 was dismissed prior to the coming into effect of Section 2-A of the Act. The dispute at the time was an individual dispute as it was not espoused either by the Union or by other workmen. Section 2-A of the Act not being retrospective in its operation cannot govern such a dispute. Although at the time of reference Section 2-A was in operation, the material date will be not the time when the reference was made but the time when the dismissal took place. Reliance was placed in support of this contention upon the decision in the case of Messrs Air France v. Miss K. Kotwal and others (1970 2 LLJ 68) and also upon the case of P. Janardhan Shetty v. Union of India (1970 2 LLJ 738). The learned counsel for the respondent no. 3 submitted that as the dispute was in existence and continued on the date when the reference was made there was no question of giving any retrospective effect to Section 2-A of the Act. In support of his contention he relied upon the decisions in the case of Surendra Mohan Mitra v. Republic Engineering Corporation Ltd. (39 FJR 87) and National Productivity Council, New Delhi v. S. N. Kaul (1969 2 LLJ 136. In support of his contention he relied upon the decisions in the case of Surendra Mohan Mitra v. Republic Engineering Corporation Ltd. (39 FJR 87) and National Productivity Council, New Delhi v. S. N. Kaul (1969 2 LLJ 136. To appreciate the rival contentions of the parties it is necessary to consider the nature and character of an industrial dispute as defined in Section 2 (k) of the Act before the introduction of Section 2-A. The preponderance of the judicial opinion was that a dispute between an employer and a single employee cannot per se be an industrial dispute, but it may become one if it is taken up by the Union or a number of workmen Central Provinces Transport Service Ltd. v. Raghunath ( AIR 1957 SC 104 . The underlying purpose of restricting an industrial dispute to a collective dispute is based on the necessity of achieving collective amity between labour and capital by recourse to the various means of conciliation, mediation and adjudication provided under the Act. 3. INSPITE of the very wide language used in Section 2 (k), a dispute touching the individual rights of a workman was not intended to be the subject of an adjudication under the Act unless it acquired the general characteristic of an industrial dispute, viz. the workmen as a body or a considerable section of them had made a common case with the individual workman and had taken up the individual rights of the workmen. Section 2-A of the Act by a deeming provision has extended the scope and definition of an "industrial dispute" as defined in Section 2 (k) of the Act. The fiction introduced by Section 2-A deems an individual dispute connected with or arising out of "discharge", "dismissal", "retrenchment" or "termination" as an "industrial dispute" notwithstanding that no other workmen nor any Union of workmen is a party to the dispute. The result of the insertion of Section 2-A is that an individual workman himself can raise an industrial dispute regarding his discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise termination of his service and it will be competent for the authority under the Act to deal with such a dispute of an individual workman as an "industrial dispute" even though there is no espousal by his fellow workmen or any Union composed of them. The question arises as to whether a workman is entitled to the benefit of Section 2-A unless his dismissal, termination, etc. took place after the coming into effect of Section 2-A of the Act. A determination of this question requires an analysis of the scope and the object of the Act and the circumstance leading to the introduction of the amendment. Under Section 2 (k) of the Act only such a dispute which involves the rights of workmen as a class would come within the definition. A dispute which is concerned only with the rights of an individual workman was treated as an individual dispute, but if such an individual dispute is taken up either by the Union or a number of workmen it acquires the character of an industrial dispute. An individual dispute, therefore, has the potentiality of being converted into an industrial dispute and when such a dispute is espoused by a Union or a number of workmen. The crucial test is therefore at the time when the reference is made under Section 10 (1) of the Act by the appropriate Government, whether the dispute so referred has acquired the quality and character of an industrial dispute, in the sense that such a dispute has been supported either by the Union or by a number of workmen. See Bombay Union of Journalists and others v. Hindu, Bombay and another (1961 3 FLR 466=1950-67 3 SCLJ 1769= 1961 2 LLJ 436 . An industrial dispute as denned 1 under the Act postulates and pre-supposes a dispute between employer and workmen. Until such a dispute arises or is apprehended on the date of reference, there cannot be any question of an industrial dispute which can be referred for adjudication. An act of dismissal therefore cannot per se be equated with an industrial dispute. Such an act may constitute an incident which may give rise to a dispute between the employer and its workmen. There is nothing in Section 2-A of the Act which suggests that in order that an industrial dispute may be treated as an industrial dispute under the said section the facts which have given rise to such a dispute must have arisen after the coming into effect of Section 2-A of the Act. There is nothing in Section 2-A of the Act which suggests that in order that an industrial dispute may be treated as an industrial dispute under the said section the facts which have given rise to such a dispute must have arisen after the coming into effect of Section 2-A of the Act. Let us take a case where the act of dismissal takes place the day prior to the coming into effect of Section 2-A, but the workman concerned has raised the dispute before the Management on the next day or a few days thereafter. 4. IF the material date is to be taken as the date of dismissal, the dispute cannot be treated as an industrial dispute by reason of the deeming clause. In fact the dispute was not raised until the deeming provision came into operation. Such a construction, in my view, is patently unacceptable. In ascertaining whether an individual dispute has acquired the status and character of an industrial dispute one has to consider whether on the date of reference it has become so by reason of Section 2-A of the Act. I do not read anything in Section 2-A which lends support to the view that it will apply only to a dispute which originated after this section came into force. The facts giving rise to the dispute may have arisen prior to the introduction of Section 2-A but this does not preclude the operation of the section if at the time when it has come into force, the dispute is in existence and is continuing and is clothed with the character of an industrial dispute by reason of the deeming section. This view is supported by the decision in the case of Birla Brothers Ltd. v. Modok (ILR 1948 2 Cal. 209. Since the said decision has been approved of by the Supreme Court in the case of Jahiruddin and others v. K. D. Rathi (1966 2 FLR 196=air1966 SC 907), it is now a fairly established principle that if a dispute which originated before the Act came into force but was in existence on the date when that Act became law, the Act applied to the dispute since it was in existence and continuing on that date and no question of giving retrospective effect to the act arose. The above decision gives a quietus to all such contentions regarding the retrospective operation of the deeming clause when it is attracted to a dispute which originated prior to its introduction but continued to exist after the new clause came into operation. The several distinct senses in which the word 'retrospective' is used have sometime given rise to a good deal of confusion. It is now well established that a statute is not properly called retrospective 'because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from time antecedent to its passing. See R. v. St. Mary White chapel (1848 12 QB 120), Master Ladies Tailors Organisation v. Minister of Labour and National Service (1950 2 All. ER 525. The view that I have taken is supported by the decision in the case of surendra Mohan Mitra v. Republic Engineering Corpn. Ltd. (supra. The earlier Division Bench Judgment of this court in the case of Messrs Air France v. Miss K. Kotwal and others (supra) has also been considered in the subsequent decision of this court. In my view this point has not been raised in its present form in the case decided by the Division Bench and as such has not been concluded by the said decision. The only question which was raised in the Division bench case of Air France was whether the Aero Employees Union not being representative Union of the employees of the Company, i.e. Messrs Air France is not entitled under the law to sponsor the case of the respondent workman. The Division Bench remanded the matter as there were not sufficient materials on records to come to the conclusion that the said Union was fairly representative of the employees engaged in the industries of air transport. The judgment of the Mysore High Court in the case of Janardhan Shetty v. Union of India (supra) no doubt has taken a different view but for the reasons set out earlier in my judgment I respectfully agree with the view taken in the case of National Productivity Council v. S.N. Kaul (supra) and the decision of this court in the case of Surendra Mohan Mitra v. Republic Engineering Corpn. Ltd. (supra. Ltd. (supra. In my view as the dispute was in existence and continued on December 1, 1965 when section 2-A came into force, on the date of reference which was subsequent to the introduction of Section 2-A the dispute has acquired the character of an industrial dispute by reason of the introduction of the deeming clause and hence the reference is not incompetent. For the reasons set out above this rule is discharged. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. There will be no order as to costs.