JUDGMENT 1. This appeal is at the instance of the plaintiff and it arises out of a suit for eviction. 2. The defendant had been a tenant of the plaintiff and his three brothers in respect of the second floor of premise no. 25a, Raj Chandra Sen. Lane The case of the plaintiff is that the said premises has since been partitioned between him and his brothers by a deed of partition dated December 16, 1970. Under this partition the portion marked 'c' in the plaint annexed to the deed of partition, fell to the share of the plaintiff. The tenancy of the defendant in respect of the second floor is also in clouded in this plan. Since the partition, the defendant became a tenant under the plaintiff exclusively and the defendant had been paying rent to the plaintiff alone. The plaintiff has been residing in premises No. 28b, Raj Chandra Sen Lane, which belongs to his brother Kanai Lai, as his licensee. It has been alleged that in allotment 'c' which has fallen to his share, there is no staircase leading from the first floor 10 the second floor. 'the defendant has been going to the second floor through another stair case, which has fallen to the share of another brother. In the partition deed, it has been provided that the defendant would be allowed to use the aforesaid staircase upto March 31, 1972. In order to make the second floor habitable, the plaintiff claims that he has to construct a staircase from the first to the second floor of the said premises. Accordingly, the plaintiff claims that he requires the suit premises for the purposes of building and re-building and also for his own occupation. The plaintiff determined the tenancy of the defendant by the; service of a notice to quit. But the; defendant not having vacated the suit premises, the present suit has been filed by the plaintiff. The defendant has contested the suit by filing a written statement. It has been contended by her that the suit is barred by the provisions of sub-section (2a) of Section 13 of the West Bengal premises Tenancy Act, 1956. She has denied that the plaintiff requires the suit premises for his own occupation or for the purposes of building a staircase, as alleged. 3. It has been contended by her that the suit is barred by the provisions of sub-section (2a) of Section 13 of the West Bengal premises Tenancy Act, 1956. She has denied that the plaintiff requires the suit premises for his own occupation or for the purposes of building a staircase, as alleged. 3. The learned Judge, Seventh blench, City Civil Court, Calcutta came to the rinding that the plaintiff's suit is barred, by sub-section (3a) of Section 13. He also found that the plaintiff failed to prove his requirement of the suit premises either for his own occupation or for the purposes of building and re-building. In that view of the matter, the learned judge dismissed the suit. Hence this appeal at the instance of the plaintiff. 4. The first point to be considered is whether the suit is barred by sub section (3a) of Section 13. The learned judge took the view that partition was a transfer and that the plaintiff got the suit premises by transfer from his other co-sharers. In my opinion, the learned judge is entirely wrong. Partition is not a transfer in law and as such, the provisions of sub-section (3a) of Section 13 is not attracted at all. Accordingly, the finding of the learned Judge that the suit is barred by sub-section (3a) of Section 13 cannot be accepted. The next question is whether the plaintiff reasonably requires the suit premises. As has been stated already, the suit premises is the second floor of premises No. 25a, Raj Chandra Sen lane consisting of two rooms, bath and kitchen. There can be no doubt that the said premises has been partitioned between the plaintiff and his brothers. It is also not disputed that the plaintiff has been residing as a licensee in premises No. 28b, Raj Chandra Sen Lane belonging to his brother F-nai Lal. The accommodation of a licensee cannot be considered as a reasonably suitable accommodation. There is no evidence to shown that the plaintiff has got any other accommodation elsewhere besides the suit premises. In my opinion, this is sufficient for passing a decree for eviction in favour of the plaintiff. It has not been disputed and it is also the rinding of the learned judge that the plaintiff requires four rooms, one kitchen and a bath. In my opinion, this is sufficient for passing a decree for eviction in favour of the plaintiff. It has not been disputed and it is also the rinding of the learned judge that the plaintiff requires four rooms, one kitchen and a bath. The learned Judge is of the view that as the suit premises consists of two rooms only the same will not meet the plaintiffs requirement. The plaintiff has, how ever, said in his evidence that he has filed a suit for the eviction of the ground floor tenant. It transfers from his evidence that he has not filed any suit against the first floor tenant. The learned Judge could not believe the plaintiff's story of requirement on the ground that if the plaintiff had really required the suit premises, he would have also taken steps for evicting the first floor tenants. I am not inclined to accept this argument of the learned judge. It is for the plaintiff how he will use the suit premises. If the plaintiff chooses to use the suit premises and the ground floor for the accommodation of himself and the members of his family that, will not demolish or disprove his case for reasonable requirement of the suit premises. The learned Judge has also disbelieved the plaintiff's ease that he will have to construct a staircase from the first floor to the second floor. The plaintiff is an officer of Hindustan Steel and he gets a salary of Rs. 1,500/- per month. The learned judge has observed that he may be a man who spread more than Rs. 1,500/-per month but may not have any bank balance. This observation of the foamed judge is based on mere conjecture. I fail to understand why a person having a monthly income of Rs. 1,500/- is not in a position to construct a small stair case. I believe the case of the plaintiff that he will construct a staircase and that the plaintiff is in a position to construct the same. After considering the respective cases of the parties and the evidence adduced on their behalf, I am satisfied that the plaintiff has been able to make out a case for reasonable requirement of the suit premises for his own occupation and for the purposes of constructing a staircase from the first floor to the second floor. 5. After considering the respective cases of the parties and the evidence adduced on their behalf, I am satisfied that the plaintiff has been able to make out a case for reasonable requirement of the suit premises for his own occupation and for the purposes of constructing a staircase from the first floor to the second floor. 5. For the reasons stated above, the judgment and decree of the learned judge are hereby set aside and the suit is decreed. The appeal is allowed but I direct each party to bear his own costs both in this Court and in the court below. 6. The defendant is granted time till the end of February, 1974 so as to enable her to vacate and deliver up vacant and peaceful possession of the suit premises to the plaintiff. The defendant shall go on depositing in the trial court the monthly mesne profits at the rate of rent month by month by the 15th of the next month following that for which it is due; the first of such deposits shall be made on or before December 15, 1978 for the month of November 1973. If the defendant commits default in depositing the mesne profits for a single month, the plaintiff will be entitled to execute the decree at once, notwithstanding the time grant ed in favour of the defendant. If any amount i.e. deposited by the defendant in terms of this judgment and the amounts which are already been deposited by the defendant either in the court below or with the Rent Controller, the plaintiff will be entitled to with draw the same without furnishing any security. Appeal allowed.