JUDGMENT 1. THESE two Rules are at the instance of the accused petitioner, Prabhudayal Gupta, directed against two orders dated the 13th September, 1973 passed by Sri S. M. Guha, Sessions Judge, Alipore, District 24-Parganas rejecting the petitioner's application for bail in criminal misc. cases Nos. 744 of 1973 and 745 of 1973. The Rules, which were directed to be heard together, involve the same points and are taken up for disposal together for the sake of convenience. 2. THE backdrop of facts leading on to the two Rules can be put in a short compass. The accused-petitioner, Prabhudayal Gupta, was arrested under Sections 468, 420 and 120b of the Indian penal Code read with Section 8 of the west Bengal Anti-Profiteering Act, 1958 (Act XXIV of 1958), in connection with the Behala P. S. case No. 72 dated 22.6.73 and under Sections 468, 420 and 120b of the Indian Penal Code read with Sections 4 and 8 of the West Bengal Anti-profiteering Act, 1958 (Act xxiv of 1958) in connection with the bhowanipur P. S. Case No. 294 dated 30.6.73. Bereft of "all verbiage, the prosecution case, inter alia, is that the petitioner had entered into a conspiracy and collected the permits of a number of stockists of wheat bran making a clandestine sale after drawing the same from different flour mills. Most of the permits, it is alleged, were obtained in fictitious names of stockists who are non est. The petitioner was arrested on the 23rd July, 1973 and several cases were started against him and several others on different first information reports. He was admitted thereafter in the S.S.K.M. Hospital for treatment and on being discharged therefrom he was produced before the learned Magistrate at Alipore. An application for bail was made on his behalf on the ground that he was suffering from heart-trouble but the same was rejected. The accused-petitioner was kept in police custody till the 16th August, 1973 and in jail custody thereafter from the 17th August, 1973. A prayer made on his behalf for keeping him in a Nursing home under police vigilance was also rejected. Applications thereafter were made on his behalf from time to time for bail but, those were also rejected by the learned Magistrate as well as by the learned Sessions Judge, Alipore. A prayer made on his behalf for keeping him in a Nursing home under police vigilance was also rejected. Applications thereafter were made on his behalf from time to time for bail but, those were also rejected by the learned Magistrate as well as by the learned Sessions Judge, Alipore. The investigation proceeded and in course thereof several statements under section 161 of the Code of Criminal procedure as also two statements under section 164 of the Criminal Procedure code were recorded. There was a renewal of the prayer for bail and revisional applications, arising out of the two case mentioned above, were preferred before the learned Sessions Judge, Alipore but were ultimately rejected on the 13th September, 1973. The orders of rejection have been impugned and form the subject-matter of the present Rules. At the time when the Rules were issued by the Division Bench, the prayer for ad-interim bail was rejected "for the present". The contentions of Mr. Snehansu Kr. Acharya, Senior Advocate (with. Mr. D. P. Kundu, Advocate, who appeared on behalf of the accused petitioner in both the Rules, are of five; dimension;, one of which is of law and the other four based on facts. Mr. Gorari Mitter, Advocate-General, West Bengal (with Messrs Bipankar Gupta, standing Counsel, Promode Ranjan Roy, Junior Govt. Advocate and Mr. J. Roy Choudhury, Advocate) appearing on behalf of the State joined issue ore all the grounds and further raised an ancillary contention that at this stage bail should not be granted. 3. The first dimension of Mr. Acharya's contention is that even if one of the offences is non-bailable, the case does not come within the ambit of section 497 of the Criminal Procedure code; and that even if it does so, the powers of the High Court to grant bail under Section 498 of the Criminal Procedure code are unfettered and untrammelled by Section 497, and it can grant bail in any case whether the offences are bailable or not. The second branch of the submissions made on behalf of the accused-petitioner is that wheat bran having since been decontrolled the alleged offences are not serious and the prayer for bail should have been considered accordingly. The third dimension of Mr. The second branch of the submissions made on behalf of the accused-petitioner is that wheat bran having since been decontrolled the alleged offences are not serious and the prayer for bail should have been considered accordingly. The third dimension of Mr. Acharya's contention is that when on the same offence all other accused-persons have been allowed bail, the order refusing bail to the accused-petitioner, Prabhudayal Gupta, has been bad and repugnant. The fourth dimension of the argument raised is that the materials collected by the prosecution, including the statements recorded in the two cases, far from establishing the offences alleged, do not even land assurance to the same and as such the failure on the part of the learned Sessions Judge, alipore to grant bail to the accused-petitioner, has resulted in a failure of justice. The fifth and last dimension of Mr. Acharya's contention is based on the ground of the petitioner's illness. 4. WE will now proceed to consider the different dimensions of Mr. Acharya's submission. The first one; as already observed, is one of law going to the very root of the cases. For a proper consideration thereof a reference has to be made to the provisions of section 497 of the Code which are inter alia as follows : - "when any person accused of or suspected of the commission of any non-bailable offence is arrested or detained. . . . . . he may be released on bail, but he shall not be so released if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. " The aforesaid provisions have been amended by Section 14 of the West Bengal Maintenance of Public Order act, 1972 (West Bengal Act IX of 1972)and Section 14 (b) thereof provides that- "in section 497, in sub-section (1), for the portion beginning with if there appear reasonable grounds and ending with 'imprisonment for life, the words 'unless the prosecution has been given a reasonable opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and where such application is opposed by the prosecution unless the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of any offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of seven years or more' shall be substituted. " The aforesaid amendment therefore widens, in the first place, the periphery of Section 497, Criminal procedure Code by making the same applicable also to cases of imprisonment for a term of seven years or more and secondly, lays down the sine qua non for bail under the said Section, enjoining that the prosecution has to be given a reasonable opportunity to oppose the application for such release and that where such application is opposed by the prosecution, the Court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of any offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of seven years at more, before releasing the accused on bail. The offence under Section 468 of the Indian Penal Code which provides for imprisonment of either description for seven years and fine accordingly comes within the bounds of the amended provisions and unless and until there appears reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the said offence, he should not be released on bail. 5. MR. Acharya submitted in the first place that there are no reasonable grounds within the bounds of the amended provisions of Section 497 Criminal procedure Code for believing that the accused is guilty of an offence under Section 468 Indian Penal Code; and secondly that even if it was so, the bar under Section 497 Criminal Procedure Code does not apply to the provisions contained in Section 498 of the Code, whereunder the High Court's powers to grant bail, if it is so satisfied, are unfettered and untrammelled. 6. ON the point raised by Mr. Acharya as to whether Section 497 Criminal Procedure code controls Section 498, there were at one stage two apparently conflicting schools 01 opinion. The position in law however is now well-sealed and the cloud raised has since been removed by the imprimatur of judicial decisions. The first school of view is incorporated in a number of decisions. Some of which are referred to in this context. In the case of (1) Emperor v. Hutchinson imported in A.I.R. 1931 All. pp. 336, Mukherji, J, observed that "on general principles, and on principles of which Sees. 490 and 4d7 (as amended in 1923), are framed, the grant of bail should be the rule and the refusal of bail should be exception. In the case of (1) Emperor v. Hutchinson imported in A.I.R. 1931 All. pp. 336, Mukherji, J, observed that "on general principles, and on principles of which Sees. 490 and 4d7 (as amended in 1923), are framed, the grant of bail should be the rule and the refusal of bail should be exception. " The next case Is also' of the Allahabad High Court viz. the case of (4) K. N. Joglekar v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1831 All. pp. 504 (SB.) where in the Acting Chief Justice Suleian observed at pp. 506 that "it in a mistake to imagine that S. 498 is controlled by the limitations of S. 497 except when there are not reasonable grounds for believing that the accused committed the offence. " The next case on the point is the case of (5) Kedia Vasudeo Kortikar, Accused Petitioner v. Emperor Opposite Party reported in A.I.R. 1933 Bombay pp. 492. It was held therein that "having regard to s. 498 it is clear that the power of the sessions Judge, like the power of the high Court, is unlimited and not fettered, as the discretion of the Magistrate is by the provisions of sub -S. (1)S 497". A reference now may be made to the case of (6) Kripa Sankar, Appellant v. Emperor opposite party reported in A.I.R. 1948 All. pp. 26 wherein. Mr. Justice Malik (as his Lord-ship then was) relied on the Special Bench's decision in A.I.R. 1931 All. pp. 504 and held that "s. 498 confers upon a Sessions Judge or the High Court wide powers to grant bail which are not handicapped by the restrictions in the preceding section". A reference now may be made to a more recent decision of the Allahabad High Court viz. the case of (8) Md. Muzaffar v. State reported in A.I.R. 1963 All. pp. 127 wherein E. B. Asthana J. held that in the matter of granting bail under section 498 Criminal Procedure Could, the High Court has got a very wide discretion and the exercise of that unfettered discretion is not controlled b y the limitations of Section 497. " It is to be noted however the it the observations made in most of the cases referred to above are not wholly unqualified. The wide view taken by the Allahabad High Court in the case of Emperor v. Hutchinson in A.I.R. 1931 All. pp. " It is to be noted however the it the observations made in most of the cases referred to above are not wholly unqualified. The wide view taken by the Allahabad High Court in the case of Emperor v. Hutchinson in A.I.R. 1931 All. pp. 356 was considerably modified by the same High Court in the subsequent Special Bench's decision in the case of K. N. Joglekar emperor A.I.R. 1931 All. pp. 504 that the discretion is unfettered, it cannot be exercised arbitrarily, but must he exercised judicially. There is no hard-and-fast rule and no inflexible principle governing such discretion. The considerations are too numerous to be qualified or catalogued exhaustively". The Division Bench of the Bomb; y high Court also provided for an exception in Keshav vasudeo Kortikar's case and observed as follows: -"except of course in this sense that the Sessions Judge like the High Court will naturally not grant bail in a case which comes under the clause in question unless there are some good grounds for doing so", and in that context referred to the provisions of sub-Sec. (1) to Section 497 Cr. P. 2. In the case of Kripa Sankar referred to above Mr. Justice Malik (as His Lord ship then was) lelied on the other part of the Special Bench's Decision in k. IV. Joglekar's case and observed as follows. That the discretion is unfettered but of course it cannot be exercised arbitrarily but must be exercised judicially," and also that "it is the cumulative effect of all the combined circumstances that must weight with the court". In the other important: case referred to above constituting the first school of opinion viz., "section 498 (Jr. P. C. is not controlled by the limitations of Section 497 of the Code". Mr. Justice K. B. Asthana proceeded to observe that it is not any one single circumstance which necessarily concludes the discretion but it is the cumulative effect of all the combined practice and caution and relied on the principles laid down in the Special bench's decision in Jogekar's case. 7. WE will now proceed to consider the other school of decisions holding that Section 497 Cr. P. C. has an impact on the provisions contained in Section 498 of the Code and constitutes one of the many considerations for exercising the same. 8. 7. WE will now proceed to consider the other school of decisions holding that Section 497 Cr. P. C. has an impact on the provisions contained in Section 498 of the Code and constitutes one of the many considerations for exercising the same. 8. IN the case of (2) Emperor v. Sourindra Mohan Chuckerbutty reported in I.L.R. XXXVI. Calcutta pp. 412 Mr. Justice Stephen and Mr. Justice Carnduff observed at page 416 that "our power to grant bail 'in any case' as given by section 49s of the criminal Procedure Code is quite unfettered". It was further observed that "though we consider that in exercising our discretion we ought to take into consideration the limitations of the powers of other authorities to grant bail imposed by section 497 the former section does not in turn apply to section 498 of the Code, but we are of the opinion that we are to take the provisions into consideration in the same way as we are to take in consideration those of section 497". The next case on the point is till at of (7) Lala Jairam Das and others Appellants v. Emperor respondents reported in A.I.R. 1945 Privy Counce1, page 94 wherein it was observed by Lord Rusted of Killowan that "in truth the scheme of Chp. 39 is that SS. 496 and 497 provides for the grant of bail to accused persons before trial and the other sections of the chapter deal with matters ancillary or subsidiary to that provision. The consideration of S. 496 re-enforces the view that S. 498 has no reference to convicted persons". In another case, namely, that of (3) Gout, of West Bengal v. Abdul hokim, reported in I.L.R. 199s (2) Calcutta page 92 Sen and Renupada Mukherji JJ. followed the decision in lala Jairam Das's case by the Privy council and held that the provisions of section 498 of the Code of Criminal procedure must be controlled by the provisions of Section 496 of the Code. Reliance has however been made on the observations of Judicial Committee to the effect that the provisions of section 498 Criminal Procedure Code are controlled by Sections 496 and 497 criminal Procedure Code. Reliance has however been made on the observations of Judicial Committee to the effect that the provisions of section 498 Criminal Procedure Code are controlled by Sections 496 and 497 criminal Procedure Code. The next case on the point is the case of (10) Public Prosecutor, Andhra Pradesh, Petitioner v. G. Manikya Rao, respondent, reported in A.I.R. 1959 Andhra Pradesh page 639 wherein it was held that the expression "may, in any case" and "direct that any person be admitted to bail" occurring in Section 498 Criminal Procedure Code do not enlarge the powers of the court in the matter of granting bail. They any indicate that any accused person can avail himself of that section, whether the case in which he is involved as bailable on conviction or ant. The words in any case" govern only the language following, viz., whether there be. a bail on conviction or not. In the case of (11) the Stale Appellant v. Captain Jagjit Singh respondent reported in A.I.R. 1962 Supreme Court page 253, the observations of the Supreme Court at page 255 are that "it is true that under. S. 498 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the powers of the High Court in the matter of granting bail are very wide" But we should not overlook the other observation made in the said judgment that "various considerations such as, nature and seriousness of the offence, the character of the evidence, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused a reasonable possibility of the presence of the accused not being; secured at the trial, reasonable apprehension of witness being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or the State, similar other considerations which arise when a court is asked for bail in a non bailable offence". Mr. Justice Wanchoo (as His Lordship then was) delivering the judgment of the court ultimately observed at page 255 that "even so, where the offence is non-bailable, various considerations such as those indicated above have to be taken into account before bail is granted in a non-bailable offence. " 9. Mr. Justice Wanchoo (as His Lordship then was) delivering the judgment of the court ultimately observed at page 255 that "even so, where the offence is non-bailable, various considerations such as those indicated above have to be taken into account before bail is granted in a non-bailable offence. " 9. IN a recent decision of this court in the case of (12) Swapan Banerjee v. The State reported in 75 C.W.N. 939 the Division Bench relied on the observation made by the Supreme court in the case referred to above and on the point whether Section 497 Criminal Procedure Code is one of the: considerations controlling the provision of Section 498, observed at pp. 944 that "a balance must be struck between the two and the correct position is a delicate equipoise between the two extreme propositions referred to above, giving effect; thereby to the intention of the legislature and conform is to the line of decisions by the different courts". It was ultimately held that "the provision of Section 497 (1) Criminal procedure Code accordingly do not, in terms, control or qualify the provisions of Section 498 Criminal Procedure code, but the same nonetheless constitutes one of the relevant considerations, amongst several others, in the Judicial exercise of the powers of granting bail by the High Court or the Court of sessions relating to the non-bailable offences, where there appear reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life". After the amendment of Section 497, Criminal Procedure Cope by section 14 of Act 9 of 72, the period of imprisonment has been reduced to 1 years. In view therefore of the position in law, as incorporated in the statute, and also in view of the imprimatur of the judicial decisions; refer red to above, there appears to be no cloud on the point and the tests for granting bail in a case of non-bailable offence punishable with death or in presentment for life or imprisonment for a term of seven years or more. The conditions laid down under Section 49 criminal Procedure Code do constitute a relevant consideration though not the only consideration, along with several ethers as referred to above, for deciding whether bail should be granted to the accused in a case involving a non bailable offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life of imprisonment for a term of seven years or more. It is therefore difficult for us to agree with the submissions in this behalf. As was observed by Viscount Simonds in the case of (2) Magor and St. Meston Rural district Council Appellants v. Newport Corporation reported in 1832 a. C. 129 at pp. 191 that the power and duty of the Court to travel outside them (words used by the legislature) on a voyage of discovery are strictly limited''. We respectfully egret with the same and hold that to give effect to the interpretation given by Mr. Acharya to the provisions of Sections 497 and 498 criminal Procedure Code, would be embarking on a voyage of discovery beyond the bounds of the Statute. The first dimension of Mr. Acharya's competition accordingly fails. 10. THE other four dimensions to Mr. Acharya's submission relate to merits. The first one is that wheat bran having since been decontrolled, the offence, if any, is no longer a serious one, attracting one of the considerations laid down by the Supreme Court in Jagjit Singh's case to jettison the prayer for bail. To lend assurance to this contention, Mr. Acharya referred to the reports published in several English and Bengali Dailies, that the government had decided to arrange "free sale" of the commodity at a controlled rate. The learned Advocate general contended that the submission is wholly untenable and the steps of his reasoning are, that the reports do not in any way establish in law the purported repeal of the relevant order; that the Wheat Roller Flour Mill, (Licensing and Control) Order, 1957 has not in fact been repealed, that the reports at best refer to proposed policy; and that in any event the offences relate to a period of time when the wheat Roller Flour Mills (Licensing and Control) Order, 1957 was enforce and as such the objection taken in this behalf by Mr. Acharya is unwarranted and untenable. We agree with the submissions of the learned Advocate general and this branch of Mr. Acharya is unwarranted and untenable. We agree with the submissions of the learned Advocate general and this branch of Mr. Acharya's contention accordingly fails The next contention raised is that bail having been, granted to a other co-accused on the tame facts involving the same offences, the accessed-petitioner should not have been denied the same. It was contended on behalf of the State that the involvement is not the same and the accused petitioner is the king-pin of the conspiracy. In this context the learned advocate General pinpointed the backdrop of the facts, viz., that the accused petitioner could not be apprehended and warrant of proclamation and arrest had to be issued by the learned Magistrate. Photographs of the accused petitioner were also published. It is difficult, therefore, for us to agree with the submissions of Mr. Acharya. Justice may not be as precise as chemistry but each case must depend on its own facts. We have given our anxious considerations to the matter and we are unable to agree with the submission of Mr. Acharya at this stage and the same also fails. 11. THIS brings us to a consideration of the next contention of Mr. Acharya that the statements and other materials in this case do not make out the offences alleged and in any event the materials are not of such a nature that bail at this stage should be refused to the accused-petitioner. Quite a number of statements have been recorded under section 161 of the Code of criminal Procedure including two statements under section 134 of the Code. We have given our anxious consideration to the submissions made in this behalf by Mr. Acharya but we are unable to uphold the same at this stage, in view of the materials referred to above find the pending investigation nearing completion. 12. THE last dimension of Mr. Acharya's contention is passed on the ground of illness. In the revisional application before us it has been averred that "the petitioner is ill and special care is to be taken for his treatment which is only possible in a nursing home or in a good hospital". 12. THE last dimension of Mr. Acharya's contention is passed on the ground of illness. In the revisional application before us it has been averred that "the petitioner is ill and special care is to be taken for his treatment which is only possible in a nursing home or in a good hospital". From the order sheet it undoubtedly appears that because of his illness the accused-petitioner was admitted in the S. S. K. M. Hospital for treatment and on being discharged therefrom he was produced under arrest before the learned Magistrate on the 11th August, 1973. The learned advocate-General in this context referred to the order dated the 4th August, 1973 passed by the learned Magistrate where by he rejected the accused-petitioner's prayer for bail holding inter alia that "the disease he is suffering from is one and not a recent development". He further referred to the order dated the 16th August 1973 passed by the learned Magistrate rejecting that prayer for bail made on behalf of the accused-petitioner and observing that "an eminent cardiologist like Dr. C. C. Kar has certified after proper exam, that the aced is hale and hearty. So, there is no point in allowing the accused to get him treated in a nursing home. "The learned Advocate-General further contended that it is the present condition of the accused petitioner that is relevant and in this connection he pinpointed that the accused-petitioner came all the way form Jamshsdpur (Calcutta by taxi before his arrest, ruling out there by any serious infraction of the heart. Mr. Acharya however pressed his prayer on humane grounds Viz. that the accused petitioner who has been ailing for a considerable period should in any event be released on bail with sufficient conditions. The learned Advocate-General submitted that the absence of any present exigency rules out the prayer for bail on the ground of illness and he assured that all necessary attention and care would be taken whenever balled for by the accused petitioner in view of the materials on the record and the submissions made, we are not inclined to allow the defence prayer for conditional bail at this stage. One ancillary submission abides out consideration viz. the ground of delay. Mr. One ancillary submission abides out consideration viz. the ground of delay. Mr. Acharya submitted that the accused-petitioner who was arrested on the 24th July 1973 has since then been kept in custody and to add to the prejudice of the accused-petitioner the investigation is also proceeding at a snail's pace. The learned Advocate-General joined issue and submitted that the field of investigation in his case is very wide, the witnesses are many and the documents are numerous. Therefore it was not possible to complete the investigation within this period in spite of the best efforts made by the prosecution. It was submitted, however, that the investigation is nearing completion and an allotment of the case to the Special court is under contemplation. It should not be overlooked as was observed by the Judicial Committee in the case of king-Emperor-Appellant and Khwaja nazir Ahmad-Respondent reported in lxxi I. A. pp. 203 at pp. 212 that "the functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping. " such investigations therefore should not be tinkered with, as the Judicial Committee held. Excepting under Section 491 Criminal Procedure Code or as the supreme Court held in the case of s. N. Sharma v. B. Tewari reported in A. I. R. 1970 S. C. pp. 786, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India when the investigation is malafide. In the circumstances, we are not inclined to allow the prayer for bail on the ground of a purported delay in investigation. 13. BEFORE we part with the case, we must make it quite clear however that we have made no observations on the merits of the case, excepting by way of considering the same prima facie and on a balance of convenience for the purpose of disusing of the application for bail. In the result, the prayer for bail is rejected at this stage and the two Rules are discharged. The records shall go down expeditiously. Rules discharged