JUDGMENT 1. THESE Rules were issued upon application under art. 227 of the Constitution of India and are directed against an order passed by the specially empowered officer in a proceeding under Sec. 44 (2a) of the Estates Acquisition Act purporting to revise the finally published Record of Rights suo motu. 2. THE relevant facts which are not in controversy in these two Revision cases are that the present petitioners by several registered kobalas on various dated viz., April 27, 1962, February l1, 1957, July 17, 1957 and February 13, 1965 purchased the Rayati interest at one Madan Gopal Hazra son of Shri sourindra Mohan Hazra in respect of the lands appertaining to Khalian Nos. 1321, 1329 and 1330 of Mouza Jabui within Police Station Memari in the District of Burdwan, Some of those purchases were jointly by some of the petitioners and some were by the respective petitioners alone. The petitioners claimed to have been possessing the respective lands and have been cultivating the same by paying rents to the Government since the Estates Ac question Act was brought into force. The superior interest which was Patni governed by Regulation VIII of 1810 originally belonged to one Saradi prosad Hazra. He having died, in 1849 the Patni interest was inherited by his three sons viz., Achuta Nanda, Girindns mohan and Sourindra Mohan Hazra. After that devolution of interest at this superior level, some lands of the said three khatians mentioned above were settled by Amalnamas in favour at sachidulal Hazra and Madan Gopal hazra in Rayati interest. This Sachidulal was no other than the son of achuta Nanda Hazra, one of the sons of Sarada Prosad Hazra. Those Amal namas were of the year 1352 B. S. which corresponds to 1945/1946, that is long before the enactment of Estates Acquisition Act in 1953. When the hierarchy to interest in respect of the lands were remaining in the state as mentioned above, the estates Acquisition Act came into forces and under the provisions thereof the revisional settlement operations were undertaken. 3. THE entries in the Records of right had been made in the draft of the record prepared under Sec. 44 (1) after hearing the objection that was made to the entries in the draft record of the names of the father or uncles of transferors of the present petitioners. 3. THE entries in the Records of right had been made in the draft of the record prepared under Sec. 44 (1) after hearing the objection that was made to the entries in the draft record of the names of the father or uncles of transferors of the present petitioners. That objection was on the ground that those transferors had taken settlement of the relevant land from those persons who had taken settlement by amalnamas long before the Estate Acquisition act had either been enacted or brought into force. Those objections were by Sachi Dulal Hazra and Madan gopal Hazra, On hearing those objections the contentions of the present petitioners were upheld by the Revenue officer at that stage and the names of the objectors were entered in the records of Right as finally published under Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 44, as a result of the proceeding under Sec. 44 (1). The present petitioners are the transferees from those persons whose names have been recorded m the finally published Records of right. 4. LONG after final publication of the Records of Right, the specially empowered officer purporting to act under secs. 44 (2t) initiated the present proceedings on 2nd of March 1968. In that order of initiation itself the previous proceeding and the order passed in the relevant objection case under Sec. 44 (1) of the Estates Acquisition Act were recounted and the order further proceeded to say "whereas it appears prima lade from the above face that the khatians has been wrongly suspended and it is now necessary to examine the material papers and to revise the entries in the said finally published khatian proceeding. Proceedings under sec. 44 (2a) of the E. A. Act are hereby drawn up suo motu for the purpose". Having so initiated the proceedings the specially empowered officer has by a long order purported to revise the entries in the Records of right by omitting the names of the persons that had been entered in the finally published Records of right and by that revising order restoring the names which had been first entered in the draft records of right before the correction in the proceeding under Sec. 44 (1). The two orders Nos. The two orders Nos. 4 and 5 in the two cases have been challenged in these two rules as having been without jurisdiction as also on the ground of estoppel against the State of West Bengal, which ground was added as an additional ground in the petition. 5. THE State of West Bengal which is the opposite party No. 1 in each of the cases appeared to oppose the Rules. 6. THE learned Advocate for the petitioner Mr. Madan Mohan Ghose has placed the relevant facts appearing from the records and has contended that the order of the specially empowered officer purporting to have been made in the proceeding under Sec. 44 (2a)should be held to be illegal and without jurisdiction on several grounds taken in the petition. Mr. Ghose contends that what appears in the order initiating the proceeding under Sec. 4 (2a) are clearly pointing to the fact that though the present proceeding is sought to be given complexion of a suo motu proceeding under Sec. 44 (2a), it is in fact a projection of the application by which objection was raised in the earlier proceeding. For that reason and in that view of the matter, Mr. Ghose contends, it should be held that the proceeding sought to be initiated under sec. 44 (2a) is one not initiated suo motu, but by the effect of an application, though that application was the objection that was filed and/or Sec. 44 (1. According to the contention of the learned Advocate of the petitioners that the limitation for initiation of the proceeding under Sec. 44 (2a) shall be 9 months from the date of the final publication and not 12 years or for the matter of that, 18 years as is the result of the recent amendment, from the date of the final publication. If that is accepted the proceeding should be held to be barred by limitation. The second contention of Mr. If that is accepted the proceeding should be held to be barred by limitation. The second contention of Mr. Ghose is that the order of initiation of the proceeding under Sec. 44 (2a) itself shows and that is more loudly appearing in the impugned order of the specially empowered officer that the said officer was sitting in judgment over the decision of the revenue Officer in the previous proceeding under Sec. 44 (1) 3s if he was superior or an appellate authority that respect, though the decision in the proceeding under Sec. 44 (1) bad not been appealed from and that order was allowed to stand final in the eye of the law. It is therefore contended by Mr. Ghose that initiation of the proceeding as also the decision given in the impugned order are both without jurisdiction. Third contention of Mr. Ghose is that in Sec. 44 (2a) itself the Second proviso reads as follows: "provided further that no such officer shall entertain any application under this sub-section or shall of his own motion take steps to revise any entry, if an appeal against an order passed by a Revenue Officer on any objection made under sub-section (1), has been filed before the commencement of the west Bengal Estates Acquisition (Second Amendment) Ordinance, 1957 before a Tribunal appointed for the purpose of this section, and, notwithstanding anything in this section, any such appeal may continue and be heard and disposed of as if the West Bengal estates Acquisition (Second Amendment) Ordinance, 1957 had not been promulgated. " 7. THAT shows that by the provisions of the Act, particularly, in this part thereof, the decision in the proceeding under Sec. 44 (1) if there has been an appeal therefore cannot be agitated under Sec. 44 (2a) In the present case, the Revenue Officer did not prefer any appeal from the decision in the proceeding under Sec. 44 (1) and that has become final after the period of limitation of appeal therefore has elapsed. To counteract that finality, which 5s the basis of the second proviso to sec. 44 (2a) above quoted, this proceeding has been sought to be initiated and that long years after the final publication of the Records of right in accordance with the decision under Sec. 44 (1), by giving the present proceeding under sec. 44 (2a) a complexion of suo motu initiation. 44 (2a) above quoted, this proceeding has been sought to be initiated and that long years after the final publication of the Records of right in accordance with the decision under Sec. 44 (1), by giving the present proceeding under sec. 44 (2a) a complexion of suo motu initiation. That should not be allowed because it is hit by estoppel, for the reason of representation that the finally published Record of Rights contains and also beyond the jurisdiction that the tribunal exercises under Sec. 44 (2a. For these reasons Mr. Ghose contended that the impugned order should be set aside by exercising super intending jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 227. 8. THE learned Advocate for the state Mr. Chandidas Roy Chowdhury has faced up the state of records and the facts appearing therefrom as correct rendering by Mr. Ghose. In the face of those facts not only the finality which is the basis of the Second proviso under Sec. 44 (2a) appears to have been nullified by exercise of jurisdiction not vested in law, but also both the manner of initiation and the convent of the whole proceeding was that the initiation was only for the purpose of reopening the question of title recorded in the finally published Records of right, thereby affecting the title of the present petitioners who are purchasers from those persons who have been recorded in that finally published record by effect of the order made m the proceeding under Sec. 44 (1) That being so this case is directly coming within the decision of this Court reported in Ramesh Chandra Sood v. Assistant settlement Officer, 76 C.W.N.T. page 149 sub-Division-Ranaghat, District Nadia and Ors. Not only so, there are two earlier decisions of this Court which do not appear to have been remind and those are decisions in Civil Rule No. 2259-2261 of 1968 by the judgment of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice A.C. Sen on 31st March 1969 and the decision in civil Rule No. 2893 and 2804 of 1961 by the judgment of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice B. N. Banerjee on 16th January 1967. In the first of those mentioned above A. C. Sen, J. held "it appears no appeal was taken by the State against order passed by the R. O. under Sec. 44 (2a) of the Act the order must have become final as no appeal was preferred. Justice B. N. Banerjee on 16th January 1967. In the first of those mentioned above A. C. Sen, J. held "it appears no appeal was taken by the State against order passed by the R. O. under Sec. 44 (2a) of the Act the order must have become final as no appeal was preferred. Such an order cannot certainly be reopened by another Revenue Officer in exercise or his inherent powers assuming he Ms such powers. " 9. IN the latter judgment by B. N. Banerjee J. it was observed : "in my opinion, the opp. parties had a right of appeal against the order made under Sub-sec. 2 (a) of Sec 44 of the Act, which went against them. They did not take recourse to that procedure. They did not even apply for the setting aside of the order made under section 44 (2a) on the ground that notices were not duly served upon them. A right of review cannot be usurped and I uphold the argument of Mr. Hemanta Krishna mitra, learned Advocate for the petitioners, that the S. E. O. had no night of review of the order made by him under section 44 (2a) of the Act. " 10. IN view of those decisions above mentioned the learned Advocate of the state Mr. Roy Chowdhury could not overcome the contention of Mr. Ghose that the present proceeding is loudly without jurisdiction. I respectfully agree with the view of law that appear in those two decisions which in my view are based on sound principles of law and also the principle or, which the second proviso under Sec. 44 (2a) and also Sec. 45 itself is based. Both the rules therefore must succeed on that ground and it is not necessary for me to consider whether the other contention of Mr. Ghose based on the ground of limitation and estoppel are correct. I may, however, say that the ground of estoppel appear to have force of reason in the particular circumstances and that need be considered in appropriate case, though it was not necessary to be decided in the cases on hand, Rules in which have succeeded on another ground. In the result, I make both the rules absolute and the impugned orders in both the eases No. 4 and 5 under Sec. 44 (2a) are set aside and those two proceedings in the whole are quashed. In the result, I make both the rules absolute and the impugned orders in both the eases No. 4 and 5 under Sec. 44 (2a) are set aside and those two proceedings in the whole are quashed. There will be no order as to costs in the two Rules. 11. Before I leave this case I feel the necessity of mention that in view of what has been land down by the several judgments of thus Court long ago, to which I have made reference above, it is necessary and fair for the Department of the State Government concerned to take steps 10 acquaint the specially empowered officers of the position of law so clearly laid down on these decisions, so that the citizen may not be harassed unnecessarily and the expenses of the. litigant by wind ling the public exechequer may be avoided. Rules made absolute.