Order.- This Criminal Miscellaneous Petition has been filed for quashing the proceedings in M.C. No. 6 of 1973, on the file of the Executive First Class Magistrate (Revenue Divisional Officer), Chidambaram. There is also a further prayer in the petition for directing the revenue officials to remove the seal put on the outer door of the premises of the E.I.D. and S.F. Limited, Labour Union, Nellikuppam. 2. The petitioner herein is the President of the E.I.D. and S.F. Limited Labour Union and the other petitioners are office bears thereof. The second respondent is a worker in E.I.D. Parry Sugar Factory, the third respondent is a worker in Parry Confectionary Limited and the fourth respondent is a worker in E.I.D. The E.I.D. and S.F. Limited Labour Union is a registered Trade Union, having in its fold 1,500 workers. The office of the Trade Union, according to the petitioners herein is located in S. No. 144, Factory Road, Nellikuppam, for over fifteen years. 3. There was some strike in the factory and finally there was an executive committee meeting of the above Union held at the Union building on the morning of 29th January, 1973. In that, there seems to be some rival groups and a pandemonium prevailed. Finally, the Police in order to avoid any clash sent out all the persons and the revenue officers put a seal over the lock put by the petitioners on the door of the premise’s. It is also stated that the key of the lock is with the first petitioner. 4. Subsequently, the Revenue Officer, Chidambaram, has issued summons under section 145 of the Civil Procedure Code alleging that there was a dispute relating to the Union premises and it was likely to cause breach of the peace. The petitioners have been shown as A-Party and respondents as 2 to 5 B-‘Party. The proceedings were initiated on a report dated 6th February, 1973 made by the Inspector of Police, Panruti, before the Executive First Class Magistrate, Chidambaram. 5. It has been alleged by the respondents that on 29th January, 1973 the rival group passed a resolution removing the President and the members of the executive committee and has selected new office-bearers for the union. But the petitioners stoutly deny it and have stated that any resolution or election is illegal and void. 6. 5. It has been alleged by the respondents that on 29th January, 1973 the rival group passed a resolution removing the President and the members of the executive committee and has selected new office-bearers for the union. But the petitioners stoutly deny it and have stated that any resolution or election is illegal and void. 6. The petitioners have alleged that the action taken by the revenue officers and the Police is high-handed and there is no question of any breach of the peace as on date. According to the petitioners, the proceedings under section 145 are in abuse of the process of the law, there is no dispute relating to the Union premises and there is also no likelihood of breach of the peace and the police report is mala fide, On these allegations, the petitioners seek to have the section 145 proceedings, quashed. 7. Thiru K.T. Palpandian, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners, submitted that the jurisdiction of the Magistrate is invoked by suppression of material facts and for which he would not have had any jurisdiction. He also submitted that the suppression of material facts had resulted in oppressive proceedings under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, initiated in this case, that the order passed by the Magistrate does not state the ground as required under section 145. (1) and that therefore any further proceeding based on that order will be without jurisdiction. He also brought to my notice the illegal sealing of the Union promises by the revenue officials and the way in which the Police have acted in removing the petitioners from the building in question. Thiru Palpandian, the learned Counsel for the petitioners laid stress on the point that the Magistrate does not state the reason for his having been satisfied and that the office note made on the complaint sent by the Inspector clearly make it that no application of the mind has been made by the Magistrate and the issue of notice under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code was only mechanical. 8. Thiru Sriramulu, the learned Counsel appearing for respondents 2 to 5, has stated that the order of the Magistrate is clear and it can be easily spelt out that he was satisfied before issuing the order under section 145 (1), Criminal Procedure Code. 8. Thiru Sriramulu, the learned Counsel appearing for respondents 2 to 5, has stated that the order of the Magistrate is clear and it can be easily spelt out that he was satisfied before issuing the order under section 145 (1), Criminal Procedure Code. He also submitted that there is nothing to be quashed as at present since the Magistrate has ample powers under section 145 (5), Criminal Procedure Code to cancel any order he has passed. He also submitted that on the face of the complaint there is mention of imminent breach of the peace and that there is enough material on record to issue an order under section 145 (1). 9. The learned Public Prosecutor also submitted that the sealing of the premises by the revenue authorities has nothing to do with the proceedings under section 145 (1) Criminal Procedure Code, and the same is not in pursuance of the section 145 proceedings. If anybody is aggrieved by such a sealing, he can as well invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for any appropriate relief. 10. The report of the Inspector of Police, Panruti, inter alia, states that: “Now each party wants to gain mastery over the other party with a view to take possession of the sealed premises by unlawful (way) and that if any attempts to do so, the party will also try to avert it and as a result of that there is every likelihood of breach of peace by their unlawful act.” On the above said allegation and also on further facts, the Inspector has prayed for an order under section 145 in order to restrain either party from taking possession of the sealed premises. Thus, it is clear from the report of the Inspector of Police that even though a meeting took place as early as 29th January, 1973, the tense situation to get at the Union premises prevailed even on 6th February, 1973. Section 145 proceedings are summary in nature and are intended to prevent an imminent breach of the peace concerning any land or water. The action under section 145 (1) has no doubt to be taken only when a Magistrate is satisfied as regards the imminent breach of the peace from a police report or on other information. 11. Section 145 proceedings are summary in nature and are intended to prevent an imminent breach of the peace concerning any land or water. The action under section 145 (1) has no doubt to be taken only when a Magistrate is satisfied as regards the imminent breach of the peace from a police report or on other information. 11. Thiru Palpandian, the learned Counsel for the petitioners, referred to the preliminary notice under section 145 (1) of the Executive First Class Magistrate which states: “Whereas the Inspector of Police, Panruti, has reported in Crime No. Crl - 82 43/73 dated 7th February, 1973 that there is a dispute in the possession and enjoyment of immovable property scheduled below, that the dispute is likely to cause breach of peace and that action under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, is necessary. I am satisfied that there is likelihood of breach of peace in he locality between the parties....” From this, learned Counsel submits that the Magistrate has mechanically passed the order instead of applying his mind and getting satisfaction about the report. 12. A umber of decisions were cited at the Bar by the learned Counsel for the petitioners, as well as by the learned Counsel for the respondent. It has been repeatedly held by various High Courts, and also by the Supreme Court, that the interference under section 561-A for proceedings has to be done only in extraordinary circumstances for the purpose of averting any miscarriage of justice and unnecessary harassment. It has also been laid down that, if a complaint prima facie makes out a case for action, it is for the Court which has received the complaint to dispose it of on merits, and the same cannot be quashed by the High Court. 13. I do not think it is accessary to refer to the various decisions dealing with the ‘satisfaction’ of the Magistrate and the imminent breach of the peace’ for the issue of an order under section 145 (1), Criminal Procedure Code. There cannot be any analogy in criminal cases and each case has to depend on its facts. 14. As far as the present case is concerned, the report of the Inspector of Police clearly states that on the date of the report each party wanted to gain mastery over the other party with a view to take possession of the scaled premises by unlawful way. 14. As far as the present case is concerned, the report of the Inspector of Police clearly states that on the date of the report each party wanted to gain mastery over the other party with a view to take possession of the scaled premises by unlawful way. If it should be found that there is no likelihood or breach of the peace, there are ample powers with the Magistrate concerned to drop the proceedings under section 145 (5). The arguments of Thiru Palpandian is to the effect that since this Court is apprised of the whole facts it can as well deal with the matter and quash the proceedings. I do not think I can accept this argument, since admissions of cases under section 561-A for quashing proceedings will result in disposing of the whole matter by the High Court itself while the lower Court can effectively dispose of but for such admission. We are mainly concerned with the question as to whether the proceedings initiated before the Court below have to be quashed, or not. If this Court comes to the conclusion that there is nothing to be quashed, dismissal of the petition must follow with the result the Magistrate must be allowed to proceed with the matter and act according to the procedure laid down by the law. 15.R.H. Bhutani v. Mani J.Desai1, clearly deals with the powers and procedures under section 145 (1). The Supreme Court laid down: “The satisfaction under sub-section (1) of section 145 is of the Magistrate. The question whether on the materials before him, he should initiate proceedings or not is therefore, in his discretion which, no doubt has to be exercised in accordance with the well recognised rules of law in that behalf. No hard and fast rules can, therefore, be laid down as to the sufficiency of material for his satisfaction. The language of the sub-section is clear and unambiguous that he can arrive at his satisfaction both from the police report or” from other information’ which must include an application by the party dispossessed. The High Court, in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, would not go into the question of sufficiency of material which has satisfied the Magistrate.” It has been further held by the Supreme Court that at the time of passing the final order the apprehension of breach of peace should continue or exist. The High Court, in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, would not go into the question of sufficiency of material which has satisfied the Magistrate.” It has been further held by the Supreme Court that at the time of passing the final order the apprehension of breach of peace should continue or exist. As far as the facts of the present case are concerned, there is a clear mention in the report of the Inspector of Police and also in the order passed by the Magistrate about the apprehension of breach of the peace. The Magistrate has been satisfied with the report. Following the abovesaid decision rendered by the Supreme Court, I do not think there is any substance in the argument of the counsel for the petitioners herein. That apart, no case has been made out for quashing the proceedings, under section 561-A, by this Court. 16. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab2, the general criteria have been laid down for the purpose of entertaining quashing proceedings by the High Court. It has been held by the Supreme Court that a proceeding can be quashed when there is manifestly a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the criminal proceedings in respect of the offence alleged, when there is absence of requisite sanction, when the allegations in the first information report to the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their! entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged and when the allegations made against the accused person do constitute the offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. I do not find any of these conditions is present in the present case. No doubt the enumeration of the above condtions is subject to the power of the Court concerned to quash the proceedings in the interest of justice and equity. As I have discussed already, the petitioners can have ample remedy before the Magistrate himself. If they are able to satisfy the Magistrate that the proceedings are illegal, the Magistrate has enough power to drop the same, under section 145 (5). 17. In these circumstances, the criminal miscellaneous petition is dismissed. No costs. The Magistrate is directed to dispose of the matter as expeditiously as possible, since already three months have lapsed.