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1973 DIGILAW 287 (CAL)

A. C. Bose v. Union of India

1973-11-26

SABYASACHI MUKHERJI, SANKAR PRASAD MITRA

body1973
JUDGMENT Mitra C. J.: The appellant is an employee of the posts & Telegraph Department of the Government of India. He has challenged in these proceedings an order of compulsory retirement under Fundamental Rule 56(j)(i) passed on the 25th July, 1972. His application under Article 226 of the Constitution was heard by Anil K. Sen J. By his Judgment delivered on the 28th May, 1973, Sen J. has dismissed the application and discharged the Rule which was issued by this Court. The, appeal is directed against this judgment. 2. The appellant was born on the ht March, 1917. He joined the Central Telegraph Office as Clerk on the 15th May, 1937. He was promoted on the 12th February, 1940, as a Telegraphist. In April, 1943, he was promoted as Engineering Supervisor. On the 30th April, 1955, he was promoted as Assistant Engineer. On the 14th August, 1957, the General Manager, Calcutta Telegraphs, by a letter expressed his appreciation of the appellant's work. He was confirmed as Assistant Engineer on the 15th November, 1961. He got an assignment as Construction Officer, Jammu and Kashmir Circle in 1963 and stayed there for about four months. During this period he purchased 1450 tent roofs at the rate of Rs. 1.25 each. In November, 1963, he was charged with misconduct. But on the 3rd June, 1965 he was allowed to cross the first efficiency bar. Then on October 14, 1966 he was absolved and reinstated. But on the 16th November, 1966, the Chairman, P & T Board administered a warning for violation of the Rule in having purchased piecemeal. This has reference to his purchase of 1450 tent roofs at Kashmir. In April 1970, the special Police Establishment, Jammu and Kashmir called upon the appellant to explain certain discrepancies in the Stores Department. He offered explanation which was accepted and on the 31st July, 1970 the case against him was dropped. 3. His subsequent report appears to be satisfactory. For instance, on the 4th April, the appellant was recommended for promotion out of turn by the General Manager Telecommunication Factories, Calcutta. On the 3rd June, 1972, he was allowed to cross his last efficiency bar. On the 25th July, 1972, his case was reviewed by the Review Committee. 3. His subsequent report appears to be satisfactory. For instance, on the 4th April, the appellant was recommended for promotion out of turn by the General Manager Telecommunication Factories, Calcutta. On the 3rd June, 1972, he was allowed to cross his last efficiency bar. On the 25th July, 1972, his case was reviewed by the Review Committee. It now appears from a letter dated the 26th November, 1973 from the General Manager, Telecommunication Factories to Shri Samar Banerjee, Advocate appearing for the respondents, which has been filed before us this morning on behalf of the respondents that in this review the appellant's confidential record upto the 31st March, 1972 was considered, The order of compulsory retirement was passed on the 23rd November, 1972. 4. The appellant preferred an appeal to the President of India on December 22, 1972, but the appeal was rejected. A Rule was issued by this Court on the 12th February, 1973. 5. Now, Rule 56 (j) (i) of the Fundamental Rules as it stood on the 31st May, 1969 was as follows :- "Notwithstanding anything contained in this rule the appropriate authority shall, if it is of the opinion that it is in the public interest to do so, have the absolute right to retire any Government servant by giving him notice of not less then three months in writing or three months pay and allowances in lieu of such notice; (i) if he is in Class I or Class II service or post and has entered Government service before attaining the age of thirty-five years, after he has attained the age of fifty years. (ii) " " " " Prior to the 31st May, 1969, the prescribed age in this Rule was 55 and not 50 years. 6. Our attention has also been drawn to various instructions and notifications issued by appropriate departments of the Government of India containing provisions as to the procedure to be adopted for enforcement of the Fundamental Rule including Rule 56 (j) (i). In (1) Sant Ram Sharma v, State of Rajasthan and another, 1968 (1) SCR 111 . 6. Our attention has also been drawn to various instructions and notifications issued by appropriate departments of the Government of India containing provisions as to the procedure to be adopted for enforcement of the Fundamental Rule including Rule 56 (j) (i). In (1) Sant Ram Sharma v, State of Rajasthan and another, 1968 (1) SCR 111 . the Supreme Court observed: “It is true that the Government cannot amend or supersede statutory rules by administrative instructions but if the rules are silent on any particular point Government can fill up the gaps and supplement the rules and issue instructions not inconsistent with the rules already framed." The Supreme Court took the same view in (2) Guman Singh v. The State of Rajasthan, 1971(2) S.C. Cases, 452 at page 470 paragraph 39. The Allahabad High Court in (3) Hardwari Lal v. Divisional Engineer, Telegraphs, Allahabad and ors. 1972 Services Law Reporter, Vol. VII, 279, also points out that the Directions with respect to the Fundamental Rules given by the Government of India provided the safeguard against the mandatory exercise of powers. The Government's instructions do not supply at the rules; on the contrary, they supplement the rules as they make provisions for matters about which the rules are silent. 7. In determining, therefore, whether the order for compulsory retirement is justified in the instant case, we have to consider not only the provisions of F. R. 56(j)(i) but also the directions, instructions and notifications of the Government from time to time issued to supplement the Rule on matters on which the Rule is silent. 8. Before, however, we discuss about the directions. instructions or notifications, it appears that an order for compulsory retirement can be made under Fundamental Rule 56 (j)(i) if the appropriate authority is of opinion that it is in public interest to do so. The Considerations that should prevail upon the appropriate authority to form the opinion that it is in public interest to make an order of compulsory retirement of a Government servant have been discussed in a number of decisions The principles enumerated by these decisions have been succiently expressed in the Delhi High Court's Judgement in the case of (4) Colonel J. N. Singh v. Union of India and others, 1971(2) Services Law Reporter, Vol. VI at page 472. VI at page 472. It is stated that the right conferred by Rule 56(j) on the appropriate authority to retire a Government servant compulsorily is an absolute one, but that right or power can be exercised only subject to the conditions mentioned in the Rule and one of these conditions is that the appropriate authority must be of opinion that it is in public interest to do so. If the authority bona fide forms that opinion, the correctness of that opinion cannot be challenged before Courts. But it is open to an aggrieved party to contend that the requisite opinion bas not been formed or that the decision is based on collateral grounds or that it is an arbitrary decision. In order that the decision may not be arbitrary, it should be based on some ground or material which is germane to the question whether it is in public interest to retire the Government servant. And if the decision is based on no such ground or material or is based on a ground or material which is not germane to the issue, it would be an arbitrary decision. The Courts are of the view that since Fundamental Rule 56(j) provides fort he formation of the requisite opinion by the appropriate authority and not by a Court, the sufficiency of the ground or material is not justiciable. But, some ground or material germane to the issue must exist, and it is open to a Court to examine whether such ground or material exists or not. 9. The legal position, as we understand, therefore, is that before an order for compulsory retirement is made, the appropriate authority must form an opinion that it is in public interest to make the order. The opinion cannot be based on collateral grounds. The opinion cannot also be formed arbitrarily but must depend on some grounds or materials germane to the issue of compulsory retirement. And when an order for compulsory retirement is challenged in a Court of law, the Court has the right to examine whether some grounds or materials germane to the issue exists although the Court is not interested in the sufficiency of those materials. 10. And when an order for compulsory retirement is challenged in a Court of law, the Court has the right to examine whether some grounds or materials germane to the issue exists although the Court is not interested in the sufficiency of those materials. 10. In this case a copy of the minutes of the meeting of the committee constituted for reviewing the cases of Class I and Class II Gazetted Officers other than those whose cases are referable to the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet for retention in service beyond the age of 50 years held on the 25th July, 1970 has been produced, In paragraph I of the minutes the cases of 62 officers have been dealt with. Paragraph 2 runs thus: "In respect of the remaining 6 officers, the Committee recommended as follows: (1) An overall assessment of the confidential records of the following officers does not justify their continuance in service and, therefore, they should be retired in public interest. 1. Shri A.C. Bose." 11. We have already stated that the Government's case is that confidential records upto 31st March, 1972, of the appellant were considered for review. The relevant minutes of the Review Committee's meeting of the 26th July 1972, set out above, do not disclose the ground or material germane to the issue of compulsory retirement on the basis of which the appropriate authority formed the opinion that it was in public interest to make the order for compulsory retirement of the appellant. We invited learned Counsel for the Respondents to apprise us of these grounds or materials but he had no instructions other than those appearing in the aforesaid minutes. On these facts, it is not possible for us to examine whether some grounds or materials germane to the issue existed for the formation of the opinion referred to in Fundamental Rule 56 (j) (i). We find, on the contrary, that the impugned order suffers from a serious infirmity. 12. In the Post and Telegraphs Department Notification dated the 8th September, 1970, it is laid down in paragraph 2 (vide page 117 and 118 of the paper book) that Government servants whose integrity is doubtful should be retired and that in locating others who are in effective, the basic consideration should be fitness or the competence of the employee to continue in the post which he is holding at the time of review. The appellant's case does not appear to be one of doubtful integrity. His fitness or competence, therefore, at the time of review was the basic consideration. The appropriate authority took into consideration the confidential rolls upto the 31st March, 1972, and not thereafter. In other words, his record of performance between March, 1972 and July, 1972, was not considered before the decision on his compulsory retirement was taken. After the 31st March, 1972, the appellant was allowed to cross the efficiency bar on the 3rd June, 1972. This factor, although not conclusive, should not have been ignored completely at the time of review of the appellant's case on the 25th July, 1972. 13. We are, therefore unable to sustain the impugned order of compulsory retirement on two grounds, viz. (1) the materials germane to the issue have not been disclosed by the appropriate authority, and, (2) appropriate authority has not applied its mind to the appellant's record of performance upto the time of the review. 14. The view we have already expressed is enough to dispose of the appeal; but since several other points were urged before us we ought to deal with them briefly and state our reactions to them. 15. Learned Counsel for the appellant has submitted to us that on the 3rd June, 1972, the appellant was allowed to cross his last efficiency bar. And the effect of allowing the efficiency bar to be crossed was that tarnishes, if any, in his previous records, stood obliterated. 16. This contention cannot be accepted in view of the relevant notifications directions and instruction, applicable to Fundamental Rules 56 (j) (i). In the "Department of Personnel O.M. No..........dated 25.6.71 in paragraph 4 (at page 38 of the paper book) it stated as follows: "In regard to review of cases under R. E. 56(j) (i) and Rule 2(2) of Libralised Pension Rules and in retiring Government servants in pursuance of the aforesaid provisions, to following factors should also be borne in mind by the appropriate authorities; 1. The review should be made on an assessment of the entire service record." Secondly, in Office Memorandum dated the 23rd June, 1969 (at page 32 of the paper book) in paragraph 4 (b) it is stated; "The criteria to be followed by the Committee in making their recommendations would be as follows: (a) (b) in locating others who are ineffective and who should be retired at that stage, the basic consideration should be the fitness/competence of the employee to continue in the post which he is holding. If, on the result of the review, it is considered that an officer although he had done well in a lower grade but is not adequate to the responsibilities of the post he occupies or will not be able to perform efficiently all the duties of the post he is likely to hold for the next few years, he should be retired." 17. These instructions/notifications/directions clearly contemplate that the record of an officer in the post which he is holding at the time of the proposed order of compulsory retirement has to be taken into consideration as a whole for the purpose of forming the opinion in terms of Fundamental Rule 56 (j) (i). It cannot, therefore, be argued, since these instructions/notifications/directions supplement the rules, that the crossing of the efficiency bar obliterate altogather the previous record of the employee concerned. 18. The second point argued before us is that the review was made when the appellant was 55 years 4 months and 17 days" old and not 6 months before he attained the age of 55 years as required by the notification dated the 10th November, 1966 (at page 109 of the paper-book). Clause (i) of the Notification reads as follows: "The case of the Government servant concerned should be reviewed six months before he attains the age of 55 years and decision taken thereon by the appropriate authority." This notification has no application to the instant case. Fundamental Rule 56 (j) (i) was amended on May 31, 1969. Prior to this date, the Rule could be invoked only if the employee concerned had attained the age of 55 years. The new rule reduced the age to 50 years and the appellant's case has been disposed of under the new rule. 19. Fundamental Rule 56 (j) (i) was amended on May 31, 1969. Prior to this date, the Rule could be invoked only if the employee concerned had attained the age of 55 years. The new rule reduced the age to 50 years and the appellant's case has been disposed of under the new rule. 19. The third contention is that in the notification dated the 25th June, 1971 (pages 71 and 72 of the paperbook) it is stated that the appropriate authority should record on the file its opinion that it is necessary in the public interest to retire the Government servant in pursuance, inter alia, of Rule 56 (j) (i). In the instant case, it is argued, in the file no opinion of the appropriate authority has been recorded. It is unnecessary for us to give a decision on this point, we have already held that the Court is entitled to examine the grounds or menterials germane to the issue of compulsory retirement and in this appeal these grounds or materials have not been made available to us. 20. The last argument of Counsel for the appellant has been that in terms of the notification of the 23rd June, 1969 (page III of the paperbook, paragraph 4 at page 115) the appellant's case should have been reviewed immediately after the appellant attained the age of 50 years. On the 23rd June, 1969, the appellant was 52 years 4 months and 17 days old but the review of his case did not take place till the 25th July 1972. The contention is that this incordinate delay in reviewing the appellant's case for purpose of compulsory retirement has vitiated the impugned order altogather. It seems to us that the relevant instruction requires that the review should be made "immediately". But whether or not the review has been made "immediately" would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. 21. As our decision in this appeal rests on the first point we have referred to, we need not discuss whether the review was made within the time indicated by the relevant instructions. 22. For the reasons aforesaid, this appeal is allowed. The judgment and order of the trial court are set aside. The impugned order of compulsory retirement dated the 25th July, 1972, is set aside. 23. Let appropriate writs issue. There will be no order as to costs. 24. 22. For the reasons aforesaid, this appeal is allowed. The judgment and order of the trial court are set aside. The impugned order of compulsory retirement dated the 25th July, 1972, is set aside. 23. Let appropriate writs issue. There will be no order as to costs. 24. We make it clear that this order will not, in any way, prejudice the rights of the Government, if any, to proceed against the appellant in accordance with law. Sabyasachi Mukherji J : I agree.