PARAMESWARAN v. STATE OF KERALA — 1973 DIGILAW 288 (KER)

Judgment :- 1. These petitions seek to quash the notification Ext. P1 dated 26 71973 issued by the State Government in purported exercise of its powers under sub-rule (2) of R.114 of the Defence of India Rules, 1971, for short, the Rules. This notification was published in the Kerala Gazette No. 31 dated 31st July, 1973. Sub-rule (2) of R.114 of the Rules runs thus: "If the Central Government or the State Government is of opinion that it is necessary or expedient so to do for securing the defence of India and civil defence, the efficient conduct of military operations or the maintenance or increase of supplies and services essential to the life of the community or for securing the equitable distribution and availability of any article or thing at fair prices.it may, by order, provide for regulating or prohibiting the production, manufacture, supply and distribution, use and consumption of articles or things and trade and commerce therein or for preventing any corrupt practice or abuse of authority in respect of any such matter." 2. We shall also read the Notification Ext. P1: " NOTIFICATION No. 19768/E2/73/ID. Dated, Trivandrum, 26th July, 1973. S.R.O. No. 474/73: Whereas use of machinery for the extraction of fibre from coconut husk increased considerably in the district of Trivandrum, Quilon and Alleppey in recent times; And whereas mechanisation in the production of such fibre results in very high consumption of coconut husks and the consequent enhancement of the price of such husks; And whereas due to the very high consumption of coconut husks for the production of fibre by using machinery and the enhancement of the price of such husks, sufficient quantity of such husks are not available at fair prices in the said districts for use in the traditional sector; And whereas the Government are of opinion that for securing the equitable distribution and availability at fair prices of coconut husks in the said districts for production of fibre in the traditional sector it is necessary to prohibit the use of machinery in (hose districts for the production of such fibre; Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-rule (2) of R.114 of the Defence of India Rules, 1971, the Government hereby prohibit the production of fibre from coconut husks by the use of the machinery in the said districts. By Order of the Governor." 3. By Order of the Governor." 3. The 14 petitions were heard together as the same question or questions arise for determination. There are a number of petitioners in each of these petitions, the total being 138. Most of them, if not all, are owners of small scale industrial units employing machinery and the mechanised process for decortication of retted coconut husks. Government declared de-fibreing of coconut-husks by mechanical means as a small scale industry eligible for financial assistance under the Small Scale Industries Development Scheme. Most of the petitioners, it is alleged, had availed themselves of the loans under the Scheme and the others had taken loans from banks for the purpose of installing machinery for de-fibreing husks. According to the petitioners the cost involved in installing machinery in a proper building for the purpose would range from Rs. 22,000 to Rs. 35,000. All the petitioners challenge the purported exercise of power under sub-rule (2) of R.114 of the Rules. The challenge is based on" the assumption that the formation of the opinion by the State Government for the purpose of exercise of power under the sub-rule is a justiciable issue; that it is possible for this Court to call for the material based on which the opinion had been formed by the State Government and examine the material with a view to find out whether a reasonable man or authority would have come to the conclusion that in its opinion, for securing the equitable distribution and availability of retted husks at fair prices, a regulation or prohibition of the manufacture of fibre from retted husks by mechanical means is necessary. An alternative contention was also raised that in any view of the matter, it will be open to the petitioners to prove by positive evidence before this Court that there was no material available to the State Government to form the opinion, which it says it did. An alternative contention was also raised that in any view of the matter, it will be open to the petitioners to prove by positive evidence before this Court that there was no material available to the State Government to form the opinion, which it says it did. On this aspect of the case, further arguments were advanced before us that the discharge of the burden, if any cast on the petitioners to prove that there was no material on the basis of which the opinion could have been formed, can be by the process of examining the material supplied by the State Government in its counter affidavit, even assuming that it would not be possible if the principle of the decision in Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson and Another reported in 1942 A. C. 206 that the petitioners cannot claim that this Court should call for the information that the State Government is said to have had, should be approved. So ran the main arguments advanced by counsel for the various petitioners. In addition, it was also contended that S.38 of the Defence of India Act, 1971, for short, the Act, had been violated; that the notification is against Art.301 of the Constitution of India and further that it violated Art.14 of the Constitution of India. 4. We may pause here for a moment to state that consequent on the confrontation with Pakistan in December 1971, the President of India in exercise of the powers vested in him by Art.352 of the Constitution of India declared on 3121971 that an emergency existed in the country. In the wake of that declaration, the Act was passed on the 4th December, 1971 and the Rules were framed on the next day, 5 121971. The declaration is in force even today and so by virtue of Art.358 of the Constitution, nothing in Art.19 would restrict the power of the State as defined in Part III to make any law or to take any executive action which the State would but for the provisions contained in that Part be competent to make or to take. 5. The State Government has taken the stand that the formation of the opinion by the State Government is not a justiciable issue. 5. The State Government has taken the stand that the formation of the opinion by the State Government is not a justiciable issue. We shall extract the very words in the counter affidavit filed by the joint Secretary to the State Government, who is said to be conversant with the facts. This is in Para.3 of the counter affidavit filed in O. P. No. 2821 of 1973 and we shall extract that paragraph: "3. Exhibit P1 notification is issued under R.114(2) of Defence of India Rules, which is a piece of emergency legislation.and that the enabling language in R.114 Defence of India Rules confers absolute discretion in the State Government in issuing the notification thereunder. The matters specified in R.114(2) Defence of India Rules are matters of opinion or judgment and not matters of fact. The rules of construction of such emergency legislations are well settled by decisions of courts as hereinafter submitted. The onus for forming the opinion is discharged by the notification itself. The material on which the Government founded its opinion cannot be enquired into by courts. The opinion is entirely that of the Government. The causes that induced the formation of the opinion is that of Government alone. There can be no triable issue as to the reasonableness of the formation of the opinion, for the court to enquire into. As the administrative plenary discretion is vested in the Government, it is for the Government to decide whether there are grounds for the opinion and act accordingly. No outsider's decision can be invoked, nor is the issue within the competence of the court. It cannot be suggested that the Government must prove that it was so satisfied when it issued the order or notification. The compliance with the requirements of the provisions of R.114 Defence of India Rules has to be presumed. The court cannot enquire whether in fact the Government had grounds for the formation of the opinion under R.114(2) Defence of India Rules. The matter is one of executive discretion of the Government. The court cannot compel the Government to give particulars of the grounds on which the opinion was formed. The court cannot enquire whether in fact the Government had grounds for the formation of the opinion under R.114(2) Defence of India Rules. The matter is one of executive discretion of the Government. The court cannot compel the Government to give particulars of the grounds on which the opinion was formed. The issue of the notification by the Government ex facie regular and duly authenticated constitutes a complete defence in an action impugning the order, and the Government cannot be called upon to justify the notification by proving that the Government had before it materials sufficient to support." 6. Without prejudice to the submissions made in that paragraph, further averments have been made in Para.4 to 9 of the said counter affidavit. 7. We are not at this stage going to refer to these averments as we are not going to refer to the various averments in the detailed petition in O. P.. No. 2821 of 1973 wherein many facts and circumstances have been enumerated, for, we think that for considering the first question arising before us, namely, whether the formation of the opinion for the purpose of sub-rule (2) of R.114 of the Rules is justiciable, these averments in the petition and the counter affidavit are unnecessary. Before we proceed to deal with this aspect of the case, it is necessary to state that it has been agreed before us by counsel appearing for the petitioners as well as the learned Advocate General who appeared for the State that the pleadings in O. P. No. 2821 of 1973 and those in O. P. Nos. 2647 and 2771 of 1973 and the counter affidavits filed in these three petitions by the State Government are exhaustive of the pleadings of the contending parties before us. 8. Now turning to the first aspect, we have naturally to refer to the decision of the House of Lords in Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson and Another reported in 1942 A. C. 206. What has been decided by the House of Lords therein is very clear. 8. Now turning to the first aspect, we have naturally to refer to the decision of the House of Lords in Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson and Another reported in 1942 A. C. 206. What has been decided by the House of Lords therein is very clear. In this connection, it will be useful to remember that no information had been made available to the court by the Secretary of State who in purported exercise of the power under Regulation.18B of the Defence (General) Regulations, 1939, admittedly acting in good faith, made an order in which he recited that he had reasonable cause to believe that the person who was detained had hostile associations and that by reason thereof it was necessary to exercise control over him and hence directed that that person be detained. The action by the person detained was against the Secretary of State for damages for false imprisonment and the ruling categorically laid down that the court cannot compel the defendant to give particulars of the grounds on which he had reasonable cause to believe that the plaintiff was a person of hostile associations or that by reason of such hostile associations it was necessary to exercise control over the plaintiff. Before the House of Lords again, the question was whether the Home Secretary could be compelled to disclose the grounds on which he thought that he had reason to believe and the ruling was that he could not be compelled. No doubt another question also arose, an important question, regarding the interpretation of the words "that he had reasonable cause to believe". The majority of the learned Law Lords understood the words occurring in an emergency legislation in emergent times as indicating a "subjective satisfaction". This view of the majority has been strongly criticised by Lord Atkin in his then and now famous dissenting judgment. It is unnecessary for our purpose to refer to this controversy, for, the words used in R.114(2) of the Rules are different. We may take it as well-established that such expressions as "where it appears to the Minister (or to the local authority) that he (they) may ", or "provided the Minister is satisfied that", or, "where in the opinion of the Minister, he may," import a subjective satisfaction. We may take it as well-established that such expressions as "where it appears to the Minister (or to the local authority) that he (they) may ", or "provided the Minister is satisfied that", or, "where in the opinion of the Minister, he may," import a subjective satisfaction. This must be more so when the words occur in an emergency legislation, as in the rules framed under the Act, the Act and the Rules both following a declaration of emergency by the President under Art.352 of the Constitution. We have referred at some length to the decision in Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson and Another reported in 1942 A.C. 206 because we felt that the import of the decision had not always been fully comprehend or understood; at times, we think it had been mis-understood. In the case of "subjective satisfaction", where the subjective satisfaction had to be that of a high authority as the Home Secretary, or by a Minister, and that in times of emergency, and for the purpose of an emergency legislation, we conceive, that the law in England still is what is stated in Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson and Another reported in 1942 A. C. 206. The only qualification that has been engrafted to this is perhaps that introduced by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Ross-Clunis v. Papadopoullos and others reported in (1958) 2 All E. R.23. It appears that even in cases where the test is a "subjective test", it could be shown that there were no grounds on which an authority could be so satisfied and when it is so shown a court might infer either that the authority did not honestly form that view of that, in forming it, he could not have applied his mind to the relevant facts. Excluding mala fides, not in the sense of dishonest or corrupt motive alone but as comprehending a non-application of the. Excluding mala fides, not in the sense of dishonest or corrupt motive alone but as comprehending a non-application of the. mind to the relevant material, and excluding considerations arising from relying on extraneous considerations or omitting to take into account relevant material for forming the opinion, and excluding cases where it is established by positive evidence that the opinion could not have been formed if there has been proper application of the mind, the formation of opinion cannot be subjected to scrutiny, analysis or reassessment by a court in order to find out whether there was reasonable cause or grounds on the basis of which a reasonable man would have come to the conclusion that the authority did. In this connection it must be remembered that a statute, and naturally the words used in the particular section of the Act under which action was taken and the rules framed under the statute will take its colouring from the scheme of the Act, the subject matter dealt with therein, the time and purpose for which the Act was passed and the time at which the power was sought to be exercised. This is an important aspect which has got to be borne in mind; for, if this aspect is forgotten, it may be difficult to reconcile the conclusions reached by the highest courts including that of the Supreme Court in different cases on the subject. The main controversy before us between counsel who argued for the petitioners and the learned Advocate General on the other side turned on the question whether it is the principle that is stated by the Supreme Court in Barium Chemicals Ltd. and Another v. Company Law Board and others reported in AIR. 1967 SC. 295 which is the same as that reiterated by the Supreme Court in Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. S.D. Agarwal and another reported in AIR. 1969 SC. 707, interpreting S.237 (b) of the Companies Act, 1956 that should apply or whether as is contended by the learned Advocate General it is the principle of the decision of the Supreme Court in Jaichand Lal Sethia v. The State of West Bengal and others reported in AIR. 1967 SC. 483, which is the same as that stated by the Supreme Court in Lakhanpal v. Union of India and another reported in AIR. 1967 SC. 1967 SC. 483, which is the same as that stated by the Supreme Court in Lakhanpal v. Union of India and another reported in AIR. 1967 SC. 908, and that in Ram Manohar Lohia v. The State of Bihar and another reported in AIR. 1966 SC. 740 that should apply. Counsel for the petitioners strenuously urged for our acceptance that R.114 (2) of the Rules should be interpreted in the same manner in which the Supreme Court interpreted S.237 (b) of the Companies Act, 1956. We think that the ruling in Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. S. D. Agarwal and another reported in AIR. 1969 SC. 707 relied on by counsel for the petitioners itself gives the answer to this controversy. Justice Hegde in his judgment in the above decision referred to the decision of the Privy Council in Hubli Electricity Company Ltd. v. Province of Bombay reported in AIR. 1949 P. C. 136, wherein the Judicial Committee came to the conclusion that the opinion to be formed by the Provincial Government under S.4 (1) of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 is a subjective opinion and the same cannot be adjudged by applying objective tests. The following passage from the opinion of the Judicial Committee was extracted by the Supreme Court: "Their Lordships are unable to see that there is anything in the language of the subsection or in the subject matter to which it relates on which to found the suggestion that the opinion of the Government is to be subject to objective tests. In terms the relevant matter is the opinion of the Government not the grounds on which the opinion is based. The language leaves ho room for the relevance of a judicial examination as to the sufficiency of the grounds on which the government acted in forming an opinion. Further the question on which the opinion of the government is relevant is not whether a default has been wilful and unreasonably prolonged but whether there has been a wilful and unreasonably prolonged default. Further the question on which the opinion of the government is relevant is not whether a default has been wilful and unreasonably prolonged but whether there has been a wilful and unreasonably prolonged default. On that point the opinion is the determining matter, and if it is not to good cause displaced as a relevant opinion it is conclusive." After reading the above passage, the learned judge observed as follows: "It may be remembered that therein the Judicial Committee was considering a pre-constitutional provision which was not subject to the mandate of Art.19(1)(g) Further their Lordships were careful enough to observe: "that they are unable to see that there is anything in the language of the sub-section or in the subject matter to which it relates on which to found the suggestion that the opinion of the Government is to be subject to objective tests." In other words in their Lordships' opinion the subject matter of a legislation has an important bearing in the interpretation of a provision" (the Italics is ours) The Supreme Court referred to the decisions in Point of Ayr Collieries Ltd. v. Lloyd George reported in 1943-2 All E. R.546, Liversidge v. Anderson and Another reported in 1942 A. C. 206, already noted by us, and Greene v Home Secretary reported in 1941-3 All E.R. 388 and explained away those decisions by stating that "Those decisions cannot serve as real guide for interpreting the provision of law with which we are concerned." 9. Thereafter a number of decisions have been examined by the Supreme Court and it was finally ruled that in finding out the true scope of S.237 (b) one will have to bear in mind that that section is a part of the scheme already noticed in the judgment and that therefore the provision in the section must take its colour from S.235 and 236 of the Banking Companies Act 1956 Further it was said that in interpreting S.237(b) the adverse effect of the investigation on the company cannot be ignored and further that it should be remembered that the section in question is an inroad on the powers of the company to carry on its trade or business and thereby an infraction of the fundamental right guaranteed to its shareholders under Art.19(1) (g) and that its validity cannot be upheld unless it is considered that the power in question is a reasonable restriction in the interest of the general public. These considerations we are afraid cannot be applied in understanding the scope and ambit of sub-rule (2) of R.114 of the Rules. Entirely different considerations must prevail and the provisions will have to be understood as conferring a very wide and we are inclined to think, an almost unfettered discretion, on the State Government to form its opinion on the materials that were available before it. In the absence of mala fides or in the absence of proof that the State Government had misdirected itself or where it has been established that there has been no application of the mind or where the petitioners had established by relevant and cogent material that no opinion could have been formed by the State Government, the courts are out of the picture and the notification issued must stand Counsel Sri. S. Narayanan Poti tried to distinguish the principle of the decision of the Judicial Committee in The Hubli Electricity Co. Ltd. v. The Province of Bombay reported in AIR. (36) 1949 P. C. 136 by contending that that decision was rendered when neither Art.19 nor Art.14 of the Constitution was available in view of the Order of the President under Art.359 of the Constitution. Ltd. v. The Province of Bombay reported in AIR. (36) 1949 P. C. 136 by contending that that decision was rendered when neither Art.19 nor Art.14 of the Constitution was available in view of the Order of the President under Art.359 of the Constitution. It was submitted that Art.14 of the Constitution has not been abrogated notwithstanding the declaration of emergency by the President on 3121971, that all the provisions in Part III of the Constitution excepting Art.19 remained in tact and available to the petitioners and therefore the principle of the decision of the Judicial Committee cannot be applied. We are unable to accept this contention. The main right that is infringed and which is complained of is the fundamental right guaranteed by Art.19(1)(g) of the Constitution to carry on any occupation, trade or business. The business of the petitioners before us is the extraction of fibre from retted coconut husks by the use of machinery and it is the carrying on of this business that has been completely prohibited. Normally such a prohibition will be prima facie against Art.19(1)(g), and unless it is established that such prohibition is a reasonable restriction in the interest of the general public, the prohibition would not stand. But by virtue of the declaration of emergency and the consequent non-availability of Art.19, such a contention cannot be urged. After all in the broad context of the administrative process, the role of judicial institutions is inevitably sporadic and peripheral. S.A. de Smith, in his Book "Judicial Review of Administrative Action said: "In the broad context of the administrative process the role of judicial institutions is inevitably sporadic and peripheral. The administrative process is not, and cannot be, a succession of justiciable controversies." If that be so, in extraordinary circumstances and in times of emergency it does not appear to us to be strange that even the sporadic and peripheral exercise of judicial review may not be available. What we have said is sufficient to negative the very large contention that has been urged before us by counsel. What we have said is sufficient to negative the very large contention that has been urged before us by counsel. Art.14 and the other Articles in Part III of the Constitution which have not been affected by the declaration of emergency can still be relied on by the petitioners and the contention that Art.14 has been violated by the notification and the further contention that Art.301 of the Constitution has been violated, we shall deal with presently; but as we said, the existence of these provisions in the Constitution and the availability of the contentions based on these provisions to the petitioners cannot affect the principle that should be applied in interpreting the words used in sub-rule (2) of R.114 of the Rules framed under the Defence of India Act passed at the time of emergency to meet an emergent situation. The context, the subject matter and the words used in the sub-rule clearly spell a "subjective satisfaction". In every case, the degree of discretion conferred by a statute or regulation must be determined by reference to the statute or regulation in question. In Nakkuda Ali v. Jayaratne reported in (1951) A. C. 66, the Judicial Committee held that there was no general principle that a court could not examine whether reasonable grounds in fact existed. The power of the courts to control the administration is subject to what Parliament has laid down; and Parliament may exclude the courts either expressly, or indirectly by conferring discretions of such a kind that there is virtually no possibility of challenge. (See page 632 of Constitutional Law by E. C. S. Wade and Godfrey Philips, Eighth Edition). The Privy Council said in NakkudaAli v. Jayaratne that Liversidge v. Anderson is an authority for the proposition that the words "if A. B. has reasonable cause to believe" are capable of meaning "if A. B. honestly thinks that he has reasonable cause to believe". And that is the principle which we think, still must prevail in cases of this nature arising in times of emergency and in interpreting a provision contained in an emergency legislation. It is therefore the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the decisions relied on by the Advocate General in Ram Manohar Lohia v. The State of Bihar and another reported in AIR. 1966 SC. It is therefore the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the decisions relied on by the Advocate General in Ram Manohar Lohia v. The State of Bihar and another reported in AIR. 1966 SC. 740, Jaichand Lal Sethia v. The State of West Bengal and others reported in AIR. 1967 SC. 483 and Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. 5. D. Agarwal and another reported in AIR. 1969 SC. 707 that must prevail. 10. This leads us to the next aspect arising from the main contention that the opinion formed by the State Government cannot stand either because what is stated by the petitioners is sufficient to disprove the availability of material for forming an opinion such as that formed or because the information supplied by the State Government in its counter affidavit in Para.4 to 9 both inclusive, conclusively dispel the availability of material for forming such a conclusion. We have carefully read the averments in the petition in O. P. No. 2821 of 1973 which it was agreed contained all the aspects. The complaint therein seems to be that the Coir Board entrusted with important functions relating to the coir industry had not been consulted; its opinion not ascertained, and that various reports indicating that mechanisation is the only salvation for the coir industry, that without it, the export of the finished articles produced from the coir fibre would become impossible and that the coir industry itself would very soon breathe its last had not been taken into account. These aspects, we do not consider are relevant or material in forming the opinion for the purpose of sub-rule (2) of R.114 of the Rules. Whether the coir industry would survive only if there is large scale mechanisation it is admitted that the introduction of such mechanisation would result in large scale unemployment or whether it would die otherwise is a matter which we are not called upon to decide. Whether the industry should survive only as a cottage industry or as a large scale export industry is a matter of high economic policy which should be decided by the State Government. This aspect, we do not think really arises for the purpose of taking action under R.114 (2) of the Rules which has a much more limited application. This is so even when the rule is read with S.38 of the Act. This aspect, we do not think really arises for the purpose of taking action under R.114 (2) of the Rules which has a much more limited application. This is so even when the rule is read with S.38 of the Act. We have not of course referred in detail to the various aspects mentioned in the petition in O. P. No. 2821 of 1973 but we are correct in stating that it is of the kind which we have indicated, matters which are not germane to the issue of forming an opinion for the exercise of power under sub-rule (2) of R.114 of the Rules. We have no doubt, therefore, that the petitioners have not established by cogent material before us that the opinion formed by the State Government cannot stand. The only question then is whether the averments in Para.4 to 9 of the counter affidavit carry the death-warrant to the contentions of the State Government in Para.3 of the counter affidavit. In dealing with this aspect, we must remember that the contention put forward by the State Government is categorical and we have extracted in extenso the whole of Para.3 of the counter affidavit. The submission on behalf of the State is that the matter is not justiciable, that it is a matter of discretion to be exercised by the State Government, that as long as there has been no mis¬direction and non-application of the mind to the questions arising for consideration which are whether for equal distribution and for availability at fair prices the opinion formed must stand. It is only without prejudice to this essential contention that certain facts are stated in Para.4 to 9 of the counter affidavit and these facts clearly establish certain facts. (1) Mechanisation had progressed at a fairly high rate in the three districts of Trivandrum, Quilon and Alleppey. Out of the 414 mechanised units in the whole of the Kerala State consisting of 11 districts, 283 are in these three districts alone. There is thus a heavy concentration of mechanised units in the three districts, (2) only a handful of workmen are required with the assistance of the machines to extract fibre from retted coconut husks. Out of the 414 mechanised units in the whole of the Kerala State consisting of 11 districts, 283 are in these three districts alone. There is thus a heavy concentration of mechanised units in the three districts, (2) only a handful of workmen are required with the assistance of the machines to extract fibre from retted coconut husks. The figure given is that only 10 workers are required for de-fibreing husks of 12,000 coconuts by the use of machines as against 120 workers by the process known as the hand-method, (3) the use of machines makes production of fibre more economic, (4) that the work is done mechanically much more quickly giving a capacity to the machines to consume coconut husks in very large quantities, (5) there have been appreciable increase of prices of retted coconut husks in the districts of Trivandrum, Quilon and Alleppey and (6) there have been large scale unemployment of labour engaged in the traditional method and consequently serious unrest in the area. 11. From the above facts, which are all based on materials referred to in the counter affidavit, the inference had been drawn by the State Government that the use of machines has affected the availability of retted coconut husks for equitable distributional fair prices. Far from disproving the existence of cogent material for the formation of the opinion, for action under R.114(2) of the Rules, we think that the information supplied is relevant and useful. It cannot be said that the view taken is not a plausible view on the materials that were available. This Court, it is admitted cannot examine the sufficiency of the material. That is a well-established principle. The petitions fail on this aspect of the case as we'll. The main point urged by counsel on behalf of the petitioners in these petitions on both its aspects cannot be accepted. 12. Art.301 of the Constitution is not available to the petitioners in view of the provision in Art.302 of the Constitution. The Defence of India Act has been passed by the Parliament and the restrictions that have been imposed are imposed in the interest of the general public. 12. Art.301 of the Constitution is not available to the petitioners in view of the provision in Art.302 of the Constitution. The Defence of India Act has been passed by the Parliament and the restrictions that have been imposed are imposed in the interest of the general public. The Rules framed under the Act must stand on the same footing and the restrictions imposed on any trade or business resulting from the exercise of power under such legislation passed in an emergency cannot be struck down as violative of Art.301 of the Constitution. 13. Nor are we impressed by the argument that there has been violation of Art.14 of the Constitution. It is not as though Art.14 insists that any law made must always uniformly be applied to all the subjects of a State or nation. It is well-established that classification is a process which can legitimately be applied in the matter of imposing restrictions or enacting laws or in treating different subjects in a different manner. The plea put forward by the State is that the three districts, Trivandrum, Quilon and Alleppey stand on a different footing from the other districts. Increase by leaps and bounds of the use of mechanical process for decortication has been most in the three districts. The bulk of the machinery in the State are situate in the three districts. The bulk of the unemployment also occurred in these three districts. The non-availability of husks for equitable distribution at fair prices also is serious in these three districts. The prices have increased far more in these three districts. The three districts can therefore be treated differently from the other eight districts in the State. And we are not satisfied that Art.14 of the Constitution has been infringed by the order. 14. There remains for us only to consider S.38 of the Defence of India Act, 1971. That section is in these terms-. "38. Ordinary avocations of life to be interfered with as little as possible. Any authority or person acting in pursuance of this Act shall interfere with the ordinary avocations of life and the enjoyment of property as little as may be consonant with the purpose of ensuring the public safety and interest and the defence of India and civil defence." The provision in the section is not mandatory. Any authority or person acting in pursuance of this Act shall interfere with the ordinary avocations of life and the enjoyment of property as little as may be consonant with the purpose of ensuring the public safety and interest and the defence of India and civil defence." The provision in the section is not mandatory. It only serves as a guide-line to the exercise of the power under the Act and the Rules framed under the Act. It is a matter of policy for the State Government to decide what should be the extent of the interference in relation to the enjoyment of property. That public interest is to be the paramount consideration is evident from the wording of the section itself. As we said earlier, whether the action is in the general interest of the trade or good for its expansion or even its continuance can only be a matter of high policy of the State. We are not prepared to say that on the basis of S.38 of the Act we can set at naught the action taken by the State Government under sub-rule (2) of R.114 of the Rules. 15. We have not referred to the numerous decisions that have been quoted by counsel appearing for the petitioners and also by the Advocate General for, we think that it is unnecessary to examine all of them for deciding the matter before us. We have referred to the important decisions. We need only further refer to a few decisions merely giving citations, relied on by the Advocate General in support of his contention that the considerations that would weigh with the Court and with the State Government in times of emergency would be different from those that are to be applied in normal times. We would refer to the Supreme Court decisions in 1966 SC. 91 at p. 94, 1966 SC. 740 at p. 745, 1967 SC. 908 at p. 911 and 1969 SC. 707 that have been referred to by the learned Advocate General. We have already said earlier in the judgment that the subject matter of the statute, the legislation under which the action has been taken, the time at which the legislation has been passed and the paramount considerations arising from an emergency must all contribute to the meaning to be attached to the words in the provisions in the statute. We have already said earlier in the judgment that the subject matter of the statute, the legislation under which the action has been taken, the time at which the legislation has been passed and the paramount considerations arising from an emergency must all contribute to the meaning to be attached to the words in the provisions in the statute. The petitioners are no doubt adversely affected and atleast in the case of some of them, the effect of the impugned notification would be severe. At times of stress, it may be necessary that some may have to suffer in this manner but such circumstances are to be taken note of by the State Government as a matter of high policy. Whatever it be, these are matters that a court cannot consider for determining the validity of the impugned notification and we shall conclude by referring to the decisions which have clearly laid down that we cannot consider the reasonableness, propriety or expediency of the step. We said so in our decision in N. J. Thomas and others v. The State of Kerala & Others reported in 1966 KLT. 931 and the Supreme Court has laid down the same principle in the decision in Rustom Cavasjee Cooper and another v. Union of India reported in AIR. 1970 SC. 564. 16. We dismiss these petitions but direct the parties to bear their respective costs.