JUDGMENT T. S. Misra, J. - This is defendant's appeal arising out of a suit for declaration that the notice of termination of service served by the Superintendent of Police, Barabanki, and affirmed in appeal by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Lucknow, and the Inspector General of Police, Lucknow, is illegal, ultra vires and of no effect and that the plaintiff still continues in service as well as for recovery of Rs. 2524.10 and for future salary. The plaintiff alleged that he was recruited as a Civil Constable by the Superintendent of Police Barabanki on 29-2-1960 and was posted at Barabanki after successfully completing his training. Though no employment letter was issued to him but it was understood that he had been recruited on probation for two years. He further alleged that after completion of two years' service he was never informed if the period of probation had been extended or not, nor was he informed that he had been employed on temporary duties or on permanent duties. The plaintiff also alleged that he continued to work honestly and satisfactorily but on 4-7-1964 he was informed that his name was struck off from the roll of constables of the District with effect from the forenoon of 5-7-1964 and that his pay upto 4-7-1964 would be sent by money order. He made representations against the order of termination of service which were, however, rejected. He, therefore, challenged the order of termination dated 5-6-1964 in the suit alleging that the Superintendent of Police, Barabanki was not entitled to dismiss him from service without serving on him a show cause notice. The suit was contested by the State. It was alleged that the plaintiff was enlisted as a temporary constable and was not brought on probation and that his services were terminated with effect from 5-7-1964 after serving on him one month's notice. The other contentions raised by the plaintiff were also denied. The trial Court found that the plaintiff was appointed on probation and as his services were terminated without following a definite procedure laid down in Rule 541 of the U. P. Police Regulation, the order terminating the service was illegal, ultra vires and unconstitutional. The suit was, therefore, decreed as prayed. The appeal preferred by the State against the said decision was also dismissed. The State has now come to this Court in second appeal. 2. The suit was, therefore, decreed as prayed. The appeal preferred by the State against the said decision was also dismissed. The State has now come to this Court in second appeal. 2. It was argued by the learned Chief Standing Counsel that the plaintiff was a temporary employee, hence his services could be terminated at any time by giving him one month's notice. He also urged that the rules contained in Chapter XXXVII of the U. P. Police Regulations were merely of the nature of administrative directions and had no statutory force. Hence non-compliance of Rule 541 would, in any event, not render the order of termination of service void and ultra vires. The learned counsel for the respondent, however, laid great stress on R. 541 of the U. P. Police Regulations contained in Chapter XXXVII and submitted that the plaintiff having been appointed on probation was governed by Rule 541 of the U. P. Police Regulations and the order of termination of service being in violation of the provisions of that rule was, therefore, void and ultra vires. 3. The learned counsel for the respondent relied on the provisions of Section 243 of the Government of India Act, 1935, which lays down that: "The conditions of service of the subordinate ranks of the various police forces in India shall be such as may be determined by or under the Acts relating to those forces respectively." He argued that these provisions have been kept alive by Article 313 of the Constitution; consequently the conditions of service in the Police Force are still governed by the Police Act 1861 and the rules that have been framed and the orders and notifications that have been issued thereunder. The learned counsel for the respondent further argued that the plaintiff having passed through the prescribed training course and having been attached to Police Station must be deemed to have become a probationer in accordance with paragraph 541 of the Police Regulations which deals with the constable recruits. Consequently it was submitted that his service could not be terminated without affording him an opportunity to show cause against the proposed action. I, however, find much force in the contention raised on behalf of the State. Consequently it was submitted that his service could not be terminated without affording him an opportunity to show cause against the proposed action. I, however, find much force in the contention raised on behalf of the State. It has not been shown that para graph 541 contained in Chapter XXXVII of the Police Regulations on which reliance has been placed by both the courts below have statutory force. It is merely an administrative direction and non-compliance thereof would, therefore, not render the impugned order void and inoperative. A similar question arose in the case of Nanak Chand v. State of U.P., 1971 All LJ 724. The Full Bench of this Court while dealing with that case observed that the paragraphs contained in Chapters XXXVI and XXXVII of the Police Regulations had not been shown to have statutory force. They merely embody administrative directions as to what is necessary by way of training and experience before a Police Officer can be considered fit for permanent appointment. In the case of Nanak Chand, 1971 All LJ 724 (supra), two petitioners Nanak Chand and Subedar Singh were working as Sub-Inspectors of Police while the rest were serving as Police constables. In that case also no appointment letter had been issued to the constables. It was, therefore, argued on their behalf that every recruit to the Police Force must automatically become a probationer. Attention of the Full Bench was, therefore, drawn to paragraph 541 of the U. P. Police Regulations to contend that the impugned order having been passed in violation of that paragraph was void. While examining the argument the Full Bench had made the observation that paragraph 541 had not been shown to have statutory force and that it merely embodied administrative direction. In the present case also the learned counsel for the respondent could not show that paragraph 541 has statutory force. 4. It may be observed that it is not that all the paragraphs of the U. P. Police Regulations have statutory force. The regulations contained in Chapter XX thereof have no statutory basis and are merely executive or departmental instructions framed for the guidance of the Police Officer, as was held by the Supreme Court in the case of Kharak Singh v. State, ( AIR 1963 SC 1295 ). The regulations contained in Chapter XX thereof have no statutory basis and are merely executive or departmental instructions framed for the guidance of the Police Officer, as was held by the Supreme Court in the case of Kharak Singh v. State, ( AIR 1963 SC 1295 ). The rules in Chapter XXXII of the Police Regulations having been framed under Section 7 of the Police Act have however, statutory force as was held by the Supreme Court in the case of State v. Babu Ram, ( AIR 1961 SC 751 ). Paragragh 541 has, however, no statutory force as was held in the case of Nanak Chand, 1971 All LJ 724 ; (1971 Lab IC 1151) supra. 5. The services of the plaintiff were terminated by the Superintendent of Police by serving on him a notice dated 5-6-1964, Ex. A-2, with effect from 5-7-1964. The plaintiff admittedly was not made permanent. His services could, therefore, be terminated by giving him one month's notice. The impugned order was not illegal or ultra vires and the Courts below were, therefore, not justified in decreeing the suit. No other point was urged. 6. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the decree passed by the Court below is set aside and the suit is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs throughout.