JUDGMENT 1. THIS is an appeal by the defendant against the judgment and decree of affirmance decreeing the plaintiffs' suit for recovery of possession. The original plaintiff Sm. Mrinalini Debi instituted the suit on September 14, 1968 for recovery of possession of a portion of premises No. 18, Nepal Bhattacharyya street, Calcutta, which the defendant held as a monthly tenant-at-will at a monthly rent of Rs. 145- payable accordingly to English calendar month. The tenancy was determined by combined notice to quit and of suit with the expiry of the month of November 1967, but the defendant failed to vacate the suit premises as required. The ground for eviction was the plaintiff's requirement of the suit premises for her own imc and occupation. It was stated that the plaintiff, who indisputedly was the owner of the premises, had no son but two married daughters who, though married, always lived with her with their respective families in the said premises. The suit premises was required by the plaintiff, who was an old lady of sixty eight year's suffering from various ailments, for her use and occupation as also for her daughter's families who had no suitable accommodation available elsewhere while the accommodation available to the plaintiff in the said premises was insufficient. It appears that the plaintiff died on July 2, 1969 and by order dated July 8, 1969 the present plaintiffs, the respondents in this Court, who are the daughters of the deceased plaintiff, were substituted in her place without any objection, it appears, from the defendant. 2. THE suit was contested by the defendant and was tried on evidence. The trial court found that the substituted plaintiffs with their respective families all through lived with their mother in the said premises No, 18, Nepal bhattacharyya Street and they had no suitable accommodation elsewhere. It was held that the families of the daughters were to be considered as members of the plaintiff's family and her requirement would include their requirement as well. It was further found that the suit premises was reason ably required for the accommodation of the plaintiff's family. The original plaintiff was entitled to a decree and the substituted plaintiffs were also equally entitled to a decree for possession. The court further found that the combined notice to quit and of suit was a valid notice in law and was duly served. The suit was accordingly decreed. The original plaintiff was entitled to a decree and the substituted plaintiffs were also equally entitled to a decree for possession. The court further found that the combined notice to quit and of suit was a valid notice in law and was duly served. The suit was accordingly decreed. An appeal was preferred, by the defendant and the appellate court dismissed the appeal affirming the findings of the trial court. The present appeal is by the defendant against this decision. 3. MR. Sakti Nath Mukherjee appearing with Mr. Bhaskar Ghosh has contended that the courts below were in error in not holding that the suit abated with the death of the original plaintiff. The other findings arrived at by the courts below were not assailed as they could not be in this second appeal. In support of his contention, Mr. Mukherjee relied on the decision of the Supreme court in Sm. Phool Rani and others v. Sh. Naubat Rai Ahluwalia A.I.R, 1973 S.C. 2110, in which it was held that the requirement of the plaintiff, which was a personal cause of action, must perish with the plaintiff. 4. THE Supreme Court in this case was considering a case for ejectment of the tenant under section 14 (1) (e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act for the bonafide requirement of the premises for the residence of plaintiff landlord and his family members. It was held : "thus, the requirement pleaded in the ejectment application and on which the plaintiff has founded his right to relief, is his requirement, or to use an expression which will effectively bring out the real point, his personal requirement. If the ejectment application succeeds-we will forget for a moment that the plaintiff is dead-the premises in the possession of the tenant may come to be occupied by the plaintiff and the members of his family but that does not make the requirement pleaded in the application any the less a personal requirement of the plaintiff. That the member's of his family must reside with him is his requirement, not theirs. Such personal cause of action must perish with the plaintiff". The relevant provisions of the west Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 are pari materia with those of the Delhi act which was under consideration of the Supreme Court. That the member's of his family must reside with him is his requirement, not theirs. Such personal cause of action must perish with the plaintiff". The relevant provisions of the west Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 are pari materia with those of the Delhi act which was under consideration of the Supreme Court. The "reasonable requirement" in the West Bengal Act, in place of the "bonafide requirement" in the Delhi Act, does make any difference, in my opinion, on the question of requirement of the landlord, which must be personal as its basis. On the above authority, it must be held that the plaintiff's right to sue did not survive to the Substituted plaintiffs and it must accordingly held that the suit abated with the death of the plaintiff. 5. MR. Manindra Nath Ghosh and Mr. Dhruba Bhattacharyya appearing for the respondents have contended that no objection was ever taken by the appellant to the substitution of the plain tiff and such objection should not be allowed to be taken for the first time in this court. Further the suit was tried on evidence in all, aspects about the requirement of the substituted plaintiffs including the question as to whether the said plaintiffs had in their occupation suitable accommodation elsewhere. It may be mentioned that the Supreme Court also considered this aspect of the case and it was held that if the substituted plaintiffs are permitted to continue the proceedings, "the his will assume a completion wholly beyond the compass of the original cause of action" much beyond the permissible amendments of pleadings. This was also an additional reason in support of the above decision. It was contended that in this case there was no such infirmity in procedure as the parties went to trial on these aspects of the case and adduced evidence in support of their respective cases, leading to findings of fact by the courts below which were no longer open for further consideration in the appeal. 6. THE basic question at issue is whether the suit on the death of the plaintiff is maintainable in law. If the cause of action does not survive to the plaintiff's heirs on his death, the court will have no further jurisdiction to proceed with the suit. 6. THE basic question at issue is whether the suit on the death of the plaintiff is maintainable in law. If the cause of action does not survive to the plaintiff's heirs on his death, the court will have no further jurisdiction to proceed with the suit. A wrong order of substitution even if unchallenged will not confer any jurisdiction on the court to proceed with the case and pass a decree therein. The suit thus abates on the death of the plaintiff landlord in such circumstances and a trial on other issues oh substitution of his heirs if held is obviously without jurisdiction which the court loses on the happening of such event. For these reasons the appeal succeeds and is allowed and the judgments and decrees of the courts below are set aside and the suit is dismissed. There will be no order for costs in this appeal in the circumstances. Leave under clause 15 of the Letters Patent is prayed for and is refused.