Judgment :- 1. This second appeal arises out of a suit O.S. No. 38 of 1964, Munsiff's Court, Kottarakara filed by certain minors represented by their next friend for setting aside the decree in O.S. No. 86 of 1962 on the file of the same court as well as a court sale held in execution thereof and for cancellation of a mortgage deed evidenced by Ext. D1 on the basis of which the said decree was passed. 2. Plaintiffs 1 to 5 (minors) are the children of the 4th defendant, Lekshmy Janamma, by her husband Govindan Kunju Raman who is the 3rd defendant in the suit. The 5th defendant is the mother of the 4th defendant. The plaint property was obtained by the sub-tarwad consisting of the plaintiffs and the 4th defendant as per the partition deed Ext. P1 dated 14th October, 1952. Under the said document a life-interest has been reserved in favour of the 5th defendant with power to encumber the property to the extent of Rs. 100/-. On 17-5-1958 defendants Nos. 3 to 5 executed a chitty hypothecation bond in favour of the 1st defendant for securing the payment of the future subscriptions amounting to Rs. 175/-due in respect of a chitty which had been prized by the 3rd defendant. It was recited in the bond that the prize amount had been received for the purpose of meeting the expenses of renovation of the residential building of the executants. Subsequently, on 911960 defendants 3 to 5 executed the mortgage deed Ext. D1 in favour of the 1st defendant for Rs. 600/-out of which Rs. 200/-was adjusted towards the debt due under the hypothecation bond Ext. D2, another sum of Rs. 200/- was stated as already received from the 1st defendant and utilised for paying off certain debts incurred by the executants in putting up the residential building in the mortgaged property and the balance of Rs. 200/-was adjusted towards the amount borrowed by the executants from the 1st defendant as per a promissory note for meeting the expenses of completing the construction of the said building. The 1st defendant instituted the suit O.S. No. 86 of 1962 in enforcement of the the mortgage Ext. D1, obtained a decree, brought a portion of the plaint schedule property to sale in execution thereof and purchased the property at the court auction. 3. The 1st defendant instituted the suit O.S. No. 86 of 1962 in enforcement of the the mortgage Ext. D1, obtained a decree, brought a portion of the plaint schedule property to sale in execution thereof and purchased the property at the court auction. 3. The present plaintiffs had been impleaded as eo nomine parties in O.S. No. 86 of 1962 and their mother (4th defendant) was originally shown as their guardian. Though summons was issued to the 4th defendant in her capacity as the guardian of the minors she did not enter appearance in the suit. Thereupon an application. was made to court by the plaintiff in O.S. No. 86 of 1962 (present 1st defendant) for the appointment of a court guardian for the minors and an officer of the court (2nd defendant herein) was appointed as the guardian of the minor defendants. A written statement was filed by him on behalf of the minors of which Ext. P6 is a copy. 4. The case put forward by the plaintiffs is that the mortgage Ext. D1 was not supported by consideration or necessity and it was not therefore binding on their sub-tarwad or its properties, that the executants of the mortgage had no authority to alienate the properties of the sub-tarwad and thereby jeopardise the interests of the minor members, that the court guardian had been guilty of gross negligence in not raising valid and proper contentions which were open to the present plaintiffs as defendants in O.S. No. 86 of 1962, that he had colluded with the Ist defendant and wrongfully and deliberately suffered a decree to be passed against the minors, that the mortgage Ext. D1, the decree in O.S. No. 86 of 1962 passed on the basis thereof and the court auction sale held pursuant thereto are not valid and binding as against the plaintiffs and their sub-tarwad properties and should be set aside on the said ground. 5. The courts below have come to divergent findings on the material issues arising for determination. The learned Munsiff held that the mortgage evidenced by Ext. D1 was not supported by consideration and tarwad necessity and it could not hence be regarded as a debt binding on the sub-tarwad of the plaintiffs. But, in view of the provision contained in the partition deed Ext.P1 empowering the 5th defendant to encumber the property to the extent of Rs. D1 was not supported by consideration and tarwad necessity and it could not hence be regarded as a debt binding on the sub-tarwad of the plaintiffs. But, in view of the provision contained in the partition deed Ext.P1 empowering the 5th defendant to encumber the property to the extent of Rs. 100/- and since the 5th defendant was also a signatory in Ext. D1 the mortgage had to be deemed as valid to the extent of Rs. 100/-. In the light of its conclusion that the mortgage was not supported by consideration and did not bind the sub-tarwad the trial court held that the court guardian appointed in O. S. No. 86 of 1962 was guilty of gross negligence in having omitted to urge the plea regarding the invalidity of the mortgage in defence to the said suit and that the minor plaintiffs are therefore entitled to have the decree and execution sale set aside. On the basis of the aforesaid findings the trial court passed a decree setting aside the mortgage Ext. D1 as well as the decree and court sale in O. S. No. 86 of 1962. The 1st defendant carried the matter in appeal to the Subordinate Judge's Court, Kottarakara. The learned Subordinate Judge discussed the evidence at length and came to the conclusion that the chitty hypothecation bond evidenced by Ext. D2 as well as the mortgage Ext. D1 were fully supported by consideration, that the borrowings under these documents were effected for sub-tarwad necessity, namely, for meeting the cost of reconstruction of the residential building of the sub-tarwad, and that there was no negligence or collusion on the part of the court guardian who represented the minors in the prior litigation. In the light of the said findings the learned Subordinate Judge set aside the decree and judgment of the trial court and dismissed the suit. Hence this second appeal by the plaintiffs. 6. In the light of the said findings the learned Subordinate Judge set aside the decree and judgment of the trial court and dismissed the suit. Hence this second appeal by the plaintiffs. 6. When this case came up for hearing before one of us, sitting singly, a contention was taken on behalf of the respondents that in O.S. No. 86 of 1962 the minors were not necessary parties at all since their sub¬tarwad was adequately represented in the eye of law by the adult members who had been impleaded therein and that, hence, irrespective of the question as to whether the court guardian had been guilty of any negligence or collusion, the decree passed in that suit could not be sought to be reopened by the minors by a separate suit. In support of the said contention reliance was placed on the decision of a learned single judge of this court reported in Arya v. Joseph & others, 1962 KLJ.1251. Since some of the observations in that decision appeared to run counter to the principle laid down by a Full Bench of five judges of the Travancore High Court in Mahommed Rowther v. Kochucherukkan, 26 TLJ.188, and several subsequent rulings based thereon it was felt that the decision in Arya v. Joseph & Others, 1962 KLJ.1251, may require reconsideration and hence this second appeal was referred to a Division Bench. 7. After having been gone through the entire evidence adduced in the case and considered the arguments advanced on both sides we have come to the conclusion that the findings entered by the learned Subordinate Judge that the mortgage Ext. D1 was supported by consideration and sub-tarwad necessity and that there was no negligence on the part of the court guardian who represented the minors in O. S. No. 86 of 1962 are perfectly correct and have to be upheld. In as much as it is thus found that the plaintiffs have failed to establish that the mortgage evidenced by Ext. In as much as it is thus found that the plaintiffs have failed to establish that the mortgage evidenced by Ext. D1 was not binding on the sub¬tarwad or that there were valid defences open to the members of the [sub-tarwad which had not been put forward in O. S. No. 86 of 1962 on account of the gross negligence or collusion on the part of the court guardian, we are not really called upon to consider the question whether the plaintiffs are entitled to in law to maintain this fresh suit for setting aside the mortgage Ext. Dl as well as the decree and court sale in O. S. No. 86 of 1962 on the aforesaid grounds. We, however, consider it necessary to point out that ever since the Full Bench decision in Mandan Raman and 2 others v. Ramasubba Aiyan Kulathoor Aiyan, 21 T. L. R.41, it had been regarded as settled law by courts in the Travancore area that the junior members of a marumakkathayam tarwad who had not figured as parties in an earlier suit instituted against the tarwad represented by the karnavar or in the execution proceedings therein are entitled to challenge by a fresh suit the validity of the decree passed in the prior suit and also the proceedings taken in execution thereof and that in such an action they can seek to set aside the earlier decree not only on the ground of fraud or collusion, but also by questioning the validity and binding nature of. the transaction which was sued on, or the reality of the debt contracted by the karnavan and the absence of consideration or tarwad necessity in regard to the same. The same principle was reiterated by another Full Bench in Perumal Velayudhan v. Raman Kesavan, 22 T. L. J. 215, and it was again affirmed by a Full Bench of five judges in Muhammed Rowther v. Kochucherukkan, 26 TLJ.188. It is true that on the question of maintainability of such a fresh suit a different view has been expressed, by some of the other High Courts including the Madras High Court. This divergence of judicial opinion did exist even at the time when Mahommed Rowther v. Kochucherukkan 26 TLJ.188, was decided and the Full Bench had taken due note of the said fact. This divergence of judicial opinion did exist even at the time when Mahommed Rowther v. Kochucherukkan 26 TLJ.188, was decided and the Full Bench had taken due note of the said fact. The Full Bench held that the question was really one of procedure and in as much as the principle of giving one opportunity to the junior members to institute a fresh suit had been consistently accepted as sound by the courts in Travancore and such a practice had grown and been in existence in the area for over 50 years, any attempt to disturb the current of decisions would create untold confusion and that hence the existing order of things should be allowed to continue. Four more decades have passed since the Full Bench spoke those words and the practice referred to by the learned judges has all along been. followed in the Travancore area in the meanwhile. The principle of stare decisis which was invoked in Mahommed Rowther v. Kochucherukkan, 27 TLJ.188 should apply in respect of the matter all the more strongly now. Hence we are clearly of the view that it will not be correct for this court to permit any attempt to reopen the legal position laid down in Mahommed Rowther v. Kochucherukkan 26 TLJ.188. The principles laid down in the said decision having been accepted and acted upon as sound and established law in the courts in the Travancore area for more than three-quarters of a century they must, in the larger interests of the certainty of the law, be left undisturbed and continued to be applied as the law governing the subject in respect of the said part of the territory of our State. Though Arya v. Joseph & Others 1962 KLJ. 1251, was also a case from the Travancore area the attention of the learned judge does not appear to have been drawn either to the Full Bench decision in Mohammed Rowther v. Kochucherukkan, 26 TLJ.188, or to the subsequent rulings following the same. The observations in the judgment in Arya's case to the extent to which they are inconsistent with the dictum laid down in Mohammed Rowther's case cannot be regarded as laying down the correct legal position on the subject in respect of the Travancore area. 8. We now come back to the facts of the present case as brought out in the evidence. 8. We now come back to the facts of the present case as brought out in the evidence. Even though the definite case put forward in the plaint is that the tavazhi house where the plaintiffs as well as defendants Nos. 3 to 5 were admittedly residing at the time of institution of the suit was constructed in 1951 prior to the tarwad partition and that thereafter defendants Nos. 3 and 4 had not undertaken any work of reconstruction or renovation of the tavazhi building, the next friend of the plaintiffs when examined as pw. 2 has frankly admitted that the old building which was in existence in 1951 fell down and that a completely new house was subsequently put up at a place 20 koles to the east of the old site. Apparently realising the serious implications of this damaging admission, pw. 2 has no doubt added a statement that the new construction was in 1952. This version cannot, however, be believed not merely because of its being completely inconsistent with the version given in the plaint but also for the reason that it is clearly brought out by the testimony of Dws.1 to 4 that the new residential building was constructed subsequent to 1958. It is thus seen from the evidence that the original house which the tavazhi got at the tarwad partition fell down and that a new residential building had to be constructed and hence there was necessity for the sub-tarwad to find funds for carrying out the construction work. The plaintiffs have no case that apart from the plaint schedule property the tavazhi was possessed of any other immovable properties or cash with the aid of which construction work, could be carried out. It was for the specific purpose of meeting the expenses of reconstruction of the residential building of the tavazhi that the borrowing was effected under the chitty hypothecation bond Ext. D2. It is not seriously contended on behalf of the plaintiffs that the amount of Rs. 175/- mentioned in Ext. D1 had not been actually received by the executants of the mortgage. In the circumstances, it has to be held that the mortgage Ext. Dl was supported by consideration and sub-tarwad necessity and was a debt binding on the plaintiff's tavazhi. Out of the total consideration of Rs. 600/- mentioned in the mortgage deed Ext. D1, Rs. D1 had not been actually received by the executants of the mortgage. In the circumstances, it has to be held that the mortgage Ext. Dl was supported by consideration and sub-tarwad necessity and was a debt binding on the plaintiff's tavazhi. Out of the total consideration of Rs. 600/- mentioned in the mortgage deed Ext. D1, Rs. 200/-was adjusted towards the liability due under Ext. D2, another sum of Rs, 200/- had been received by the executants from the 1st defendant on the date of the document and utilised for paying off some liabilities incurred by them for the construction of the tavazhi building and the balance amount of Rs. 200/- was adjusted in discharge of a promissory note debt owed by the executants to the 1st defendant, the said borrowing also having been effected for meeting the house construction expenses. dw. 2 who is an independent witness has deposed that the 3rd defendant had purchased from him the materials of an old building for Rs. 400/-, that towards the said amount Rs. 200/-was paid before taking delivery of those materials and a promissory note was executed in his favour for the balance amount and that the amount due under the said promissory note was paid to him by the 3rd defendant on the date on which the mortgage Ext. Dl was exencted. It is also stated by this witness that he was present. in the document writer's office when the original of Ext Dl was written and the repayment of Rs. 200/- due to him was effected by the 3rd defendant from out of the amount advanced as per the mortgage Ext. Dl. Although dw. 2 has been cross-examined at length, nothing has been brought out to discredit his testimony. dw. 3 who is another independent witness has deposed that he had supplied bricks for the construction of the building in the plaint property in 1134. In the evidence given by the 1st defendant as dw. 6 he has stated that the amount of Rs. 200/-advanced by him to defendants Nos. 3 to 6 under the promissory note had been utilised for the purchase of bricks from dw. 3 and for other expenses relating to the house construction. In the evidence given by the 1st defendant as dw. 6 he has stated that the amount of Rs. 200/-advanced by him to defendants Nos. 3 to 6 under the promissory note had been utilised for the purchase of bricks from dw. 3 and for other expenses relating to the house construction. Dws 4 and 5 who are neighbours have been examined to prove that the old house which was in existence in the plaint schedule property at the time of the partition subsequently fell down and thereafter a new residential building was put up for the tavazhi.. The learned Subordinate Judge has carefully analysed the evidence of all those witnesses and he has given valid reasons for accepting the testimony of Dws.1 to 6. in preference to the vague and evasive assertions made by the plaintiffs' next friend in his deposition as Pw. 2. 9. Counsel appearing for the appellants pointed out that there are some inconsistencies between the versions given by some of the witnesses examined on the side of the 1st defendant and it was argued that in view of the those inconsistencies it is not safe to rely on the testimony of those witnesses. We do not see any force in this contention. The discrepancies pointed out by counsel are only in respect of certain minor details and they do not affect the truthfulness of the evidence given by those witnesses in regard to matters that are really material. Considering the fact that the witnesses were speaking about events which had taken place about 10 years prior to the date of their examination such minor inconsistencies are bound to be present. 10. We agree with the Subordinate Judge that the evidence adduced in the case clearly shows that there was necessity for the tavazhi to put up a new residential building, that a new building was accordingly constructed after 1958 and that the expenses thereafter were met out of the funds borrowed from the Ist defendant under Exts. D1 and D2. The mortgage Ext. D2 was, therefore, fully supported by consideration and sub-tarwad necessity and it was binding on the plaintiffs and the other members of their sub-tarwad. D1 and D2. The mortgage Ext. D2 was, therefore, fully supported by consideration and sub-tarwad necessity and it was binding on the plaintiffs and the other members of their sub-tarwad. The attempt of the plaintiffs to make out that their father, namely, the 3rd defendant, was under the dominating influence of the 1st defendant under whom he was employed as a tailor and that on account thereof the 3rd defendant had acted against the interests of the sub-tarwad and brought about Exts. D1 and D2 in collusion with the 1st defendant has miserably failed. We have no hesitation to confirm the finding of the Subordinate Judge that the mortgage Ext.D1 was a bona fide transaction supported by consideration and necessity and fully binding on the plaintiffs' sub-tarwad. There was, therefore, no valid defence which could have been put forward on behalf of the minors by their court guardian in O. S. No. 86 of 1962 and hence the contention put forward by the plaintiffs that the court guardian was guilty of gross negligence is baseless and untenable. 11. In as much as we have found that the mortgage Ext. D1 was binding on the sub-tarwad of the plaintiffs and that there was no omission on the part of the court guardian to put forward any defence that was available to the minors in O.S. No. 86 of 1962 it must follow that there are no valid grounds at all on the basis of which the plaintiffs can seek to set aside the decree and execution proceedings in O. S. No. 86 of 1962. 12. We accordingly confirm the decree and judgment of the lower appellate court and dismiss this second appeal. The appellants will pay the costs of the 5th respondent. Dismissed.