JUDGMENT M.N. Shukla, J. - This petition has been filed by Sri S.M. Banerji under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 30-4-1973 passed by the State of Uttar Pradesh compulsorily retiring him from service. The relevant part of the impugned order reads as under - "In accordance with Fundamental Rule 56 as contained in the Financial Handbook amended from time to time the Rajyapal has been pleased to order in public interest that Sri Satyendra Mohan Banerji. officiating Excise Superintendent. be required to retire compulsorily from service on the expiry of three months from the service of this notice on him." The allegations in the petition are that the petitioner was appointed to the Uttar Pradesh Subordinate Service as Excise Inspector in the year 1939. For about 26 years he discharged his duties" as an Excise Inspector in various districts and in that capacity won several awards and commendations for good and meritorious work. He was selected to the post of Superintendent of Excise by the Public Service Commission and started functioning in the said post with effect from 18-3-1966. He received annual increments as and when they fell due and the last increment drawn by him was with effect from 18-3-1972. He also crossed the efficiency bar in the scale of Rs. 250-550 at the stage of Rs. 425/- on 18-3-1972. His integrity certificate was never withheld. there was not a single adverse entry in his character roll, his work and conduct had been always above average during the entire tenure of his service and he was physically and mentally fit. to discharge his duties till he attained the age of superannuation i.e. 58 years. The petitioner was to complete the age of 55 years on 29-7-1973. Prior to that the Head of the Department, namely, the Excise Commissioner. U.P. recommended his case to the State Government that as his work and conduct were excellent and he was physically and mentally fit he should be permitted to continue in service beyond the age of 55 years. The said recommendation was endorsed by the Secretary to Government. Uttar Pradesh. Excise Department. Lucknow. Thereafter the Minister for Excise, presumably not agreeing with the aforesaid opinion, referred the matter to the Appointment Department. The Appointment Department agreed with the recommendations of the Head of the Department and the Secretary. The said recommendation was endorsed by the Secretary to Government. Uttar Pradesh. Excise Department. Lucknow. Thereafter the Minister for Excise, presumably not agreeing with the aforesaid opinion, referred the matter to the Appointment Department. The Appointment Department agreed with the recommendations of the Head of the Department and the Secretary. Excise Department and observed that the petitioner may be permitted to continue in service up to the age of 58 years. In the circumstances the impugned- order was manifestly arbitrary and capricious and based on irrelevant and collateral grounds and liable to be quashed. 2. The case was contested by the State of Uttar Pradesh and two counter affidavits were filed. The counter affidavit was filed by Sri Bhagwan Singh Under Secretary to the Government of Uttar Pradesh. Excise Department and the other affidavit was filed by Sri Swami Prasad Singh, the then Excise Minister who was personally impleaded as opposite party No. 2. In the counter affidavits it is not denied that there was no adverse entry against the petitioner, that he had crossed the efficiency bar as alleged by him. that he had secured the last promotion prior to the date of compulsory retirement, that in the circumstances the Head of the Department. Secretary, Excise Department and the Appointment Department favoured the view that the petitioner should be retained in service up to the age of 58 years. The main averment in the counter affidavit of the Under Secretary was that the petitioner had been compulsorily retired in public interest in the exercise of the powers under Rule 56 of the Fundamental Rules and that it was not correct that his work and conduct had always been found excellent. It was further averred that the State Government, while passing the order of retirement toad perused the entire record of the petitioner and it was only when it was satisfied from the material available on the record that the compulsory retirement of the petitioner was necessitated in public interest that the order of compulsory retirement was passed. It was denied that the order was passed by the State Government in the colourable exercise of powers or was based on extraneous considerations. It was denied that the order was passed by the State Government in the colourable exercise of powers or was based on extraneous considerations. Shri Swami Prasad Singh in his counter affidavit stated that the orders regarding compulsory retirement of officers were passed by the Government after scrutinising the record of individual officers and that while judging each individual case of the Government servants of the department he was governed solely by the relevant G.Os. and other considerations required for judging the question of public interest. He did not decide the question of retiring any individual officer on considerations not relevant and other than those which were contained in Government orders. The opinion formed about the petitioner by the opposite party No. 2 was endorsed by the Chief Minister of the State. 3. The main contention of the petitioner is that the order is arbitrary and based on irrelevant considerations and liable be set aside. The opposite parties, on the other hand, contend that the decision to retire the petitioner compulsorily was based on the sole consideration, namely, that it was essential in public interest and was fully covered by the relevant Government Order. I cannot refrain from remarking at the very outset that the counter affidavits in this case have been extremely vague and sketchy. In substance they have merely repeated the assertion that the decision was taken in public interest and was not based on irrelevant considerations or collateral grounds. The fact remains that the actual grounds on which the decision was founded were not traversed in the counter affidavits. This made it necessary for me to look into the character roll of the petitioner and the record relating to his service. The learned Standing Counsel placed before me the aforesaid material at the time of hearing and I have, therefore, been able to peruse the material on which alone the said decision could be based. So far as the counter affidavit of Sri Swami Prasad Singh is concerned it specifically says that in arriving at the decision he was governed solely by the Government orders on the point and the considerations contained therein. 4. So far as the counter affidavit of Sri Swami Prasad Singh is concerned it specifically says that in arriving at the decision he was governed solely by the Government orders on the point and the considerations contained therein. 4. Before I refer to the relevant Government Order it is necessary to quote Rule 56 itself as it stood on the relevant date - "56-(a) Except as otherwise provided in other clauses of this rule, the date of compulsory retirement of a Government servant, other than a Government servant in inferior service, is the date on which he attains the age of 58 years. He may be retained in service after the date of compulsory retirement with the sanction of the Government on public grounds, which must be recorded in writing, but he must not be retained after the age of 60 years except in very special circumstances provided that: ' (i) the appointing authority may at any time, without assigning any reason, require the Government Servant to retire on three months' notice or pay in lieu of the whole or part thereof, after he attains the age of 55 years, or such lesser age as together with the period of notice in lieu of which the pay is substituted would aggregate to 55 verses so, however, that in the case of pay being given in lieu of the whole or part of such notice the said period shall stand added to the Government servant's qualifying service for to purposes of calculating the pension and the death-cum-retirement gratuity due to him and for no other purpose, or (ii) the Government servant may, after attaining the age of 55 years, voluntarily retire after giving three months' notice to the appointing authority. Explanation: (1) The decision of the appointing authority under the first proviso to require the Government servant to retire as specified therein shall be taken if it appears to the said authority to be in public interest and the State Government may from time to time, issue executive instructions indicating guiding principles in that behalf but nothing herein contained shall be construed to require any recital, in the order of such decision having been taken in the public interest or to require the publication of such instructions. (2) Every such decision shall, unless the contrary is proved, be presumed to have been taken in the public interest. (2) Every such decision shall, unless the contrary is proved, be presumed to have been taken in the public interest. (3) Appointing authority means the authority which has the power to make substantive appointments to the posts or service from Which the Government servant is required or wants to retire." Acting on the power to issue executive instructions as contemplated by Explanation (i) to Rule 56 (a) the Government issued a number of such instructions by the Government Order dated 26-11-1969 (Annexure 2). Condition No. 3 of the said instructions provides that if during the last ten years of his service the integrity certificate of an officer has been withheld, he should be retired from service after he has been served with a notice of three months or has been given pay in lieu thereof. Condition No A provides that if the Civil Surgeon certifies that the officer concerned is neither mentally or physically fit to continue in service up to the age of 58 years, he should be retired from service after he has been served a notice of three months Condition No. 5 provides that such officer whose work and conduct during the last ten years of service have not been above average, should be made to retire after service of notice of three months or payment of salary in lieu thereof. On behalf of the State great stress was laid on condition No. 5 and it was submitted that the criterion which the Government had adopted for compulsorily retiring the petitioner was that the quality of his work had not been above average during the last ten years of his service and the Government was wholly within its right to adopt such criterion for determining as to whether it was in public interest to retire him. As I have already observed, the pleadings on behalf of the opposite parties were very unsatisfactory and no such averment was made in the counter affidavits except the general allegation made by the Minister concerned, namely, that he was guided by the relevant Government order in reaching the decision. As I have already observed, the pleadings on behalf of the opposite parties were very unsatisfactory and no such averment was made in the counter affidavits except the general allegation made by the Minister concerned, namely, that he was guided by the relevant Government order in reaching the decision. Reading that affidavit along with Condition No. 5 of the executive instructions mentioned above, it might be taken that the plea of the State was that the impugned order was based on the consideration that the petitioner's work and conduct had not been above average during the last ten years of his service. 5. Strong exception was. however, taken to this contention by the learned counsel for the petitioner who relied on a Full Bench decision of this Court in I.N. Srivastava v. State of U.P., 1971 All LJ 169 : ( AIR 1971 All 178 ) in which the provisions of Rule 56 of the U.P. Fundamental Rules as amended by the U.P. Fundamental Rule 56 (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1970 were held to be valid and constitutional excepting the provisions in the explanation which provided for the issuance of executive instructions. It was held by Jagdish Sahai, J. who spoke for the court as under - "On all the grounds on which the provisions relating to the issuance of executive instructions has been challenged, I hold that that part of Rule 56 is hit by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It is also bad in so far as the executive instructions require the appointing authorities to act on material provided by them which material is extraneous to and is not part of Rule 56 and which does not operate in the field of legislation at all." On the strength of the above observation it was contended that it was not open to the State Government to adopt the criterion embodied in Condition No. 5 of the executive instructions. In other words, the executive instructions no longer existed since that part of the Explanation to Rule 56 which conferred the power of issuing executive instructions had been struck down. It, therefore, followed that the executive instructions being no longer existent in law. no order could be justified on their basis. That argument evidently seeks to apply a very strict rule of pleadings whereas the settled principle of law is that pleadings should be liberally construed. It, therefore, followed that the executive instructions being no longer existent in law. no order could be justified on their basis. That argument evidently seeks to apply a very strict rule of pleadings whereas the settled principle of law is that pleadings should be liberally construed. Therefore, I am of the opinion that even without the aid of the executive instructions it is open to the Government to demons rate that it adopted the criterion which it claimed to have adopted in the present case, though it may not have been expressly stated in the counter affidavit. In substance the implication of the counter affidavit seems to be that Condition No. 5 of the executive instructions principally weighed with the Government in arriving at the conclusion that the impugned order was made in public interest. From the record also it appears that this principle had been actually adopted in reaching the conclusion in this case. In fact, the Deputy Secretary Appointment Department after enumerating the three principles to which I have already adverted as embodied in executive instructions Nos. 3, 4 and 5 expressly applied them to the case of the petitioner and addressed himself to the question as to whether his conduct and work were above average during the last ten years of his service. 6. Before dealing with this question I would like to refer to another point which was vehemently urged before me on behalf of the State. Sri V.K. Mehrotra, appearing for the respondents submitted that the subjective opinion of the Government bona fide expressed was conclusive in the matter and it was not open to the Court to go behind it and investigate as to how that opinion had been reached or whether there was sufficiency of material to warrant such opinion. He referred to the counter affidavit in which it had been said that the decision to retire the petitioner compulsorily had been taken in public interest and the relevant grounds and the Government Order had been applied to the case of the petitioner before arriving at that conclusion. I am unable to accept the broad contention that mere statement of the Government or the appointing authority in such matters, even though their subjective opinion may have been prescribed by the statute as determinant of the question of compulsory retirement, can be treated as conclusive. I am unable to accept the broad contention that mere statement of the Government or the appointing authority in such matters, even though their subjective opinion may have been prescribed by the statute as determinant of the question of compulsory retirement, can be treated as conclusive. The rule with regard to matters left to the discretion or subjective opinion of the Government or the executive authority in such matters is not so simple as the learned Standing Counsel sought to make it. If the ipse dixit of the appointing authority were regarded as the last word in the matter, the power would become untrammelled and arbitrary. The question which has ever vexed the Courts is whether the exercise of such power can be challenged by an aggrieved person or whether that power is absolutely unbridled and the mere statement of the authority concerned is enough to silence the criticism raised by the aggrieved person. I think the question was answered in unequivocal terms by the Privy Council in Emperor v. Vimalabai Desihpande, AIR 1946 PC 123 . In that case the Court,' had to interpret Rule 129 of the Defence of India Rules. 1939 which provided: "Any police officer may arrest without warrant any person whom he reasonably suspects of having acted. Their Lordships ruled that the High Court was light in holding that the burden lay on the police officer to satisfy the Court that his suspicion were reasonable, and it was plain on the evidence that he had not discharged that burden. Whenever legislature places some restriction on the exercise of power i.e. where it is intended to be exercised on the existence of certain conditions, the mere assertion by the person concerned that he had considered the material point is not enough. If it were otherwise, the restriction itself would become ineffectual and the curb intended to be exercised by the court on the exercise of such power would be also illusory. Hence, it is always left to the Courts which are the final Judge of the question as to whether the condition existed which could alone justify the exercise of such power. Therefore, in my opinion even an order passed on the subjective opinion of the Government as contemplated by a statute is amenable to judicial scrutiny provided the order is vulnerable on certain well-recognised grounds to Which I shall presently refer. 7. Therefore, in my opinion even an order passed on the subjective opinion of the Government as contemplated by a statute is amenable to judicial scrutiny provided the order is vulnerable on certain well-recognised grounds to Which I shall presently refer. 7. The learned Standing Counsel relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. J.N. Sinha, AIR 1971 SC 40 and referred to the following passage: "The aforementioned Rule 56 (J) is not intended for taking any penal action against the Government servants. That rule merely embodies one of the facets of the 'pleasure' doctrine embodied in Article 310 of the Constitution. Various considerations may weigh with the appropriate authority while exercising the power conferred under the rule. In some cases, the Government may feel that a particular post may be more usefully held in public interest by an officer more competent than the one who is holding. It may be that the officer who is holding the post is not inefficient but the appropriate authority may prefer to have a more efficient officer. It may further be that in certain key posts public interest may require that a person of undoubted ability and integrity should be there. There is no denying the fact that in all organizations and more so in Government organizations there is good deal of dead wood. It is in public interest to chop off the same. Fundamental Rule 56 (J) holds the balance between the rights of the individual Government servant and the interests of the public. While a minimum service is guaranteed to the Government servant, the Government is given power to energise its machinery and make it more efficient by compulsorily retiring those who in its opinion should not be there in public interest." It is true that the decision as to whether it is in public interest to compulsorily retire a Government servant depends on the subjective opinion of the Government and the Court will not substitute its own opinion for the same or express an opinion as to whether the material on record was sufficient to warrant such opinion. Nevertheless, there are certain basic exceptions which have to be engrafted on this general rule and in J.N. Sinha's case, AIR 1971 SC 40 : (1971 Lab IC 8) (supra) itself Hegde, J. was alive to such exceptions which would justify a scrutiny of the opinion reached by the Government. In paragraph 8 it was observed: "Now coming to the express words of Fundamental Rule 56 (j) it says that the appropriate authority has the absolute right to retire a Government servant if it is of the opinion that it is in the public interest to do so. The right conferred on the appropriate authority is an absolute one. That power can be exercised subject to the conditions mentioned in the rule, one of which is that the concerned authority must be of opinion that it is in public interest to do so. If that authority bona fide forms that opinion, the. correctness of that opinion cannot be challenged before Courts. It is open to an aggrieved party to contend that, the requisite opinion has not been formed or the decision is based on collateral grounds or that it is an arbitrary decision." The above observation makes it abundantly clear that even though the Government may have an absolute right to retire a Government servant and its opinion may not be open to challenge ordinarily, yet if the aggrieved Government servant is able to make out a case which falls into one of the several categories adverted to in the last sentence of the above passage, the power of judicial review can be exercised. The fundamental exceptions contemplated by Hegde. J and which are in line with the earlier authorities on the subject, broadly fall under the following categories - (a) that the opinion was never formed. (b) that it was based on collateral grounds or irrelevant and extraneous consideration. (c) that it was mala fide. (d) that it was arbitrary in the sense that no reasonable person could have on the material come to the conclusion, and (e) that it was based on no material. There is, therefore, no doubt that even the subjective opinion of the Government can be assailed on the fundamentals grounds mentioned above. (c) that it was mala fide. (d) that it was arbitrary in the sense that no reasonable person could have on the material come to the conclusion, and (e) that it was based on no material. There is, therefore, no doubt that even the subjective opinion of the Government can be assailed on the fundamentals grounds mentioned above. The learned Standing Counsel laid stress on the Explanation to Rule 56 which provided that the rule did not require any recital in the order that the decision of compulsory retirement had been taken in public interest. The Explanation further added that unless the contrary was proved, every such decision shall be presumed to have been taken in the public interest. It is quite correct that in view of this language of the rule there is a statutory presumption that the decision had been taken in public interest and that even a non-recital of that fact in the order will not vitiate it. The impugned order in the present case does recite that the decision was taken in public interest and that fact has been reinforced by the averments in the counter affidavits of the opposite parties. But in my opinion the only effect of the Explanation to Rule 56 is that the initial burden is on the petitioner to satisfy the Court that the case falls within any exception of the nature that I have discussed above. To begin with there will be a presumption in favour of the Government but if the petitioner to positive evidence and convincing material is able to discharge the initial burden and prima fade satisfy the Court that there was no material on which such decision could be based or that the decisions are arbitrary or based on collateral grounds etc.. then the burden shifts on the appointing authority to disclose the grounds on which the opinion was founded and place before the Court such material as may justify the conclusion that the opinion could not be assailed on the ground of any of the exceptions which were formulated by the Supreme Court in J.N. Sinha's case. It is not possible for me to accede to the contention raised on behalf of the State, that the cryptic answer given by the Government and a bald statement to the effect that it had taken the designs in public interest would clinch the issue. It is not possible for me to accede to the contention raised on behalf of the State, that the cryptic answer given by the Government and a bald statement to the effect that it had taken the designs in public interest would clinch the issue. This aspect of the exercise of a power based on subjective opinion was considered by the Supreme Court in a case and similar contention was repelled in what Justice Hidayatullah referred to as "the trenchant language" of Justice Shelat. In Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Board, AIR 1967 SC 295 it was observed by Shelat. J. as follows: "It is not reasonable to say that the clause permitted the Government to say that it has formed the opinion on circumstances which it thinks exist." Therefore, there cannot be any 'bar to the Court examining as to whether the test applied by the Government is wholly irrelevant or unrelated to the object sought to be achieved by the law. This necessarily casts an obligation on the Government to disclose the grounds on which its opinion was based. The Government cannot just choose to be reticent and defeat the petitioner's action by stating that the decision was taken in public Interest. The same view seems to have been expressed in a series of cases dealing with this point. 8. I have already referred to the case of Barium Chemicals Ltd. AIR 1967 SC 295 (supra). In that case the Company had filed a writ petition in the Punjab High Court to quash the order issued by the Company Law Board under Section 237 (b) of the Companies Act, 1956 appointing four Inspectors for investigating the affairs of the Company. The said section authorised the Central Government or the Company Law Board to appoint one or more competent persons as Inspectors to investigate the affairs of a company, if in the opinion of the Central Government there were circumstances to show that the business of the company was conducted with intent to defraud its creditors or otherwise for a fraudulent or unlawful purpose or that persons concerned in the formation of the company or the management of its affairs were in connection therewith guilty of fraud etc. The impugned order was quashed by the Supreme Court on the ground that the reasons given by the Company Law Board's Chairman in the affidavit for taking action did not suggest inferences in clauses (1) and (2) of Section 237 (b). Hidayatullah, J. (as he then was) and Shelat, J. pointed out that though the formation of the opinion was subjective, the existence of circumstances relevant to the inference must be proved because that was the condition precedent for taking the action. Hidayatullah J observed thus - "An action not based on circumstances suggesting an inference of the enumerated kind will not be valid. In other words, the enumeration of the inferences which may be drawn from the circumstances, postulates the absence of a general discretion to go on fishing expedition to find evidence. No doubt, the formation of opinion is subjective, but the existence of circumstances relevant to the inference as the sine qua non for action must be demonstrable. If the action is questioned on the ground that no circumstances leading to an inference of the kind contemplated by the section exists, the action might be exposed to interference unless the_ existence of the circumstances is made out." Applying the same principle, the promotion of public interest is a condition precedent to the exercise of the power contained in Rule 56 of Fundamental Rules Therefore, if this action is being attacked on the ground that it is based on no material or on material on which not reasonable person could have formed, that opinion, it must be proved by the Government that such material did exist.; It is not sufficient to assert that the opinion was formed bona fide in public interest. The Government cannot of permitted to decline to give any clue as to, what that material was. because the existence of such material is the sine qua non of the exercise of such power. Courts have never countenanced the taciturn approach by the Government in this regard and its refusal to state the grounds on which such opinion could be reasonably formed. 9. because the existence of such material is the sine qua non of the exercise of such power. Courts have never countenanced the taciturn approach by the Government in this regard and its refusal to state the grounds on which such opinion could be reasonably formed. 9. Yet another case in which the Supreme Court had occasion to interpret Section 237 (b) of the Companies Act was Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. S.D. Agarwal, AIR 1969 SC 707 after scrutinising the facts of the case the Supreme Court held that the required circumstances on which the inferences contemplated by Section 237 (b) could be drawn did not exist. Bachawat, J. observed (paras 45 and 46) - "The law recognises certain well recognised principles within which the discretionary power under Section 237 (b) must be exercised. There must be a real exercise of the discretion. The authority must be exercised honestly and not for corrupt or ulterior purposes. The authority must form the requisite opinion honestly and after applying its mind to the relevant materials before it. In exercising the discretion the authority must have regard only to circumstances suggesting one or more of the matters specified in sub-clauses (i) and (ii) and (iii). It must act reasonably and not capriciously or arbitrarily. It will be an absurd exercise of discretion, if. for example, the authority forms the requisite opinion on the ground that the director in charge of the company is a member of a particular community. Within these narrow limits the opinion is not conclusive and can be challenged in a Court of law............ If it is established that there were no materials upon which the authority could form the requisite opinion the Court may infer that the authority did not apply its mind to the relevant facts. Within these narrow limits the opinion is not conclusive and can be challenged in a Court of law............ If it is established that there were no materials upon which the authority could form the requisite opinion the Court may infer that the authority did not apply its mind to the relevant facts. The requisite opinion is then lacking and the condition precedent to the exercise of the power under Section 237 (b) is not fulfilled .............." After referring to some of the English authorities which were cited on behalf of the respondent Hegde J. observed: "That decision cannot be considered as an authority for the proposition that whenever a provision of law confers certain power on an authority on its forming certain opinion on the basis of certain facts the Courts are precluded from examining whether those circumstances were in fact existent." His Lordship proceeded to examine the broad proposition of law in all its varied aspects as to whether the general power conferred on an authority to be exercised on the formation of its subjective opinion was unexceptionable or it admitted of any exceptions, even though they might not have been expressly provided by the Legislature.. He was of the opinion that there were certain implied exceptions which had to be read into a law conferring discretionary powers on an authority. In that connection he remarked - "In public regulation of this sort there is no such thing as absolute and untrammelled "discretion" that is, that action can be taken on any ground or for any reason that can be suggested to the mind of the administrator; no Legislative Act can, without express language be taken to contemplate an unlimited arbitrary power exercisable for any purpose, however, capricious or irrelevant, regardless of the nature or purpose of the statute. Fraud and corruption in the Commission may not be mentioned in such statutes, but they are always implied as exceptions. Discretion necessarily implies good faith in discharging public duty, there is always a perspective within which a statute is intended to operate; and any clear departure from its lines or objects is just as objectionable as fraud or corruption. Fraud and corruption in the Commission may not be mentioned in such statutes, but they are always implied as exceptions. Discretion necessarily implies good faith in discharging public duty, there is always a perspective within which a statute is intended to operate; and any clear departure from its lines or objects is just as objectionable as fraud or corruption. Could an applicant be refused a permit because he had been born in another province or because of the colour or his hair?" The rule of law which can be deduced from the various authorities is that even though the language of a statute may not expressly contain exceptions, such exceptions must be read as implied if the exercise of a discretionary owner is tainted by any of the vices to which I have already referred in the earlier part of my judgment. To borrow the language of the Supreme Court, there is a tacit principle underlying every exercise of statutory power, namely, that there is "a perspective" within which a statute is intended to operate. That perspective has to be gathered from the general and implied exceptions to which a reference has been made and the background and the objective of the statute; it is not dependent on the mere language of the statute: or the exceptions actually embodied in it. 10. In Raja Anand v. State of U.P. AIR 1967 SC 1081 the Government acquired some land applying the urgency provisions of the land Acquisition Act, (Section 17 (11 and (4).) The action was Challenged on the ground that the land was neither waste nor arable. It was contended on behalf of the State Counsel that its opinion was subjective and must be taken to be conclusive. Dealing with that contention the Court observed thus: "It is true that the opinion of the State Government which is a condition for the exercise of the power under Section 17 (4) of the Act, is subjective and a Court cannot normally enquire whether there were sufficient grounds for justification of the opinion formed by the State under Section 17 (4) ................. But even the power of the State Government has been formulated under Section 17 (4) of the Act in subjective terms, the expression of opinion of the State Government can be challenged as ultra vires in a Court of law if it could be shown that the State Government never applied its mind to the matter or that the action of the State Government is mala fide. If. therefore, in a case the land under acquisition is not actually waste or arable land, but the State Government has formed the opinion that the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 17 are applicable, the Court may legitimately draw an inference that the State Government did not honestly form that opinion or that in forming that opinion the State Government did not apply its mind to the relevant facts bearing on the question at issue." 11. In R.L. Butail v. Union of India, 1970 (2) SCC 876 on a consideration of the affidavit filed the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the concerned Government servant failed to make out his case but emphasised the dictum laid down in J.N. Sinha's case (supra) - "It is open to a,n aggrieved party to contend that the requisite opinion has not been formed or the decision is based on collateral grounds or that it is an arbitrary decision." I. have, therefore, no doubt in my mind that notwithstanding the language of Rule 56 (a) of the Fundamental Rules it is open to the Government servant concerned to contend that the decision was an arbitrary one. that it was based on no material or on material on which no reasonable person could have formed such opinion; when such contention is raised it becomes incumbent on the Government to disclose the grounds on which the opinion was formed and place before the Court the material on the basis of which the Court may be able to examine as to whether the decision to retire the Government servant compulsorily was arbitrary or not. The learned Standing Counsel relied on a decision of this Court in State of U.P. v. Dr. B.S. Sexena, 1971 All LJ 911 : (1971 Lab IC 1456) wherein Oak C.J. observed: "The petitioner's character roll is not before us According to the petitioner, he has a clean record. According to the appellant, the petitioner's record is unsatisfactory. The learned Standing Counsel relied on a decision of this Court in State of U.P. v. Dr. B.S. Sexena, 1971 All LJ 911 : (1971 Lab IC 1456) wherein Oak C.J. observed: "The petitioner's character roll is not before us According to the petitioner, he has a clean record. According to the appellant, the petitioner's record is unsatisfactory. The State Government decided to retire him from service on the ground that it is not in public interest to retain him in service. It is not for the court to decide whether the retention of the petitioner is or is not in public interest. That is a matter for the discretion of the State Government. All that the Court is concerned with is whether action against the petitioner is arbitrary or not. Paragraph 9 of the counter affidavit suggests that action against the petitioner was not arbitrary." The case is clearly distinguishable on the ground that the character roll of the petitioner was not placed before the court, there was only an assertion by the petitioner and denial by the authority. the Court was not in a position to investigate as to whether there existed any material on which a reasonable person could have formed the opinion that the Government servant Should be compulsorily retired. Still, however, it was clearly held that it was within the jurisdiction of the court to decide whether the action against the petitioner was arbitrary or not. The learned Standing Counsel also relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in N.V. Putta v. State of Mysore, AIR 1972 SC 2185 : 1972 Lab IC 942, wherein the Government had bona fide formed an opinion from a confidential report that it was in public interest to compulsorily retire the Government servant concerned. It was held whether or not the petitioner's retirement was in public interest was a matter for the State Government to consider. The learned Standing Counsel referred to this observation, but as Mitter. J. made it clear, the allegations made by the petitioner in that case were vague and unsatisfactory and it was impossible to hold on the material placed by the petitioner before the Court that the order was arbitrary or illegal, or that it suffered from the vice of mala fides. 12. J. made it clear, the allegations made by the petitioner in that case were vague and unsatisfactory and it was impossible to hold on the material placed by the petitioner before the Court that the order was arbitrary or illegal, or that it suffered from the vice of mala fides. 12. I now come to the crux of the case i.e. whether the criterion actually adopted by the Government in the instant case was valid and whether the opinion formed by it could be assailed on the ground of 'arbitrariness'. The Government had in the instant case acted on the principle that only those Government servants whose work and conduct had been found above average within the last ten years of their service Should be retained beyond the age of 55 years, Sri V.K. Mehrotra strenuously, urged that the Government was within its rights to adopt that standard and on 1)hat basis determine whether the petitioner should have been allowed to continue in service. A principle could not be imposed upon the Government from any other source. The Government had exclusive, jurisdiction to lav down the policy and determine how public interest would best be served. In other words, what constituted public interest was essentially a matter of policy of which the Government was the sole Judge. I think there is force in this contention. Public interest is an elusive concept and its contents and connotation must vary according to the circumstances of each case. It is. therefore, not possible to define it in absolute terms. The appointing or the executive authority concerned alone can devise appropriate criterion and the courts would not ordinarily sit in judgment over the criterion adopted unless it. is one which is palpably not germane to public interest. The distinction between keeping an authority within the hounds of its statutory or constitutional powers and subsisting policies for achieving the 'Objectives envisaged fey the statute or the Constitution should never be lost sight of. The moment the courts concern themselves with the latter and trespass into forbidden territory run the risk of becoming "platonic Guardians." to use that caustics phrase of Justice Black. It is well to bear in mind the apt admonition of Justice Black in his Carpenter Lectures delivered in 1968. The moment the courts concern themselves with the latter and trespass into forbidden territory run the risk of becoming "platonic Guardians." to use that caustics phrase of Justice Black. It is well to bear in mind the apt admonition of Justice Black in his Carpenter Lectures delivered in 1968. He pointed out: "In the one instance, courts proceeding within clearly marked constitutional boundaries seek to execute policies written into the Constitution; in the other, they roam at will in the limitless areas of their own beliefs as to reasonableness and actually select policies, a responsibility which the Constitution entrusts to the legislative representatives of the people." The principle that the opportunity of continuing in service beyond the age of 55 years should be vouchsafed only to those Government servants whose work and conduct have been found above average during t.he last ten years of their service cannot be said to be unrelated to public interest. One of the ways of toning up and energising a service is to ensure personnel of outstanding merit i.e. above average. It is. therefore, valid and relevant and cannot fee struck dawn. It follows that even though there may be no adverse entry against a Government servant and he may have earned various increments, yet he may be a mediocre. The decision of the Government to retire sun Government servant compulsorily will be dictated by the above principle and would not be arbitrary. Ultimately the service record of the Government servant concerned has to be examined in the light of this standard and then it is to be determined as to whether there was material on the basis of which an opinion could be reasonably formed that the work and conduct of the Government servant were not above average so as to warrant his compulsory retirement. Thus, I am of the opinion that the criterion adopted by the Government in the instant case was not irrelevant or ultra vires of Rule 56 (a). 13. I have thoroughly scrutinised the petitioner's character roll and the recommendations by the department in the matter of his compulsory retirement and I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that he completely satisfied the test of above average work and conduct. 13. I have thoroughly scrutinised the petitioner's character roll and the recommendations by the department in the matter of his compulsory retirement and I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that he completely satisfied the test of above average work and conduct. To me it appears on the basis of the record which was placed before me by the Standing Counsel that no reasonable person could come to the conclusion that his work and conduct were not above average. The admitted facts of the case are that the Secretary. Excise Department recommended that the petitioner should be retained in service up to the age of 58 years, there was no adverse entry against him, he was selected by the Public Service Commission in the year 1967 for the post of Superintendent of Excise, he crossed the efficiency bar in the scale of Rs. 250-550 at the stage of Rs. 425 in 1972 and he received his annual increments when they fell due and the last increment earned by him was with effect from 18-8-1972. It is noteworthy that there is no averment in the counter affidavits to the effect that the petitioner's work and conduct were not above average during the last ten years of his service. The fact that the petitioner had several awards to his credit in the performance of his duties was grudgingly admitted even in the counter affidavits with the only modification that the earning of such awards for actions performed in that connection was not a major part of the duties of the petitioner. The question of compulsorily retiring of the petitioner arose on 29-7-1973 when he completed the age of 55 years. Hence, the entries in his character roll in the ten years preceding that date were relevant for coming to the conclusion as to whether his work and conduct were above average. An isolated entry either in the remote or a minor entry even within the span of ten years by itself would not condemn a Government servant. It is the aggregate character roll relating to ten years which must constitute the basis on which an opinion should be based. The learned Standing Counsel referred to an entry in the character roll for the period 1962-63 which shows the petitioner to be quiet and hardworking and a good average class worker. It is the aggregate character roll relating to ten years which must constitute the basis on which an opinion should be based. The learned Standing Counsel referred to an entry in the character roll for the period 1962-63 which shows the petitioner to be quiet and hardworking and a good average class worker. It was contended that this determined the quality of the petitioner's work as 'average'. I cannot accept this submission. Firstly, the entry relates to the year 1963. Secondly, the totality of the entry must be taken into account. We cannot ignore the favourable part of the entry which declares the petitioners as 'quiet', 'hardworking" and 'good'. Fourthly, the effect of that entry is completely offset by successive entries which are overwhelmingly in favour of the petitioner. The subsequent entries are remarkably complimentary to the petitioner. The learned Standing Counsel referred to the entries of some remote years in which the word 'Santosh Janak' (satisfactory) had been used with regard to the petitioner and contended that this showed that his work was only average and not above average. This would be putting a wrong construction on the word 'satisfactory'. The dictionary meaning of the word 'satisfactory" is "giving satisfaction'. "answering fully all desires, expectations or requirements." Therefore, it is wrong to regard 'satisfactory' as synonymous with 'average' or mediocre. If anything, the dictionary meaning suggests it may be something above average. 14. Thus, on a thorough scrutiny of the record of the case and the Character roll of the petitioner I am constrained to hold that the decision of the Government about the compulsory retirement of the petitioner was manifestly arbitrary. The admitted facts of the case and the various entries in his character roll as well as the unanimous opinion of all the relevant authorities lead to the irresistible conclusion that the petitioner's work and conduct were above average and as such even Judging by the test applied by the Government it was not in public interest to retire him compulsorily. I cannot refrain from referring to the opinion of the Secretary. Appointment Department in this regard who came to the conclusion that the petitioner's work and conduct were above average during the last ten years of his service and as such to retire him compulsorily at the age of 55 years would be a breach of propriety. I cannot refrain from referring to the opinion of the Secretary. Appointment Department in this regard who came to the conclusion that the petitioner's work and conduct were above average during the last ten years of his service and as such to retire him compulsorily at the age of 55 years would be a breach of propriety. It is admitted on behalf of the Government that the Deputy Secretary, Excise Department expressed an opinion which was also favourable to the petitioner. On this material no reasonable person could have come to the conclusion that it was in public interest, to compulsorily retire" the petitioner on his attaining the age of 55 years. The dictionary meaning of word "arbitrary" is "capricious", "unrestrained", "despotic". It is also well established on Judicial authorities that when an order is either founded on no material or founded on material on which no reasonable person could have come to that conclusion or passed such an order, it must be adjudged arbitrary. 15. In the result this writ petition is allowed with costs and the impugned order dated 30-4-1973 (Annexure IV to the writ petition), compulsorily retiring the petitioner is quashed