DEBI PRASAD PAL, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner-company has challenged an order dated 23rd November, 1971 made by the learned Judge, 5th Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal in a dispute referred to himt under Sec. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). The dispute referred to him was: - ?whether the dismissal of Sri Panchu Gopal De and Sri Jiban Krishna Bhattacharyya is justified? To what relief, if any, are they entitled?? ( 2 ) SRI Panchu Gopal De, respondent No. 2 was during the material time was the Canteen Manager of a canteen maintained by Sirocco Works at Kalyani for the use of the Workmen employed there. The petitioner took over the said Sirocco Works from Davidson of India (p) Ltd. as a result of an order of amalgamation effected from 1st. October 1967. The respondent No. 2 was served with a charge sheet for indiscipline in connection with a stay-in-strike at the aforesaid Sirocco Works. After the causes were shown an enquiry was held into the matter and as a result of the said enquiry the respondent No. 2 was found guilty of the and was dismissed. It is stated that as an industrial dispute was pending before the 5th Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal at the time of the said dismissal, the petitioner made an application for the approval of the action taken by it in dismissing the respondent No. 2. The 5th Industrial Tribunal having held that it had no jurisdiction to proceed with the pretended reference, the Second Labour Court to whom the said application under Sec. 33 (2) was pending dismissed the application on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to proceed in the matter. Thereafter the present reference was made by the Government of West Bengal under Section 10 of the Act. ( 3 ) AT the time of the hearing before the Tribunal the petitioner raised certain preliminary objections. Its contention was that the respondent No. 2 was serving the petitioner-company in a managerial capacity and as such was not a ?workman? within the meaning of Sec. 2 (s) of the Act. ( 3 ) AT the time of the hearing before the Tribunal the petitioner raised certain preliminary objections. Its contention was that the respondent No. 2 was serving the petitioner-company in a managerial capacity and as such was not a ?workman? within the meaning of Sec. 2 (s) of the Act. The next preliminary objection raised by the petitioner was that the respondent No. 2 did not make any demand on the management for his reinstatement and in the absence of any such demand being raised, there was no industrial dispute which could be referred to the Tribunal. It was next contended before the Tribunal that one of the workmen specified in the Order of reference, viz. Sri Jiban Krishna Bhattacharyya having amicably settled the dispute with the company, there no longer existed any dispute on which reference was made by the Government. The industrial Tribunal overruled all the preliminary objections raised on behalf of the petitioner. ( 4 ) BEING aggrieved by the said order the petitioner moved this Court and obtained a rule nisi. The learned Counsel for the petitioner reiterated the same contentions which were raised before the Tribunal. The learned Counsel contended that the respondent No. 2 was in sole charge of the canteen being the canteen manager. His further contention was that the Tribunal has not properly appreciated the evidence on record and he invited me to decide the question as to whether the respondent No. 2 was a workman or not on the evidence which were on record and which had been annexed to the petition. The further submission is that the question whether the respondent No. 2 was a ?workman? or not was a jurisdictional fact and as such this Court should determine in the present proceedings upon the materials which are on record whether or not the finding arrived at by the Tribunal was a proper one. The learned Counsel for the respondent No. 2 contended that the question as to whether the respondent No. 2 is a workman or not is a question of fact and if the decision of the Tribunal is supported by materials on record, this Court should not interfere with the finding of the facts arrived at by the tribunal. The learned Counsel for the respondent No. 2 contended that the question as to whether the respondent No. 2 is a workman or not is a question of fact and if the decision of the Tribunal is supported by materials on record, this Court should not interfere with the finding of the facts arrived at by the tribunal. On the merits the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 2 supported the finding of the tribunal that the respondent No. 2 was not employed in any managerial capacity but his work was supervisory in nature and his monthly salary being below Rs. 500/- is a workman within the meaning of Sec. 2 (s) of the Act. ( 5 ) BEFORE I deal with the question as to whether the respondent No. 2 was a workman within the meaning of Sec. 2 (s) of the Act it is necessary to consider the limits, of interference by this Court in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution where a finding has been arrived at by the Tribunal on the materials before it that the respondent No. 2 is a workman within the meaning of the Act. There are broadly two types of facts which a judicial or a quasi-judicial tribunal has to determine; there are certain facts which such a tribunal has no doubt power or jurisdiction to determine: there are certain other facts which must exist before such a body would exercise jurisdiction. If a certain state of facts has to exist before an inferior tribunal has jurisdiction, it can enquire into the facts in order to decide whether or not it has jurisdiction, but cannot give itself jurisdiction by a wrong decision on the existence of those facts on which alone its jurisdiction depends. [rex v. Fulhan etc. , rent Tribunal, Ex. P. zerek, (1951) 2 KB 1 at page 6]. No tribunal of inferior jurisdiction can by its own decision finally decide on the question of existence or extent of such jurisdiction. No doubt the inferior tribunal has to decide the jurisdictional fact that the High Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction may enquire into the correctness of the decision and may quash the proceedings of such tribunal if such decision is erroneous. No doubt the inferior tribunal has to decide the jurisdictional fact that the High Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction may enquire into the correctness of the decision and may quash the proceedings of such tribunal if such decision is erroneous. The High Court in considering whether the inferior tribunal has jurisdiction to make or affirm the order is entitled to determine upon its own independent judgment whether or not that finding is correct. This principle is now well settled by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (1) State of Madhya Pradesh v. D. K. Jadav ( AIR 1968 SC 1186 ). In the case of (2) Baldev Singh v. Indian Explosive Ltd. (76 CWN 342) the Division Bench of this Court replying upon the above principle held that whether a person is a workman or not within the meaning of the Act is a jurisdictional fact and if in the opinion of the High Court the tribunal had come to a wrong decision on the evidence adduced by the parties the High Court can on its own appreciation of the evidence interfere with the conclusion of the tribunal. In my view, having regard to the principle stated above the question whether the respondent No. 2 is a workman or not is a jurisdictional fact on the correct determination of which the competence of the Tribunal to adjudicate the dispute will depend and it is open for his Court to determine for itself the correctness of the conclusion of the Tribunal on the materials placed before it. ( 6 ) TURNING to the question as to whether respondent No. 2 is a workman within the meaning of Sec. 2 (s) of the Act it is necessary to consider the evidence placed before the Tribunal on this point. Although the respondent No. 2 is described as a canteen manager one has to consider what are the functions and duties assigned to him. Sri R. R. Singh, the Works Manager of the petitioner-company at the material time stated in his deposition that the respondent No. 2 was in sole charge of the canteen and he used to take decision in respect of the canteen independently. Sri R. R. Singh, the Works Manager of the petitioner-company at the material time stated in his deposition that the respondent No. 2 was in sole charge of the canteen and he used to take decision in respect of the canteen independently. It is further stated by him that the respondent No. 2 need not take any advice or order from him or superior officer for dealing with the canteen matter and that he was also entitled to take any action against his subordinates who work under him. On cross-examination he could not cite any document to show that the respondent No. 2 had recommended any employee for appointment or that issued any letter of dismissal. The respondent No. 2 was answerable to him in respect of the canteen works. Sri N. Banerjee, Labour Officer of the petitioner-company deposed almost to the same effect. The respondent No. 2 in his examination stated that he had no power to appoint any canteen staff nor could he grant any leave of the canteen staff without the sanction by the Personnel officer. He had no power to handle the canteen cash. Suppliers were selected through tender and the decision was taken by Personnel Officer in consultation with the canteen advisery committee. He was in charge of sales of the canteen. On these evidence the Tribunal held that the respondent No. 2's duty was essentially supervisory in nature although the functions assigned to him required some elements of initiative and control. ( 7 ) A workman under Sec. 2 (s) of the Act has been defined, inter alia to mean any person employed in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work for hire or reward, whether terms of employment be express or implied. There are however certain categories of persons enumerated in clauses (i) to (iv) of that sub-section who are not to be included within the said definition. A person who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity is excluded from the definition of a workman. The words ?managerial or administrative capacity? have not been defined in the Act. In the absence of any such statutory definition one has to take into account the ordinary sense in which these words are used. The meaning of the expression ?manage? as stated in the Oxford Dictionary of affairs, administration, direction, control. The words ?managerial or administrative capacity? have not been defined in the Act. In the absence of any such statutory definition one has to take into account the ordinary sense in which these words are used. The meaning of the expression ?manage? as stated in the Oxford Dictionary of affairs, administration, direction, control. In deciding whether a person is employed in such a managerial or administrative capacity, the mere designation of the person is not conclusive of his status as an officer. One has to consider the nature of the work assigned to the person and the duties performed by him, in other words, whether he is employed in fact and substance mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity. In deciding such a question one has to consider whether the functions assigned to the person and the duties performed b him partake of an administration, direction and control of the affairs of the company. It is true that in the determination of such a question no abstract or rigid formula can be applied. In a large establishment although there may be one person acting in the general management or control of an establishment, several others may be placed in the management or control of particular department of the establishment, or, particular classes of manual or clerical or lower class of employees. It is not always necessary that the person should have the power of making appointment nor is it a decisive test that the person must have jurisdiction over any definite territory. A person may be in a managerial or administrative capacity if the work assigned to him requires a degree of initiative, command and control which are usually associated with the position of managerial or administrative capacity. In the case of (3) Andhra Scientific Company Ltd. v. Seshagiri Rao ( AIR 1960 AP 526 ) the workman concerned was appointed as a Store Manager of the company. It was found that he could not make any appointment in his department could not suspend or dismiss any employee under him, could not grant leave independently without the General Manager's sanction, he was not consulted when he retrenchment of the store staff took place and he never imposed any fine on any employee. It was found that he could not make any appointment in his department could not suspend or dismiss any employee under him, could not grant leave independently without the General Manager's sanction, he was not consulted when he retrenchment of the store staff took place and he never imposed any fine on any employee. On a consideration of the various functions assigned to the workman, the High Court found that such functions lacked the elements that make for control judgment is reported in (4) AIR (1967) SC 408. The Supreme Court held that what functions were actually performed by an ?employee? is a question of fact and when the labour Court on a consideration of the evidence came to the conclusion as regard those functions and bad on the basis thereof held that the employee came within the definition of workmen in Sec. 2 (s) of the Act, the High Court could not interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution except in cases where there was a clear error on the face of the record. In that, case, as the learned Attorney General appearing for the appellant-company was unable to lay any infirmity in the finding of the Labour Court, the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the conclusion of the Tribunal. In the case of (5) Standard Vacuam Company v. Additional Commissioner for Workman's Compensation (AIR (1960) Mad. 425), the question arose whether an employee appointed as an operating Assistant under the company was employed in any establishment in a position of management so as to fall within Sec. 4 (1) (a) of the Madras Shops and Establishment Act, 1947. It was found from evidence that the employee was responsible for carrying out construction of depot, petrol pump, erection of tank and also maintenance and repairing works for the various company buildings and other structures. He had also authority to spend to a maximum limit of Rs. 2,500/- budgeted job without reference to anybody else. He was responsible for the work in connection with the construction work, including correspondence with the Government. He was to engage casual labour and was responsible for taking disciplinary action against all those who were working under him. On these facts the Division Bench of the Madras High Court held that the employee was a person employed in a position of management within the meaning of the said Act. He was to engage casual labour and was responsible for taking disciplinary action against all those who were working under him. On these facts the Division Bench of the Madras High Court held that the employee was a person employed in a position of management within the meaning of the said Act. Apart from the difference in the language of the Madras Shops and Establishments Act, the facts as found in the Madras case present no difficulty in coming to the conclusion at which the High Court arrived at. ( 8 ) IN the present case the question is whether the respondent No. 2 was performing duties which required the exercise of a certain degree of direction and control of the affairs of the company which are usually associated with the position of managerial or administrative capacity. In this case the respondent No. 2 had no power of appointing or of dismissal of any of the members of the canteen staff. It is true that this by itself cannot be regarded as a conclusive test. The tribunal has also relied upon the evidence of respondent No. 2 in its finding that he had no power to purchase anything for the canteen from outside without sanction of the personnel Officer and that he did not make any payment to the parties. On the evidence placed before me I am of the view that although the respondent No. 2 was designated as a ?canteen manager? his power and function were more of a supervisory nature although certain elements of initiative and control might have to be exercised in the performance of his duties. It is also to be noticed that the petitioner made an application under Sec. 33 (2) (b) of the Act for obtaining approval of the action taken against the respondent No. 2. It is true that the tribunal rejected the said application on the ground that it had jurisdiction to exercise its power when the reference of a dispute which is said to be pending has itself been found to be without jurisdiction. The management treated the respondent No. 2 as a workman and show cause notice was given to him as to why his services should not be terminated and an enquiry was held thereafter. The management treated the respondent No. 2 as a workman and show cause notice was given to him as to why his services should not be terminated and an enquiry was held thereafter. In other words, the petitioner itself has treated the respondent No. 2 as a workman and in a similar situation in the case of (3) Andhra Pradesh Scientific Co. v. Seshagiri Rao (Supra) the Andhra High Court did not allow the management to repudiate the implication of the procedure which they themselves have pursued. In my view the petitioner in the present case has treated the respondent No. 2 as a workman, charge-sheeted him and followed the procedure of a domestic enquiry in accordance with the Standing Orders of the company. Its own action of seeking approval under Sec. 33 (2) (b) of the Act also points to that conclusion. In these circumstances the petitioner cannot be allowed to take a different stand now. I am taking it clear that in arriving at the conclusion that the respondent No. 2 is a workman I have not rested my decision on the fact alone but mainly on the consideration of the material evidence on record. ( 9 ) THE next point urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the order of reference was in connection with the dismissal of two workmen, one of them, viz. Sri Jiban Krishna Bhattacharya having settled the dispute amicably with the petitioner, the dispute, as was originally referred, no longer exists. In my view this contention has substance in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (6) Binny Co. Ltd. v. Their workmen and Ano. , ( AIR 1972 SC 1975 ). If there is an industrial dispute at the time of reference, it would not cease to be so merely because the claim of one of the dismissed employees was settled subsequently by mutual agreement. ( 10 ) THE next contention urged on behalf of the petitioner is that the reference itself is incompetent as no industrial dispute existed between the parties prior to the reference. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner unless a dispute is raised before the management, it cannot acquire the character of an industrial dispute. ( 10 ) THE next contention urged on behalf of the petitioner is that the reference itself is incompetent as no industrial dispute existed between the parties prior to the reference. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner unless a dispute is raised before the management, it cannot acquire the character of an industrial dispute. Reliance in support of this proposition was made upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (7) Sindhu Resettlement Corporation Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal of Gujarat ( AIR 1968 SC 529 ). It is necessary therefore to consider the facts of that case decide by the Supreme Court. In that case, Sri Ambwaney being an employee of the appellant-company was transferred to the subsidiary company by the principle company with his consent and he received retrenchment compensation from his new employer, when his services were terminated by the subsidiary company. Thereafter the respondent No. 3 demand retrenchment compensation from the appellant company. This being refused his case was taken up by the union which asked for the payment of retrenchment compensation. After the Conciliation proceedings continued for sometime, on the report of the Conciliation officer the Government of the State of Gujarat referred the dispute under Sec. 10 (1) of the Act for adjudication. The dispute referred related to the question of reinstatement of the workmen in the service of the appellant-company. The Supreme Court on these facts upheld the contention of the appellant that no such dispute about reinstatement was raised before the management and hence the State Government was not competent to refer a question of reinstatement as an industrial dispute for adjudication by the Tribunal. The Supreme Court noticed that what was claimed before the management of the appellant-company was payment of retrenchment compensation and at not time any dispute for reinstatement was raised. The Supreme Court further noticed that although the Conciliation officer in his report under Sec. 12 (4) had stated that an industrial dispute did exist relating to the reinstatement of the workmen concerned, when the dispute came up for adjudication before the Tribunal, the evidence produced clearly showed that no such dispute had ever been raised by the workman or the union with the management. Under these circumstances it has been held that an industrial dispute as defined, must be a dispute inter alia between employer and workmen. Under these circumstances it has been held that an industrial dispute as defined, must be a dispute inter alia between employer and workmen. If no dispute at all has been raised by the workmen with the management, any request sent by them to the Government would only be a demand by them and not an industrial dispute between them and their employer. A mere demand to a Government, without a dispute being raised by the workmen with their employer, cannot become an industrial dispute. In view of the above decision of the Supreme Court, in my view, the workmen must first raise a demand on the management and in the absence of any such prior demand, there cannot be an industrial dispute which can be said to arise and exist. Even if a demand id made to a Conciliation officer and the communication by him to the management cannot constitute an industrial dispute. This view is supported by the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of (8) Fedders Llyod Corporation (P) Ltd. v. Governor, Delhi (AIR 1970 Delhi 60 ). ( 11 ) IN the case of management of Radio Foundation Engineering Ltd. and Ano. v. State of Bihar, (AIR1970 Pat. 295) the services of the various workmen were terminated by notices served upon them. The case of the workmen was that it was a lock-out while the management denied such contention. The question was whether there was any existence of an industrial dispute when no such demand was raised before the management. The Division Bench of the Patna High Court held that in all cases it is not necessary that the dispute must be preceded by a demand and a refusal in express term by the parties concerned. It was further held that merely because in express term no such dispute was raised before the management by the workmen it is not correct to say that there was in fact no dispute and hence the reference was incompetent. A reference under Sec. 10 (1) of the Act can be made by the appropriate Government when it is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. In the present case, reference has been made on the basis of the existence of an industrial dispute. A reference under Sec. 10 (1) of the Act can be made by the appropriate Government when it is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. In the present case, reference has been made on the basis of the existence of an industrial dispute. In an appropriate case where on the apprehended of an industrial dispute if a reference is made by the appropriate Government, whether a prior demand by6 the workmen before the management is necessary to constitute an industrial dispute, does not appear to have been considered by the Supreme Court in the case of (7) Sindhu Resettlement Corporation Ltd. v. industrial tribunal (supra ). It may be that in an appropriate case this point may arise for consideration. But in the present case as the reference has been made on the basis that an industrial dispute exists between the workmen and the management, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sindhu Resettlement Corpn. Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal (supra), in my view is a clear authority for the proposition that unless a dispute is raised with the management by a demand being made no industrial dispute can be said to arise. ( 12 ) THE question therefore arises whether any such demand was made by the workmen upon the management before the reference was made. The learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 contended that the respondent No. 2 had approached the personnel officer Sri S. Mukherjee and demanded reinstatement. The petitioner states that it had no personnel officer called S. Mukherjee. The petitioner's grievance is that after the petitioner had concluded its evidence, the respondent No. 2 in his own evidence made out such a case. The petitioner's grievance is that the case made out by the respondent No. 2 was not put to any of the petitioner's witnesses who stated that Sri Panchu Gopal Dey had never raised any dispute with regard to his dismissal. This according to the learned counsel for the petitioner amounted to violation of principles of natural justice. The petitioner's grievance is that the case made out by the respondent No. 2 was not put to any of the petitioner's witnesses who stated that Sri Panchu Gopal Dey had never raised any dispute with regard to his dismissal. This according to the learned counsel for the petitioner amounted to violation of principles of natural justice. In the case of (10) A. E. G. Carapiet v. A. Y. Derderian, AIR (1961) Calcutta 359 the Division Bench of this court held that wherever the opponent has declined to avail himself of the opportunity to put his essential and material case in cross-examination, it, must follow that he believed that the testimony given could not be disputed at all. This is not merely a technical rule of evidence but constitute a rule of essential justice. It serves to prevent at trial and miscarriage of justice, because it gives notice to the other side of the actual case that is going to be made when the turn of the party on whose behalf the cross-examination is being made comes to give and lead evidence by producing witnesses. In my view the grievance of the petitioner on this ground is justified. It appears from the evidence of the witnesses that at the time o f the examination of the petitioner's witnesses, the case made out by the respondent No. 2 that he approached personnel officer Sri S. Mukherjee and demanded reinstatement was never put to any of the witnesses. In fact after the examination of the witnesses of the petitioner was closed the petitioner had no opportunity to meet the new case which been made out by the respondent No. 2 in his evidence. The procedure therefore has violated the principles of natural justice. ( 13 ) THE learned Counsel for the respondent No. 2 contended that his client had filed the written statement in reply to the company's petition under Section 33 (2) (b) of the Act objecting to the sanction to the company's act of dismissal. According to him this also in any event constitutes a demand on his part. To appreciate this contention it is necessary to consider the nature and scope of the proceedings under Sec. 33 (2) (b) of the Act. According to him this also in any event constitutes a demand on his part. To appreciate this contention it is necessary to consider the nature and scope of the proceedings under Sec. 33 (2) (b) of the Act. Under the proviso to Sec. 33 (2) (b) of the Act no workman can be discharged or dismissed unless he has been paid wages for one month and an application has been made by the employer to the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by employer. It is therefore clear that the employer has the right to pass an order of discharge or dismissal but at the same time he has to make an application for approval of the action which had been taken by him. If the tribunal in such a proceeding does not approve of the action taken by the employer, the result would be that the action taken by him would fail and there upon the workman would be deemed never to have been dismissed or discharged and would remain in the service of the employer. In such a proceeding no specific provision as to reinstatement is necessary and by the very fact of the tribunal not approving the action of the employer, the dismissal or discharge of the workman would be of no effect and the workman concerned would continue to be in service as if there had been no dismissal or discharge by the employer. It is only in this sense that it can be said that an order of discharge or dismissal passed by the employer does not become final and conclusive until it is approved by the tribunal under sec. 33 (2), (11) (Straw Board Manufacturing Co. v. Gobind AIR 1962 SC 1500 ). It is true that in such a proceeding the jurisdiction of the tribunal is of a limited character and all that it has to decide is to enquire whether there has been a proper domestic enquiry before the order of discharge or dismissal has been passed and whether a prima facie case for according approval is made out. The tribunal is not at that stage called upon to assume power of an appellate court and to consider the adequacy of evidence or its sufficiency or satisfactory character, (12) Lord Krishna Textiles Mills Ltd v. Their workmen, AIR (1961) Sc 860 ). The tribunal is not at that stage called upon to assume power of an appellate court and to consider the adequacy of evidence or its sufficiency or satisfactory character, (12) Lord Krishna Textiles Mills Ltd v. Their workmen, AIR (1961) Sc 860 ). The position therefore is that in a proceeding under Sec. 33 (2) (b) when there is an order of discharge or dismissal and the employer seeks approval of the tribunal for the action taken by him, if the workmen in such a proceeding contests the action of the employer can it be said that no industrial dispute exists because a formal demand has not been made by the workmen before the management? Section 2 (k) of the Act which defines an industrial dispute to mean any dispute or difference, inter alia, between employer and workmen which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of the employment or with the conditions of labour of any person. The significant words in this definition are ?dispute? or ?difference?. An industrial dispute may exist when there is a difference between employer and his workmen in connection with the employment or non-employment or terms of employment. Such a difference may exist long before the parties become locked in a combat. ? It is not necessary that they should have come to blow. It is sufficient that they should be sparring for an opening?, (13) Beetham and ano. v. Trinidad Cement Ltd. 1960 (I) All ER 274 PC per Lord Denning. The term ?industrial dispute? connects a real and substantial difference and having some element of persistency and likely, if not, adjusted, to endanger the industrial peace of the community. (14) Federated Shaw Mills and Tember Yard and General Wood Workmen's Employee Association v. James Moore and Sons Proprietory Ltd. 8 CLR 465 per Grifith, CJ ). In my view in considering whether there exists an industrial dispute or difference one has to consider the nature of such dispute or difference and has to find out whether the dispute has acquired a definite and substantial character in the sense that both the parties are contesting and are substantially interested in the controversy. In the present case the dispute is with regard to the dismissal of the respondent No. 2. In the present case the dispute is with regard to the dismissal of the respondent No. 2. This very act of dismissal being the subject matter of the proceeding under Sec. 33 (2) (b) of the Act and the respondent No. 2 having contested in such a proceeding there is, in my view, an of industrial dispute regarding such dismissal. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the subject matter of the dispute in a proceeding under Sec. 33 (2) (b) of the Act and in a reference under Sec. 10 (1) of the Act are entirely different. According to him in a proceeding under Sec. 33 (2) (b) of the Act the employer is seeking approval of the action taken by him. In such a proceeding the workmen cannot claim for any reinstatement. The relief which is asked for in a reference under Sec. 10 (1) is one of reinstatement if the dismissal is found to be not justified. This argument in my view ignored the basic nature and character of a proceeding under Sec. 33 (2) (b) of the Act. In the case of (11) Straw Board Manufacturing Co v. Gobind (supra) it was contended that if the tribunal refused to approve of the action, the workmen would be left with on remedy as there was no provision for reinstatement in Sec. 33 (2) of the Act. The Supreme Court negative such contention and held that if the tribunal does not approve if the action taken by the employer, no specific provisions as to reinstatement is necessary because the dismissal or discharge of the workmen would be of no effect and the workmen concerned would continue to be in service of the employer. In my view the dispute or the difference is raised when the act of dismissal is contested by the workmen. In a proceeding under Section 33 (2) (b) of the Act when the workman is contesting the proceeding and objecting to the sanction asked for by the employer, the insistence of a formal demand by the workman upon the management on this very question of dismissal is to lay greater emphasis upon the rather than the substance. In a proceeding under Section 33 (2) (b) of the Act when the workman is contesting the proceeding and objecting to the sanction asked for by the employer, the insistence of a formal demand by the workman upon the management on this very question of dismissal is to lay greater emphasis upon the rather than the substance. ( 14 ) IN my view, in the present case as the workmen has filed a written statement under Sec. 33 (2) (b) of the Act objecting to the act of dismissal, there existed an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act when the State Government made the reference under Sec. 10 (1) of the Act. ( 15 ) FOR the reasons stated above this rule is discharged. Interim order if any, is vacated. There will be no order as to costs. Rule discharged.