( 1 ) THIS writ petition is directed against an order made by the Divisional commissioner of Mysore (hereinafter referred tp as Commissioner) in ina. PR 101-0-10645/69-70, on 12-1-1971. By that order the Commissioner held that the 'area' comprised in the inam village Yengayyana Kere Mole (hereinafter referred to as 'y. K. Mole') was part of the inam village of mellahalli, the inam pertaining to which stood abolished by a notification dt. 13-1-1959 issued pursuant to S. 1 (4) of the Mysore (Personal and miscellaneous) Inams Aboition Act, 1954, (hereinafter referred to as the 'inams Act' ). The order came to be made pursuant to the power vested in the Commissioner by virtue of S. 27a of the Inams Act. S. 27a of the inams Act was introduced with retrospective effect from the date of the inams Act, by the Mysore Inams' Abortion Laws (Amendment) Act of 1959. It is convenient to set out that Section at this stage. It reads;" 27a. Control by. the Divisional Comissioner-The Divisional commissioner shall, within his jurisdiction have power.- (a) to give effect to the provisions of this Act and in particular to superintend the taking over of inams and to, make due arrangements for the administration thereof; (b) to issue instructions for the guidance of the Deputy commissioner; (c) to cancel or revise any order of the Deputy Commisioner declaring whether a particular area is part of an inam or not. " ( 2 ) BEFORE proceeding further, it is necessary to refer to a few facts in order to appreciate the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner. The petitioner, along with some others, was the major 'vrittidar' of the inam village of Melahalli situated in Yelandur Taluk. The said village was notified under the Inams Act as stated earlier. Accordingly, claims were preferred by the inamdars, including the petitioner, and other persons interested in the lands comprised therein for registration of occupancy and other rights as provided under the various provisions of the Act, before the Special Deputy Commissioner constituted for the purpose. The said village was notified under the Inams Act as stated earlier. Accordingly, claims were preferred by the inamdars, including the petitioner, and other persons interested in the lands comprised therein for registration of occupancy and other rights as provided under the various provisions of the Act, before the Special Deputy Commissioner constituted for the purpose. ( 3 ) ON behalf of the petitioner it was contended that the 'dhakla' village of Y. K. Mole was not part of Jodi Mellahalli and that it was an independent village and, therefore, in the absence of a Notification under section 1 (4) of the Inams Act specially naming the said village, the Special deputy Commissioner could not exercise jurisdiction over the said village (Y. K. Mole) under that Act. The 'in charge' Special Deputy commissioner after enquiring into this objection, upheld this contention by his order dated 28-8-1959. ( 4 ) THE Divisional Commissioner of Mysore Division, purporting to exercise the revisional power vested in him u/s. 217 of the Mysore Land revenue Code of 1888, set aside the order. The petitioner, feeling aggrieved by it, approached this Court in WP. 333/1960. This Court quashed the order of the Divisional Commissioner, holding that that Officer could not act under S. 217 of the Mysore Land Revenue Code to interfere with an order made by an authority under the provisions of a Special Act such as the Inams Act. Presumably because of this decision that the Legislature enacted Sec. 27a of the Inams Act, with retrospective effect, with a view to enable a Divisional Commissioner to revise such an order made under the Inams Act. ( 5 ) AFTER the enactment of the said S. 27a, the Commissioner issued notices to parties and after hearing them passed the impugned order. By the said order he held that an 'in charge' Special Deputy Commisioner for inams Abolition was incompetent to decide the question raised before him relative to an issue whether or not Y. K. Mole village was a 'dhakla' or 'majare' village of Jodi Mellahalli and also the further question whether or not the area comprised in Y. K. Mole Village was part and parcel of mellahalli village. After coming to this conclusion and after considering the question of remand and concluding that it was unnecessary to do so, he examined all the material evidence on record and held that y. K. Mole was a 'dhakla' or 'majare' village of Mellahalli and, therefore, properly formed part of the latter. He therefore, concluded that the Notification under S. 1 (4) of the Inams Act, affecting Mellahalli, would include 'y. K. Mole' also. Aggrieved by this order, the petitioner has approached this Court. ( 6 ) I shall now proceed to consider the contentions urged on behalf of the petitioner, in the order in which they were urged, by his learned counsel, Sri S. K. Venkataranga lyengar. ( 7 ) IT was urged that the Commissioner was in error in holding that the Special Deputy Commissioner was only an 'in charge' officer on the date he recorded his finding that Y. K. Mole was not part of Jpdi Mellahalli and that he was not an officer who was holding a rank equivalent to the deputy Commissioner of a District. The specific argument is that such a view ran counter to the order made by this Court in the earlier Writ petition 333/1960 and, therefore, it was not open to him to have come to such a conclusion. It seems to me that this argument overlooks the fact that what was decided in that case was only that it was not open to a divisional Commissioner to have exercised jurisdiction under S. 217 L. R. Code in respect of a matter falling under the Inams Act which was a special Act with a hierarchy of authorities separately constituted there in. In my view that indeed was the substantial question raised in the said writ petition. It cannot therefore, be held that the Commissioner had ex-ceeded his juisdiction, or transgressed the bounds of propriety in any manner, in coming to the above conclusions. Moreover, assuming that such conclusions were uncalled for as contended, the fact remains that the commissioner has examined all the evidence available, as best as he could and concluded that Y. K. Mole Village was included in the area comprised in Jodi Mellahalli village, which had been notified. Moreover, assuming that such conclusions were uncalled for as contended, the fact remains that the commissioner has examined all the evidence available, as best as he could and concluded that Y. K. Mole Village was included in the area comprised in Jodi Mellahalli village, which had been notified. This indeed could be legally done by the Commissioner in the exercise of the controlling and supervisory power vested in him under Sec. 27a of the Inams Act, particularly clause (c) thereof. Hence, this contention clearly deserves to be rejected. ( 8 ) IT was next urged that the Special Deputy Commissioner under the Inams Act would function as a Tribunal. Therefore, if he acts under s. 1 (4) read with S. 3 of that Act, it was not open to the Commissioner in the exercise of his controlling power under S. 27a of the Act to interfere with such a finding. This argument, in my opinion, clearly overlooks the plain language of S. 27a (c), whereby power is conferred on him to cancel or revise any order of the Deputy Commissioner (under the Inams act) declaring whether a particular area is part of an inam or not'. It was sought to be argued that the word 'area' occurring in that sub-clause would not take within its ambit a separate and independent village like y. K. Mole. There is no force in this contention. The 'area' in the context, in which it is used would, in my view, take within its ambit the area of a 'dhakla' or 'majare' village, i. e. , a hamlet. So long as such a finding, which is one of fact, remains unassailable, it would be open to the commissioner, acting under S. 27a of the Inams Act to see that the area of the hamlet is included in the 'area' of the notified inam village. Hence, this contention also has no force. ( 9 ) IT was next urged that the retrospectivity conferred on the provisions of S. 27a would not enable the Commissioner to interfere with an order made long prior to the enactment of that Section. There is no merit in such a contention. Once a provision is made effective retrospectively, it would for all purposes be deemed to have been written into, the enactment as on the date such an amending enactment had been intended by the Legislature to take effect from. There is no merit in such a contention. Once a provision is made effective retrospectively, it would for all purposes be deemed to have been written into, the enactment as on the date such an amending enactment had been intended by the Legislature to take effect from. In this view, the Commissioner could exercise the power vested in him under S. 27a in respect of the order of the Deputy Commissioner in question. ( 10 ) LASTLY, it was contended that the survey maps concerning these villages made in 1891 and 192? had not been cqrrectly interpreted and the conclusions based thereon could not be supported. This argument also has to be rejected for more than one reason. First, this being a question of fact, it is not amenable for interference under the extra-ordinary jurisdiction vested in this Court by the Constitution. Second, the appreciation of evidence by the Commissioner has been quite reasonable and fair and cannot at all be termed as perverse so as to warrant interference at the hand of this Court. ( 11 ) FOR the above reasons, this petition has to fail and is accordingly dismissed. No costs. --- *** --- .