Judgment :- 1. This second appeal has been referred to a Division Bench, in view of the importance of the question of law involved. One Perumal Sankaran executed a will-Ext. XI dated 17-1-1100 M.E., conveying properties to his wife Perumal Appi. Appi had a daughter Janaki and a son Vasavan (3rd defendant). Janaki's children are the plaintiff, the 4th defendant and the 5th defendant, in the suit out of which this second appeal arises. After the death of Appi and Janaki, the third defendant as guardian of the minor plaintiff, along with defendants 4 and S, and also on his own behalf, executed Ext. P1 sale deed in favour of the Ist defendant on 23rd Vrichigom 1125. The 1st defendant subsequently mortgaged the property in favour of the 2nd defendant on 14-3-1959 (Ext. P2). The plaintiff sued to set aside the sale and the mortgage as not valid and binding on his 'tavazhi'. The suit was decreed by the trial court. On appeal, the appellate court held that the plaintiff is only a tenant-in-common in respect of the property, entitled to a one-sixth share, and therefore granted a decree for recovery of possession only of a one-sixth share, setting aside Exts. P1 and P2 to that extent, and allowing the plaintiff recovery of his share, after division by metes and bounds. Defendants 2 to 6 and 12 were held entitled to the value of improvements effected by them on the plot to be plotted to the plaintiff. The plaintiff has preferred the above second appeal. 2. The parties are Ezhavas governed by the Travancore Ezhava Act of 1100. The question argued before us was whether the conclusion of the lower appellate court that the plaintiff was only a tenant-in-common in respect of the property, was correct. The contention of counsel for the appellant was that the properties covered by Ext. X-1 will were taken by the parties concerned as tavazhi properties. S.4 of the Ezhava Act defines a 'tavazhi of a female' as meaning a group of persons consisting of the female and her issues how¬low-so-ever in the female line or such of that group as are alive. The definition opens with the words that it is to have the effect "unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context." Part IV of the Act deals with 'Intestate Succession'. S.18 therein reads as follows: "18. The definition opens with the words that it is to have the effect "unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context." Part IV of the Act deals with 'Intestate Succession'. S.18 therein reads as follows: "18. Devolution of self acquired or separate property of a female: On the death of an Ezhava female, the whole of her self acquired or separate property left undisposed of by her at her death shall devolve on her own Thavazhee. If she dies leaving her surviving no members of her Thavazhee but her husband and members of her mother's Thavazhee, one-half of such property shall devolve on her husband and the other half on her mother's Thavazee. In the absence of the husband the mother's Thavazhee shall take the whole, and in the absence of the mother's Thavazhee the husband shall take the whole;" S.19 provides for the devolution of properties of an Ezhava female leaving her surviving, neither members of her Thavazhee nor other members of her mother's thavazhee, nor husband. It is enough to notice only Explanation II thereof, which is as follows: "Explanation IT. The expression "children" in the case of an intestate male and the expression "Thavazhee" in the case of an interestate female, shall, for the purpose of Part IV of this Regulation, include the issue of such intestate mile or female how low-so ever." The result of reading Explanation II into S.18, is that on the death of Perumal Appi, to whom the property was conveyed absolutely under X-1 will, it devolved under S.18 on her "tavazhi", which by reason of the Explanation, included her issue, both male and female, how-low-so-ever. No dispute was raised regarding the one-sixth share to which the plaintiff was found entitled if the properties devolved on Appi's issues male and female, how-low-so-ever, as tenants-in-common. The only attack was whether they did take the properties as tenants-in-common or as members of the tavazhi. 3. We think the lower appellate court was right in holding that the properties of Perumal Appi on her death, devolved on her issues under S.18 of the Act, as tenants-in-common, and not as a "tavazhi". It seems opposed to the notions of marumakkathayam law to conceive of a tavazhi composed of descendants of the male issues, which is the effect of Explanation II. It seems opposed to the notions of marumakkathayam law to conceive of a tavazhi composed of descendants of the male issues, which is the effect of Explanation II. The group contemplated by Explanation II cannot constitute a 'tavazhi' as defined in S.4(3), which limits it to the issue how-low-so¬ever in the female line. In Nambu Kali Kallyani v. Krishnan Gopalan (1945 TLR.122) a Division Bench of the Travancore High Court considered the argument that it could not have been the intention of the legislature to create a tavazhi for Ezhava intestate females which was unknown elsewhere in Kerala, and dealt with it as follows: "The Ezhavas for whom the legislation was made are Misravazhi Ezhavas and the usages observed by them were mostly a combination of some Makkathayam and perhaps more of Marumakkathayam usages. The lack of uniformity and the difficulty of ascertainment of the usages prevailing amongst the Ezhavas have created no small difficulty in the decision of disputes about succession and family law and the Act had for its purpose a statutory settlement on definite lines of a scheme of succession that may have been acceptable to the Ezhavas in general. As the Ezhava usages had been greatly influenced both by the Makkathayam and Marumakkathayam usages, it may be misleading to approach the construction of the Ezhava Act with a presupposition that the notions of pure Marumakkathayam usage were intended to be preserved in their pristine orthodox purity. In a case such as the present, the court have to proceed only on the language used in the State. Judging the position in this aspect, there are clear indications in the 'Explanation' which go to show that the son's children were intended to be included in the Thavazhi for the purposes of Part IV of the Act. Let us look at the Explanation. The definition of two words "children" and 'Thavazhi' is set out in the Explanation as meaning something which is conveyed by the same set of words. "The issue of the intestate male or female bow low so ever" are indicated as being the meaning of 'children' in respect of an intestate male and of Thavazhi' in respect of an intestate female. In both cases, the inclusive definition brings in a set of persons as heirs who are commonly described as "the issue of the Intestate how low so ever". In both cases, the inclusive definition brings in a set of persons as heirs who are commonly described as "the issue of the Intestate how low so ever". If 'the issue' there described included the children's children how low so ever in whatever line male or female, it is difficult to introduce the limitation that with reference to the word Thavazhi the identical words did not include the issue in the female or male line. The object of Explanation II of S.19 being evidently to set up a particular definition of the word 'Thavazhi' for a particular part of the statute Part IV, it may not at all be possible to presume that the Explanation was a redundancy as regards the Thavazhi but an effective statutory addition as regards the meaning of the word 'children.' The words 'in the female line' In the general definition of 'Thavazhi' in S.4 of Act III of 1100 must have been deliberately left out in the Explanation and the word "Thavazhi" in the Explanation must be held to include all the descendants of the intestate female in either line male or female. It is not necessary to consider in this case whether the Explanation is intended to include other issue of whom it may not be possible to predicate an unbroken male or female ancestry leading to the intestate female. The decision of the lower court is right on this point and it must be affirmed." In Nanu Divakaran v. Velumbi Nani (1954 KLT. 812) a Full Bench of the Travancore-Cochin High Court considered the provisions of the Travancore Ezhava Act in the light of the principles of the decision of the Travancore High Court In Nambu Kali Kallyani's case (1945 T. L. R.122) and held that the group of persons indicated in S.18 and Explanation II to S.19. would take the properties only as tenants-in¬common, and it was impossible to conceive of them as constituting a tavazhi. Counsel for the appellant attacked this contention. But we think the conclusion arrived at in the said decision was sound. S.4 (3) defines a tavazhi of a female as including her issue how-low-so-ever in the female line. The definition is of course subject to there being nothing repugnant in the subject or context. The Explanation II to S.19, read with S.18 only provides for intestate succession to a female. S.4 (3) defines a tavazhi of a female as including her issue how-low-so-ever in the female line. The definition is of course subject to there being nothing repugnant in the subject or context. The Explanation II to S.19, read with S.18 only provides for intestate succession to a female. Reading the two together, we agree with the view in Nanu Divakaran v. Velum pi Nani (1954 KLT. 812) that the expression tavazhi is used as a compendious term to signify the issue of the intestate female, both male and female, how-low-so-ever. Beyond this, we do not think that this was meant to indicate that this group would take the properties with incidents of tavazhi property. We, therefore, hold that the devolution by inheritance postulated under S.18 read with Explanation II to S.19 was as tenants-in-common and not with incidents of tavazhi property. 4. The Full Bench decision of this Court in Mathew v. Kunjika Bharathi (1967 KLT. 133) did not have occasion to consider the character of the property held by the woman and her issue male and female, how-low-so-ever, which was involved in that case. Any observations in the judgments delivered in that case, whatever else they may indicate, certainly do not show that the property in such cases would be held with incidents of tavazhi property. The decision of the lower appellate court was correct. We dismiss this second appeal with costs.