JUDGMENT P. Govindan Nair, C.J. 1. An order Ext. P-7 produced along with this petition passed under rule 37 of the Kerala Police Departmental Inquiries, Punishment and Appeal Rules, 1958 for short the Rules, has been challenged in this petition. 2. The petitioner, a Circle Inspector was suspended under rule 7 (1) (b) of the Rules by Ext. P-1 order dated 21st July 1966 pending a criminal trial. The trial ended in the conviction of the petitioner on 5th April 1967. By Ext. P-2 order dated 7th April 1967 the petitioner was dismissed from service with effect from 5th April 1967. However an appeal taken by the petitioner from the conviction was allowed and the petitioner was acquitted on 30th January 1968. Consequently the petitioner was reinstated in the service on 18th June 1968 by Ext. P-3 order. It is admitted before us that the period from 5th April 1967 to 18th June 1968 has been treated as having been spent by the petitioner on duty and he has been given his full pay and allowances for that period. But regarding the period from 24th July 1966 to 5th April 1967 a notice Ext. P-5 dated 5th December 1969 was issued to the petitioner to show cause why this period spent under suspension, that is from 24th July 1966 to 4th April 1967 should not be treated as on duty for the limited purposes viz. for leave and increments and why his pay and allowances should not be restricted to the amount of the subsistence allowance to which the petitioner was eligible during that period The petitioner's reply to Ext. P-5 is Ext. P-6. This was considered and the order Ext. P-7 was thereafter passed giving effect to the proposal in Ext. P-5. 3. Rules 7 and 37 of the rules are in these terms: "7. (1) The appointing authority or any authority to which it is subordinate or any other authority empowered by the Government in this behalf, may place a member of a service under suspension, where (a) an inquiry into his conduct is contemplated, or is pending, or (b) a complaint against him of any criminal offence is under investigation or trial. (1) The appointing authority or any authority to which it is subordinate or any other authority empowered by the Government in this behalf, may place a member of a service under suspension, where (a) an inquiry into his conduct is contemplated, or is pending, or (b) a complaint against him of any criminal offence is under investigation or trial. (2) A member of a Service who is detained in custody whether on a criminal charge or otherwise, for a period longer than forty-eight hours shall be deemed to have been suspended by the appointing authority under this rule. (3) An order of suspension under sub-rule (1) may be revoked at any time by the authority making the order or by any authority to which it is subordinate. 37. Payment of remuneration for the period of suspension. When the suspension of a person under rule 7 is held to have been unjustifiable, or not wholly justifiable, or when a person who has been dismissed, removed or suspended is reinstated, he may be granted for the period of his absence from duty (a) If he has been found free from any blame under rule 17 or by the appellate or revising authority, the full pay to which he would have been entitled if he had not been dismissed, removed or suspended and, by an order to be separately recorded any allowance of which he was in receipt prior to his dismissal, removal or suspension, or (b) If otherwise, such proportion of pay and allowance as the appropriate authority may prescribe: Provided that any subsistence allowance paid under rule 17 (b) shall be deducted from the amount payable under this rule."� 4. The question arising for determination turns on the wording of the first paragraph of rule 37. What is the meaning to be attributed to the words "is held to have been unjustifiable or not wholly justifiable". 5. Rule 37 will take in not only persons who have been suspended pending criminal investigation or pending criminal trial but also persons who had been suspended, dismissed or removed from service because an enquiry into their conduct was contemplated or was pending [rule 7 (1) (a)]. The rule will also apply to cases where a person dismissed, removed or suspended is reinstated. The rule will also apply to cases where a person dismissed, removed or suspended is reinstated. In the case of a suspension there is the specific provision that the suspension must be held to have been unjustifiable or not wholly justifiable before the provisions in rule 37 (a) can be applied. Rule 37 (a) starts by stating that when the person "has been found free from any blame under rule 17 or by the appellate or revising authority". This part of rule 37 (a) will therefore apply only to cases where an enquiry under rule 17 had been held. We have however to understand the provisions in rule 37 (a) as also applicable to the earlier part of paragraph 1 of rule 37 that is, to cases where the suspension under rule 7 had been held to have been unjustified or not wholly justified. Incases where the suspension under rule 7 has been held to be unjustifiable, we think the full pay to which he would have been entitled if he had not been so suspended should be paid and if the suspension was not wholly justified the provision in rule 37 (b) must be applied and such proportion of pay and allowance as the appropriate authority may prescribe will have to be paid. Suspension can be had not only when an enquiry is under contemplation [rule 7(1) (a)] but also when a complaint against a person relating to a criminal offence is under investigation or trial. When the first paragraph of rule 37 speaks of a suspension under rule 7 it must naturally and normally take in the suspension under rule 7 (1) (a) and 7 (1) (b). So rule 37 (a) and (b) must also be applied to cases of suspension under rule 7 (1) (b). The provisions in the Madras Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules regarding suspension are different. Rule 17 (a) of the above rules merely states: "A member of a service may be placed under suspension from service pending enquiry into grave charges, where such suspension is necessary in the public interest." This was the rule that was interpreted by Chief Justice Rajamannar in the decision in The Union of India, represented by the Secretary, Ministry of Finance Department, New Delhi v. Tayaram Damodhar Timiri, A.I.R. 1960 Mad. 325. 325. The principle of the decision cannot be applied in interpreting rule 37 of the rules. 6. Now we must turn to the meaning of the words "when the suspension is held to have been unjustifiable or not wholly justifiable" occurring in rule 37. When a person had been suspended pending investigation into a criminal complaint or pending trial neither the investigation nor the trial would end by entering a finding on the question whether the suspension was justified or not. Nor is there any other proceeding contemplated by the rules before the question to be considered under rule 37 arises for determination viz. whether the suspension had been justified or not. It necessarily follows that the finding whether the suspension was unjustifiable or was not wholly justifiable must be contained in the order to be passed under rule 37. So it follows that before an order that full pay and allowances should be paid is passed under rule 37 (a) or such proportion of pay and allowances as contemplated by rule 37 (b) should be paid, there should be a clear finding as to whether a suspension was justifiable or not. The question then arises whether such a finding should be based exclusively on what appeared to the suspending authority when he passed the suspension order and whether the judgment or order acquitting a person and the findings entered therein should also be taken into consideration. One of us sitting alone ventured to state that whether the suspension was justified or not must be considered with reference exclusively to the state of affairs as it existed at the time of the order of suspension. (vide the Judgment of Govindan Nair, J. as he then was in O.P. Nos. 2112 and 2430 of 1963). We may mention in passing that the observations in that judgment have been relied on in the order Ext. P-7. The order of reference by which this case has come up before us has doubted the correctness of the observations. We think the statement in the judgment is far too wide and requires modification. 7. A suspension order under rule 7(1) (b) perhaps more often than not is at times based exclusively on the existence of an investigation into a criminal complaint relating to a criminal offence or the pendency of a criminal trial relating to such a complaint. We think the statement in the judgment is far too wide and requires modification. 7. A suspension order under rule 7(1) (b) perhaps more often than not is at times based exclusively on the existence of an investigation into a criminal complaint relating to a criminal offence or the pendency of a criminal trial relating to such a complaint. But for the purposes of deciding whether a suspension was justified or not the reasons for the acquittal may have to be taken into account. So the Supreme Court said in the decision in State of Assam and another v. Raghava Rajagopalachari, 1972 Service Law Reporter 44 that when the acquittal was based on the fact that the proceedings were vitiated due to lack of sanction or because the approvers' evidence in the case was not corroborated, it cannot be said that the suspension was wholly unjustified. Similar is the ruling of the Allahabad High Court in Sipahi Lal v. Section Officer G.R.P.E. Section, Moradabad and others, 1959 Allahabad Law Journal 862 where the acquittal was based on the well known principle applicable to the criminal law that there was a reasonable doubt and the rule of the Patna High Court in Sheo Prasad v. The State of Bihar and others, 1973 (1) Service Law Journal 709 where it was held that the acquittal was on technical ground is based on the same principle. These decisions we think have laid down guide lines which have to be applied and we are obliged to do so in view of the Supreme Court decision. This means that events subsequent to the passing of the order of suspension will play at times an important role. The nature of the acquittal and the reasons therefor the evidence that was available and whether that evidence can posit guilt, though not sufficient for a criminal conviction will have to be taken into account in deciding whether a suspension under rule 7 (1) (b) was justified or not. We only wish to add that there may be cases where the suspension is not based exclusively on the pendency of a criminal investigation or trial but on the consideration of the material available at the time the order of suspension was passed. We only wish to add that there may be cases where the suspension is not based exclusively on the pendency of a criminal investigation or trial but on the consideration of the material available at the time the order of suspension was passed. In such cases if the material available at the time indicated that the person was guilty of serious misconduct amounting to a criminal offence it will be difficult to hold that the suspension was unjustified notwithstanding an acquittal. 8. The decisions that counsel for the petitioner brought to our notice of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court in Ghulam Nabi Baba v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, A. I. R. 1966 Jammu and Kashmir 27 and of the Punjab High Court in Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab, A.I.R 1967 Punjab 422 as has been correctly pointed out if we may say so with respect in the order of reference turned on the construction of the particular rule considered and are not of much help. 9. The notice Ext. P-5 stated that the judgment of the Sessions Court in appeal itself indicated that the petitioner was not wholly free from blame. But when the petitioner controverted this the stand that has been taken in the order Ext. P-7 was different. We shall extract a part of the order Ext. P-7. "The contention of the accused officer is untenable. Whether a suspension is unjustifiable or not wholly justifiable must depend on the circumstances that appear to the suspending authority when the suspension order was passed. If there was prima facie indication that criminal offence has been committed and that there was a case to go for trial the suspension order is wholly justifiable, though the case ends in acquittal. This view was upheld by the Hon. High Court of Kerala in O. P. No. 2112 and 2430/63. Shri Jose did not submit any extenuating circumstances or special reasons in his representation to modify my proposal regarding disposal of the period. I therefore confirm my provisional conclusion." This is not justified. The approach made has not been correct. This view was upheld by the Hon. High Court of Kerala in O. P. No. 2112 and 2430/63. Shri Jose did not submit any extenuating circumstances or special reasons in his representation to modify my proposal regarding disposal of the period. I therefore confirm my provisional conclusion." This is not justified. The approach made has not been correct. The whole question will have to be reconsidered and a specific finding will have to be entered on the question whether the suspension was justified or not before it is decided to deny the petitioner any part of his pay and allowances for the period from 24th July 1966 to 5th April 1967. 10. We set aside the order Ext. P-7 and direct a fresh order being passed after considering all the aspects in the light of what is stated in the judgment. 11. This original petition is ordered as above. There will be no order as to costs.