( 1 ) THE appellant is the 21st judgment-debtor, Respondent 1 is the decree-holder, and respondents 2 to 22 are the other judgment-debtors. This appeal arises out of the order passed by the 1st Joint Civil Judge, Junior division, Hubli, in L. D. NO. 55 of 1961 over-ruling the objections of the present appellant which was confirmed by the learned District Judge, dharwar, in Civil Appeal No. 369 of 1962. ( 2 ) THE decree-holder is Shrimat Sadguru Muppinendra, Swamiyavaru lingayat Fund, Byadgi, by its Chairman Channabasappa Rudrapppa upasi. The Execution application was filed by Muregeppa bugerappa, Yadwad who alleged that he was authorised by the Chairman of the decree-holder-Fund for filing the execution application. In the present execution application it was stated that an application was filed in Diary Application no. 22/60 and a certificate of transfer to the Ranibennur Court was obtained. That application was filed on 5-2-1960. After the transfer, no further steps appear to have been taken. Thereafter, an application for transfer was filed in 1961 for transfer of the execution to the Hubli Court in Diary application No. 6 of 1961, and a certificate was obtained on 24-1-1961. It is stated in the application that according to the terms of the decree, the judgment-debtors 2, 6 to 12, 14 to 16, and 18 to 21 are liable to pay Rs. 5,265 with interest at six per eent from the date of suit. Thus the sum of Rs. 7383- 15-4 and future interest is sought to be recovered from the 21st judgment-debtor. . It was also stated that this M. S. Yadwad had obtained a document of authority from the Chairman of the decree-holder-Fund for prosecuting the execution proceedings. The Office of the Court noted that the execution applicant has not produced the Power of Attorney. But the learned Judge has passed an order under the Office note to the effect that notice under O. 21, R. 22 CPC may be issued on 16-3-1961. In his objection statement, the present appellant admitted that a decree had been obtained against him and other judgment-debtors. He also stated that according to the decree, he had been making payments from time to time and that he had paid more than his share of the decretal amount. In his objection statement, the present appellant admitted that a decree had been obtained against him and other judgment-debtors. He also stated that according to the decree, he had been making payments from time to time and that he had paid more than his share of the decretal amount. The more substantial contention taken by him was that M. S. Yadwad was not authorised to file the execution application, that he has not filed any letter of authority from the decree-holder and that, therefore, the execution application is not maintainable. The appellant also alleged that the execution application is not within time. Both the lower Courts have over-ruled the objections of the appellant. ( 3 ) IT is contended by Mr. Karanth, that the 1st execution application, diary Application No. 22/60, filed on 5-2-1960 was itself without proper authority from the decree-holder, that the execution application itself was incompetent, that any proceeding thereunder is invalid and that it does not serve as a step-in-aid of execution and that the present application filed on 27-2-61, being beyond three years from the date of the decree, is itself barred by limitation. The objection to the maintainability of the present execution application is also on the ground that M. S. Yadwad is not authorised to file the execution application and that the execution is not maintainable. Hence, the validity of the proceeding under the former execution petition, Diary Application No. 22/60 will depend upon the same question namely, the competence of the present execution application. ( 4 ) THE decree-holder relied upon the copy of the resolution dt. 7-6-59 passed by the Committee of Trustees of the decree-holder-Fund. On behalf of the decree-holder it was contended that the said resolution authorised m. S. Yadwad to file the execution application and to recover the amount due under the decree. It is stated that a wrong copy of the said resolution was filed into Court which purported to authorise M. S. Yadwad to recover the decretal amount mentioning the number of the suit in which the decree was passed specifically. But at a later stage, the resolution book of the managing Committee of the respondent-Trust was produced. The 1st item of the Agenda, in the meeting field on 7-6-59 mentions "kuruvathi firmina sherudarara melay decree ada Court nalli kelasa madalikke adhikara koduva uddesha. . . . . . . . . . . . . But at a later stage, the resolution book of the managing Committee of the respondent-Trust was produced. The 1st item of the Agenda, in the meeting field on 7-6-59 mentions "kuruvathi firmina sherudarara melay decree ada Court nalli kelasa madalikke adhikara koduva uddesha. . . . . . . . . . . . . . " The resolution said that M. S. Yadwad is authorised to " Courn nalli kelasa nadisi vasulu maduva bagge adhikara kodathakkadhu antha. . . . . . . . . . . . . . " this M. S. Yadwad is one of the members of the Managing Committee of the decree-holder-Trust. It is contended by Mr. Karanth, that this resolution is inadmissible in evidence since it has not been marked as an exhibit in the case by the execution Court and that the lower appellate Court was in error in relying upon the said resolution. In the course of its order, the lower appellate Court has observed :" My attention was invited to a resolution passed by the decree-holder-Trust. That ia also referred to by consent by the learned Civil judge, Junior Division. That resolution is to be found on the reverse of page 28 of the resolution book of the decree-holder. The resolution is dated 7-6-1959. "it is urged by Mr. Karanth that there was no consent on the part of the present appellant to the Cpurt treating the resolution as part of the evidence in the case. It is true that the resolution has not been marked as an exhibit as required under the rules. There it only a mark in red pencil by the side of the Resolution on page 28 of the Resolution book. There is no rubber stamp of the Court or initials of the Presiding Officer as required Under the rules. But the execution Court has discussed the contents of the resolution and its legal implications. In the memorandum of grounds of appeal filed before the lower appellate court, it was not urged that the said resolution should not have been treated as part of the evidence. Hence, it is not open to the appellant now to urge that the said resolution should not have been treated as evidence though the formality of marking it as an exhibit has not been complied with. Both the lower Courts have treated it as part of the evidence. 4a. Hence, it is not open to the appellant now to urge that the said resolution should not have been treated as evidence though the formality of marking it as an exhibit has not been complied with. Both the lower Courts have treated it as part of the evidence. 4a. The lower appellate Court hag relied on the decision of this Court in SVPS v. Padmarajappa, and AIR 1924 Caj. . 811. In SVPS Ltd. v. I. Padmarajappa, (1971) 1 Mys. L. J. 131, the decree was obtained by the Secretary of the decree-holder-Corporation. The President filed the execution application. It was held relying on the provisions of Or. 21, R. 11 (2) CPC. , that prima facie it can be taken that the President is a person acquainted with the facts of the case and therefore competent to make the execution petition. In khararia Mijazilla Zamindari Syndicate Ltd. v. Omed Sheikh, AIR. 1924 Cal. 811, it was held that under Or. 21, R. 11 (2) CPC the person other than the decree-holder who makes the application need not obtain the permission of the Court before verifying the execution application and that all that is necessary is that the Court should be satisfied that the person who signed the verified application is acquainted with the facts of the case. But it is contended by Mr. Karanth that the decision of this Court in SVPS's cose (1) does not lay down the correct interpreation of Or. 21, R. 11 (2) CPC and that it needs reconsideration by a Division Bench of this Court, relying on the decisions in Supdt. Court of wards v. Gopi Krishnaji, AIR 1957 Raj. 122, and Appaji v. Gowindaswami, AIR, 1937 Mad. 760. ( 5 ) IN Appaji v. Goanndaswami (4), the execution application was not presented either by the party or by a Vakil duly authorised on his behalf the execution application appears to have been signed and verified by the decree-holder's Pleader though no Vakalatnama was filed by the Pleader on behalf of the decree-holder. The objection taken appears to be that the execution application was not. presented either by the party or by a duly authorised person on his behalf. The learned single Judge who decided that case observed that Or. The objection taken appears to be that the execution application was not. presented either by the party or by a duly authorised person on his behalf. The learned single Judge who decided that case observed that Or. 21, R. 11 (2) CPC merely sets out the form in which the application is to be drafted and that any person acquainted with the facts can sign or verify the written application. But reading Or. 3, R. 1 and Or. 21, R. 10 together it was held that the moving of the Court to do an act must be either by the party himself, by a recognised agent or by a Pleader duly authorised. Since hi that case the application was made by a person who had no authority at all it was held that it was no valid execution application at all. This decision was followed by a Division bench of the, Rajasthan High Court in Supdt. Court of Wards v. Gopikrishnaji (3 ). The learned Judges referred to Or. 3, R. I, Or. 6, R. 10, Or. 6, r. 15 as well as Or. 21, R. 10 while considering the provisions of sub-rule (2) of Or. 21, B. 11. Significance appears to have been attached to the fact that there is a comma after the word 'writing' and not after the word 'signed' in sub-rule (2) of Or. 21, R. 11 CPC. ( 6 ) OR. 21, R. 10 provides for the application to be filed by the decree-holder either to the Court which passed the decree or to the Court to which the decree is transferred. Or. 21, R. 11 provides for the mode of application being made to the Court. Sub-clause (1) of Or. 21, R. 11 provides for an oral application. Such an application can be made only by the decree-holder himself. Sub-clause (2) of Or. 21, R. 11 provides for cases other than those provided by sub-rule, (1) and it states that every application for the execution of a decree shall be made in writing, signed and verified by the applicant or by some other person who proves to the satisfaction of the court that he is acquainted with the facts of the case. 21, R. 11 provides for cases other than those provided by sub-rule, (1) and it states that every application for the execution of a decree shall be made in writing, signed and verified by the applicant or by some other person who proves to the satisfaction of the court that he is acquainted with the facts of the case. There is no warrant for reading the said provision as requiring the decree-holder to sign the application in all cases even when the application is filed by some other person and that the verification alone should be made by such other person who is said to be acquainted with the facts of the case. Or. 3, R. 1 CPC provides that an application to any Court may be done by the party in person or by his recognised agent or by a Pleader appearing, applying or acting on his behalf "except where otherwise expressly provided by any law for the time being in force". The provision of sub-clause (2) of Or. 21, r. 11 provides for such an exception and under that provision a person other than the decree-holder can file the execution application provided he proves to the satisfaction of the Court that he is acquainted with the facts of the case. Under sub-clause (2) of Or. 6, R. 14, it is provided that every pleading can be signed by the party and his Pleader and that where a party is unable to sign the pleading, it may be signed by any person duly authorised by him. U/or. 6, R. 15, it is provided that save as otherwise provided by any law for the time being in force, every pleading shall be verified at the foot by the party or by one of the parties pleading or by some other person proved to the satisfaction of the Court to be acquainted with the facts of the case. By reading these two provisions, namely, Or. 6, r. 14 (2) and Or. 6, R. 15, it is clear that a pleading should be signed by the party as well as his. Pleader and that if the party is unable to sign it, it may be signed by any person duly authorised by him. By reading these two provisions, namely, Or. 6, r. 14 (2) and Or. 6, R. 15, it is clear that a pleading should be signed by the party as well as his. Pleader and that if the party is unable to sign it, it may be signed by any person duly authorised by him. But the verification of the pleadings can be done by the party or one of the parties or by some person proved to the satisfaction of the Court to be acquainted with the facts of the case. On the basis of these provisions it is contended on behalf of the appellant that a, similar interpretation should be given to the provisions of sub-clause (2) of Or. 21, R. 11. But the wording of sub-clause (2) of Or. 21, R. 11 does npt warrant any such interpretation. The very fact that the wording of this provision is different from the provisions of sub-clause (2) of Or. 6, R. 14 and Or. 6, R. 15 shows that the intention of the legislature while framing sub-clause (2) of Or. 21, R. 11 was different as to the requirements of an application for execution as distinct from the requirements of a pleading. Hence, I am of the opinion that there is no reason to differ from the earlier decision of this Court. ( 7 ) MR. Karanth relied on the decision in nethiri Menon v. Gopalan nair, ILR 39 Mad, 597, and contended that the applicant has not been authorised by all the trustees of the decree-holder-Fund, and that therefore all the trustees were necessary parties to the execution application. In that case, it has been held that a payment to one only of several trustees is not a valid payment unless he has or is held out by his co-trustees as having authority to receive the same and that the words "any trustees or trustee" in S. 42 of the Indian Trusts Act mean the trustee where there is only one the trustees where there are more. But that decision is not one under Or. 21, R. 11, (2) CPC and has no application to the facts of this case. ( 8 ) IT was next contended that the execution application against only one of the judgment-debtors is not maintainable. But that decision is not one under Or. 21, R. 11, (2) CPC and has no application to the facts of this case. ( 8 ) IT was next contended that the execution application against only one of the judgment-debtors is not maintainable. This contention has been negatived by both the lower Courts on the ground that the decree provides for a joint and several liability of the judgment-debtors Nos. 2, 6 to 12, 14 to 16 and 18 to 21 in respect of the decretal debt of Rs. 5,265. This finding is justified on the terms of the decree. ( 9 ) THE present applicant M. S. Yadwad has been held to be competent to file the execution application by both the lower Courts since according to their finding he must be deemed to be a person who is acquainted with the facts of the case. It is true that the terms of the resolution do not specifically authorise M. S. Yadwad to recover the decretal amount relating to the present execution application. Since the subject-matter ol the resolution appears to relate to the decretaj debt due from the shareholders of Kurvatti firm and having regard to the circumstances of the case, both the lower Courts have come to the conclusion that M. S. Yawad is a person acquainted with the facts of the case and was therefore competent to file the execution application under Or. 21, R. 11 (2) CPC. There is therefore no reason to differ from the said finding. In view of the fact that the applicant has been held to be a person who was competent to file the execution application, it must be held that the previous execution application, Diary Application No. 22/60 is one which was also competent and valid in law. Therefore, it served as a step-in-aid of execution and the present application cannot be said to be barred by time. ( 10 ) THE appellant did not raise any other objections as to the validity of the proceeding under the previous execution application, Diary no 22/60, though he stated in his objection statement that the execution application is barred by time. Since no objection other than the compepetency of M. S. Yadwad to file the execution application was specifically taken, it was not open to the appellant to question the validity of the said previous execution application on any other ground. Since no objection other than the compepetency of M. S. Yadwad to file the execution application was specifically taken, it was not open to the appellant to question the validity of the said previous execution application on any other ground. ( 11 ) THIS appeal is therefore dismissed. But in view of the fact that the respondents are unrepresented, there will be no order as to costs. --- *** --- .