Judgment :- 1. There is an ancient mosque known as Mohideen Palli situate in Calicut. For a long time the mosque was under the exclusive management of a family known as Pocker Hajiarakath. In due course the worshippers at the mosque felt the necessity for greater interference on their part in the affairs of the mosque; and in a public meeting convened on 7th September 1947 a body called "The Palayam Mohideen Palli Paripalana Committee" (shortly the committee) was constituted for assuming the management of the mosque and its assets. The committee in due course framed a constitution, drew up the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the body and made certain rules and bye-laws. The 2nd defendant functioned as the Imam of the mosque under the committee. Matters went on smoothly till 27th January 1957, when the services of the 2nd defendant were terminated by the then committee. An attempt for reinstatement of the 2nd defendant as Imam, made by his supporters did not succeed. The result was the emergence of a rival faction which chose to call itself as the group of orthodox Sunnis. According to that dissident group the committee as well as its supportes were Wahabis having certain progressive ideas in matters of religion. When the activities of the two groups transgressed reasonable limits the police interfered; and a general body meeting was held on 25th May 1958 at the Calicut Town Hall for reconciling the two factions. That meeting, far from patching up the quarrel only widened the rift. Proceedings were thereafter initiated under S.147 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as M.C. 10/1958. The committee simultaneously moved the Civil Court and instituted O.S. 1111/ 1958 for an injunction and allied reliefs. In M. C. 10/1951 a tentative agreement was arrived at between the two groups whereby each group was permitted to have its prayers conducted in the mosque at specified hours. O.S. 1111/1958 was subsequently withdrawn with liberty to file a fresh suit. The interim arrangement made in the M.C. proceedings was soon felt to be unsatisfactory by the committee. It appears that the dissident group began to conduct congregational prayers under an Imam of their choice. The committee thereupon as 1st plaintiff instituted the suit which gave rise to this appeal. The 2nd plaintiff is the Imam duly appointed by the committee. The interim arrangement made in the M.C. proceedings was soon felt to be unsatisfactory by the committee. It appears that the dissident group began to conduct congregational prayers under an Imam of their choice. The committee thereupon as 1st plaintiff instituted the suit which gave rise to this appeal. The 2nd plaintiff is the Imam duly appointed by the committee. The main prayer in the suit is for a perpetual injunction to restrain the defendants from organising either by themselves or through their agents congregational prayers in the mosque under the leadership of the 1st defendant or any other Imam than the 2nd plaintiff or any other Imam duly appointed by the 1st plaintiff committee. 2. Pending suit the 2nd defendant died. The suit was resisted on various grounds including attacks on the constitution, and representative capacity of the committee, defects in management and the irregularity committed by the committee in the matter of convening the general body meeting on 25th May 1958. The trial court decreed the suit and issued the prohibitory order in the following terms: "The defendants are perpetually restrained from organising either by themselves or through their agents congregational prayers in the Mohideen Palli in Nagaram Amsom and Desom, Kozhikode taluk under the leadership of the 1st defendant or any other I mam other than the 2nd plaintiff or other Imam duly appointed by the 1st plaintiff-committee." The trial court also made it clear that the defendants are at liberty to offer their prayers individually or behind the 2nd plaintiff or any other Imam duly appointed by the 1st plaintiff. Defendants 1 and 3 to 8 took the matter in appeal as A. S.216/1968. The lower appellate court left some of the issues open and confirmed the injunction issued by the trial court. Hence this second appeal by defendants 1 and 3 to 8. 3. In as much as the right of the appellants and their supporters to conduct worship individually at the mosque in dispute is already declared by the courts below, the short question that survives for decision is whether the group represented by the appellants have got a legal right to conduct congregational worship under an Imam of their choice. Both sides have not placed before me any authoritative text of Mohammadan Law or any decision of this court directly dealing with the matter in issue. Both sides have not placed before me any authoritative text of Mohammadan Law or any decision of this court directly dealing with the matter in issue. Though the absence of a positive rule of law has the disadvantage of increasing the responsibility of the court, it has also the virtue of leaving greater liberty to the court in the matter of applying principles which are well recognised and germane to the issue. In situations of this kind courts invariably tall back upon what are known as principles of "equity, justice and good conscience". Each one of those concepts is a term of wide import and the manner and extent of its application to a given case would depend upon the facts and circumstances of that case. Thus in matters of religious practices, equity cannot overlook public order, morality, health and reasonableness as adjudged by the prevailing conditions of society. That appears to be the approach made by some of the courts in India which had the occasion to consider problems analogous to the one raised in this case. 4. One of the earliest decisions brought to my notice and dealing with almost an identical question is that of the Patna High Court, reported in Khalil v. Israfil 37 I. C. 302-A. I. R.1916 Patna 87. As has been claimed by the appellants before me, the plaintiffs in that case suggested that certain fixed hours may be allotted to them for congregational worship with their own Imam. Chamier, C, J., rejected that claim on two grounds; firstly, that such an arrangement appeared to be unknown to the Mohammadan Law, and secondly, that the admission of such a claim would result in unseemly conflicts in the mosque. Roe, J., quoted a passage from B 7 and B 13 of Volume 1 of the chapter relating to Azan of Zadul Maad and interpreted that extract to mean that if a Mohammadan turns away from the regular prayers with abhorrence, he cannot be allowed to have a special Imam of his own. The court thus held that members of any and every sect of Mohammadans are not entitled to pray in every mosque as a separate congregation behind an Imam chosen by themselves. The Patna decision was followed in Amir Hussain Shah and others v. Hafix Ghulam Rasul and others A. I. R.1936 Peshawar 65. The court thus held that members of any and every sect of Mohammadans are not entitled to pray in every mosque as a separate congregation behind an Imam chosen by themselves. The Patna decision was followed in Amir Hussain Shah and others v. Hafix Ghulam Rasul and others A. I. R.1936 Peshawar 65. While recognising the right of every Mohammedan to say his prayers in any mosque provided he does not disturb or interrupt other worshippers, the court considered the dictum laid down by the Patna High Court and observed: "The reasoning Which was applied in that case appeals to us." 5. The view taken by the Patna High Court was followed by the Allahabad High Court in Sifat Ali Khan and others v. Ali Mian and others A. I. R.1933 Allahabad 284. In that case, the plaintiffs who were the members of the Ahamadya community claimed a right to hold separate congregational prayers. The High Court granted a decree only declaring that the plaintiffs were entitled to enter the mosque if they please and offer up prayers with the regular congregation behind the Imam chosen by the members of the congregation, but they were not entitled to pray in a separate congregation behind an Imam of their own. The whole question was again considered elaborately from all conceivable angles by the Allahabad High Court in Haji Mohd. v. Abdul Ghafor AIR. 1955 Allahabad 688. There, litigation was started between the members of a sect known as Ahl-e-Hadis on the one part and the members of a Hanafi sect on the other to restrain the latter group from interfering with the rights of the plaintiffs to offer prayers in a congregation of their own and according to their own rituals in certain mosques in the town. Besides considering the decisions reported in Khalil v. Israfil 37 I.C. 302 - AIR. 1916 Patna 87, Amir Hussain Shah and others v. Hafix Ghulam Rasul and others AIR. 1936 Peshawar 65 and Sifat Ali Khan and others v. Ali Mian and others AIR. 1933 Allahabad 284, the court took pains to analyse the available texts of Mohammadan law. In the order of importance, the court referred to the Holy Quran, the Hadis, the Ijmaa "Qeyas", none of which would throw much light upon the matter in dispute. 1936 Peshawar 65 and Sifat Ali Khan and others v. Ali Mian and others AIR. 1933 Allahabad 284, the court took pains to analyse the available texts of Mohammadan law. In the order of importance, the court referred to the Holy Quran, the Hadis, the Ijmaa "Qeyas", none of which would throw much light upon the matter in dispute. In the absence of any clear or consistent authority, the court pointed out that it is open to the jurists even according to a school of Muslim Law to resort to principles of equity for the purpose of deciding a particular question at issue before them. It was pointed out that "Istehsan" (Juristic Equity) itself is a recognised source for deciding a particular question. A passage at page 368 of the Reddul Muhtar in the chapter entitled "Azan" was brought to the notice of the court as lending support to the view that a separate congregation is permissible On a reading of the passage as a whole, the court came to the conclusion that to its mind the passage clearly condemned the holding of a second congregation, or at any rate, it did not recommend or consider it as a desirable course at all. The prayer of the plaintiffs in that case for separate congregational worship under independent Imam was turned down on the additional ground that in view of the bitter relations that had existed between the two sects for a long time, the result of such a relief would be to create a situation that would be explosive and fraught with danger. The court also took note of the circumstance that the defendants had been holding congregational prayers, according to their form in the mosque for a long time, and as such the right which they were exercising by virtue of its strength and uniform practice has ripened into a local custom. 6. The available judicial precedents are [thus decidedly against the appellants. The status of the committee as the Muthavalli of the mosque and their right to appoint the Imam were not seriously disputed before me. The defendants were rightly prohibited from holding separate congregational worship in the mosque under any Imam other than the one appointed by the 1st plaintiff. The appeal fails and it is dismissed. I make no order as to costs.