JUDGMENT Hari Swarup, J. - This appeal has been filed against the judgment of the learned Single Judge by which he allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent Chhotey, and quashed the judgments and decrees of the Revenue Courts decreeing plaintiff-appellant's suit under Section 173 of the U.P. Tenancy Act and declaring that the same had stood abated under Rule 39 of the U.P. Urban Area Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules. 2. The plaintiff was the Zamindar of the plot in dispute. According to him, he had let out a grove land to Chhotey defendant and his brother Sukhdeo in 1932 for a period of five years. By this letting out these persons have become non-occupancy tenants. Their status continued to be the same. In 1952 they cut the trees. A suit was then instituted in the civil court for possession and damages. The suit was ultimately decreed only for damages. In 1957 the Zamindar plaintiff instituted the suit giving rise to the present proceedings under Section 175 of the U.P. Tenancy Act. On July 1, 1963 the land became vested in the State by a notification issued under the U.P. Urban Area Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. 3. The defence, inter alia, was that land had not been let out for maintaining a grove but for cultivating the land. The land was actually cultivated. The lease came to an end after five years. Thereafter the Zamindar cultivated the land as the defendant had cultivated during the period of the lease. The lease was again executed for cultivation of the land in 1942 or 1943, Defendant Chhotey, after his brother's death, continued to remain the tenant of the land and became either the occupancy tenant or the hereditary tenant. On these allegations it was asserted that the suit was liable to be stayed and finally abated by virtue of Rule 39 of the U.P. Urban Area Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules. Alternatively, it was pleaded that even on the case of the plaintiff the suit was liable to be dismissed. 4. The trial court decreed the suit in 1966. This decree was upheld by the first appellate court and subsequently by the Board of Revenue. All the revenue courts held that the land in dispute was a grove land in 1932 when originally the lease was created. 4. The trial court decreed the suit in 1966. This decree was upheld by the first appellate court and subsequently by the Board of Revenue. All the revenue courts held that the land in dispute was a grove land in 1932 when originally the lease was created. By reason thereof, it was held, the defendant had acquired the status only of a non-occupancy tenant. The same status was held to have continued. On that basis it was held that the suit was not liable to be stayed or abated. On merits the suit was decreed. 5. Aggrieved by the judgments and decree of the revenue courts the defendant filed a writ petition in this Court. It was alleged that a number of points were raised and urged before the Board of Revenue on merits but the Board of Revenue did not consider them and that if the same had been taken into consideration the suit would have been dismissed. It was further alleged that on proper findings being reached the suit would have been formed liable to be abated under Rule 39 of the Rules. It was also contended in the writ petition that the finding arrived at by the revenue courts that there was a grove in 1932 and the land continued to be a grove land was vitiated by errors of law. 6. The learned Single Judge who heard the writ petition came to the conclusion that the findings recorded by the revenue courts that it was a grove land in 1932 is vitiated by errors of law. The learned Single Judge found that reliance had been placed on a civil court judgment for coming to this conclusion which was not permissible. The learned Single Judge also held that in law on the facts pleaded, the land could not constitute a grove land in 1932. We are in agreement with this finding of the learned Single Judge. The grove land has been defined in Section 3(15) of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926 as: "Grove land means any specific piece of land in Mahal having trees planted thereon in such numbers that which preclude or when fully grown they will preclude the land or any considerable portion thereof being used primarily for any other purpose and the trees of such land constitute a grove. Explanation I-The word 'trees' does not include tea plants, rose bushes, betel plants, plantains and papitas, or any mere shrubs, bushes, plants or climbers. Explanation II-The word 'trees' in the case of fruit-bearing trees such as mango or jack-fruit, which occupy the land for a long period; but does not include trees, such as guavas or peaches, which occupy the land for comparatively short period." 7. It is admitted case of the parties that the trees standing on the land in 1932 were such trees as of guavas and peaches. They could not, therefore, in law, constitute a grove. The land would also not on the same ground be a grove land. The finding of the revenue courts that it was a grove land in 1932 is thus patently erroneous. The entire judgments of revenue courts are based on this finding. Once this finding goes, the judgments become without any basis, and it becomes necessary that the revenue courts should decide the suit afresh in accordance with law. 8. The learned Single Judge further came to the conclusion that it was not pleaded that there was a grove in existence in 1939 when the U.P. Tenancy Act came into force. He also observed that there was no material on record to establish the fact that there was a grove in 1939. In our opinion, it is not possible to arrive at this finding in these proceedings, particularly when the plaint has not been filed and when the entire material that was in dispute has not been brought up in these proceedings. It is appropriate that the finding whether there did or did not exist a grove on this land and this plot constituted a grove land in 1939 must be arrived at by the revenue courts themselves. This will of course be if the point has been pleaded and arises on the pleadings in the suit. 9. For deciding the question whether a grove existed or not it would be relevant to refer to the definition of grove land as contained in the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939. The definition as given in 1926 has been maintained, but the explanation have been omitted. 9. For deciding the question whether a grove existed or not it would be relevant to refer to the definition of grove land as contained in the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939. The definition as given in 1926 has been maintained, but the explanation have been omitted. It has been contended before us, and we think rightly, that the trees of the nature of peaches or guavas which did not constitute a grove under the 1926 Act definition may constitute a grove under the 1939 Act definition provided the other conditions are fulfilled, i.e., the land is precluded from being available for cultivation because of the existence of the large number of trees on the land. 10. Only on the relevant findings arrived at by the revenue courts it can be possible for the revenue courts or even for this Court to decide as to whether the suit would continue or abate under Rule 39 of the U.P. Urban Area Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules. In case the revenue court, viz., the Board of Revenue comes to the conclusion that the status of the defendant on the date of vesting under the U.P. Urban Area Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was that of a non-occupancy tenant of the land in dispute, the suit will be decided on merits. If they come to the conclusion that the status of the defendant on that date was not of a non-occupancy tenant, the suit will have to stand abated. 11. We are confident that the Board of Revenue will not deny to the parties the right to raise all the contentions which they wish to raise in support of their pleas. The case will naturally be confined to the pleadings of the parties. In the result, we allow the appeal, modify the order of the learned Single Judge and quash the order of the Board of Revenue and direct it to decide the appeal in accordance with law in the light of the observations made above. In the circumstances of the case, parties will bear their own costs.