JUDGMENT (1.) THIS appeal is from judgment of Amaresh Chandra Roy, J by which he reversed the decision of the trial court and decreed a suit for eviction. (2.) THE appellant, was a tenant in respect of one room on. the ground floor of premises No. 54, Upper Chitpur read, Calcutta, under the predecessor in-interest of the present responded paying a monthly rent of Rs. 10/- The tenancy was determined by a notice (Ext. 6) dated the 10th June, 1964 asking the tenant to vacate the premises in dispute on the expiry of July 31, 1964. The notice which is described as a combined notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and Section 13 (6) of the West Bengal Premises. Tenancy Act, 1956 also stated that in. default of compliance the landlord would institute a suit for ejectment on two grounds, namely, (1) that the room in question was reasonably required by the landlord for the accommodation of his Durwan, and (2) that the tenant, was guilty of conduct which amounted to nuisance and caused annoyance to the neighbours including the landlord. The suit out of which this appeal arise was instituted in the City Civil Court at; Calcutta on September 5, 1964. In the plaint ejectment of the tenant defendant was sought on the following grounds: (a) that the room in the tenant's possession was reasonably required by (the plaintiff for occupation of his Durwan and for the purpose of a dispensary and druggist shop no be opened by the plaintiff's son and also for the purpose of building and re-building; it was stated that the plan for the aforesaid purpose of building and re-building "has been duly approved by Corporation of Calcutta". (b) that the defendant was guilty of conduct which was a nuisance and caused annoyance to the neighbours including the plaintiff. At the hearing of the suit how ever the only ground that was pressed was that the plaintiff required the room in dispute for building and re building. To prove his case the plain tiff examined, besides himself, P.W. 3 Dharamdas Banerjee and P.W. 5 Mahesh prosad Khetri the elder brother of the plaintiff. It is not necessary for the purpose of this appeal to refer to the evidence of P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 who were also examined on behalf of the plaintiff. To prove his case the plain tiff examined, besides himself, P.W. 3 Dharamdas Banerjee and P.W. 5 Mahesh prosad Khetri the elder brother of the plaintiff. It is not necessary for the purpose of this appeal to refer to the evidence of P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 who were also examined on behalf of the plaintiff. The defendant examined him self as D. W. 2 and a consulting engineer Dinesh Chandra Banerjee who deposed as D. W. 1. (3.) THE trial court relying on the evidence adduced in behalf of the plaintiff found that the plaintiff reason ably required the disputed premises for building and re-building but dismissed the suit on the view that the suit was not maintainable at the instance of the plaintiff alone. Amaresh Chandra Roy, J. affirmed the finding of the trial court on the question of reasonable requirement but held differing from the trial court that the plaintiff alone was competent to institute the suit and passed a decree for ejectment against the defendant. (4.) THERE is one aspect of the case which does not appear to have been noticed by either court. I have refer red to the grounds of ejectment mentioned in the notice to quit and in the plaint. The grounds stated in the plaint included in addition to those mentioned in the notice of ejectment the ground of building and re-building. At the hearing of the suit no other ground was pressed except the ground of building and re-building which did not find a place in the notice of ejectment and the suit was ultimately decreed on this ground. It is true that it was not necessary to state in the notice the grounds on which ejectment of the defendant was sought but as the landlord chose to mention several grounds therein, the fact that at the trial he relied on a ground not included in the notice is a circumstance which cannot be over looked. It is true that it was not necessary to state in the notice the grounds on which ejectment of the defendant was sought but as the landlord chose to mention several grounds therein, the fact that at the trial he relied on a ground not included in the notice is a circumstance which cannot be over looked. The law does not require grounds of ejectment to be stated either in the notice to quit or in the notice under S. 13 (6) of the West Bengal premises Tenancy Act but where a landlord proposes to institute a suit for ejectment on grounds which he specifies in the notice, his conduct, if at the trial of the suit he seeks to proceed on a new and different ground, would be a relevant consideration in judging the truth or reasonableness of his case. If the plaintiff's case is true then it was known in March 1964 when the plain tiff's engineer had inspected the house that the condition of the building was bad and it required reconstruction. It is not easy to understand therefore why the notice of ejectment which is dated June 10, 1960 should not contain this ground though it sets out several other grounds on which the plaintiff proposed to evict the defendant. The omission in the aforesaid circumstances has a bearing on the question of the truth or reasonableness of the plaintiff's case. The view we take on this point appears to similar to be that taken by Murari Mohan Dutt, J. in the case of Ghaffar haji Shakoor v. Sm. M. Sated, reported in 77 C.W.N. 648. The trial court and Amaresh Roy, J. both relied on the evidence adduced on behalf of the plaintiff as to the condition of the building. The plaintiff (P. W. 4) stated that the house was very old and would collapse if the work of building and re-building as proposed was not carried out. He added that the room in question would not exist if the house was rebuilt. P. W. 3 Dharamdas Banerjee the only other witness for the plaintiff who spoke about the condition of the building stated that the plan (Ext. 2) showing the proposed additions and alterations to the exist ing structure was prepared by his father a building engineer. He added that the room in question would not exist if the house was rebuilt. P. W. 3 Dharamdas Banerjee the only other witness for the plaintiff who spoke about the condition of the building stated that the plan (Ext. 2) showing the proposed additions and alterations to the exist ing structure was prepared by his father a building engineer. The evidence of P.W. 3 is that he accompanied his father when the latter went to inspect the house and assisted him by taking measurements and preparing a sketch, plan the evidence of this witness is that the house was old and dilapidated that in roof of the disputed room had crack and the beems had become bent. The witness however added that the work of reconstruction might be possible even without demolishing the room but 11 that event another room on the ground I floor would have to be demolishes. According to this witness the two walls of the disputed room must in any event be replaced by new bricks and the roof would have to be demolished also As against this evidence the defendant (D.W. 2) stated that the room was in good condition and had been record structed a new" D.W. 1 Dinesh Chandi a Banerjee, a consulting engineer, in his evidence said that the "building require repairs" but "no repair is necessary" in respect of the portion occupied by the defendant. This witness corroborates the defendant that the disputed room had been recently repaired. It appears that the witness also prepared a report of inspection which is Ext. B. As stated already, the trial court and Amaresh Roy, J. both relied on the witnesses for the plaintiff on the condition of the building in preference to the evidence of the defendant or his engineer. Neither the trial court nor Amaresh Roy, J. however took rote of certain relevant circumstances having a bearing on this question. It is not easy to see how P.W. 3 could be taken as a witness competent to speak about the condition of the building. The house was inspected by his father who was a building engineer. The witness only assisted his father in taking measurements and preparing a sketch plan which of course was approved by his father. It is not easy to see how P.W. 3 could be taken as a witness competent to speak about the condition of the building. The house was inspected by his father who was a building engineer. The witness only assisted his father in taking measurements and preparing a sketch plan which of course was approved by his father. The witness apparently accompanied his father to the premises in dispute not to study the condition of the building so much as to take measurements and prepare the sketch plan. It is not clear to us how he could remember all the details regarding the condition of the building after such a long lapse of time. Incidentally, the judgment of the trial court contains an observation that the plaintiff's case of reasonable requirement for building and rebuilding had not been seriously challenged. But this observation does not seem to be correct in view of the evidence adduced on behalf of the defendant to which I have referred above. (5.) ANOTHER aspect of the case which seems to have been overlooked is a palpably incorrect statement made in the plaint. It is stated in paragraph 4 of the plaint that the plan showing the proposed additions and alterations had been duly approved by the Corporation of Calcutta. The plaint was filed on September 5, 1964. It appears from the record that plan was approved by the standing Building committee on March 2, 1965 and it was sanctioned on August 10, 1965, long after the issued had been framed in the suit. (6.) TAKING all the relevant circum stances into consideration, some of which, has indicated above have, been over looked by the trial court and the learned judge who heard the appeal, we are of opinion that the plaintiff has not succeeded in proving that the room in dispute is reasonably required for the purpose of building and re-building; the evidence adduced on behalf of the plaintiff does not seem to us to be satisfactory or convincing. Mr. Banerjee, learned Advocate for the appellant, also contended that the suit was not maintainable at the in stance of the plaintiff alone. It has already been stated that the trial court had dismissed the suit on this ground. The question arises on these facts. Mr. Banerjee, learned Advocate for the appellant, also contended that the suit was not maintainable at the in stance of the plaintiff alone. It has already been stated that the trial court had dismissed the suit on this ground. The question arises on these facts. In the plaint the plaintiff claimed that he was the owner of premises No. 54, Upper Chitpur Road, in which the room in question is located. The plaintiff de posing as 'p. W. 4 repeated this claim in his examination-in-chief. On cross examination he said that the property was the self-acquired property of his father and he got it on amicable partition among the co-sharers. Then he was re-examined and in answer to a question put to him in re-examination he said that his "branch of the family" got the property on partition. He had stated earlier that his branch of the family consisted of himself and his sons constituting a joint family. Subsequently the witness sought to explain the case that he made in the plaint and also in examination-in-chief that he was the owner of the building by saying that by the word 'owner' he meant that he was the Karta of his branch of the joint family. This explanation does not appear to be at all convincing. That the plaintiff was not the sole owner but he got the property along with his sons on partition would also appear from the evidence of his elder brother P.W. 5. It has been found, however, that since 1948 the defendant was paying rent to the plaintiff clone and as such the defendant is estopped from questioning his landlord's title to the property. Also it is not necessary that the plain tiff must be the owner of the premises in order to be entitled to a decree on the ground of building and re-building. No question as to the maintainability of the suit, therefore, really arises. But this aspect of the case seems to have a bearing on the question of the bonafides of the plaintiff and the reasonableness of his claim. The plan (Ext. 2) shows that the house is entirely to be rebuilt. The plaintiff who was only a co-sharer had apparently not right to make such wholesale alterations in the existing structure unless he was doing so on behalf of or with the concurrence of the other co-sharers. The plan (Ext. 2) shows that the house is entirely to be rebuilt. The plaintiff who was only a co-sharer had apparently not right to make such wholesale alterations in the existing structure unless he was doing so on behalf of or with the concurrence of the other co-sharers. There is no such evidence the plaintiff died during the pendency of the appeal in this Court and was substituted by his heirs and legal representatives, the present respondents. The fact that his heirs who hove been substituted on his death during the pendency of this appeal have been defending the appeal does not make up for the absence of evidence that the original plaintiff proposed to reconstruct the building on their behalf or with their concurrence. For the reasons stated above the appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree passed by Amaresh Roy, J. are set aside, and the suit for ejectment dismissed. In the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs.