J. B. MEHTA, S. H. SHETH, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner who is a registered voter in the village Khad-Khambhalia challenges in this petition the notification issued on September 27 1971 under sec. 20 (1) of the Gujarat Panchayats Act 1961 hereinafter referred to as the Act by the competent authority dividing this Gram into three election wards and distributing three seats to each ward. The Khad-khambhalia Gram Panchayat originally consisted of four villages Khad-khambhalia Nava Dhunia Khatia and Rakka. From the inception of the Group Gram Panchayat in 1952 election was always uncontested and its 11 seats at that time had been divided as under:- Khad-khambhalia -6 Khatia -2 Nava Dhunia -1 Rakka -2 thus as against 6 seats for Khad-khambhalia Nava Dhunia had only one seat for all these 18 to 20 years. The old Gram Panchayat had passed unanimous resolution to have separate Panchayats for all the four villages. However the State Government under sec. 9 of the Act gave separate Panchayats by constituting only Khatia and Rakka as new Grams while Nava Dhunia still remained joint with Khad-khambhalia. Nava Dhunia therefore did not get independent Panchayat and it was therefore given at the time of constituting these election wards a separate ward. The new Gram was divided into three election wards of which 6 seats in the first-two wards were given under the impugned notification to the village Khad-khambhalia while the remaining three seats were given to Nava Dhunia which was constituted into a separate ward. In each ward there was a reserved seat. There was one reserved seat for women and one was scheduled caste seat in the two wards in Khad-khambhalia while the remaining woman seat was reserved in the ward of Nava Dhunia village. As regards the voters strength the population of the village Khadkhambhalia of 1139 souls was divided into first and second ward respectively with 324 and 267 voters; while the population of 241 souls of Nava Dhunia was given ward No. 3 with its 145 voters. The petitioner therefore challenges this impugned notification on the ground that it hits the rocognised principle of one person one vote and thereby denies equal voting power to the Khad-khambhalia voters by giving almost double weightage to these voters of Nava Dhunia village. The petitioner has not only challenged the notification but he challenges even sec. The petitioner therefore challenges this impugned notification on the ground that it hits the rocognised principle of one person one vote and thereby denies equal voting power to the Khad-khambhalia voters by giving almost double weightage to these voters of Nava Dhunia village. The petitioner has not only challenged the notification but he challenges even sec. 20 (1) itself on the ground that it confers arbitrary and unguided power and that there is no provision for giving any opportunity of hearing and that therefore it is ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution. The Taluka Development Officer has in his affidavit pointed out that a meeting of the village people of both the villages was called on July 8 1971 where the representatives mentioned therein who were the leaders of the two respective villages had after due consideration decided upon the formation of three wards after considering the population figures as per the relevant Census report. These wards were thus agreed upon after detailed discussion in the presence of the respective leaders of the villages and even one seat which was reserved in each ward was agreed upon. A report to that effect was submitted on August 4 1971 by the Taluka Panchayat to the District Collector stating that looking to the social and economic backwardness of the village Nava Dhunia separate ward should be given to that village. It was also stated in the report that distance from Nava Dhunia to Khad-khambhalia was more than 4 miles and that fact should be borne in mind. It was also pointed out that since establishment of the Panchayati Raj village Nava Dhunia was under joint Panchayat and that there was no voice of that village as the entire administration was carried out by Khad-khambhalia which was in majority. The two villages were already separate viz. Khatia and Rakka and on getting independent Panchayat they had now got minimum 9 seats each whereas this village Nava Dhunia was getting only two seats on account of the fact that it was backward and because its population had decreased. The two villages were already separate viz. Khatia and Rakka and on getting independent Panchayat they had now got minimum 9 seats each whereas this village Nava Dhunia was getting only two seats on account of the fact that it was backward and because its population had decreased. It was also observed in the report that giving only two seats to Nava Dhunia would result in injustice and it was therefore necessary that independent ward of 3 seats should be given to Nava Dhunia if not an independent panchayat so that proper representation can be given to this village which was socially and economically backward. Therefore even though population principle has been substantially borne in mind that being not the only criterion those historical facts were duly taken into account to give 3 seats by a separate ward to this village Nava Dhunia as per the relevant Government circular of August 18 1962 which was annexed and which lays down guide-lines in this connection. ( 2 ) MR. Mehta has raised two points in this petition : (1) That sec. 20 (1) is ultra vires Article 14 as it confers arbitrary and uncanalised power and as no opportunity of hearing is provided therein before rights of the concerned voters are sought to be affected while notifying various election wards. (2) That in any event the impugned notification violates the recognised principle of one person one vote and thereby denies equal treatment to all the voters by giving almost double weightage to the voters of the village Nava Dhunia as compared to the voters of the village Khad-khambhalia and therefore in any event the notification must be struck down under Article 14. ( 3 ) AS regards the first question an identical question has been concluded by the Division Bench in consisting of the learned Chief Justice and P. D. Desai J. in the decision in Sp. C. A. No. 465 of 1971 dated July 26 1971 (Vaikunthbhai Bhupatbhai Shastri v. State of Gujarat) in the context of sec. 452a of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act as amended by the 1970 amendment. C. A. No. 465 of 1971 dated July 26 1971 (Vaikunthbhai Bhupatbhai Shastri v. State of Gujarat) in the context of sec. 452a of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act as amended by the 1970 amendment. The learned Chief Justice speaking for the Division Bench vehemently relied upon the decision in Jyoti Prasad v. Union Territory of Delhi A. I. R. 1961 S. C. 1602 and pointed out that it was not essential for the legislation to comply with the rule as to equal protection that the rules for the guidance of the designated authority which is to exercise the power or which is vested with the discretion should be laid down in express terms in the statutory provision itself. Such guide-lines may be gathered from the Circumstances that led to the enactment of the law in question. That is the mischief that was intended to be remedied the preamble of the Act its scheme and provisions and even from surrounding circumstances and other well-known facts which may be brought to the notice of the Court. In the context of sec. 452 (1) in question the learned Chief Justice pointed out that the object of that provision was to give representation to the newly included areas of the Corporation and two modes were provided for giving such representation. If the mode of election is adopted there could be no doubt that the number of additional members to be elected from the included area must be proportionate to the population of such area. It was an elementary requirement of the principle underlying representation by elective process that each voter should have an effective vote and his vote should be worth as much as anothers. That principle has been judicially recognised by the United States Supreme Court in several decisions commencing from Wesberry v. Sanders 376 U. S. 1: 11 L. Ed. (Second Edition) 481 and there was no reason why it should not be accepted as a valid principle by our Courts. ( 4 ) IT is in fact a concommitant of the equality clause which forms the bed-rock of the great principle of rule of law enshrined in our Constitution. Even apart from the high policy of Constitutional law it is difficult to see how a really representative body can be constituted by elective process unless every vote is given the same weight as any other. Even apart from the high policy of Constitutional law it is difficult to see how a really representative body can be constituted by elective process unless every vote is given the same weight as any other. This requirement of the elective process necessarily involves acceptance of the principle that representation must be proportionate to the strength of the electorate subject of course to any reservations which may have to be made in order to protect the interests of the weaker sections of the community. The number of additional counselors to be elected to represent the included areas which is required to be fixed on the basis of this objective standard would have to be proportionate to the strength of voters in such area. The learned Chief Justice further pointed out in the context of that section that the mode of appointment which was provided in that enactment being alternative to the mode of election and the object of both being to give representation to the included area it was apparent that the same principle must also guide the fixation of the number of additional members for purpose of appointment. Therefore it was held that there were guide-lines provided by the Legislature to the State Government in fixing the number of additional members from the area included. Even the power to select persons to be appointed as additional members was not held to be unguided or unregulated power. The Legislature had provided in the enactment for both the modes of giving the representation by election and by appointment and had left it to the State Government to determine which should be adopted having regard to the exigencies of the situation and the object of the section namely to give proper and effective representation to the included area. Such discretion could not be held to be unguided or unregulated discretion as it had to be exercised for the purpose of effectuating the object of the statutory provision and the State Government in making its choice between the two modes of giving representation would have to be guided by the principle that it must so act as to give the most effective representation to the included area in the circumstances of the case. The State Government would have to ask itself the question what in the circumstances of the case would be the most effective mode of giving representation ? The State Government would have to ask itself the question what in the circumstances of the case would be the most effective mode of giving representation ? That would guide and control the discretion of the State Government. In view of this settled principle we would have to consider the vires of the present section. ( 5 ) AT this stage we would consider the relevant scheme of our Act. The preamble provides that it is an Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to village panchayats and district local boards in the State of Gujarat with a view to reorganise the administration pertaining to local Government in furtherance of the object of the democratic decentralisation of powers in favour of different classes of panchayats. In sec. 2 (23) population is defined as in relation to gram nagar taluka or district to mean the population thereof as ascertained at the last preceding census. Chapter II provides for establishment of panchayats of three different tiers viz. Gram Panchayat Taluka Panchayat and District Panchayat. Sec. 8 provides for subordination of Panchayats amongst themselves and their powers functions and duties. Sec. 8 (3) in terms provides that subject to the control of the State Government and the competent authority- (a) a gram panchayat shall be subordinate to the Taluka panchayat and the District Panchayat. . . Sec. 11 (1) provides for the Panchayat organisation and the exercise of control over Panchayats by State Government. Sub-sec. (2) provides that the State Government shall exercise its control over the panchayats either directly or through such officer or officers as it may by general or special order appoint for the purpose. Sec. 9 (1) provides that after making such inquiries as may be prescribed the State Government may by notification in the official Gazette declare any local area comprising of a revenue village or a group of revenue villages or hamlets forming part of a revenue village or such other administrative unit or part thereof. . . . . (b) to be a gram if the population of such local area does not exceed 10 0 Sec. 9 (2) provides that after consultation with the Taluka Panchayat the District Panchayat and the nagar or gram panchayat concerned the State Government may by like notification at any time declare the limits of gram by including or excluding from any nagar or gram any local area therefrom. Sec. 12 (1) provides that a Gram Panchayat shall subject to the provisions of sub-sec. (3) consist of such number of members not less than 9 and not more than 15 as the district panchayat may determine elected from. amongst the qualified voters of the gram. Sec. 12 (3) provides that out of the seats of members to be determined under sub-sec. (1) :- (a) two seats shall be reserved for women and (b) one more seat or in the case of any gram if the State Government having regard to the population of Scheduled castes in the gram specifies more seats in this behalf the seats so specified shall be reserved for Scheduled castes. . . Therefore under sec. 12 (1) the numbers of members of the Gram Panchayat is to be fixed by the District Panchayat between these two limits of 9 and 15 for every Gram Panchayat from amongst the qualified voters of the Gram. Out of these seats two seats have to be reserved for women under sec. 12 (3) (a) and one more for scheduled castes or scheduled tribes. Accordingly 9 minimum seats have been notified for this Gram Panchayat which includes 3 reserved seats as aforesaid. At this stage it may be noted that so far as the Scheduled caste or Scheduled tribes reservation is concerned under sec. 12 (3) (b) and (c) the population basis has been in terms mentioned in this relevant provision as per the guide-lines given by the statute. Then comes the relevant provision in sec. 20 (1) which runs as under :"for the purposes of election to a gram panchayat and a nagar panchayat each gram and nagar shall be divided into wards. The number of wards and the number of members to be elected from each ward shall be such as the competent authority may determine. "this sec. 20 (1) is challenged as ultra vires on the ground that for delimitation of the electoral divisions the section has conferred arbitrary power on the competent authority without any guide-lines. Applying the ratio laid down by the learned Chief Justice in the aforesaid decision even though guide-lines are not express they are obviously to be implied looking to the salutary object of sec. 20 (1) read with sec. 12 (1) of giving representation by resorting to elective process. Applying the ratio laid down by the learned Chief Justice in the aforesaid decision even though guide-lines are not express they are obviously to be implied looking to the salutary object of sec. 20 (1) read with sec. 12 (1) of giving representation by resorting to elective process. Such a representative local self-Government unit when it is required to be constituted by elective process the provision of elective process itself necessarily involves acceptance of the principle that representation must be proportional to the strength of the electorate subject of-course to any reservation which has to be made to protect the interests of the weaker sections of the community. Therefore the guide-line is implicit that in such elective process each voter must have on effective vote so that his vote should be worth as much as anothers so that there would be equal voting capacity of all the voters in this gram area constituting a local self-Government unit. This principle would have to be followed as a necessary guide-line looking to the scheme and object of this provision of giving representation to this population in this Panchayat unit by an elective process. The Act really brings democracy to the doors of the village people. As pointed out in the preamble a large measure of democratic decentralisation of power had been sought to be achieved in favour of these Panchayats so that the Panchayat administration serves as a primary school of democracy by training people in a democratic way of life and giving them an opportunity to participate effectively in the local self-Government. Therefore according to this salutary purpose the guide-line of one person one vote which is the most effective mode of giving representation to the electorate would surely guide and control the discretion of the competent authority. Such power therefore could never be said to be arbitrary and unguided but it is a power which has to be exercised as per the legislative mandate which is implicit in these provisions. If the competent authority takes into consideration any extraneous or irrelevant factor which defeats this salutary purpose and does not fix electoral wards in accordance with the statutory guide-lines the determination of the competent authority would be ultra vires the plain mandate of this provision of sec. 20 (1) and would be subject to the writ jurisdiction of this Court. ( 6 ) MR. 20 (1) and would be subject to the writ jurisdiction of this Court. ( 6 ) MR. Mehta however vehemently argued that there is no provision providing any opportunity to be heard. Mr. Mehta ignores the fundamental principle that an opportunity of hearing in accordance with the principles of natural justice is the requirement of exercise of a quasijudicial power. Even in administrative power if a decision is to be reached to the prejudice of the person affected or so as to impose on him serious civil or penal consequences such a decision-making function would have to be exercised in accordance with the principles of natural justice. However it could never apply when there is no decision-making function at all so as to affect any individual right. The power of the competent authority is a statutory power which has to be exercised as per the statutory guide-lines so that the constituency can vote as required by the Act at the relevant statutory election. In such a function which is not a decision-making function there would be no question of any requirement of principles of natural justice. Therefore on that score sec. 20 (1) could never be attacked. Therefore the vires of this provision in sec. 20 (1) could never be attacked on the ground that it is hit by Article 14. Equal treatment to the voters is implicit in the relevant guidelines and therefore the first ground raised by Mr. Mehta must obviously fail. ( 7 ) AS regards the second question the material question which would arise is whether there can be a permissible deviation from the aforesaid recognised standard which is to be followed in any elective process as far as it is possible. Any deviation would have to be justified as per the constitutional provision. In the present case Mr. Mehta pointed out that the total population of 1380 souls of this group village in question had got 9 seats so that there was one seat for a population of 153 souls. On that basis Nava Dhunia which has population of 241 would get only two seats including the reserved seat and the remaining seven seats should have gone to Khad-Khambhalia which has population of 1139. Even on the basis of 736 total voters if these nine seats were to be distributed the ratio would be of 83 voters per seat. On that basis Nava Dhunia which has population of 241 would get only two seats including the reserved seat and the remaining seven seats should have gone to Khad-Khambhalia which has population of 1139. Even on the basis of 736 total voters if these nine seats were to be distributed the ratio would be of 83 voters per seat. Therefore 145 voters in Nava Dhunia would be entitled to get two seats out of nine; while 591 voters of Khad-khambhalia would be entitled to get seven seats. Mr. Mehta therefore argued that the competent authority having allotted 3 seats to Nava Dhunia including reserved seat gave almost a double weightage to Nava Dhunia voters. Mr. Mehta also supported his plea of prejudicial treatment of the voters of Khad-khambhalia by the alternative calculation submitted by him on the basis of taking into consideration six general seats only in relation to the total number of population and total number of voters as well. The same result is reached even on the basis of this alternative calculation. Therefore it is not necessary in the present case to resolve the wider controversy as to how this ratio has to be worked out whether by excluding the reserved seats and whether the ratio has to be applied to the population figure or the voters figure. In any event if the rule of one person-one vote is to be strictly followed Nava Dhunia could not be given separate ward of three seats as on the aforesaid mathematical rule of uniformity Nava Dhunia would be entitled to two seats only as against 7 seats which would go to Khadkhambhalia. The State Government therefore justified deviation on the ground not only of mere history but on the substantial legitimate ground that the peculiar circumstances and facts of this case justify this departure if the salutary purpose of effective representation was to be secured to all the voters concerned. Therefore the first question which has to be resolved is whether any such deviation can be constitutionally allowed. Mr. Mehta in this connection vehemently relied upon the decision in Reynolds v. Sims 377 U. S. 533-12 L. Ed. 2nd 506. Therefore the first question which has to be resolved is whether any such deviation can be constitutionally allowed. Mr. Mehta in this connection vehemently relied upon the decision in Reynolds v. Sims 377 U. S. 533-12 L. Ed. 2nd 506. At page 536 Chief Justice Warren speaking for the majority in terms pointed out that if appointment of seats was not on the equal population principle that would not necessarily mean that such a plan was irrational or involved something other than a republican form of government. Such a plan was impermissible for the States under the Equal Protection Clause since perforce resulting in virtually every case in submergence of the equal-population principle. At page 537 the learned Chief Justice further pointed out that history indicated however that many States had deviated to a greater or lesser degree from the equal protection principle in the apportionment of seats in at least one house of their legislatures. So long as the divergences from a strict population standard were based on legitimate considerations incidental to the effectuation of a rational State policy some deviations from the equal-population principle are constitutionally permissible with respect to the apportionment of seats in either or both of the two houses of a bicameral state legislature. But neither history alone nor economic or other sorts of group interests are permissible factors in attempting to justify disparities from population based representation. Considerations of area alone provide an insufficient justification for deviations from the equal population principle. Again people not land or trees or pastures vote. Modern developments and improvements in transportation and communications made rather hollow in the mid-1960s most claims that deviations from population-based representation can validly be based solely on geographical considerations. At page 534 the learned Chief Justice had pointed out that federal analogy was inapplicable as a sustaining precedent for state legislative apportionments. It is one conceived out of compromise and concession indispensable to the establishment of a federal republic. At page 534 the learned Chief Justice had pointed out that federal analogy was inapplicable as a sustaining precedent for state legislative apportionments. It is one conceived out of compromise and concession indispensable to the establishment of a federal republic. Even in the latest decision in Hadley v. Junior College District A. I. R. 1971 U. S. S. C. at page 5 where Black J. delivered majority opinion extending the principle of one person one vote to even a junior Collegeate District where trustees are to be elected by an elective process it was in terms pointed out at page 6 that as a general rule whenever a state or local Government decides to select persons by popular election to perform Governmental functions the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required that each qualified voter must be given an equal opportunity to participate in that election and when members of an elected body were chosen from separate districts each district must be established on a basis which would ensure as far as is practicable that equal number of voters could vote for proportionally equal numbers of officials. At page 7 it was further pointed out that mathematical exactitude was not required but a plan that did not automatically discriminate in favour of certain districts was the material requirement. Further proceeding Black J. in terms pointed out :in holding that the guarantee of equal voting strength for each voter applied in all elections of governmental officials we do not feel that the States will be inhibited in finding ways to insure that legitimate political goals of representation are achieved. We have previously upheld against constitutional challenge an election scheme which required that candidates be residents of certain districts which did not contain equal numbers of people. Further illustrations were given where such deviations were held to be justified :viable local governments may need many innovations numerous combinations of old and new devices great flexibility in municipal arrangements to meet changing urban conditions. There was nothing in the constitution to prevent experimentation. A rider was however added that once a state has decided to use the process of popular election and once the class of voters is chosen and their qualifications specified we see no constitutional way by which equality of voting power may be evaded. In the dissenting opinion Mr. Justice Harlan with whom the Chief Justice and Mr. A rider was however added that once a state has decided to use the process of popular election and once the class of voters is chosen and their qualifications specified we see no constitutional way by which equality of voting power may be evaded. In the dissenting opinion Mr. Justice Harlan with whom the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Stewart agreed at page 7 it was pointed out that Reynolds established that rule for the apportionment of state legislatures thereby denying States the right to take into account in the structuring of their legislatures any historical geographical economic or social considerations or any of the other many practical and subtle factors that have always been recognised as playing a legitimate part in the practice of politics. At page 8 it was pointed out that the Courts rule was that one man one vote applied only to local bodies having general governmental powers over the entire geographic area served by the body. Even the majority view had conceded that the States might use means other than apportionment to insure that legitimate political goals of representation were achieved. The minority view than pointed out various reasonable state objectives or important countervailing interests which should not be sacrificed on the alter of numerical equality. At page 9 it was in terms pointed out that where there is participation of smaller and larger school district in the joint formation of a junior college district it represented a pragmatic choice by all concerned from among a number of possible courses of action. Insistence upon a simplistic mathematical formula as the measure of compliance with the Equal Protection Clause in all cases involving the electoral process had resulted in such cases in a total disregard of the salutary purposes underlying the statutory schemes. ( 8 ) MR. Mehta relying on the aforesaid majority view pointed out that mere history or geographical consideration would never be a justifying ground for such a deviation from the normal rule of one person one vote. In the present case however it would be important to consider the relevant historical facts particularly in the context of a village-oriented society so that the legitimate political goal of representation was duly achieved without in any manner sacrificing or submerging the one person one vote principle. In the present case however it would be important to consider the relevant historical facts particularly in the context of a village-oriented society so that the legitimate political goal of representation was duly achieved without in any manner sacrificing or submerging the one person one vote principle. For the last 20 years the old Gram Panchayat was consisting of four villages-Khad-khambhalia Nava Dhunia Khatia and Rakka which had its 11 seats distributed between them as 6: 1: 2 and 2 respectively. The old-Group Gram Panchayat had passed an unanimous resolution to have separate Panchayats for all the four villages. Aspirations of the village people of Khatia and Rakka which had only two seats each out of 11 in the old group Gram Panchayat were fulfilled by having new independent Panchayats as per the population basis. They therefore got instead of 2 9 seats when the new Grams were reconstituted. It is only this Nava Dhunia whose aspirations were roused for an independent Panchayat as per the population vote expressed by unanimous resolution of the old Group Gram Panchayat that could not get independent Panchayat by formation of a separate Gram Panchayat for this different administrative village unit. Therefore when it was made the component of the new Group Gram Panchayat by joining it with Khad-khambhalia once again this village entity which had its own identity and its own aspirations had a rightful grievance and this legitimate grievance had to be considered so that when this union was ordered by the State Government by declaration under sec. 9 it was given an effective representation in the new group Gram Panchayat. That is why even the leaders when they met from the two villages to ascertain the popular wishes in the meeting held on July 7 1971 felt the injustice which would accrue to this Nava Dhunia village if it was not given a separate ward of 3 seats. It did not get an independent Panchayat of 9 members but it was considered just even by the leaders of both the villages that for keeping its proper representation Nava Dhunia must have a separate ward at least of 3 seats. Khad-khambhalia village had even in the older complex only 6 seats as against remaining 5 seats which were with three other component villages. Khad-khambhalia village had even in the older complex only 6 seats as against remaining 5 seats which were with three other component villages. Its representation now in the new group Gram was to remain at the same level of six out of nine seats and that is why these village-leaders agreed by a compromise and concession to meet the aspirations of this smaller component of Nava Dhunia by agreeing to its constitution as a separate ward of three seats. The only concession which was made by the Khad-khambhalia was of one seat which it would have got in addition to its old six seats even when the total number was now only nine. Therefore this effective representation of Khad-Khambhalia which had so substantially increased was not going to be diluted. As for the Nava Dhunia village however it was the question of its identity being completely lost unless it was given some weightage so that its representation would be effective. In the affidavit of the State Government it is also pointed out that the fact was duly taken into account that Nava Dhunia was the village socially and economically backward as compared to Khad-khambhalia and the further fact which was material in this connection was that Nava Dhunia was at a distance of four miles from Khad-khambhalia from where the entire administration of this group gram was carried on. Considering these facts in the setting of our Indian villages where there are no adequate facilities of modern transport even these would be relevant factors. In any event such historical facts by way of inherent dissimilarities existing in the two village entities would in order to implement guarantee of equal voting require additional weightage to be given to the smaller component when it was linked with a larger one. Such considerations which are legitimate and relevant to the effectuation of a rational State policy of giving effective representation by effective participation of the smaller component village people would surely permit a deviation from the normal mathematical rule of one person one vote. We should also keep in mind that our Article 14 does not embrace the wide due process guarantee of the American Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause and it has been interpreted as always justifying on historical ground a prejudicial treatment. We should also keep in mind that our Article 14 does not embrace the wide due process guarantee of the American Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause and it has been interpreted as always justifying on historical ground a prejudicial treatment. In R. L. Wadhwa v. State of Hariyana A. I. R. 1972 S. C. 1982 in the larger bench of seven Judges in the majority Judgment of His Lordship Shelat J. it is in terms pointed out that if through historical reasons the teachers had remained in two separate categories the classification of the provincialised teachers into a separate cadre could not be said to infringe Article 14 or Article 16. It is true that in the minority decision by His Lordship Beg J. at page 2015 it is in terms held that it was not enough to hold that there was in fact a classification of the teachers into two cadres by finding that the two services started dissimilarly continued dissimilarly in any respect or that members of either of the two cadres were for purely historical reasons differently treated in any matter whatsoever in the past. These differences might be very relevant for some purposes. These largely accidental dissimilarities which had almost evaporated and disappeared were put forward only to justify a difference made in the promotional chances of the two cadres. Such difference should never be considered as material so far as the promotion was concerned as the relevant differences for such classification would be those which affect the competence and qualification of a teacher as a teacher as compared with others discharging a highly responsible duty or trust. Therefore it is settled legal position so far as our Article 14 is concerned that such historical background of inherent dissimilarities would surely be the relevant factors as that is the majority view in our country. Besides the guide-line which is furnished by one person one vote rule which is to be applied as far as possible subject to any reservation for weaker section would have to be applied subject to any such permissible constitutional deviations which could be justified by facts and circumstances of any individual case. Besides the guide-line which is furnished by one person one vote rule which is to be applied as far as possible subject to any reservation for weaker section would have to be applied subject to any such permissible constitutional deviations which could be justified by facts and circumstances of any individual case. The guidelines having been evolved to serve the salutary purpose so as to guarantee equal voting power to the voters it is obvious that if deviation has got to be made by competent authority for purpose of giving effective representation to secure effective participation of smaller component village unit and if such power is exercised at an initial stage when such unequal units are joined together so as to ensure co-operation between them the deviation would always be constitutionally permissible. Such a deviation would really make effective the constitutional guarantee of equal voting power as otherwise voice of such small components would not be likely to be felt in the larger whole. Unless it was given some additional weightage its voice would be drowned completely. We can never forget in our Indian society the salient feature of its being village-oriented so that each village retains its identity by which it is animated in all its aspirations. That is why more appropriate would be the federal analogy in such cases where some compromise or concession is inherent in such a situation. In the present case even the village leaders of both the villages had on the earlier occasion in the joint meeting concurred in this plan and therefore when the competent authority issued this relevant notification forming election wards it was merely giving effect to the popular wishes in such way that both the components got the real guarantee of equal voting as far as it was feasible in the peculiar circumstances of the case. Therefore in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case this small deviation by giving one seat to Nava Dhunia village so as to complete it as a separate ward of three minimum seats when its aspirations for an independent Panchayat could not be fulfilled was permissible deviation and there was no violation of equal voting treatment as envisaged in Article 14 in the present case. This was not a case of submergence of the population principle but giving effect to it with a small inconsequential deviation so as to achieve the legitimate political goal of representation of this smaller village component. The State Governments relevant circular which is annexed to the affidavit dated August 18 1962 even adopts population basis as the relevant test for fixing various electoral wards because in Para 4 (i) it is provided that seats should be allotted to the electoral divisions on a population basis. In Para 4 (ii) it is provided that no electoral division should ordinarily have more than four seats and less than three seats. Only in exceptional cases an electoral division may have only one or two seats. That is why in the present case this separate ward with some additional weightage of three minimum seats was rightly given to Nava Dhunia village. Therefore the petitioners attack on the impugned notification on the aforesaid two grounds must obviously fail. In the circumstances it is not necessary to go into the contention of Mr. Dave that without joining the persons affected from Nava Dhunia village such a petition was not legally competent on which we do not express any opinion. ( 9 ) IN the result this petition fails and the rule is discharged with no order as to costs in the circumstances of the case. Petition dismissed. .