JUDGMENT : R.N. Misra, J. - This appeal u/s 417(1), Code of Criminal Procedure at the instance of the State of Orissa is directed against the judgment of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge of Koraput acquitting the two Respondents of charges under Sections 302, 34 and 201 34. Indian Penal Code. 2. The prosecution alleged that during the night of 28-5-1969 one Budra Santa (the deceased) went to watch over his maize field. The next morning (Thursday) as Budra did not return home as usual, his son Kamulu went in search of him to the maize field. He returned weeping and informed the accused Dinu that someone had severed the head of his father from the body and the headless body was lying in the field. The informant (accused Dinu) lodged the F.I.R. after having gone to the field and seen the dead-body. It was alleged that the severed head was not traced. p.w. 7 the Investigating Officer, after recording the F.I.R. came to the spot and started investigation. Upon his preliminary investigation he arrested both the accused persons on 31-5-1969. Accused Dinu, while in custody, gave information about the severed head as also of the axe and led the Investigating Officer and the two witnesses p.ws. 5 and 9 to the places of concealment. The accused persons were sent for recording of their confessional statements. Exts. 5 and 6 are such statements recorded by a Magistrate, First Class (p.w. 3). In due course the accused persons were committed to stand their trial for the two charges referred to above. 3. Both the accused persons pleaded not guilty and retracted from their confessions Exts. 5 and 6. They denied the recoveries of the head of the deceased and the axe on the basis of any disclosure made by them. 4. The prosecution mainly relied on the confessions Exts. 5 and 6, the extra-judicial confession supported by p.ws. 4 and 8, and the discovery of the head of the deceased and the axe (M.O.I.) with the accompanying evidence of p.ws. 1, 5, 7 and 9. The prosecution also relied upon the circumstance that the relationship between the parties was very strained. Most of the witnesses who had implicated the accused persons during investigation or even at the committal enquiry turned hostile. The confessions were branded as the outcome of coercion and pressure of the police. 1, 5, 7 and 9. The prosecution also relied upon the circumstance that the relationship between the parties was very strained. Most of the witnesses who had implicated the accused persons during investigation or even at the committal enquiry turned hostile. The confessions were branded as the outcome of coercion and pressure of the police. Some evidence appeared to show that the place of concealment of the head was known to persons other than the accused. The learned Sessions Judge did not rely upon the discovery as a circumstance against the accused persons because he was of the view that the discovery was tainted being brought about by pressure. Ultimately he recorded a judgment of acquittal. This appeal is directed against the said judgment. 5. The learned Counsel in support of the appeal contended that the view taken by the learned Sessions Judge in regard to recovery of the severed head and M.O.I. is contrary to law. The learned Trial Judge in dealing with this aspect of the matter has said: The prosecution next relies on the recovery of the severed head and the axe (M.O.I.) at the instance of accused Dinu. The witnesses in this respect are p.w. 5 Madhab Sahu alias Choudhury and p.w. 9 Kesu Santa. It may appear from the evidence of p.w. 5 that accused Dinu answered to the question put by the I.O. and that cannot be said to have been in conformity with the provisions u/s 27 of the Evidence Act. The test of admissibility of the confession u/s 27 is 'was the fact discovered by reason of the information and how much of the information was the immediate cause of the fact discovered and as such a relevant fact.' It has been in the evidence of some of the p.ws. as already discussed, that the police tortured both the accused as also the witnesses. The confession u/s 27 of the Evidence Act cannot be taken into consideration unless it is free from any inducement, threat or promise as per the provisions u/s 24 of the Evidence Act. It is clear from p.w. 5 that on the interrogation made by the I.O. accused Dinu made certain statements and the statements obtained in that manner cannot be admissible u/s 27 of the Evidence Act. We agree with the contention raised before us that the approach to the matter is vitiated in law. It is clear from p.w. 5 that on the interrogation made by the I.O. accused Dinu made certain statements and the statements obtained in that manner cannot be admissible u/s 27 of the Evidence Act. We agree with the contention raised before us that the approach to the matter is vitiated in law. It is well settled that Section 27 is indeed an exception to the provisions of Sections 24 to 26 of the Evidence Act. Section 27 is to the following effect: Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered may be proved. Two limitations have been provided for determining how much of the information received from the accused is provable against him: (i) The information must be such as has caused the discovery of the fact; in other words, the fact must be the consequence and the information the cause of the discovery; (ii) The information must relate distinctly to the fact discovered. Both these conditions have to be sissified in order that Section 27 of the Evidence Act may be applied. Again non-voluntariness of the confession or the statement has nothing to do with the discovery of that fact which is relevant. If the information relating to the discovery of a fact is obtained non-voluntarily, what is banned by the section is not discovery of the fact itself but so much of the confession or the statement accompanying the information which is of a confessional nature. Sections 24 to 26 of the Evidence Act ban the receipt of statements amounting to confession because law assumes that in the circumstances indicated in those sections the Statement of the accused would not b a voluntary one. In carving out an exception in Section 27 the voluntariness has been kept out and what is otherwise admissible as a result of Section 27 is not affected by the non-voluntary nature of the statement. The confession or statement accompanying the information which leads to the discovery is kept away. The fact of discovery as a consequence of the information is not affected. Nor has Article 20(3) of the Constitution brought about any change in the position. The confession or statement accompanying the information which leads to the discovery is kept away. The fact of discovery as a consequence of the information is not affected. Nor has Article 20(3) of the Constitution brought about any change in the position. In The State of Bombay Vs. Kathi Kalu Oghad and Others their Lordships of the Supreme Court have laid down: If the self-incriminatory information has been given by an accused person without any threat, that will be admissible in evidence and that will not be hit by the provisions of Clause (3) of Article 20 of the Constitution for the reason that there has been no compulsion. It must, therefore, be held that the provisions of Section 27 of the Evidence Act are not within the prohibition aforesaid, unless compulsion had been used in obtaining the (Self incriminatory) information. The basic theory of relevancy in Section 27 is the discovery of a fact in consequence of information received from the accused while in custody whether obtained voluntarily or non-voluntarily and this of course is quite different from any self incriminatory information by the accused whether given voluntarily or under compulsion. A self incriminatory statement of a confessional nature obtained under compulsion, threat or inducement is also hit by Section 24 of the Evidence Act. The learned Sessions Judge was, therefore, not correct in brushing aside the effect of discovery merely because the confessional statement which contained the information was according to him the outcome of threat, pressure and coercion. The fact of discovery, however, is not enough to establish the prosecution case. 6. As indicated by Sir John Beaumont in Kottaya v. Emperor AIR 1947 P.C. 67 The difficulty, however great, of proving that a fact discovered on information supplied by the accused is a relevant fact can afford no justification for reading into Section 27 something which is not there, and admitting in evidence a confession barred by Section 26. Except in cases in which the possession, or concealment, of an object constitutes the gist of the offence charged, it can seldom happen that information relating to the discovery of a fact forms the foundation of the prosecution case. It is only one link in the chain of proof, and the other links must be forged in manner allowed by law. It is only one link in the chain of proof, and the other links must be forged in manner allowed by law. In this case the learned Sessions Judge has found that the prosecution evidence is not at all acceptable. All the relevant witnesses have turned hostile and they do not support the prosecution case. There is some evidence that even the place of concealment of the head was known to some of the prosecution witnesses. It is difficult in these circumstances to hold that the place of concealment of the head was only within the knowledge of the accused persons and discovery there of had been given by the accused while in custody. 7. The judicial confession has been retracted. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Balbir Singh Vs. State of Punjab have indicated: ...both the confessions were retracted subsequently, and the proper approach in case of this nature is to consider each confession as a whole on its merits and use it against the maker thereof, provided the Court is in a position to come to an unhesitating conclusion that the confession was voluntary and true; and though a retracted confession, if believed to be true and voluntarily made, may form the basis of a conviction, the rule of practice and prodence requires that it should be corroborated by independent evidence. It is unnecessary to consider in this case if the evidence of an accomplice stands on better, equal or worse footing than a retracted confession; nor need we consider the question of the nature and extent of corroboration necessary for the evidence of an accomplice. In this case, the main points for consideration were (a) whether the confession of the Appellant was voluntary, (b) whether it was true, and (c) what independent corroboration was furnished by the other evidence on the record. On a discussion of the entire evidence the learned trial Judge has come to the conclusion that the police had coerced the accused as also the witness. According to the learned Sessions Judge the confessions were not voluntary. We are not prepared to take a different view on reading the evidence. Therefore, the prosecution would not be entitled to make use of the involuntary statements. 8. The extra-judicial confession has also been discarded by the trial Court. According to the learned Sessions Judge the confessions were not voluntary. We are not prepared to take a different view on reading the evidence. Therefore, the prosecution would not be entitled to make use of the involuntary statements. 8. The extra-judicial confession has also been discarded by the trial Court. The witnesses who according to the prosecution this part of its case have not testified in Court at the trial in support of such confession by the accused before them. The learned Sessions Judge has found even in the original statements which were supporting the prosecution to be contradictory so far as the extra-judicial confession is concerned. 9. Strained relationship is certainly a circumstance, but it also is one which provides the motive for implicating a person in a false charge. While it could provide the motive for the offence very often also it provides the motive for implication. In the circumstances bad blood between the two parties cannot be given undue emphasis. 10. Once the confession are ruled out, the extra-judicial confession is discarded and the prosecution is found not entitled to rely upon the discovery, the prosecution case must indeed stand rejected as has been done by the learned Trial Judge. We see no merit in the appeal. It is accordingly dismissed and the acquittal is sustained. B.K. Ray, J. 11. I agree.