Patna Tyres Dealers Association v. District Magistrate
1973-02-07
S.N.P.SINGH, SHIVESHWAR PRASAD SINHA
body1973
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment S.N.P.Singh, J. 1. These two writ applications have been heard together ,as common questions of fact and law are involved in them and they are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. In C. W. J. C. No. 1722 of 1971 petitioner No. 1 is Patna Tyre Dealers Association and petitioners 2 to 5 are the office-bearers of the said Association. Petitioners 2 to 5 are also individual dealers in tyres having their business in Patna. In C. W. J. C. No. 46 of 1972 the three petitioners are the truck owners. The petitioners of C. W. J. C. No. 1722 of 1971 had initially challenged the validity of the orders of the District Magistrate, Patna, dated the 20th of February, 1971 (Annexure 1); dated the 9th July. 1971 (Annexure 2) and dated the 13th of December, 1971 (Annexure 4). They had also challenged the validity of the order of the State Government dated the 6th of December 1971 (Annexure 5). In C. W. J. C. No. 46 of 1972 the petitioners had only challenged the validity of the order of the State Government dated the 6th of December. 1971 a copy whereof has been made Annexure 1 to that writ application. It appears that the Government subsequently modified the order dated the 6th of December, 1971 by an order dated the 17th of March, 1972 a copy whereof has been made Annexure 17 to the reply filed by the petitioners to the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in C.W.J.C. No. 1722 of 1971. At the time of the hearing of these two writ applications only the validity of the order of the State Government dated the 17th of March. 1972, as contained in Annexure 17 read with the order of the State Government dated the 6th of December, 1971 (Annexure 5 to C. W. J. C. No. 1722 of 1971 and Annexure 1 to C.W.J.C. No. 46 of 1972) was challenged. 3. In exercise of the powers conferred by Sec. 5 of the Essential Commodities Act. 1955 (Act 10 of 1955) hereinafter to be called "the Act", the Central Government by Notification No S. O. 1844 dated the 18th of June. 1966, delegated the powers to the State Government to make orders under Sec.3 (1) of the Act to provide for the matters specified in Clauses (d). (e).
1955 (Act 10 of 1955) hereinafter to be called "the Act", the Central Government by Notification No S. O. 1844 dated the 18th of June. 1966, delegated the powers to the State Government to make orders under Sec.3 (1) of the Act to provide for the matters specified in Clauses (d). (e). (f), (a), (h), (i), (ii) and (j) of Sub-section (2) thereof in relation to all the commodities other than foodstuffs and fertilisers on certain conditions. The Governor of Bihar in exercise of the powers conferred by Sec.3 of the Act read with the order of the Government of India in the Ministry of Commerce published under Notification No. S. O. 1844 dated the 18th of June. 1966, and with the prior concurrence of the Government of India made the Bihar Essential Commodities--other than foodgrains--Prices and Stocks (Display and Control) Order, 1967 (hereinafter to be called "the Control Order") by Notification No. G.S.R. 1. dated the 20th of January, 1967 published in the Bihar Gazette Extraordinary dated the 2nd of March. 1967. By that Control Order certain commodities were placed in Schedule I and certain commodit es were placed in Schedule II. By Notification No. S.O. 2878, dated the 22nd of August. 1968. the Central Government in exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-clause (xi) of Clause (a) of Sec.2 of the Act declared "Tyres and tubes of cars and tractors" as an essential commodity for the purposes of the said Act (vide Annexure C to the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in C.WJ.C. No, 1722 of 1971). By Notification No. S.O. 85. dated the 3rd of January. 1969 the Central Government in exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-clause (xi) of Clause (a) of Sec.2 of the Act made amendment in the notification dated the 22nd of August 1968, and for the entry "Tyres and tubes of cars and tractors" the following was substituted, namely. "Tyres and tubes of cars, buses, vans, trucks, automobiles, other category whatsoever, tractors and tractor-trollies" (vide Annexure B to the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in C.W.J.C. No. 1722 of 1971). By a notification dated the 18th of December, 1970 published in the Bihar Gazette Extraordinary dated the 22nd of December.
"Tyres and tubes of cars, buses, vans, trucks, automobiles, other category whatsoever, tractors and tractor-trollies" (vide Annexure B to the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in C.W.J.C. No. 1722 of 1971). By a notification dated the 18th of December, 1970 published in the Bihar Gazette Extraordinary dated the 22nd of December. 1970 the State Government in exercise of the powers conferred by Sec.3 of the Act added a number of items in Schedule IT of the Control Order including "tyres and tubes of cars, buses, jeeps vans, trucks, automobiles of any category whatsoever, tractors and tractor-trollies". Clause 6 of the Control Order, which is relevant for our purpose, reads as follows:- - "(1) The State Government may, by order regulate the distribution of any scheduled commodity specified in Schedule II by any manufacturers, producer or distributor in such area or areas and in such manner as may be specified. (2) Every manufacturer, producer or distributor shall comply with any direction issued by the State Government under Sub-clause (1). (3) Every distributor, dealer or agent shall, on receipt of a scheduled commodity specified in Schedule II supplied by any manufacturers, producer or distributor, as the case may be whether in pursuance of an order made under Sub- Clause (1) or otherwise, shall distribute the same in the area concerned in accordance with any direction issued by the officer authorised by the State Government in this behalf." It appears that in exercise of the powers conferred under sub-clause (3) of clause 6 of the Control Order, the Governor of Bihar authorised all the District Magistrates to exercise the powers specified in Clause 6 within the local limits of their respective jurisdiction by Notification No. S. O. 182 dated the 6th of February. 1971 (vide Annexure D to the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in C.W.J.C. No. 1722 of 1971). 4. As stated in C.W.J.C. No. 1722 of 1971 the District Magistrate of Patna on or about the 22nd of February. 1971, issued an order, in exercise of the powers conferred upon him under Sub-clause (3) of clause 6 of the control order. A copy of that order has been made Annexure 1 to that writ application. The order shows that all the tyre distributors, dealers and agents of the Patna district were directed to submit in the Rationing Office.
1971, issued an order, in exercise of the powers conferred upon him under Sub-clause (3) of clause 6 of the control order. A copy of that order has been made Annexure 1 to that writ application. The order shows that all the tyre distributors, dealers and agents of the Patna district were directed to submit in the Rationing Office. Patna, (11 immediate return showing the existing stock of nylon tyres and 5% extra rubber tyres of trucks; and (2) regular return of all subsequent arrivals of the above tyres in the stock. They were further directed that, they would not sell such tyres in any other manner than the one prescribed by the District Magistrate. They were also directed to maintain a stock register showing daily opening balance, arrival, sale and closing balance of such stock of tyres. On the 9th of July, 1971, the District Magistrate of Patna issued another order in modification of the above order (Annexure 11 under the same provisions of the Control Order. By that order the distributors and dealers of tyres were directed to furnish in the Rationing Office. Patna (1) immediate return showing particulars of the tyres of 5% extra nylon, ordinary nylon and 5% extra rubber tyres received in their stock since 1st June, 1971 in the pro forma prescribed in office letter No. 39 dated 11-5-1971, and (2) regular weekly returns for week ending Saturday in respect of all subsequent arrivals of the above categories of tyres. They were directed to maintain daily accounts showing the opening balance receipt, sales and the closing balance of such tyres. There was a further direction that they would sell freely 50% of the stock of those tyres in the open market and the remaining 50% of the same would be sold against permits issued by the Special Officer, Rationing Patna, or the Deputy Rationing Officer. Patna. A copy of that order has been made Annexure 2 to the writ application. On the 13th of December. 1971 the District Magistrate issued another order under sub-clause (3) of clause 6 of the Control Order directing all the tyre distributors and dealers of Patna District to furnish in the Rationing Office. Patna, with immediate effect, daily returns showing particulars of (100%) tyres and tubes of trucks and buses in their stock in the pro forma detailed in that order.
Patna, with immediate effect, daily returns showing particulars of (100%) tyres and tubes of trucks and buses in their stock in the pro forma detailed in that order. They were directed to maintain daily stock register in the pro forma separately for tyres and tubes. There was also a direction that all the tyres and tubes should be sold on permits issued by the Special Officer, Rationing, or the Deputy Rationing Officer. Patna. By that order the previous order dated the 9th of July, 1971 (Annexure 2) was modified. A copy of that order has been made Annexure 4 to the writ application, 5. The State Government on the 6th of December. 1971 issued circular letter to all the District Magistrates. A copy of that circular letter has been made Annexure 5 to C.WJ.C. No. 1722 of 1971 and Annexure 1 to C.W.J.C. No. 46 of 1972. That circular letter embodies the direction of the Government relating to the control over the distribution of tyres of trucks and buses. The following decisions inter alia, of the Government are contained in that circular letter: (1) That with immediate effect there would be full control over all tyres and tubes of trucks and buses; (2) That the tyre dealers would sell the tyres of trucks and buses only on permits granted by the Local Supply Officer and there would be no free sale of tyres of trucks and buses; (3) That the distribution of tyres and tubes would be done by a committee consisting of (i) the Additional Collector (incharge of supply) the Chairman, (ii) the District Supply Officer: (iii) the Deputy Superintendent of Police in charge of Motor Vehicles; (iv) one member of the District Truck Owners Association; (v) one member of the District Bus Owners Association; (vi) one member of the Tyre Dealers Association and (vii) a local Press representative. In paragraphs 5 to 12 of the said circular letter certain guidelines have been given for the distribution of tyres. It appears that the Government subsequently by an order contained in circular letter dated the 22nd of January, 1972 made certain modification in the order as contained in the circular letter dated the 6th of December, 1971. The Government ultimately took the decision to lift the control in respect of all tyres except nylon tyres and 5% extra rubber tyres.
It appears that the Government subsequently by an order contained in circular letter dated the 22nd of January, 1972 made certain modification in the order as contained in the circular letter dated the 6th of December, 1971. The Government ultimately took the decision to lift the control in respect of all tyres except nylon tyres and 5% extra rubber tyres. The decision of the Government was conveyed by the circular letter dated the 17th of March. 1972 (Annexure 17 to the reply to the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in C.W.J.C. No. 1722 of 1971). According to that circular letter the distribution of nylon tyres and 5% extra rubber tyres is to be made by the same committee as mentioned in the circular letter dated the 6th of December, 1971, and in accordance with the directions as contained in the circular letter dated the 22nd of January, 1972. Further, according to this circular letter the dealers are given the permission to sell even the aforesaid two varieties of tyres if permits are not issued within fifteen days of the receipt of the submission of returns by the dealers. 6. The validity of the order of the Government as contained in Annexure 17 read with the order as contained in Annexure 5 of C.W.J.C. No. 1722 of 1971 and Annexure 1 of C.W.J.C. No. 46 of 1972 has been challenged on behalf of the petitioners on the following three grounds: (1) That the impugned order is ultra vires clause 6 of the Control Order. (2) That the order is discriminatory for the reason that it invests arbitrary discretion in the authority to issue permit on one dealer and not to issue permit on any other dealer within the period of 15 days resulting in adverse economic impact on different tvre dealers in different ways. (3) That the impugned order (Annexure 5 of C.W.J.C. No. 1722 of 1971 and Annexure 1 of C.W.J.C. No. 46 of 1972) as modified by the order (Annexure 17 of C.W.J.C. No. 1722 of 1971) is ultra vires Sec.3 of the Act. 7. Mr. Basudeva Prasad who argued the case on behalf of the petitioners in C.W.J.C. No. 1722 of 1971 developed the first point in this way.
7. Mr. Basudeva Prasad who argued the case on behalf of the petitioners in C.W.J.C. No. 1722 of 1971 developed the first point in this way. Under clause 6 of the Control Order the State Government has been authorised only to regulate the distribution of any scheduled commodity and not to prohibit the distribution of such a commodity by a manufacturer or dealer. The orders of the State Government imposing restrictions on the sale of the tyres of buses and trucks without permit even for a period of 15 days from the date of the receipt of the return has the effect of prohibiting the dealers in such tyres from selling them. Learned counsel in support of his contention relied on a decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the case of Municipal Corporation of the City of Toronto V/s. Virgo reported in 1896 AC 88. In that case the question for decision was whether Subsection (2a) of the by-law was validly made by the Corporation of the City of Toronto. Sub-section (2a) was in the following words: "No person named and specified in Sub-section (2) of this section (whether a licensee or not) shall after the first day of July, 1892 prosecute his calling or trade in any of the following streets and portions of streets in the City of Toronto." The Corporation had the statutory power to make by-law "for licensing, regulating and governing" hawkers etc. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee while dealing with the question whether under a power to pass by-laws "for regulating and governing" hawkers etc., the council could prohibit hawkers from plying their trade at all in a substantial and important portion of the city made the fallowing observations : "No doubt the regulation and governance of a trade may involve the imposition of restrictions on its exercise both as to time and to a certain extent as to place where such restrictions are in the opinion of the public authority necessary to prevent a nuisance or for the maintenance of order. But their Lordships think there is marked distinction to be drawn between the prohibition or prevention of a trade and the regulation or governance of it.
But their Lordships think there is marked distinction to be drawn between the prohibition or prevention of a trade and the regulation or governance of it. and indeed a power to regulate and govern seems to imply the continued existence of that which is to be regulated or governed." It was argued in that case on behalf of the Corporation that the impugned by law did not amount to prohibition because hawkers and chapmen could still carry on their business in certain streets of the city. The above argument was rejected by their Lordships with the following observation: "The Question is one of substance and should be regarded from the point of view as well of the public as of the hawkers. The effect of the bye-law is practically to deprive the residents of what is admitted the most important part of the city of buving their goods of or of trading with the class of traders in question." In my opinion, that case is of no assistance to the petitioners as the facts were entirely different. In that case the hawkers etc.. were prohibited from carrying on their trade in eight streets in the city of Toronto which streets comprised the busiest and most important thoroughfares of the city. In the instant case there is no such prohibition by the impugned orders. The dealers in tyres for buses and trucks are only required to sell the tyres of specified varieties to persons holding permits for such tvres and to no others. The underlying purpose of the impugned orders is to regulate the distribution of tyres of trucks and buses of specified varieties so that the genuine persons might not have the difficulty in obtaining the tvres. The object is not to prohibit the dealers in tyres from carrying on their trade or business in tyres even for a single day. The view which I have taken gets full support from the observation made by a Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case of the State of Uttar Pradesh V/s. Suraj Bhan Pande. AIR 1972 All 401 .
The view which I have taken gets full support from the observation made by a Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case of the State of Uttar Pradesh V/s. Suraj Bhan Pande. AIR 1972 All 401 . In that case the distinction between the scope of power to regulate and the scope of power to prohibit was pointed out in these words : "The power to regulate portrays the idea of control, governance and direction, while the power to prohibit conveys the sense of the imposition of a ban or the placing of a restraint or restriction. The power to regulate the production, supply and distribution of an essential commodity and trade and commerce therein may easily comprehend and embrace the power to control or govern these matters by issue of licenses and permits, or in some other manner, or by controlling transport, ware-housing or price, or by regulating sale to specified persons or class of persons, or for maintenance of books of accounts or for imposition of fees for issue of licenses and permits or for search and seizure of stock for contravention of any regulated matter or for other subsidiary and ancillary subjects. On the other hand, the power to prohibit conveys a wholly contrary idea, for example the imposition of a total or partial ban or the imposition of certain restrictions with regard to production, supply and distribution of an essential commodity and trade and commerce therein." By the impugned orders there has been no ban whatsoever with regard to the sale of tyres of buses and trucks of a specified variety. The orders have only the effect of regulating the sale of tyres of buses and trucks of a specified variety to specified persons. The orders, therefore, in essence, are regulatory measures and not prohibitory in nature. There is thus no substance in the first contention which has been raised on behalf of the petitioners 8. Now I proceed to consider the Question whether there is any merit in the contention that the impugned orders are discriminatory. Mr.
The orders, therefore, in essence, are regulatory measures and not prohibitory in nature. There is thus no substance in the first contention which has been raised on behalf of the petitioners 8. Now I proceed to consider the Question whether there is any merit in the contention that the impugned orders are discriminatory. Mr. Basudeva Pra-sad submitted that it is open to the committee to issue permit on some dealers in the specified tyres and not to issue permit on other dealers in such tvres and therebv to deprive those dealers in tyres on whom the permits are not issued from selling the tyres for a period of 15 days This argument, in my opinion, is an argument of fear, if I may use that expression, and is based on the assumption that the Committee which has been entrusted with the distribution of permits will not discharge the functions properly and will favour some dealers. It is difficult to accept this contention. Merely because some discretion has been given to the Committee to issue permit it cannot be held that the power is discriminatory and abuse of such power cannot be assumed. As already stated, the Committee consists of not only the officials but also representatives of the District Truck Owners Association. District Bus Owners Association and Tyre and Tube Dealers Association. Thus in the Committee there are representatives of the Bus owners, the Truck owners and dealers in tyre and tube to look after their interest. It is not expected that such a committee will not discharge its functions properly. It may be stated here that the Committee has been functioning since the month of December. 1971 but no concrete instances have been given to show that the Committee favoured some dealers during the period of last one year or so. The reply to the counter affidavit of the respondents was filed by the petitioners on the 22nd of January, 1973. when the hearing of the two cases had commenced. Copies of the representations made on behalf of "Standard Tyres" of which petitioner No. 2 of C.W.J.C. No. 1722 of 1971 is a partner have been made Annexures 9. 10 and 11. There is no allegation in any of the annexures that the Committee favoured some dealers and gave them preferential treatment.
Copies of the representations made on behalf of "Standard Tyres" of which petitioner No. 2 of C.W.J.C. No. 1722 of 1971 is a partner have been made Annexures 9. 10 and 11. There is no allegation in any of the annexures that the Committee favoured some dealers and gave them preferential treatment. Annexure 14 to the reply to the counter-affidavit is a copy of a representation dated the 21st of January, 1972 addressed to the Food Commissioner. Patna. on behalf of Patna Tyre Dealers Association. In this annexure figures of stock of tyres held by the individual dealers of Patna have been given to show that the stock of tyres could not be sold for want of permit. In that representation a prayer was made to fix a maximum period of 3 days for the Rationing Office to issue permits on the basis of daily statement from dealers and to fix five days for the consumers to lift the tyres from dealers. There is however, no allegation in Annexure 14 that favour was ever shown by the Committee to any dealer. Annexure 15 is a copy of representation dated the 7th of February. 1972 of the Patna Dealers Association addressed to the Sperial Officer. Incharge Rationing. In that representation also no complaint was mae that favour was being shown to some dealers in the matter of issue of permits. Indeed Mr. Basudeva Prasad, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, did not place before us any letters or representation in which such a grievance was made by any of the dealers or by the Association. I may refer here to the case of Chinta Lingam V/s. The Government of India. AIR 1971 SC 474 . In that case one of the contentions which had been raised was that the control orders imposed unreasonable restrictions on the right of the petitioners of that case to carry on trade as arbitrary powers had been conferred in the matter of issuing or withholding permits and there were no provisions for appeal or revision against refusal to grant a permit.
Their Lordships of the Supreme Court repelled that contention with the following observation : "It is common ground that the officers authorised by the State Government are the District Collector and the Deputy Commissioner of Civil Supplies These Officers cannot but be regarded as of fairly high rank who are expected to discharge their duties in a responsible and reasonable manner. In Dwerka Pra-sad Laxmi Narain v State of Uttar Pradesh. 1954 SCR .803 = ( AIR 1954 SC 224 ) in which the provisions of Clause 4 (3) of the U. P. Coal Control Order. 1953 which gave the licensing authority absolute power to grant or refuse to grant any licence (sic) were struck down on the ground that a law which confers arbitrary and uncontrolled power upon the executive in the matter of regulating trade or business in normally available commodities must be held to be unreasonable. There the power could be exercised by any person to whom the State Coal Controller might choose to delegate the same. The matter which has been stressed before us relates generally to the absence of any provision relating to appeal or revision in the Control Orders if the District Collector or the Deputy Commissioner of Civil Supplies refuses to grant a permit under clause 3 of the Order. In Dwarka Praseds case, 1954 SCR 803 = ( AIR 1954 SC 224 ) the delegation could be made to any one which was certainly a relevant factor in judging the reasonableness of the impugned provision. But in the cases before us the permit is to be granted either by the State Government or by responsible officers of the rank of the District Collector or the Deputy Commissioner of Civil Supplies. Indeed. Mrs. Pappu quite properly agreed that if the State Government alone had the power to issue the permits the challenge on the ground of unreasonableness of the restrictions would not be available. We consider that there is no bar to any of the aggrieved parties approaching the State Government by means of a representation for a final decision even if the matter has been dealt with by the District Collector or the Deputy Commissioner of Civil Supplies in the first instance and the permit has been refused or wrongly withheld by those officers. In these circumstances the absence of a provision for appeal or revision can be of no consequence.
In these circumstances the absence of a provision for appeal or revision can be of no consequence. At any rate it has been pointed out in more than one decision of this court that when the power had to be exercised by one of the highest officers the fact that no appeal has been provided for is a matter of no moment: (See K. L. Gupta V/s. Bombay Municipal Corporation. (19681 1 SCR 274 at p. 297 = (AIR 196S SC 303 at p. 3161. It may also be remembered that emphasis was laid in Pannalal Binjrai V/s. Union of India 1957 SCR 233 at p. 257 = ( AIR 1957 SC 397 at p. 408) on the power being vested not in any minor official but in top-ranking authority. It was said that though the power was discretionary but it was not necessarily discriminatory and abuse of power could not be easily assumed. There was moreover a presumption that public officials would discharge their duties honestly and in accordance with rules of law." The above observation made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court fully supports my view that the orders cannot be held to be discriminatory merely because certain discretion has been given to the Committee and abuse of power cannot be assumed. 9. Now remains to consider the last point which has been raised in the writ application. It was submitted by Mr. Basudeva Frasad that before promulgating an order under Sec.3 the Central Government has to form an opinion that it is necessary or expedient to issue such an order. The condition prescribed by the first part of Sec.3 (l) of the Act is thus a condition precedent. It is only when the said condition is satisfied that the power to issue a regulatory order can be exercised by the Central Government. The State Government being the delegatee of the Central Government has similarly to form an opinion about the necessity or expediency for issuing a regulatory order before exercising the power to issue such an order. It must be made clear that Mr.
The State Government being the delegatee of the Central Government has similarly to form an opinion about the necessity or expediency for issuing a regulatory order before exercising the power to issue such an order. It must be made clear that Mr. Basudeva Prasad has not raised the contention that the condition prescribed by the first part of Sec.3 (1) of the Act was not fulfilled and the State Government did not form the opinion about the necessity or expediency for issuing a regulatory order before the Control Order, namely, the Bihar Essential Commodities -- other than foodgrains -- Prices and Stocks (Display and Control) Order. 1967, was made by the State Government. Therefore, it is not necessary to go into that question. According to learned counsel, there is nothing to show that the impugned order (Annexune 5) as modified by Annexure 17, was issued by the State Government after forming an opinion that it was necessary or expedient to issue the order and as such the two orders are void. In support of his contention learned counsel relied on two decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Barium Chemicals Ltd. V/s. Company Law Board, AIR 1967 SC 295 and Rohtas Industries Ltd. V/s. S. D. Agarwal, AIR 1969 SC 707 . This point which has been canvassed on behalf of the petitioners has not been specifically raised in either of the two writ applications. There is no allegation whatsoever that no opinion was formed by the State Government that it was necessary or expedient to pass the impugned order as contained in Annexure 5 or Annexure 17. There are materials on the record to show that the State Government had the jurisdiction to pass the impugned orders. In paragraph 5 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in C.W.J.C. No. 1722 of 1971 it has been stated as follows: "In February. 1971 due to short supply and large demand of tyres and tubes there arose an acute problem of law and order and steps had to be taken for the proper distribution of the same and the District Magistrates were authorised under Sub-clause (3) of Clause 6 of the Bihar Essential Commodities, other than Foodgrains. Price and Stock (Display and Control) Order 1967." The above statement made in paragraph 5 of the counter-affidavit has been denied in paragraph 5 of the reply to the counter-affidavit.
Price and Stock (Display and Control) Order 1967." The above statement made in paragraph 5 of the counter-affidavit has been denied in paragraph 5 of the reply to the counter-affidavit. As I have already stated this reply to the counter-affidavit was actually filed on the 22nd of January. 1973, when the hearing of the two oases had commenced. The respondents had therefore, no opportunity to controvert the statement made in paragraph 5 of the reply to the counter-affidavit. I may, however, point out that some of the petitions which have been filed on behalf of Patna Tyre Dealers Association themselves show that there was scarcity of tyres of certain varieties In the letter (Annexure 15 to C.W.J.C. No. 1722 of 1971) dated 7-2-1972, which was sent on behalf of Patna Dealers Association to the Special Officer In charge Rationing, it was stated as follows (vide paragraph 1) : "That, actually the shortage is for particular brands of nylon tyres only and not of all truck/bus tyres. Your office records reveal that there is no demand for Sada tyres. Even Nylon and 5% extra rubber tyres of less popular brands are not in demand. That is why permits for Sada tyres are not beinS taken by transporters from your office." It appears from the letter dated the 26th of May. 1971, which was sent by the Patna Tyre Dealers Association to the Deputy Secretary. Department of Supplies and Commerce. Government of Bihar. Patna (Annexure 20 to C.W.J.C. No. 1722 of 1971) that there was a discussion in the meeting attended by the officials of the Transport. Supply and representatives of Tyre Dealers Association, Tyre Manufacturing Companies and Truck Operating Association of Patna and Patna City and others, and it was decided that -- "In view of the small supply of and large demand for nylon tyres and 5% extra rubber tyres, only trucks registered in Patna will be eligible for such supply. Truck with 14500 K.G. R.L.W. and above will be eligible for two nylon tyres maximum at one time. Truck with 10699 K.G. R.L.W. and above but below 14500 K.G. R.L.W. will be eligible for two 5% extra rubber tyres maximum at a time.
Truck with 14500 K.G. R.L.W. and above will be eligible for two nylon tyres maximum at one time. Truck with 10699 K.G. R.L.W. and above but below 14500 K.G. R.L.W. will be eligible for two 5% extra rubber tyres maximum at a time. The truck of other categories will set supply of ordinary tyres available in the market." Thus it is clear from Annexure 20 that it was an admitted position that there was small supply of and large demand for Nylon tyres and 5% extra rubber tyres. The Government, therefore, was fully justified in passing the impugned order (Annexure 17) in C.W.J.C. No. 1722 of 1971 to lift the control in respect of all tyres except Nylon tyres and 5% extra rubber tyres. The petitioners are, therefore, not justified in making the grievance regarding the control over the distribution of Nylon tyres and 5% extra rubber tyres and that too only for a period of 15 days from the receipt of the returns filed by a particular dealer. For the foregoing reasons I do not find any substance even in the last contention which has been raised on behalf of the petitioners. 10. Mr. Prabha Shankar Mishra, who argued C.W.J.C. No. 46 of 1972, adopted the arguments which were raised by Mr. Basudeva Prasad appearing for the petitioners in C.WJ.C. No. 1722 of 1971. Learned counsel further brought to our notice some of the allegations made in the reply to the counter-affidavit filed by the respondents. As already stated, the reply to the counter-affidavit was filed on the 22nd of January. 1973. In paragraphs 9 and 10 of the reply to the counter-affidavit the following statements have been made: "9. That in the purported exercise of the power under the impugned order the authorities have found from amongst the transporters such beneficiaries who, for one reason or the other, sued(?) them. It would not be out of place to mention here that in the garb of regulating the distribution permits have been issued from the Patna office alone which made a farce of the control order. A schedule of the permits issued to some of the transporters is annexed herewith marked Annexure 2 for identification and forms part of this affidavit." "10. That the fact that the petitioner (deponent) along with Messrs.
A schedule of the permits issued to some of the transporters is annexed herewith marked Annexure 2 for identification and forms part of this affidavit." "10. That the fact that the petitioner (deponent) along with Messrs. Prasad Construction applied for extra nylon Tyres and 5 per cent extra rubber tyres on 22-6-72 to the Superintending Engineer. Ganga Bridge Project North Circle Hajipur, who forwarded that to the Rationing Officer on 25-6-72. But in spite of the said application made as early as June 1972. no tyre has been available to him till date. A copy of the said application along with the forwarding note of the Superintending Engineer is annexed herewith marked as Annexure 3 for identification and forms part of this affidavit." Learned counsel on the basis of the aforesaid statements made in the reply to the counter-affidavit submitted that discriminations are being made in the matter of distribution of permits to the transporters. In my opinion it is difficult to hold on the basis of the statements contained in the two paragraphs and on Annexure 2 that any discrimination is being made in the matter of grant of permits. Merely because no permit has been granted to Jagarnath Mishra (Petitioner no. 1) on his application filed in the month of June. 1972 it cannot be inferred that preferential treatment has been given to others. It is quite probable that the requirements of others who had been granted permits were more urgent than that of Jagarnath Mishra (Petitioner No. 1). If petitioner No. 1 has any grievance on the score that no permit has been granted to him although he filed an application in the month of June, 1972, it is open to the petitioner to file a representation to the higher authorities for the redress of his grievance. On the basis of the statements, however, contained in paragraphs 9 and 10 it cannot be held that there has been a discrimination in the matter of grant of permit to the transporters and as such the order is discriminatory. I may state here that sufficient guidelines have been provided in the order dated the 22nd of January, 1972 (Annexure B to the counter-affidavit filed in C. W. J. C. no. 1722 of 1971). According to the guidelines a priority list has to be made on certain basis.
I may state here that sufficient guidelines have been provided in the order dated the 22nd of January, 1972 (Annexure B to the counter-affidavit filed in C. W. J. C. no. 1722 of 1971). According to the guidelines a priority list has to be made on certain basis. It was not argued before us that the basis for drawing the priority list is unreasonable. I am, therefore, of the view that there is no scope for the arbitrary exercise of power in the matter oJ grant of permits to the truck or bus owners. 11 Having considered all the points which were raised on behalf of the petitioners in the two writ applications, I find no merit in the two applications. Both the writ applications are accordingly dismissed. In the circumstances I would make no order as to costs. S.N.P.Singh, J. 12 I agree.