JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, J. - The Nagar Mahapalika, Allahabad, instituted a suit for the ejectment of the respondent under Section 175, U. P. Tenancy Act. Its case was that it had let out the land to the respondent under a deed of lease dated June 5, 1945 for a period of 15 years. The period had expired and the Mahapalika wanted possession of the land for its own use. The suit was contested on the ground that the defendant had acquired hereditary tenancy rights. It was also pleaded that the Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit and that the Zamindari Abolition Act applied to the land in suit on which the defendant had become sirdar. The trial court held that the land was acquired by the Mahapalika under the Land Acquisition Act in 1915 for a public purpose for the trenching ground of the Allahabad Municipality. The acquisition came within the purview of clause (of Section 8 of the Municipalities Act and so it fell within clause (d) of Section 30 of the U. P. Tenancy Act where under hereditary tenancy rights could not accrue in such land. It was also held that the land having been acquired for a public purpose, it fell within the purview of clause (3) of Section 30 and for that reason also the land was outside the purview of Sec. 29. On this ground also hereditary tenancy rights did not accrue to the defendant. The trial court observed that the only ground on which jurisdiction was challenged was that the land lies, in city area within municipal limits, hence U. P. Tenancy Act does not apply and the Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit under Section 175 of the U. P. Tenancy Act. The trial court found that the land in dispute being within municipal limits, the Zamindari Abolition Act did not apply. It was held that the defendant was a non-occupancy tenant liable to be ejectment. On these grounds the suit was decreed. 2. The defendant went up in appeal. The only point argued in appeal was that the defendant acquired hereditary tenancy rights under Section 29 of the U. P. Tenancy Act. The Additional Commissioner repelled this submission. It was held that the defendant was a non-occupancy tenant liable to be ejectment. On these grounds the suit was decreed. 2. The defendant went up in appeal. The only point argued in appeal was that the defendant acquired hereditary tenancy rights under Section 29 of the U. P. Tenancy Act. The Additional Commissioner repelled this submission. He held that the land having been acquired under the Land Acquisition Act was acquired for a public purpose and so Sec. 30(3) clearly applied and no hereditary tenancy rights accrued. The appeal was dismissed. The respondent then filed a second appeal before the Board of Revenue. The same was dismissed summarily. There also the only point urged was as to the applicability of Section 30 of the U. P. Tenancy Act. 3. The defendant respondent then instituted a writ petition in this Court. In the body of the writ petition nothing was stated in respect of the question of jurisdiction of the trial court to entertain the suit. At the hearing of the writ petition it appears to have been argued that the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act applied to the land in dispute and so the suit under the U.P. Tenancy Act was not maintainable. A learned single Judge held that there was nothing on the record to suggest that on 7th July, 1949, the village where the land in dispute was situate was comprised in the municipal area of Allahabad. Therefore the exception in Section 2 (i) of the Zamindari Abolition Act was not applicable. He also found that there was nothing to show that the land in question was included in the municipal trenching ground so as to apply the exception contained in "Sec. 2(1 (c) of the Act. On these findings it was held that the suit was not maintainable under the Tenancy Act because that Act had been repealed by the Zamindari Abolition Act. The writ petition was allowed and the impugned orders were quashed. Aggrieved, the Nagar Mahapalika has come up in appeal. 4. It will be seen that the defendant himself had taken up the case before the trial court that the land in dispute was situate within municipal limits. It was on this ground that the trial court held that the Zamindari Abolition Act will not apply and the plea of jurisdiction was negatived. 4. It will be seen that the defendant himself had taken up the case before the trial court that the land in dispute was situate within municipal limits. It was on this ground that the trial court held that the Zamindari Abolition Act will not apply and the plea of jurisdiction was negatived. This finding of the trial court was not challenged either in appeal or second t appeal. The judgment of the learned Additional Commissioner specifically mentions that the only point urged before him related to Secs. 29 and 30 of the U.P. Tenancy Act. In the body of the writ petition also it was not pleaded that in fact the plots in dispute were outside the municipal limits as they stood on 7th July, 1949. In this background it was not open to the respondent to raise the question that the land in dispute was not situate within municipal limits on 7tn July, 1949 for the first time at the hearing of the writ petition. The learned single Judge has mentioned nothing which may have impelled him to deviate from the well settled principle that a question of law which requires investigation of facts cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time in appeal or even in a writ petition. It is all the more so when the plea of jurisdiction was taken in the trial court and when it was negatived by that Court, the plea was abandoned in appeal. It is equally settled that a point which has been abandoned cannot be permitted to be re agitated at a subsequent appellate stage. We are hence unable to sustain the order of the learned Single Judge that the suits were not maintainable. 5. The next question argued on behalf of the defendant-respondent was, that he had acquired hereditary rights under Section 29 of the U.P. Tenancy Act. The Municipal Board had let out the land to the defendant for a fixed term of 15 years. Ex facie, the respondent would acquire hereditary tenancy rights under Sec. 29. Sec. 30 engrafts a statutory exception. It provide that: "Notwithstanding any thing in Section 29, hereditary rights shall not accrue in - ....... ........ .............. ........ ........... (3) land acquired or held for a public purpose or a work of public utility; and in particular, and without prejudice to the generality of this clause- ....... ........ .............. ........ Sec. 30 engrafts a statutory exception. It provide that: "Notwithstanding any thing in Section 29, hereditary rights shall not accrue in - ....... ........ .............. ........ ........... (3) land acquired or held for a public purpose or a work of public utility; and in particular, and without prejudice to the generality of this clause- ....... ........ .............. ........ ........... (d) lands acquired ... by a municipality for a purpose mentioned in clause (a) or clause (c) of Section 8 of the United Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916........." 6. Clause (3) of Section 30 provides that hereditary rights shall not accrue in land acquired or held for a public purpose. In the present case the land was acquired under the Land Acquisition Act. Clearly, it was acquired for a public purpose. It fell within the purview of clause (3). 7. The second part of clause (3), namely "and in particular, and without prejudice to the generality of this clause" is illustrative of acquisitions for public purposes. The kinds of acquisitions mentioned in clauses (a) to (g) are illustrative of lands being acquired or held for public purposes. It is to be noted that the phrase "acquired or held" shows that it is not necessary that land which was acquired for a public purpose must continue to be held for that purpose. If it is either acquired or held for a public purpose it will come within the clause. So the fact that after being acquired for a public purpose the land in dispute was let out to the defendant will not take it outside the purview of clause (3). In any event, it was acquired for a public purpose. 8. The trial court found that the acquisition in the present case was covered by clause (c) of Section 8, Municipalities Act. Sec. 8(c) mentions "reclaiming unhealthy localities." In this case the acquisition related to sanitation. In our opinion the purpose of the acquisition is clearly covered by clause (c). It thus appears that the land was such in which hereditary rights could not accrue. 9. Mr. G.N. Varma appearing for the respondent urged yet another fresh point. According to learned counsel, the applicability of Section 30 of the U.P. Tenancy Act was given up by the Municipal Board when it agreed to let out the land to the defendant for a period of 15 years. In support reliance was placed upon Sub-sec. 9. Mr. G.N. Varma appearing for the respondent urged yet another fresh point. According to learned counsel, the applicability of Section 30 of the U.P. Tenancy Act was given up by the Municipal Board when it agreed to let out the land to the defendant for a period of 15 years. In support reliance was placed upon Sub-sec. (4) of Section 4 of the U.P. Tenancy Act which provides: - "Subject to the provisions of this section and any other law for the time being in force, any agreement entered into between a landlord and a tenant relating to a holding, including an agreement conferring transferable rights, shall be valid and enforceable." 10. Sub-sec. (4) operates "subject to the provisions of this section and any other law for the time being in force." So no agreement can take the land outside the purview of Section 30 if it otherwise applies to it. Further, Sub-sec. (4) only provides for the enforcement of an agreement which may confer transferable rights. That question does not arise here. Here the sole point is whether the defendant acquired hereditary rights in the land. In our opinion, no benefit can be derived from this provision. 11. In the result, the appeals succeed and are allowed. The judgment of the learned Single Judge is set aside and the writ petitions are dismissed with costs.