Judgment :- 1. This appeal arises out of an order of the District Court, Trichur, granting Letters of Administration with the will annexed to the petitioners in Letters of Administration O.P. No. 5 of 1963 of that Court. One Narayanan Nambudiri died on 21-12-1961 having executed Ext. D-2 will dated 9-11-1956 (Ext. P1 is the copy of the will) which was the subject matter of the application and the grant. The properties devised were the self acquisitions of the testator, and were dealt with in different schedules to the will. Schedules A to G were bequeathed to the wife and children of the testator, and schedule H to the testator's brother Neelakantan Nambudiri. There was a residuary clause in the will, that in respect of the share of the testator in his illom properties, in respect of any of his properties found undisposed of at the time of his death, and in respect of his own independent verumpattom right over Re. Sy.No. 373/1, these were to go to the children of his brother Neelakantan Nambudiri. Neelakantan Nambudiri died on 23 81962. The petitioners who applied for administration are the Nambudiri wife and children of Neelakantan Nambudiri, the 1st petitioner, the wife, being Sreedevi Antharjanam. The 1st respondent to the application was another brother of the late Narayanan Nambudiri and Respondents 2 to 7 were the Nair wife and the children of Narayanan Nambudiri through her. The court below, in the first instance, granted the application, against which, A.S. 30 of 1966 was filed in this Court. Upholding the plea that the will had not been properly proved in accordance with law, this Court allowed the appeal, set aside the grant, and remanded the matter to the lower court for fresh disposal in accordance with law. Thereafter, the court below found that the will had been properly proved. It was contended by respondents 2 to 8, that the grant of part of the estate in this case the H schedule and the items covered by the residuary clause, which had been devised to Neelakantan Nambudiri and his children was unknown to law, and could not be countenanced. The court below dealt with the matter as follows: "But it is contended that S.232 contemplates grant of Letters of the whole estate or of such much thereof as may be unadministered. Admittedly in this proceedings, Letters are not sought for the whole estate. The court below dealt with the matter as follows: "But it is contended that S.232 contemplates grant of Letters of the whole estate or of such much thereof as may be unadministered. Admittedly in this proceedings, Letters are not sought for the whole estate. Schedules A to G of the will are not included in the scope of the petition. These properties were bequeathed to respondents 2 to 7. This argument is met with the contention that schedules A to G of the will have already been administered and only the petition schedule properties remain unadministered. For two reasons, I cannot accept the contention of the contesting respondents. This objection has never been raised in this proceedings at any stage. As I have already observed, even as long back as 1965. the petition was disposed of by this Court. The matter went up in appeal and was subsequently remanded. At no stage was this contention raised. Under those circumstances, the respondents cannot be permitted to raise this contention at this stage. Secondly, the section contemplates grant of Letters, either of the whole estate or of the part which remains unadministered. In view of the fact that the respondents did not raise the objection, it is legitimate to infer that they have already taken possession of Schedules A to G which have been bequeathed to them. If that is so, It must necessarily follow that the estate which remains unadministered consists only of the properties mentioned in the petition. I therefore, find that the objection is without merit." Against the grant of Letters of Administration with the will annexed thus made by the court below, the 2nd Respondent, the wife of Narayanan Nambudiri, has preferred this appeal. 2. Two contentions were raised before us: first that the Letters of Administration with the will annexed cannot be granted in respect of a part of the estate of the testator; and second, that the will had been revoked by reason of certain dealings with the properties comprised therein effected by a partition-deed executed subsequent to the will, and evidenced by Ext. D-1 dated 10-3-1951. 3. There is little doubt that the general rule and principle is that Letters of Administration with the will annexed must relate to the entirety of the property disposed of by the will, and cannot relate to a part of the estate. D-1 dated 10-3-1951. 3. There is little doubt that the general rule and principle is that Letters of Administration with the will annexed must relate to the entirety of the property disposed of by the will, and cannot relate to a part of the estate. The authorities have been collected and surveyed in a number of decisions, of which it is enough to notice In re T. K. Parthasarathi Naidu (AIR. 1955 Mad. 411), Ramaswamy Iyengar v. Lakshmi Narasimhan & others (AIR. 1965 Mysore 87), and Vrindavanlal Goverdanlal Pitti & Others v. Smt. Kamala Bai Goverdanlal & Others (AIR. 1970 And. Prad.109). The Madras decision has noticed the principle which has been stated in'Williams: on Executors and Administrators', (Fourteenth Edition) at page 137 as follows: "If there are several executors appointed with distinct powers, as one for one part of the estate, and another for all other purposes, probate is usually granted to the latter, if he is the first to apply, save and except that special purpose or specific part of the estate If it is the limited executor that applies first, he will obtain his limited grant and the other may take probate caetororum. If both apply simultaneously, the grant may be made in the same instrument, the powers of the respective executors being distinguished." It is clear from these decisions, that the court is not entirely without jurisdiction to make a grant of letters of administration with the will annexed, limited to part only of an estate. S.255 and 257 of the Indian Succession Act recognise sufficiently that there is jurisdiction, in the court in appropriate cases, to limit the grant to a part of the estate alone. These sections read as follows: "255. Probate or administration, with will annexed, subject to exception-Whenever the nature of the case requires that an exception be made, probate of a will, or letters of administration with the will annexed, shall be granted subject to such exception. 257. These sections read as follows: "255. Probate or administration, with will annexed, subject to exception-Whenever the nature of the case requires that an exception be made, probate of a will, or letters of administration with the will annexed, shall be granted subject to such exception. 257. Probate or administration of rest:-Whenever a grant with exception of probate or of letters of administration with or without the will annexed, has been made, the person entitled to probate or administration of the remainder of the deceased's estate may take a grant of probate or letters of administration, as the case may be, of a rest of the deceased's estate." In the light of the principles noticed in the above decisions and to the provisions of the Act, and particularly to the fact that the objection to a grant limited to a part of the estate, was not raised when the proceedings were in the first instance before the trial court, nor when the matter was in appeal to this Court earlier in A.S. 30 of 1966, we are not disposed to interfere with the grant made by the court below. On the passage that we have extracted above, the same seems to be limited to the H schedule and the items covered by the residuary clause of the will, and certainly does not seem to cover schedules A to G of the will in which the appellant and her children are interested. We overrule the objection to the grant of Letters of Administration of a part of the estate. 4. We see no merit at all in the contention that there has been a revocation of the will by reason of the execution of the partition deed Ext. D1. It was contended that the properties covered by the residuary clause, especially R.S. No. 373/1, were also the subject-matter of the Partition Ext. D1. The residuary clause, as noticed earlier, covered the items undisposed of by the testator at the time of his death, his share in the illom properties, and his separate and independent verumpattom rights over R.S. 373/1, the reversionary right (kanam right) in which, belonged to the illom. Ext. D1 partition-deed was executed because Neelakantan Nambudiri demanded partition of the illom properties. Ext. D1 partition-deed was executed because Neelakantan Nambudiri demanded partition of the illom properties. The illom properties alone were dealt with in the partition deed, and therefore only the reversionary rights in respect of R.S. No. 373/1 and not the verumpattons right was the subject-matter of the said partition deed. Under the said document, the parties separated as three branches: Narayanan Nambudiri and two of the children of Neelakantan Nambudiri, taking together as one branch; Neelakantan Nambudiri and two other children taking together as the second branch; and Sreedevi Antharjanam and yet two other children of hers by Neelakantan Nambudiri, taking as the third branch. The properties covered by the will were the self-acquisitions of Narayanan Nambudiri. On these facts, we are quite unable to see how any case of revocation of Ext. P1 will can arise. 5. Counsel for the appellant drew our attention to the fact that the petitioners in the court below have not paid the requisite court-fee on the application. From the records available in this Court, we are unable to see if this has been done or not. Counsel appearing for the respondents in the appeal stated that the court-fee had been paid. It is enough for us to draw attention to the provisions of S.57 of the Court-fees Act under which the court shall make no grant of probate or letters of administration till satisfied that the requisite court fee had been paid. 6. Subject as above, we dismiss this appeal with costs. Dismissed.