( 1 ) THIS petition by an employer governed by the Industrial Disputes Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act, is directed against an order of the labour Court, Bangalore, made in Appln. 75 of 1972, on a preliminary objection as to jurisdiction taken on behalf of the employer. ( 2 ) THE material facts are briefly as follows: There was a lay-off of workers in a section of the factory of the petitioners. The workers concerned were informed that they would not be entitled to compensation on that account as such lay-off was on account of the go-slow tactics adopted by a section of workmen in another section of the factory. Respondents 2 to 17 thereupon preferred a complaint to the Labour Court under S. 33c (2) of the Act, claiming compensation for such lay-off as per the provisions of chapter VA of the Act. On behalf of the management an objection had been raised that on account of the provisions of S. 25e (iii) of the Act, no such compensation would become payable, and therefore, the complaint under S. 33c (2) would not be maintainable. On behalf of the applicants- workmen the fact that such lay-off was necessitated on account of the go- slow tactics of the workmen of some other section of the factory, had been denied. All the same, the preliminary objection had been pressed on the ground that a determination of the issue relative to the reason for the lay-off would properly fall within the scope of a reference under S. 10 (1) of the Act and, therefore, it would not be competent for the Labour Court to adjudicate upon it in a matter arising under S. 33c (2) of the Act. The labour Court over-ruled the objection by the order impugned herein. ( 3 ) IT is relevant to note that the matter had been once before brought up before this Court in WP. 2776/72 and remanded with a direction that the labour Court ought to give cogent reasons' for its order. It is thereafter the present impugned order came to be passed. A reference to this circumstance has become necessary in view of a contention urged on behalf of the petitioner that there has been no proper or satisfactory compliance with such a direction of this Court. The contention may conveniently be disposed of at this stage. It is thereafter the present impugned order came to be passed. A reference to this circumstance has become necessary in view of a contention urged on behalf of the petitioner that there has been no proper or satisfactory compliance with such a direction of this Court. The contention may conveniently be disposed of at this stage. The argument pressed before me is that the labour Court has not discussed the matter in issue, after a proper study and analysis of the precedent cited on behalf of the parties. I have been taken through the order in question; and I do not see much justification for such a criticism. It is, however, unnecessary to pursue this aspect of the case any further, as I propose to examine the precedents relied on in the context of the main contention urged. ( 4 ) THE main question that arises for consideration is whether in the course of investigation of a claim for compesation for lay off for the purposes of S. 33c (2) of the Act, the Labour Court could examine an issue relating to the existence of the conditions specified in Sec. 25 (iii) which if found to have existed, would disentitle an applicant under S. 33c (2) to such lay off compensation. ( 5 ) ON behalf of the parties, reliance has been placed in support of their respective stands, almost exclusively on certain decided cases of the Supreme court. The more specific argument on behalf of the petitioner is that such an issue ought to properly form the subject matter of a reference under Sec. 10 (1) of the Act and on that account excluded from the purview of an investigation by a Labour Court under S. 33c (2) of that Act. ( 6 ) ON a careful examination of the decisions relied on, I am of opinion that the answer to the question posed ought to be in the affirmative and against the contention of the petitioner. Before proceeding with the examination of the decisions, it is convenient to set out the relevant portions of the provisions of the Act, which are material for the present purpose. Before proceeding with the examination of the decisions, it is convenient to set out the relevant portions of the provisions of the Act, which are material for the present purpose. S. 25c (1) of the Act refers to the right of the workman for compensation on account of lay off; and reads thus :"whenever a workman (other than a badli workman or a, casual workman) whose name is borne on the muster rolls of an industrial establishment and who has completed not less than one year of continuous service under an employer is laid off, he shall be paid by the employer for all days during which he is so laid-off, except for such weekly holidays as may intervene, compensation which shall be equal to fifty per cent of the total of the basic wages and dearness allowance that would have been payable to him had he not been so laid-off;" (Rest of the provisions not set out as unnecessary ). S. 25e specifies the circumstances when workmen would be disentitled to compensation. It is sufficient to set qut only sub-clause (iii) thereof, and the same reads thus :" No compensation shall be paid to a workman who has been laid off- (iii) If such laying-off is due to a strike or slowing-down of production on the part of workmen in another part of the establishment. " ( 7 ) THE only other provisions which need to be reproduced are sub-sections (1) and (2) of Sec. 33c, only with a view to show that any claim arising under Chapter VA of the Act, which embraces Ss. 25c and 25e, properly requires to be adjudicated upon under S. 33c (2) of that Act. " ( 7 ) THE only other provisions which need to be reproduced are sub-sections (1) and (2) of Sec. 33c, only with a view to show that any claim arising under Chapter VA of the Act, which embraces Ss. 25c and 25e, properly requires to be adjudicated upon under S. 33c (2) of that Act. " (1) Where any money is due to a workman from an employer under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of Chapter V-A, the workman himself or any other person authorised by him in writing in this behalf or, in the case of the death of the workman, his assignee or heirs may, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, make an application to the appropriate Government for the recovery of the money due to him, and if the appropriate Government is satisfied that any money is so due, it shall issue a certificate for that amount to the Collector who shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue: (2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government. " ( 8 ) IN Central Bank of India v. P. S. Rajagopalan, AIR 1964 SC. 743 , the Supreme Court while dealing with the scope of S. 33c of the Act, has enunciated in paragraphs 15 and 16 of the said report, thus :"therefore, in construing S. 33c we have to bear in mind two relevant considerations. The construction should not be so broad as to bring within the scope of S. 33c cases which would fall under S. 10 (1 ). Where industrial disputes arise between employees acting collectively and their employers, they must be adjudicated upon in the manner prescribed by the Act, as for instance, by reference under S. 10 (1 ). These disputes cannot be brought within the purview of S. 33c. Where industrial disputes arise between employees acting collectively and their employers, they must be adjudicated upon in the manner prescribed by the Act, as for instance, by reference under S. 10 (1 ). These disputes cannot be brought within the purview of S. 33c. Simiarly having regard to the fact that the policy of the Legislature in enacting S. 33c is to provide a speadv remedy to the individual workmen to enforce or execute their existing rights, it would not be reasor nable to exclude from the scope of this section cases of existing rights which are sought to be implemented by individual workmen. In other words, though in determining the scope of S. 33c we must take care not to exclude cases which legitimatelv fall within it's purview we must also bear in mind that cases which fall under S. 10 (1) of the Act for instance, cannot be brought within the scope of S. 33c. "again,"in our opinion, on a fair and a reasonable construction of sub-sec. (2) it is clear that if a workman's right to receive the benefit is disputed, that mav have to be determined by the Labour Court. Before proceeding to compute the benefit in terms of monev. the Labour court inevitablv has to deal with the question as to whether the workman has a right to receive that benefit. Tf the said right is not disputed, nothing more needs to be done and the Labour Court can proceed to compute the value of the benefit in terms of monev; but if the said right is disputed the Labour Court must deal with that question and decide whether the workman has the right to receive the benefit as alleged by him and it is only if the Labour Court answers this point in favour of the workman that the next question of making the necessary computation can arise. " ( 9 ) ONE thing is clear from the above enunciations that if the right of the workman is disputed by the employer, the Labour Court must decide the issue in anv application under S 33c (2) and proceed to compute the benefit due to a workman, if the answer to the point is in favour of the workman. It is also made clear that if the matter thus put in issue partakes the character of an industrial dispute. It is also made clear that if the matter thus put in issue partakes the character of an industrial dispute. it cannot be decided in anv such proceeding under S. 33c of the Act. The decision, however, is not concerned with a case of lay off of a workman as in the case on hand. ( 10 ) THE next case relied on is State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Khandelwal, (1968)1 LLJ. 589. In that case the Supreme Court was concerned with a matter arising under S. 33c (2) in regard to a claim for benefit of supervisory allowance by a clerk who had worked in a supervisory capacity but reverted later. The question that was raised on his behalf was that he had been wrongly reverted from the supevisory post to the lower one. The specific claim was that he ought to be paid the supervisory allowance. The employer had contested the claim on the ground that the workman, during the period concerned with the claim, had not been holding such supervisory post or discharging supervisory functions. It was in these circumstances that the Court observed as fellows :"the question whether his reversion was wrongful or rightful or whether it should be set aside, is not a matter within the jurisdiction of a labour court dealing with an application under S. 33c (2 ). The vacation of such an order can only be sought raising an industrial dispute and having it decided in accordance with the other provisions of the Act. A Labour Court; acting under S. 33c (2) hag to decide the application on the basis that, in fact, the respondent was, during the relevant period, doing routine clerical work and was not employed on supervisory duties. " ( 11 ) IN my opinion, although this case affirms the principle that if a matter were to arise in any proceeding under S. 33c (2) which requires to be raised in the form of a dispute under S. 10 (1) of the Act, it does not touch the question that had arisen in the case on hand. In the instant case the specific case of the employer is that the facts alleged, if established, would bring the case within Sec. 25e (iii) and therefore, the application of the workmen would not be maintainable. In the instant case the specific case of the employer is that the facts alleged, if established, would bring the case within Sec. 25e (iii) and therefore, the application of the workmen would not be maintainable. But the real question is whether the issue of fact involved therein could be investigated in a proceeding under s. 33c (2) or whether it is a, matter which requires investigation separately on a reference under Section 10 (1) of the Act. ( 12 ) IT seems to me that a mere allegation by the employer that the lay-off in question was one which fell within S. 25e (iii) would not be sufficient to non-suit the applicants-workmen. All that this provision says is that in case the employer succeeds in bringing his case within the ambit of the said provisions, then the workmen would not be entitled to the compensation under S. 25c of the Act In other words, the employer must show by placing material, before the Labour Court that the position was such in order to deny the claim cf the workmen on account of lay-off. This is not the same as saying that the Labour Court has no jurisdiction at all to entertain the matter under S. 33c (2) of the Act, especialy when it is noticed that the lay-off is conceded by the employer and only exceptional circumstancee have been pleaded with a view to avoid liability. It is also to be remembered that the claim of the workmen is under S. 25c which forms part of Chapter V-A of the Act and the recovery of it has been expressly provided for under S. 33c of that Act. It is also to be remarked that it has not been shown to me how such a question of lay-cff could or ought in the circumstances, to have been referred to under S. 10 (1) of the Act. I am not, therefore, inclined to accept the view that the said decision of the supreme Court would be of assistance to the petitioner's case. ( 13 ) I pass on to the next case of the Supreme Court in U. P. Electric supply Co. v. Shukla, (1969) 2 LLJ. 728 . I am not, therefore, inclined to accept the view that the said decision of the supreme Court would be of assistance to the petitioner's case. ( 13 ) I pass on to the next case of the Supreme Court in U. P. Electric supply Co. v. Shukla, (1969) 2 LLJ. 728 . In that case on a complaint under S. 33c (2) a question arose whether the dispute relating to retrenchment of workmen and closure of the establishment fell within the exclusive competence of the Industrial Tribunal by virtue of certain provisions of the Uttar Pradesh industrial Disputes Act, and not within the competence of Labour court, by virtue of some other provision of that Act. It was in this context , that the Court observed thus at page 735 of the above report :"if the liability arises from an award, settlement or under the provisions of Chapter V-A or by virtue of a statute or a scheme made thereunder, mere denial by the employer may not be sufficient to negative the claim under S 33c (2) before the Labour Court. Where however the right to retrenchment compensation which is the foundation of the claim is itself a matter which is exclusively within the competence of the industrial tribunal to be adjudicated upon on a reference, it would be, training the language of S. 33c (2) to hold that the question whether there has been retrenchment may be decided by the Labour Court. The power of the Labour Court is to compute the compensation claimed to be payable to the workmen on the footing that there has been retrenchment of the workmen. Where retrenchment is conceded, and the only matter in dispute is that by virtue of s. 25ff no liability to pay compensation has arisen, the Labour Court will be competent to decide the question. In such a case the question is one of the computation and not of determination, of the conditions precedent to the accrual of liability. Where, however, the dispute is whether workmen have been retrenched and computation of the amount is subsidiary or incidental in our judgment, the Labour Court will have no authority to trespass upon the powers of the Tribunal with which it is statutorily invested. Where, however, the dispute is whether workmen have been retrenched and computation of the amount is subsidiary or incidental in our judgment, the Labour Court will have no authority to trespass upon the powers of the Tribunal with which it is statutorily invested. " ( 14 ) IT is plain from the above enunciation that on a clear finding that the question referred to earlier was one falling within the jurisdiction of the industrial Tribunal, the Court held that Labour Court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon it. It is also made clear that if the fact of retrenchment had been conceded and the only dispute had been that by virtue of S. 25ff no liability to pay compensation has arisen, the Labour Court would have been competent to decide the question. It seems to me that in the case on hand, no such question as in the first of the above propositions has arisen. On the other hand the latter principle is very much closer to the question on hand, and does not go in support of the proposition canvassed on behalf of the petitioner. ( 15 ) I now turn to the last case relied on, on which reliance exclusively was placed on behalf of the respondents. It is R. B. Bansilal Abhirchand mills Co. v. Labour Court, Nagpur, AIR 1972 SC. 451 . The facts of that case are that the establishment had been closed down on account of a fire. By a series of notices to workmen who had been iaid off on that account, it was intimated that the mill in question was expected to commence working from a certain date. A section of the Mill however continued to work for sometime. The employer, however, subsequent to the date specified in the last of such notices, regarding commencement of work and without complying with the terms thereof sold away the mill. The notices, however, did not make out a case at any tune that the damage was such that it was not possible to run the Mills at all. The workmen thereupon lodged applications under S. 33c (2) of the Act, claiming compensation for lay-off from March, 1959 to September, 1960. The notices, however, did not make out a case at any tune that the damage was such that it was not possible to run the Mills at all. The workmen thereupon lodged applications under S. 33c (2) of the Act, claiming compensation for lay-off from March, 1959 to September, 1960. One of the contentions urged on behalf of the employer was that the Labour court had no jurisdiction under S. 33c (2) and the parties had to work out their rights within the four corners of the C. P. and Berar Industrial disputes Act. On this contention having been rejected by the Bombay high Court, in a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution, the employer took the matter up in appeal to the Supreme Court. The Court, on review of many of the decisions bearing on the question, rejected the appeal. It was in this context that the Court observed in paragraph 23 of the report as follows :"in substance the point urged by the appellants was that if a claim is made on the basis of a lay-off and the employer contends that there was no lay-off but closure, it is not open to a Labour Court to entertain an application under S. 33c (2 ). The more so it was stated, when the dispute was not between a solitary workman en the one hand and the employer on the other but a whole body of workmen ranged against their employer who was fared with numerous applications before the Labour Court for computation of benefit in terms of money. As has been said already, the Labour Court must go into the matter and come to a decision as to whether there was really a closure or a lay-off. If it took the view that there was a lay-off without any closure of the business it would be acting within its jurisdiction if it awarded compensation in terms of the provisions of Chapter V-A. In our opinion the High Court's conclusion that 'in fact the business of this company was continuing. They in fact continued to employ several employees. Their notices say that, some portions of the mills would continue to work was unexceptionable. The notices which we have referred to can only lead to the above conclusion. They in fact continued to employ several employees. Their notices say that, some portions of the mills would continue to work was unexceptionable. The notices which we have referred to can only lead to the above conclusion. The Labour Court's jurisdiction could not be ousted by a mere plea denying the workman's claim to the computation of the benefit in terms of money the Labour Court had to go into the question and determine whether, on the facts it had jurisdiction to make the computation. It could not however give itself jurisdiction by a wrong decision on the jurisdictional plea. " ( 16 ) THE above enunciation, in my view, is clearly applicable to the question raised in the case on hand. On behalf of the petitioner, it was contended that the case is distinguishable. I fail to see any distinguishing feature that would render the proposition laid down therein inapplicable to the present case. I have also earlier concluded that S. 25e (iii) is only a provision enabling an employer to question the right of a workman to claim compensation for lay-off and has no direct relevance to the jurisdiction exercisable by a Labour Court under S. 33c (2) of the Act. If the Labour court on an examination of the material concludes that the case fell within s. 25e (iii), it would have to dismiss the claim. If the finding is the other way. then it will have to proceed to determine the compensation under S. 2?c of the Act, which means that it is competent fcr it to entertain the application under S. 33c (2) of the Act. For all these reasons, i held that the order impugned does not call for interference. The result of the above discussion is that this petition deserves to fail and is dismissed. Respondents 2 to 17 will get their costs. Counsel's fee rs. 250. 00. --- *** --- .