Judgment :- 1. The defendant In a suit for eviction and allied reliefs Is the appellant. The trial court gave a decree as prayed for, and that has been confirmed in appeal. 2. Tee plaintiff's case is as follows: To 21st plaintiff is the owner of the plaint schedule property and the sheds therein. The plaint schedule property with the sheds therein were leased out to the defendant by the first plaintiff for a period of two years from 1101963 on a monthly rent of Rs. 30/- under a registered lease deed, Ext. PI, dated 7 10 1963- After the expiry of the period of the lease, the defendant continued to occupy the plaint schedule property and sheds paying rent at the same rate. During the absence of the 1st plaintiff from the station, the second plaintiff, brother of the 1st plaintiff, had been looking after the affairs of the plaint schedule property and receiving its rent etc. on behalf of the 1st plaintiff. The defendant had kept the rent in arrears from December 1967. Contrary to the terms of the lease deed, the defendant had put up a lean-to on the back of the shed without the permission of the plaintiffs. The defendant was also storing timber logs in the said lean-to in violation of the terms of the lease deed and in spite of the protests of the plaintiffs. For the unauthorised use of the place beyond the area permitted in the lease deed, the plaintiffs claimed Rs. 26/-per month by way of damages. Though the plaintiffs had sent a notice to the defendant on 5 81969 terminating the lease as on 3181969 and demanding surrender of the property on the next day, which the defendant had received on 118 1969, the defendant bad not complied with the requirements of the said notice. Damages for use and occupation of the schedule property at the rate of Rs. 30/-from 191969 till the date of eviction also was claimed in the plaint. Plaintiffs sought to recover possession of the plaint schedule property with arrears of rent and damages as stated above. 3. The defendant resisted the suit, alleging as follows in the written statement: The defendant took the premises on lease from the 1st plaintiff on 121961 at a ground rent of Rs 30/- per mensem. Plaintiffs sought to recover possession of the plaint schedule property with arrears of rent and damages as stated above. 3. The defendant resisted the suit, alleging as follows in the written statement: The defendant took the premises on lease from the 1st plaintiff on 121961 at a ground rent of Rs 30/- per mensem. During the period from 121961 to 12 21961 he reclaimed the property and constructed the sheds and a room. Thereafter be executed the lease deed as required by the plaintiffs. He did not protest to the execution of the lease deed, as from his point of view it made no difference in the matter of rent, which remained at Rs. 30/-, as before. After the execution of the lease deed, he bad effected repairs to the shed and the room and they were tiled. In December 1963 he had constructed another shed and a lean-to for the existing shed in the premises which he had taken on ground rent arrangement. He had been using the said sheds and the courtyard on the eastern and western sides under the ground rent arrangement from 121961 onwards. He had been running an industry In the schedule property. He did not commit any acts of trespass, and all that he had been doing would fall within the ground rent arrangement of 121961, and as such he was not liable to pay anything more than the ground rent of Rs. 30/- per mensem. He was entitled to the benefits of Act 1 of 1964, Act 9 of 1967 and Act 35 of 1969, and was not liable to be evicted from the property. There was no proper notice to quit and the suit was not maintainable. In the event of eviction he was entitled to get value of the buildings etc. 4. On the issue whether the lease deed relied on by the plaintiffs was genuine and binding on the defendant the finding of the trial court was in favour of the plaintiffs. The trial court also found that the buildings in the premises belonged to the 1st plaintiff. The lean-to on the back of the schedule building, according to the finding of the trial court, was constructed by the defendant without the permission of the plaintiffs. The trial court also found that the buildings in the premises belonged to the 1st plaintiff. The lean-to on the back of the schedule building, according to the finding of the trial court, was constructed by the defendant without the permission of the plaintiffs. On the question of validity of the notice under S.106 of the Transfer of Property Act, the finding was that there was valid notice terminating the tenancy. On the question of right to recover damages and to remove the lean-to and timber etc., outside the plaint property and within the compound of the first plaintiff, the finding of the trial court was against the plaintiffs. The substantial relief of recovery of the plaint schedule property and the sheds described in the plaint schedule and to recover arrears of rent till the date of eviction as claimed in the plaint was allowed by the trial court in favour of the plaintiffs. Though the matter was carried in appeal, the appellate court, agreeing with the findings of the trial court, dismissed the appeal with costs. 5. Sri. P. K. Kesavan Nair, the learned counsel for the appellant, submits, that though the findings of the courts below are concurrent and are against the defendant, be is still entitled to canvass the correctness of those decisions, as they are vitiated by error of law. Arguments have been advanced before me under three heads: (1) the defendant is entitled to fixity of tenure under S.13 of Act 1 of 1964 as amended by Act 35 of 1969; (2) he is entitled to the protection under S.106 of Act 1 of 1964 as amended by Act 35 of 1969; and (3) the lease is one for manufacturing purpose and as such, six months' notice to quit not having been given, the suit is bad for non-compliance with the provisions of S.106 of the T. P. Act. I will deal with each of these contentions one by one. 6. Prom the description of the property leased as given in the schedule to Ext. P-1 and in the schedule to the plaint, it is found that total extent of the property Is a little less than 5 cents and that the lease is in respect of the two sheds and the courtyard in front of them. From the description of the property I have no hesitation in holding that the lease contemplated under Ext. P-1 and in the schedule to the plaint, it is found that total extent of the property Is a little less than 5 cents and that the lease is in respect of the two sheds and the courtyard in front of them. From the description of the property I have no hesitation in holding that the lease contemplated under Ext. P-1 is one of building and the land appurtenant thereto for the convenient enjoyment thereof, which would fall within the category of matters exempted from the operation of Act 1 of 1964 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) by virtue of the provisions contained in S.3(ii) of the Act. There is, therefore, no merit in the contention that the defendant is entitled to fixity of tenure under S.13 of the Act. It has also to be noted that no such contention was taken in the memorandum of appeal before the first appellate court, though in a vague manner in ground No. 2 in the memorandum of second appeal it has been stated that "the appellant is entitled to fixity of tenure under the provisions of Act 1 of 1964 as amended by Act 35 of 1969". There appears to be no such specific contention in the written statement also, though in Para.6 of the written statement there is a passing reference to the protection against defendant's eviction under the provisions of Act 1 of 1964, Act 9 of 1967 and Act 35 of 1969. Neither the pleadings nor the evidence available in the case warrants a conclusion that the defendant is entitled to fixity of tenure as contemplated under S.13 of the Act." 7. S.106 of the Act also cannot be availed of by the defendant. For the application of the said provision the lease should have been of land for manufacturing or commercial purpose. In this case, as we have already seen, the lease is of the buildings and the land appurtenant thereto and it is the specific finding of the trial court, which has not been disturbed by the first appellate court, that the buildings were put up by the plaintiffs and the lease was In respect of the buildings. In view of this concurrent finding, there is absolutely no scope for applying S.106 of the Act to the facts of the case. The second contention also has, therefore, to be rejected. 8. In view of this concurrent finding, there is absolutely no scope for applying S.106 of the Act to the facts of the case. The second contention also has, therefore, to be rejected. 8. The last contention relates to the question of validity and sufficiency of the notice given by the plaintiffs. A decision on this question centres round the averments in Ext. D-1 notice sent by the plaintiff's Advocate to the defendant. In and by the said notice sent on 5-8-1969, which the defendant received on 11-8-'69, the lease was terminated as on 31-8-1969 and the defendant was required to surrender the property on the next day. This notice, according to the learned counsel for the appellant is invalid as the time allowed to quit falls short of the period of six months as enjoined in S.106 of the T. P Act. The relevant portion of S.106 of the T. P. Act is as follows: "106. In the absence of a contractor local law or usage to the contrary, a lease of immoveable property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by six months, notice expiring with the end of a year of the tenancy; and a lease of immoveable property for any other purpose shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by fifteen days' notice expiring with the end of a month of the tenancy " Sri Kesavan Nair argues that the purpose of the lease was for manufacture, as the lease deed contemplated the installation of a saw mill in the building. The material portion in Ext. P-1 reads as follows: It would be clear from the portion of the recitals in Ext. P-1 extracted above that the lease was not for the purpose of manufacture as such, but was only for the sale of timber. It is specifically made clear that the use of the building should only be for the purpose of effecting sale of sawn timber. So the installation of a sawmill according to Sri. P-1 extracted above that the lease was not for the purpose of manufacture as such, but was only for the sale of timber. It is specifically made clear that the use of the building should only be for the purpose of effecting sale of sawn timber. So the installation of a sawmill according to Sri. C. S. Thomas, the learned counsel for the respondents - plaintiffs, could only be with respect to the machine for cutting the sawn timber to size for the purpose of stocking, and as such, the lease cannot be construed to be one for manufacturing purposes. 9. Sri. Kesavan Nair has cited the decision of the Calcutta High Court In Rupeswari Debi v. M/s. Lokenath Hosiery (AIR. 1962 Calcatta 608) where with respect to a lease pertaining to the running of a hosiery factory, the Calcutta High Court has held as follows: "Where the lessee is running a hosiery factory in the premises the mere fact that one of the rooms is being occupied by one of his officers for residence would not make the purpose i. e. both manufacturing and residential purpose. It would still be a manufacturing purpose. Though the original purpose may not be a manufacturing purpose, if the premises are required and used for manufacturing purposes to the knowledge of the landlord or the lessor six months' notice would be necessary". The facts of the above case show that except for making use of one room by one of the officers of the company, the entire premises is used as a factory, the extent and size presumably is large. That is not the position here, and therefore that decision cannot be applied to the facts of this case 10. The next decision cited by him is the one reported in State v. Madhogarla (A.IR.1959 Kerala 200). That is not the position here, and therefore that decision cannot be applied to the facts of this case 10. The next decision cited by him is the one reported in State v. Madhogarla (A.IR.1959 Kerala 200). This decision also cannot have any bearing to the facts of the instant case, as what came up for consideration of the Division Bench in that case was the nature of the activities carried on by the respondent therein in the light of the definition given to 'manufacturing process' in sub-clause (1) of S.2(k) of the Factories Act, 1948, which reads as follows: "'Manufacturing process' means any process for making, altering, repairing, ornamenting, finishing, packing, oiling, washing, cleaning, breaking up, demolishing or otherwise treating or adapting any article or substance with a view to its use, sale, transport, delivery, or disposal." No definition of the term "manufacturing purposes", as used in S.106 of the Transfer of Property Act, is given in that Act, and therefore the line of the reasoning given in a totally different context, cannot be relied on by the appellant in support of his contention that the lease in the present case evidences one for manufacturing purpose. 11. One other decision cited by Sri. Kesavan Nair is the one In Jayanti Hosiery Mills v. Upendra Chandra Das (AIR. (33) 1946 Calcutta 317). That was a case in which the question whether the particular lease was for manufacturing purposes or not within the scope of S.106 of the Transfer of Property Act, terminable by six months' notice, came up for consideration. In that decision the Calcutta High Court held as follows: "It is Immaterial that the yarn is not produced in the premises in suit. It is enough to make the house a manufacturing house if knitting and cutting operations are gone through in this premises, and that is and essential part of the manufacturing business. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the lease was really taken for manufacturing purposes and consequently, it must be deemed to be a lease from year to year terminable by six months' notice expiring with the end of the year of the tenancy I am afraid, this decision also cannot be applied to the facts of the present case. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the lease was really taken for manufacturing purposes and consequently, it must be deemed to be a lease from year to year terminable by six months' notice expiring with the end of the year of the tenancy I am afraid, this decision also cannot be applied to the facts of the present case. Knitting and cutting operations, stated to be essential parts of the manufacturing business, are stated to have gone through in the premises referred to in the above case. There is no evidence to show that such essential part of the manufacturing business was carried on in the plaint schedule building. Moreover, the purpose of the lease as clearly stipulated in the document itself is one for the sale of sawn timber, and the cutting of the timber with the aid of the saw mill plays only a very minor role in the business, as distinguished from the essential part attributed to "knitting and cutting" operations in the manufacture of yarn as stated in the above case decided by the Calcutta High Court. 12. In this connection it would be advantageous to refer to two decisions of the Supreme Court: (1) In Commisioner of Sales Tax, U. f. v. Dr. Tukh Deo (1968 (1) SCR. 710 = AIR. 1967 SC 499) considering the question whether dispensing of medicines was 'manufacture' within the meaning of the notification issued under S.3A of the U. P. Sales Tax Act, 1948, the Supreme Court held: "When as prescribed by a medical practitioner, a mixture of different drugs is prepared by the medical practitioner or by the employees specially for the use of a patient in the treatment of an ailment or discomfort diagnosed by the medical practitioner by his professional skill, and which mixture is normally incapable of being passed from hand to band as a commercial commodity, the medical practitioner supplying the medicines cannot be said to be a manufacturer of the mixture and the mixture cannot be said to be manufactured within the meaning of the notification."; and (2) C. Mackertich v. Steuari & Co. Ltd. (AIR 1970 S C. 839), which was a case where the very question as to whether six months' notice under S.106 of the T. P. Act was necessary came up for consideration on the pleading that the lease was for manufacturing purpose. Ltd. (AIR 1970 S C. 839), which was a case where the very question as to whether six months' notice under S.106 of the T. P. Act was necessary came up for consideration on the pleading that the lease was for manufacturing purpose. The observation of the Supreme Court in this case was as follows: "In our opinion neither the evidence of Mr. J. N. Ghose nor the statement in Ex. W. Memorandum and Articles of Association, can be taken as sufficient evidence to prove that the purpose of the lease was exclusively or even dominantly for a manufacturing purpose..."' The above decision was rendered in a case where the object of the company to which the lease was granted, as enumerated in Para.3 and 4 of the Memorandum of Articles of Association, was as follows. "(3) To carry on the business of motor-cab, motor-car, motor-omnibus, motor boat and motor-van proprietors, motor-engineers, manufacturers, builders, painters, decorators, and repairers of motor cars, cabs, omnibuses, vans and other vehicles of every description constructed as to progress whether on land or water or in the air. (4) To carry on the business of harness makers and wheel Wright, mechanical engineers and manufacturers of and dealers in lamps whips, rugs, leather goods, India-rubber goods, wheels, springs, axles, upholsterings, India-rubber tyres and all component parts of any carriage or vehicle and other articles used in the manufacture or fitting up of the above mentioned or any similar articles, and manufacturers or factors of or dealers in all products or substances which may be used in or in connection with the said business or any of them or in which it may be considered advantageous to deal." If the lease in respect of a company carrying on such activities as mentioned above cannot be construed to be a lease for manufacturing purposes; much less can be said in the instant case that Ext. P-1 evidences a lease for manufacturing purposes." 13. Sri. Kesavan Nair has also cited the decision in Madhavan Vydiar v. Janaki 1973 KLT 490) in an attempt to establish that the termination of the lease, even if it is treated as one from month to month, is not by notice expiring with the end of a month of the tenancy, and therefore invalid. Sri. Kesavan Nair has also cited the decision in Madhavan Vydiar v. Janaki 1973 KLT 490) in an attempt to establish that the termination of the lease, even if it is treated as one from month to month, is not by notice expiring with the end of a month of the tenancy, and therefore invalid. I do not propose to go into the merit of this contention as, in the absence of such specific pleadings, there is no justification at this belated stage to do so. 14. I also find considerable force in the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that S.106 of the Transfer of Property Act cannot have application to the facts of the case, as there is a contract to the contrary as envisaged in S.106 of the T. P. Act, as could be spelt out from the following recitals In Ext. P-1: The finding of the courts below is that there has been default in the payment of rent and the contract stood forfeited as per the above terms in Ext.P-i, In the light of the above discussion, the second appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.