JUDGMENT CHANDURKAR J.-This petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India arises out of an application filed by the petitioner Jalilkhan before the Second Labour Court at Nagpur, purporting to be one under section 78 (I) A (a) (iii) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The case of the petitioner before the Labour Court was that he was in the employment of the respondent No., 1. Company as a permanent employee and that his services were terminated as no longer required by a notice dated 28-8·1966. He claimed that he had approached the employer by a letter dated 5-9-1966 and had by that letter requested the respondent No.1 to pay his full salary to which he was entitled under the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act and that he should also be reinstated. The defence of the respondent No. 1 was that the petitioner was not working as a full-time clerk at all and that he was given a part time employment in order to help him to earn some money required for his own education. Therefore, according to the respondent No. 1, his termination was not in any manner illegal or contrary to the provisions of the Standing Orders, because it was a discharge simpliciter as his services were no longer required. The respondent No.1 had admitted that a notice dated 5·9·1966 had been given by the petitioner but that notice, according to the respondent No. 1 was not an approach notice as contemplated by law and, therefore, the application made to the Labour Court was not maintainable. The respondent No. 1, therefore, denied the claim of the petitioner for reinstatement. 2. The Second Labour Court at Nagpur which had tried the application of the petitioner held that the petitioner had failed to prove that the Management had any grudge against him and that the order was in any manner illegal. It held that the documents on record and the petitioners own admission showed that the Management had rendered help to the petitioner in prosecuting his higher studies in a college. The Labour Court, therefore, found that there was no illegal removal as alleged by the petitioner and, therefore, he was not entitled to any relief. It held that the documents on record and the petitioners own admission showed that the Management had rendered help to the petitioner in prosecuting his higher studies in a college. The Labour Court, therefore, found that there was no illegal removal as alleged by the petitioner and, therefore, he was not entitled to any relief. With regard to the validity of the contention of the respondent No. 1 that a proper approach notice had not been given and therefore the application for reinstatement filed before the Labour Court was not maintainable, the Labour Court took the view that the petitioner had failed to show that he had complied with the requirements of rule 53 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Rules, 1947 .(hereinafter referred to as the Rules). On a construction of the letter itself, the Labour Court held that the letter could not be treated as a request for reinstatement as the requirements of rule 53 had not been followed. The application of the petitioner was treated as one under section 78 (1) A (a) (iii) of the Act and was held to be not maintainable. It was, therefore, rejected. 3. Against this order of the Labour Court, the petitioner filed an appeal before the Industrial Court at Nagpur. The learned Judge of the Industrial Court came to the conclusion that the petitioner was not a temporary employee. He found that unless the petitioner was given .one months notice, his services could not be terminated. The termination was, therefore, found to be illegal. The Industrial Court, however, took the view that the application of the petitioner would fall under section 78 (1) A (a) (ii) of the Act. The learned Member of the Industrial Court concurred with the finding given by the Labour Court that the copy of the approach notice served by the petitioner on the employer was not forwarded to the Commissioner of Labour and the approach notice could not, therefore, be said to have complied with the provisions of rule 53 of the Rules. The Industrial Court, therefore, held that non-compliance with rule 53 of the Rules was fatal and that the application filed before the Labour Court by the petitioner was not tenable. In view of this finding, it dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner. This petition is now filed by the petitioner challenging these two orders of the Industrial Courts. 4. The Industrial Court, therefore, held that non-compliance with rule 53 of the Rules was fatal and that the application filed before the Labour Court by the petitioner was not tenable. In view of this finding, it dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner. This petition is now filed by the petitioner challenging these two orders of the Industrial Courts. 4. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner by Shri Sohoni that the failure of the petitioner to send a copy of the approach notice to either the Commissioner of Labour or the Labour Officer did not affect the validity of the approach notice itself and that what was really material for the purpose deciding whether the provisions of the proviso to sub-section (4) of section. section have been complied with, was whether a request for reinstating the petition was made by him to the employer concerned. Reliance was placed by the petitioner on a Division Bench of this Court in The Aruna Mills Ltd., Ahmedabad v. The Industrial Court, Bombay and others!, in support of the proposition that the failure to send a copy of the a aproach notice to the Commissioner of Labour or the Labour Officer did not off ct the fact that the employer was approached by the employee as contemplated by the proviso to sub-section (4) of section 42 of the Act. 5. Sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 42 of the Act deal with a notice of change which is required to be given in case a change is sought either by the employer or by the employee. Under sub-section (I) of section 42 it is provided that any employer intending to effect any change in respect of an industrial matter specified in Schedule II shall give notice of such intention in the prescribed form to the representative of employees. The employer is required to send a copy of such notice to the Chief Conciliator, the conciliator for the industry concerned for the local area, the Registrar, the Labour Officer and such other person as may be prescribed. He is also required to affix a copy of such notice at a conspicuous place on the premises where the employees affected by the change are employed for work and at such other place as may be directed by the Chief Conciliator in any particular case. He is also required to affix a copy of such notice at a conspicuous place on the premises where the employees affected by the change are employed for work and at such other place as may be directed by the Chief Conciliator in any particular case. Sub-section (2) of section 42 deals with the right of the employer: to give a notice of change. It provides that an employee desiring a change in respect of an industrial matter not specified in Schedule I or III shall give notice in the prescribed form to the employer through the representative of employees who shall forward a copy of the notice to the Chief Conciliator, the Conciliator for the industry concerned for the local area, the registrar, the Labour Officer and such other person as may be prescribed. Sub· sections (3) and (4) then provide as follows: "(3) When no settlement is arrived at in any conciliation proceeding in regard to any industrial dispute which has arisen in consequence of a notice relating to any change given under sub-section (1) or sub· section (2), no fresh notice with regard to the same change or a change similar in all material particulars shall be given before the expiry of two months from the date of the completion of the proceeding within the meaning of section 68. If, at any time after the expiry of the said period of two months, any employer or employee again desires the same change or a change similar in all material particulars, he shall give fresh notice in the manner provided in sub-section (1) or (2), as the case may be. (4) Any employee or a representative union desiring a change in respect of (i) any order passed by the employer under standing orders, or (ii) any industrial matter arising out of the application or interpretation of standing orders, or (iii) an industrial matter specified in Schedule III. (except item ( 5) thereof), shall make an application to the Labour Court and as respects change desired in any industrial matter specified in item (5) of Schedule III, to the Industrial Court. (except item ( 5) thereof), shall make an application to the Labour Court and as respects change desired in any industrial matter specified in item (5) of Schedule III, to the Industrial Court. Provided that no such application shall lie unless the employee or a representative union has in the prescribed manner approached the employer with a request for the change and no agreement has been arrived at in respect of the change within the prescribed period." We have referred to these provisions in several parts of section 42 with a view to point out that while sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 42 specifically refer to a notice of change being given by the employer or the employee, as the case may be, sub-section (4) does not in terms refer to any notice of change being required to be given where an employees desires a change in respect of the matters specified in sub-section (4). The provisions of sub-section (4) indicate that where an employee desires a change in respect of the matters enumerated in that sub-section, he has either to apply to the Labour Court where the change relates either to any order passed by the employer under the standing orders, or any industrial matter arising out of the application or interpretation of standing orders, or an industrial matter specified in Schedule III, except item (5) thereof; or he has to approach the Industrial Court where he seeks a a change in the matter specified in item (5) of Schedule III. The proviso to sub-section (4), however, specifies a condition precedent which must be satisfied before the employee approaches the Labour Court or the Industrial Court, as the case may be. The proviso to sub-section (4) positively provides that an application contemplated by sub-section (4) of section 42 shall not lie unless the employee or representative union has approached the employer with a request for the change and no agreement has been arrived at in respect of the change within the prescribed period. Two conditions must, therefore, be satisfied before an employee seeking a change in any of the matters specified in sub-section (4) of section 42 can file an application either to the Labour Court or to the Industrial Court, as the case may be. Two conditions must, therefore, be satisfied before an employee seeking a change in any of the matters specified in sub-section (4) of section 42 can file an application either to the Labour Court or to the Industrial Court, as the case may be. The first condition is either that he or the representative union must have approached the employer with a request for the change; the second condition is that no agreement has been arrived at in respect of the said change between the employee or the representative union on the one side and the employer on the other. The prescribed manner and the prescribed period referred to in the proviso is to be found in rule 53 of the Rules which reads as follows: "53. (1) Any employee or a Representative Union desiring a change in respect of (i) any order passed by the employer concerned under Standing Orders or (ii) any industrial matter arising out of the application or interpretation of Standing Orders or (iii) an industrial matter specified in Schedule III shall make an application in writing to the employer. An application for change in respect of an order passed by the employer under Standing Orders shall be made within a period of three months from the date of such order. Where such application is make by an employee it may be made to the employer direct or through the Labour Officer for the local area or the representative of employees concerned. A copy of the application shall be forwarded to the Commissioner of Labour and in cases where such application is not made through the Labour Officer for the local area to that officer. (2) Where an application has been made by an employee under sub-rule (II the employer and the employee may arrive at an agreement within fifteen days of the receipt of the application by the employer or within such further period as may be mutually fixed by the employer and the employee or the Labour Officer for the local area or the representative of employees as the case may be. (3) Where an application has been made by a Representative Union under sub rule (l), the employer and the Representative Union may arrive at an agreement within fifteen days of the receipt of the application by the employer or within such further period as may be mutually agreed upon by the parties." This rule, therefore, requires that the approach which is contemplated to be made by an application to the employer has to be made within three months from the date of the order which is passed by the employer. This rule also requires that a copy of this application has to be sent to the Commissioner of Labour and where such application is not made through the Labour Officer for the local area to that officer. 6. The provisions of section 42 (4) of the Act came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in M/s. C. J. Patel & Co. v. The Industrial Court, Maharashtra Nagpur Bench, Nagpur and others2. The Supreme Court was dealing with an appeal against a decision of this Court in M/s. Chhotabkai Jethabhai Patel & Co. by its manager v. The Industrial Court, Nagpur and others3 This Court had held that in respect of orders of dismissal passed under the Standing Orders the employee was not hampered by the pre-conditions of section 42 (4) of the Act and the proviso thereto, before he can get relief when an application is made under section 78 (1) D of the Act. The view taken was that it was not necessary for the employee to approach the employer as contemplated by the proviso to sub-section (4) of section 42 of the Act before he makes an application to the Labour Court. This construction of the provisions of section 42(4) and section 78 (1) D was not, however, accepted by the Supreme Court in M/s. C. J. Patel & Co.’s case cited supra. Dealing with this question the Supreme Court observed in paragraphs 13 and 16 as follows :- "13. The question therefore narrows down to this, i.e., whether the Legislature by inserting paragraph D in section 78 (1) in tended to chalk out a wholly different course of action to that prescribed in Chapter VIII dealing with changes. In our view, there is nothing in the Act which warrants such a conclusion. The question therefore narrows down to this, i.e., whether the Legislature by inserting paragraph D in section 78 (1) in tended to chalk out a wholly different course of action to that prescribed in Chapter VIII dealing with changes. In our view, there is nothing in the Act which warrants such a conclusion. The Scheme of Chapter VIII seems to be that in regard to any change in an industrial matter there must be compliance with the provisions of that Chapter. In other words, effort must first be made by the employer intending to effect any change in respect of matters covered by section 42(1) or an employee desiring a change in respect of any order passed by the employer under Standing Orders which would of necessity include an order of dismissal, to see whether it was possible to come to any agreement and an application to the Labour Court could only be resorted to after efforts had been made to settle the dispute and no agreement had been arrived at." "16. It must be held that a person who is dismissed would be an employee within the meaning of section 3 (13) of the Act and we can see no valid reason for differentiating the case of a dismissed employee from one who complains of some other change. As the scheme of the Act is that disputes should be settled as far as possible and primarily through conciliation and agreement, it does not stand to reason that an employee should be able to Side step all this by a direct reference to the Labour Court. A Labour Court is a creature of the statute and it can only exercise such jurisdiction as the statute confers on it; if there are certain pre-conditions to the exercise of its jurisdiction, it must refuse to entertain any such application unless such pre-conditions are first complied with." - (Italios is ours). 7. The exposition of the law relating to the construction of section 42 (4) and the proviso thereto read with section 78(1)D does not now, therefore, leave any doubt that before an employee approaches the Labour Court, he must give, what is in common parlance called, an approach notice, to the employer. 7. The exposition of the law relating to the construction of section 42 (4) and the proviso thereto read with section 78(1)D does not now, therefore, leave any doubt that before an employee approaches the Labour Court, he must give, what is in common parlance called, an approach notice, to the employer. It is not disputed that the change which is sought in the instant case, viz, the claim for setting aside an order of dismissal as it is termed by the employee is covered by Entry (6) in Schedule III which reads as "Employment including (i) reinstatement and recruitment; (ii) unemployment of persons previously employed in the industry concerned." Thus, specific prayer of the petitioner in his application made before the Labour Court and in his communication addressed to the employer on 5-9-1966 (Annexure-D) is that he should be reinstated. The application which was made by the petitioner before the Labour Court, therefore, was expressly covered by section 78 (1) D of the Act and not by section 78 (1) A (ii) or (iii) of the Act. This position indeed is not now in dispute before us. The stand taken by the employer that the petitioner must, therefore, show that he had complied with the requirements of the proviso to sub· section t4) of section 42 was justified. 8. It was, however, contended on behalf of the petitioner-employee that the finding given by the Industrial Court that the communication dated 5-9-1966 cannot in law be called an approach notice and, in any case, that notice was ineffective because a copy of that notice was not sent either to the Commissioner of Labour or to the Labour Officer of the area concerned, was not justified either by the contents of the said communication or by the requirements of rule 53 of the Rules. Rule 53 does not prescribe any particular form for making an application by the employee to the employer. The proviso to subsection (4) merely provides for prescribing a manner in which such an application should be made. The manner prescribed by rule 53 is that either the application is to be sent directly to the employer or through the Labour Officer of the area concerned. The proviso to subsection (4) merely provides for prescribing a manner in which such an application should be made. The manner prescribed by rule 53 is that either the application is to be sent directly to the employer or through the Labour Officer of the area concerned. If it is possible to positively ascertain from the application made by the employee to the employer the nature of the change which is sought by the employee and if the contents of such a communication sent by the employee are in the view of the Court sufficient to give notice to the employer as to what change the employee is seeking, in our view, such an application or a communication will satisfy the requirement of the proviso to sub-section (4) of section 42. When we look at the communication sent by the employee, we find that the employee has expressly made a demand for reinstatement because after having recited the fact of the termination of his employment, the employee has prayed, "pay my full salary as per minimum wages along with the previous arrears and reinstate me". It is difficult to appreciate the view taken by the Industrial Court as to why such a request made by the employee cannot be said to be an application asking for reinstatement which is the only change which the employee was seeking. On a bare reading of this application we are satisfied that this, communication dated 5-9-1966 is an application by the employee to the employer praying for his reinstatement. In our view, the Industrial Court was, therefore, not right in holding that the sending of this letter cannot be treated as compliance with the proviso to sub-section (4) of section 42 of the Act. 9. We are also not satisfied that the other ground on which the Industrial Court has held that the requirement of proviso to sub-section (4) of section 42 of the Act is not satisfied, can be sustained. It is, no doubt, true that rule 53 requires a copy of an application made to the employer to be served on the Commissioner of Labour or to the Labour Officer of the local area concerned if the application is not sent through the Labour Officer. This requirement clearly appears to us to be directory in nature. It is, no doubt, true that rule 53 requires a copy of an application made to the employer to be served on the Commissioner of Labour or to the Labour Officer of the local area concerned if the application is not sent through the Labour Officer. This requirement clearly appears to us to be directory in nature. Neither the Act nor the rules provide for any consequences for failure to comply with the requirement of rule 53. At the same time, merely because of the failure of the employee to send copies to the authorities named in rule 53 we cannot ignore the fact that the employee has positively approached the employer by making an application to him praying for reinstatement in his employment. The main object of the proviso to section 42 (4) of the Act is to give an opportunity to the employer to settle the demand made by the employee by mutual agreement and this purpose is served when the application is made by the employee to the employer. The receipt or non-receipt of the copy of the application by the Labour Commissioner or by the Labour Officer does not prevent the employer from considering the request made by the employee and arriving at an agreement with him regarding the change if it is possible. We are supported in this view which we are taking by an earlier decision of this Court in Aruna Mills Lid. Ahmedabad v. The Industrial Court Bombay & others cited supra. A similar argument was advanced in that case. The employee in that case was Claiming a change in his wages and had sent an application to the employer as contemplated by the proviso to section 42 (4) of the Act, but he had not sent copies of that application to the Commissioner of Labour and to the Labour Officer for the local area concerned. The argument for the employer there was that since the prescribed procedure had not been followed, the employee cannot be said to have asked for the change as contemplated by section 42 (4) of tile Act. The argument for the employer there was that since the prescribed procedure had not been followed, the employee cannot be said to have asked for the change as contemplated by section 42 (4) of tile Act. Repelling this contention the Division Bench observed as follows:- "The proviso to sub-section (4) of section 42 states that an approach to tile employer for a change should be made to the prescribed manner Sub-rule (1) of rule 53 provides that a copy of the application made to the employer shall be forwarded to the Commissioner of Labour and also to the Labour Officer for the local area. Respondent No. 6 (employee) had not sent copies of his letter to the petitioner to these officers Mr. Rane has, therefore, urged that as the prescribed procedure had not been followed, respondent No.6 cannot be said to have asked for change within the meaning Sub-section (4,) of section 42. It is however clear from his letter that he had asked for a change in his wages. It will be difficult to bold that he had not asked for a change merely because he did not send copies of his letter to the Commissioner of Labour and the Labour Officer, as he ought to have done under the rules." 10. We must, therefore, hold that the failure of the petitioner to send copies of his application made to the employer, to the Commissioner of Labour and to the Labour Officer did not come in his way of applying to the Labour Court because the employer had, admittedly, failed to accept the plea of reinstatement made by the employee in his application and, therefore, no agreement had been reached between the employee and the employer with regard to the change which the employee had sought. 11. It was sought to be contended on behalf of the respondent No.1 that mere making of an application to the employer was not sufficient compliance with the provisions of the proviso to sub-section (4) of section 42 of the Act. It was contended that the petitioner should have pursued the matter further by taking the matter to the Conciliator under section 54 of the Act. This contention was obviously raised hailing regard to the observations of the Supreme Court quoted above in paragraph 16 of their judgment in C. J. Patel and Companys case. It was contended that the petitioner should have pursued the matter further by taking the matter to the Conciliator under section 54 of the Act. This contention was obviously raised hailing regard to the observations of the Supreme Court quoted above in paragraph 16 of their judgment in C. J. Patel and Companys case. As already pointed out above, the Supreme Court had observed that the scheme of the Act was that disputes should be settled as far as possible and primarily through conciliation and agreement. There is, however, nothing in the judgment of the Supreme Court to show that the reference to conciliation made in paragraph 16 of the judgment was intended to be to the conciliation proceedings contemplated by Chapter X of the Act. The Supreme Court had referred to several material provisions of the Act but the provisions of section 54 do not find any reference in the judgment. The contention of the petitioner also cannot be accepted having regard to the words of section 54 (1). section 54- (1) which is to be found in Chapter X, which is headed as "Conciliation Proceedings", provides as follows:- "54. (1) If any proposed change in respect of which notice is given under section 42, or an intimation or special notice is given under section 43 is objected to by the employer or the employee, as the case may be, the party who gave such notice, intimation or special notice shall. if he still desire that the change should be effected, forward to the Registrar, toe Chief Conciliator and the Conciliator for the local area for the industry concerned a full statement of the ease in the prescribed form within fifteen day s from the date of service of such notice, intimation or special notice on the other party or within one week of the expiry of the period fixed by both the parties under sub-section (1) of section 44 for arriving at an agreement. Explanation.-For the purposes of this sub-section a change shall be deemed to be objected to by the employer or employee, as the case may be, if within seven days from the date of service of such notice, intimation or special notice or within the period fixed by both the parties under sub-section (l) of section 44 for arriving at an agreement a memorandum of agreement has not been forwarded to the Registrar under the said sub· section. " It is, no doubt, true that section 54 refers to section 42 also and as a matter of first impression section 42 (4) can also be read as being covered by section 42 as referred to in section 54. But a closure look at the provisions of section 42 and section 54 indicates that the conciliation proceedings contemplated by section 54 were not contemplated in a case which is covered by sub-section (4) of section 42 of the Act. The pre-condition for approaching the Registrar or the Chief Conciliator or the Conciliator is that a notice of change should have been given and the person giving such a notice of change must still desire that the change should be effected. A notice of change which is contemplated in section 42 is to be found only in sub-sections (1) and (2) of that section. Sub-section (4) of section 42 does not refer to any notice of change at all. While sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 42 require the employer and the employee respectively to give a notice of change, sub-section (4) of that section enables the employee to make an application to the Labour Court or the Industrial Court, as the case may be; but under the proviso, he is required to make an application to the employer asking for such a change to be made. Having regard to the use of the different phraseology in sub-sections (I) and (2) and sub-section (4) it is not possible for us to accept the contention that where the employer declines to make the change in respect of which an application has been made by the employee under the proviso to sub-section (4) of section 42, the employee is further required to proceed with the matter and then to approach the Conciliator under section 54. This is also clear from the provisions of section 79(3) (b) of the Act. This is also clear from the provisions of section 79(3) (b) of the Act. Section 79 of the Act provides for an application to be made to the Labour Court. Sub· sections (1), (2) and (3) thereof read as follows :- "79. (1) Proceedings before a Labour Court in respect of disputes falling under clause (6) of paragraph A of sub-section (1) of section 78 shall he commenced on an application made by any of the parties to the dispute, a special application under sub-section (3) of section 52 or an application by the Labour Officer or a representative union and proceedings in respect of a matter falling under clause (c) of the said paragraph A on an application made by any employer or employee directly affected or the Labour Officer or a representative union. (2) Every application under sub-section (1) shall be made in the prescribed form and manner. (3) An application in respect of a dispute falling under clause (a) of paragraph A of sub- section (1) of section 78 shall be made. (a) if it is a dispute falling under sub-clause (i) or (ii) of the said clause within three months of the arising of the dispute; (b) if it is a dispute falling under sub-clause (iii) of the said clause, within three months of the employee concerned having last approached the employer under the proviso to sub-section (4) of section 42." The provisions of clause (b) of sub-section (3) of section 79 will show that where an application in respect of a dispute falling under clause (a) of paragraph A of section 78 is to be made, if the dispute is one which falls under sub-clause (iii), i.e. any change made by an employer or desired by an employee in. respect of an industrial matter specified in Schedule III except item (5) thereof and matters arising out of such change, which is also one of the matters referred to in sub-section (4) of section 42, it is required to be made within three months of the employee concerned having last approached the employer under the proviso to sub-section (4) of section 42. Thus the limitation for making an application in respect of a change which is contemplated by section 42 (4) commences not from the failure of any conciliation proceedings as contemplated by section 54 but from the time when the employee has last approached the employer. It is thus clear that all that the law contemplated in a case where the employee wants to approach the Labour Court under section 78 is respect of a change covered by section 42 (4) is the making of an application to the employer in the manner prescribed by Rule 53 and if the employer fails to take note of the demand and the parties fail to arrive at an agreement, it is open to the employee to approach the Labour Court. It is not necessary for him to take recourse to the machinery of conciliation provided by section 54 of the Act. We are not, therefore, inclined to construe the observations of the Supreme Court in paragraph 16 of the judgment in the manner as contended on behalf of the respondent No.1. 12. Though we have reversed the findings with regard to the validity of the approach notice which were recorded against the petitioner by the Indus. trial Court, the respondent No.1 Was entitled to justify the order of dismissal of the application on any other ground. It was, therefore, urged on behalf of the respondent No.1 that the appeal filed before the Industrial Court against the order of the Labour Court was not maintainable. The position that in a case where the Labour Court exercised jurisdiction under section 78 (1) D in a matter relating to reinstatement the order passed by the Labour Court is not appeal able, stands settled by a Division Bench decision of this Court in Shri Talkies, Kamptee v. Industrial Court4. The Division Bench has in that case held that an order passed by the Labour Court in exercise of its powers under section 78 (1), Para D, of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, is not made appealable under section 84 (I) of the Act and no appeal therefore against such an order lies to the Industrial Court. The order of the Industrial Court shows that it was purporting to decide an appeal which was filed by the employee. The order of the Industrial Court shows that it was purporting to decide an appeal which was filed by the employee. Having regard to the accepted position that the application was in substance one intended to invoke the jurisdiction of the Labour Court under section 78 (1) D, the appeal filed was not tenable. That, however, cannot prevent the Industrial Court from exercising its revisional jurisdiction if such exercise was warranted by the facts of the case. 13. One of the contentions raised on behalf of the respondent No.1 before the Industrial Court was that the finding given by the Labour Court that the present petitioner was a part-time employee should not be disturbed. The same argument is again advanced before us. It is not necessary for us to go into this question in view of the fact that we are now setting aside the order of the Industrial Court by which it set aside the order of the Labour Court and remanding the matter back to the Industrial Court. Since the order of the Industrial Court was passed in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction when no such appeal lay, that order is quashed. The matter ill remanded to the Industrial Court to enable it to go into the question whether the petitioner can justifiably invoke its revisional jurisdiction and whether he can challenge any of the findings given by the Labour Court. The result, therefore, is that the petition is allowed but in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to Costs. Petition allowed.