K. P. SETHUMADHAVAN v. DISTRICT EDUCATIONAL OFFICER, PALGHAT
1973-12-04
K.SADASIVAN, P.GOVINDA NAIR
body1973
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment :- 1. The question that is raised in this appeal is a very limited one and as we understand it, the question is only whether the educational authorities have power under the Kerala Education Act and the Rules framed thereunder to direct the Manager of an aided school to appoint a particular teacher as the Headmaster. The Assistant Educational Officer by Exts. P2 and P3 orders produced along with the Original Petition directed that the 3rd respondent in the Original Petition who is also the 3rd respondent in this appeal should be appointed as the Headmaster of the school of which the appellant is the Manager who is also a teacher there. The appellant questioned the orders Exts. P2 and P3 by way of appeal before the District Educational Officer, the 1st respondent herein, but the appeal was dismissed by Ext. P4 order. 2. Justice Viswanatha Iyer dismissed the Original Petition challenging the orders Exts. P2, P3 and P4 mainly on the ground that the appellant being the Manager of the school is precluded from functioning as the Headmaster in view of R.8 of Chapter III of the Kerala Education Rules. The appellant being thus eliminated the 3rd respondent who was directed to be appointed was held to be the proper person to be appointed and therefore it was held that no interference was necessary. 3. We would have normally dismissed this appeal, but we think, there is a matter of principle involved which has to be clarified. The power to appoint the Headmaster or a teacher is vested in the Manager under the educational Act and the Rules. Notwithstanding the restrictions and the limitations introduced by the Act and Rules this power is still with the Manager. The only insistence by the Act and the Rules being that this power must be exercised subject to the provisions of the Act and Rules. No educational authority has the power in the first instance to direct that any person should be appointed as a teacher or the Headmaster in a school. That power must be exercised by the Manager.
The only insistence by the Act and the Rules being that this power must be exercised subject to the provisions of the Act and Rules. No educational authority has the power in the first instance to direct that any person should be appointed as a teacher or the Headmaster in a school. That power must be exercised by the Manager. This is understandable, and is as it should be, because it is he who has to run the school and his power of choice and his ideas of competence and the manner in which he wants the school to be run, which we expect would be in the most efficient manner, and in the best interests, of the pupils and in the interests of general public, must not be interfered with by the educational authorities created by the statute only for the purpose of ensuring fair play and the prevention of favourism or of denying to persons rights they have under the statute and the rules. Often times this position is forgotten, and the only reason why we are now dealing with this matter in appeal is to remind the authorities concerned that this is the position and this must be strictly followed and adhered to. 4. We would wish to say nothing on the merits of the claim of the appellant or of the 3rd respondent for the post of Headmaster in the school. That the post fell vacant, that the appellant assumed charge, that he did not appoint anybody else as the Headmaster and apparently matters were allowed to drift in this fashion for some time, and that was the reason why the 3rd respondent complained to the Assistant Educational authority and why Exts. P2 and P3 orders were passed are clear. Our attention was invited by counsel appearing for the educational authorities to R.64 of Chapter XIV (A) of the Kerala Education Rules and it was urged that there was a dispute between the appellant and the 3rd respondent and the Assistant Educational Officer was competent to deal with that dispute. Counsel is quite correct in the submission that the ambit of R.64 is very wide. Any dispute between a teacher and the Manager can be taken up before the educational authorities and if it is so taken up, they are bound to deal with the matter. There are however two reasons why the orders Exts.
Counsel is quite correct in the submission that the ambit of R.64 is very wide. Any dispute between a teacher and the Manager can be taken up before the educational authorities and if it is so taken up, they are bound to deal with the matter. There are however two reasons why the orders Exts. P2 and P3 cannot be upheld as falling under R.64 of Chapter XIV (A). First of all there was no appointment made to the post of Headmaster by the appellant. And there was no specific order against the 3rd respondent saying that he will not be appointed. The complaint could therefore have been only that there was undue delay in the matter of filling up the post and a direction could therefore have been given that the post must be filled up in accordance with the provisions in the Act and the Rules without further delay. This was not what was done by Exts. P2 and P3. Secondly in dealing with the complaint of the 3rd respondent, the Assistant Educational Officer did not act in the manner in which he should have. The complaint should have been forwarded to the appellant and his representations and what he had to say regarding the complaint of the 3rd respondent should have been considered before passing the orders Exts. P2 and P3. In this respect also the orders Exts. P2 and P3 cannot stand and Ext. P4 only confirms the order Exts. P2 and P3 and it must therefore fall with Exts. P2 and P3. 5. Elaborate arguments have been advanced before us by counsel for the appellant and for the 3rd respondent, the former insisting that there are sufficient grounds to overlook the seniority of the 3rd respondent (it is admitted that the 3rd respondent is senior to the appellant as a teacher). It is pointed out that the appellant is an S. S. L. C. with T. T. C. qualification whereas the 3rd respondent is only a person who has been held eligible to appear for the T. T. C. and holding only a H. E. T. T. C. and therefore the appellant has better qualifications than the 3rd respondent. It is even suggested by counsel that there were complaints against the 3rd respondent and the 3rd respondent was not suitable for the post of a Headmaster.
It is even suggested by counsel that there were complaints against the 3rd respondent and the 3rd respondent was not suitable for the post of a Headmaster. In reply thereto the respondent contended that he is a person fully qualified and eligible under R.45-A in Chapter XIV (A) and there is no blemish attached to him. It is further submitted that the appellant by virtue of R.3 of Chapter III is precluded from becoming a Headmaster and the question whether he is entitled to hold the post of Headmaster must be determined with reference to the date on which the vacancy, occurred, namely, 14 1973 and that even if the appellant decided to give up his management of the school he cannot be considered for the post of Headmaster that fell vacant on 141973. These are all matters which have to be duly considered before any appointment is made. The appointment order has to be passed by the appellant since he is the Manager of the school. It is necessary that this order should be passed as early as possible, in any case, before the 31st of December, 1973. Any person aggrieved by the order will be entitled to question the order in appropriate proceedings. 6. In the light of the above, we set aside the judgment under appeal and Exts. P2, P3 and P4 orders and direct the appellant to pass an order appointing a Headmaster to the school considering the claims of the 3rd respondent and bearing in mind that the provisions in the Kerala Education Rules and stating the reasons for the appointment of that person and if the preferential claim that a senior ordinarily has by virtue of R.44 and 45-A in Chapter XVI (A) is to be overlooked stating in the order specific reasons for doing so. Such an order will be passed on or before 3112 1973. There will be no order as to costs. Allowed.