JUDGMENT P. Govindan Nair, C.J. 1. The only point urged by counsel for the appellant, the Kerala State Electricity Board, is that the order Ext. R-6 passed by the Board reducing the pension payable to the respondent satisfies the requirements of rule 67 in Chapter V of Part III of the Kerala Service Rules. These rules have admittedly been made applicable to the Kerala State Electricity Board. The rule runs thus: "67. Award of full pension. (a) The full pension admissible under the rules is not to be given as a matter of course, or unless the service rendered has been really approved. (b) If the service has not been thoroughly satisfactory, the authority sanctioning the pensions should make such reduction in the amounts as it thinks proper. Note 1. Government may review its orders if the affected officer makes a request within a period of three months from the date of orders. Note 2. This rule does not operate to authorise a reduction of ordinary pension either to nothing or to a nominal amount." 2. It is unnecessary to go into the history of the fairly long dispute that has been fought out by the Board and the respondent which originated with an order of suspension against the respondent and culminated by his retirement on refusal by this Court to extend the time for enquiry and the judgment in O.P. No. 2943 of 1970 by which this Court quashed a fresh attempt to conduct an enquiry against the respondent. To resume from there we may refer to Ext. P-1 notice issued to the respondent in which certain grounds have been alleged in support of the view that there must be a reduction of the pension payable to the respondent. The respondent filed a representation Ext. P-2 and thereafter the order Ext. R-6 followed. The relevant part of the order contains only one sentence which is in these terms: "The Board carefully considered the replies of Sri K. Narayanan and has come to the conclusion that his service under the Board as Superintendent of Stores at Alwaye has not been satisfactory." Justice Poti found this to be a very unsatisfactory order and quashed it. The Electricity Board says that it is an order in accordance with law. The question is whether this is supportable. 3. The Electricity Board says that it is an order in accordance with law. The question is whether this is supportable. 3. It is now well established that the right to a pension does not arise from any bounty that the right to pension is property and a deprivation of that property would be violative of the guarantee under Article 19 of the Constitution. However bald the rule may be in its terms, or in its wording, the rule has to be approached in the background of the fact that there is a valuable right which normally accrues to a person who had spent the best part of his life in the service of the State or the Electricity Board or some other institution, to get his full pension though of course it is not an automatic procedure by which in all cases he would get his full pension. The question is whether the pension can be reduced by merely stating that his service has been found to be unsatisfactory. In this case there is no lack of notice; Ext. P-1 issued to the respondent satisfies the requirement that a person to be affected must be informed in specific terms the grounds on which action, is proposed. The principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the decision in M. Gopalakrishna Naidu v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 240 is therefore satisfied. There is a further point that on representations being made against such notice the order by which a person's rights are adversely affected the order must itself indicate on the face of it the reasons for such action; in other words the order should be a speaking order (vide 1970 S.C. 1302). This requirement is not satisfied by Ext. R-6 as think the principle of the decision in M/s Mahabir Prasad Santosh Kumar v. State of U.P. and others, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1032 must apply to proceedings under rule 67 as well. 4. Counsel for the appellant invited our attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in M. Narasimhachar v. The State of Mysore, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 247. The order in that case was also somewhat similarly worded as the order Ext. R-6 here. But the observations of the Supreme Court in that case will have to be understood in the light of the arguments that have been advanced by counsel for the appellant. The order in that case was also somewhat similarly worded as the order Ext. R-6 here. But the observations of the Supreme Court in that case will have to be understood in the light of the arguments that have been advanced by counsel for the appellant. There the only contention that was raised was that the order was violative of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. This was negatived by the Supreme Court. Whether in passing an order under the appropriate rule reducing pension the principles of natural justice should be followed and speaking orders should be ceased had not been considered by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in 1960 S.C. 247. The matter has been left open in the decision of the Supreme Court in Deokinnandan Prasad v. The State of Bihar and others, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1409 (vide page 1419, paragraph 32). No decision dealing with a similar matter other than the Full Bench decision of the Punjab High Court in K. R. Erry and another v. State of Punjab , A.I.R. 1967 Punjab 279 has been brought to our notice. The Punjab High Court does not dealt with the full ambit of a similar rule which was dealt with therein nor do we think that we are called upon in this case to determine the exact scene and ambit of rule 67. All that the learned Judge said in the judgment under appeal is that the order on the face of it must indicate that the representation made by the person that there were no grounds to reduce the pension was considered and that it was rejected for reasons discernible from the order itself. This we conceive in a minimum requirement in reducing pension. We see therefore no reason to interfere with the judgment under appeal. We dismiss this appeal but direct the parties to bear their respective costs. 5. The time granted by the judgment under appeal for passing final orders has already been expired. We extend the time up to for a month from today. Final orders must be passed on or before the 5th January, 1974.