( 1 ) THIS petition is directed against the order made by the Mysore Revenue Appellate tribunal, Bangalore in Appeal No. 914/71 and Appeal no. 522/71 (R ). The petitioner is, however concerned only with the result of the Appeal No. 914 of 1971. This order, therefore is confined to the order relating to such appeal. ( 2 ) THE petitioner was served with a notice under sub-section (3) of S. 94 of the Mysore Land Revenue Act which provides for eviction of unauthorised occupants of lands belonging to the Government specified in subsection (1) there of. This order was issued by the Tahsildar of Buntwal taluk. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner appealed to the Tribunal. The Tribunal after a reference to the Full Bench came to the conclusion that an appeal against such an order of eviction would not be maintainable. The appeal, however, is yet to be disposed of by the Regular bench of that Tribunal. Aggrieved by the opinion of the Full Bench, the petitioner has approached this Court. ( 3 ) THE Tribunal held that sub-30c (3) of S. 94 was an integral part of of the other sub-sections of that section and further by virtue of the finality attached to the orders made under sub-sec. (2) of S. 94, the appeal would not be competent. ( 4 ) ON a careful examination of the scheme of S. 94 and also the delegability of the power of the Deputy Commissioner under S. 94 (3) of the act, I am clearly of opinion that this view of the Tribunal is erroneous. Sub-sec. (1) of S. 94 empowers the Deputy Commissioner that in case of unauthorised occupation of land, set apart for any special purpose or any unoccupied land which has not been alienated by the Government, to levy a fine not exceeding Rs. 1,000 per acre subject to certain conditions specified therein and also an assessment amounting to twice the assessment for every year of his unauthorised occupation as would be leviable in regard to similar land in the same village. It does not in specific terms refer to eviction. Sub-sec. (2) of that section, inter alia, declares that any determination of the fine and assessment made by the Deputy Commr. on such lands in the preceding sub-section, shall be final. Sub-sec. It does not in specific terms refer to eviction. Sub-sec. (2) of that section, inter alia, declares that any determination of the fine and assessment made by the Deputy Commr. on such lands in the preceding sub-section, shall be final. Sub-sec. (3) of the section provides that such unauthorised occupant shall also be liable to be summarily evicted by the Deputy Commissioner. For the present, we are not concerned with sub-sec. (4) there of. What the Tribunal has concluded is that in view of the scheme of S. 94, the finality attached to the orders made under sub-sec. (1) by virtue of the provision made in sub-sec. (2) there of is also attracted in regard to the orders made in sub-sec. (3 ). ( 5 ) IT is of course true that if this were to be the correct interpretation, which it is not, in my opinion, only a revision would be competent in accordance with the provisions of S. 57 read with S. 56 of the Land revenue Act. But in my opinion, sub-sec. (3) stands by itself and it has no relation whatsoever to the two preceding sub-sections. It may at best be supplemental to the power exercisable under sub-sec. (1) of S. 94, It is plain from the language of sub-sec. (2) that the finality intended by the legislature is confined to the levy of assessment and fine under sub-sec. (1) of that section. Sub-see. (2) is explicit in regard to this master and reads thus : (2) The decision of the Deputy Commissioner under sub-sec. (1) as to the amount of assessment and ftne payable for the unauthorised occupatoin of the land shall be final, and in determining this amount, occupation for a portion ot a year shall be counted as for a whole year. No such provision is to be found in sub-sec. (3) of S. 94. If the Legislature had intended that any order of eviction covered by S. 94 (3) should also be final, it would have expressly made provision for it. Once this position is reached, the conclusion must follow that any order made under sub-sec. (3) of S. 94 is subject to an appeal or revision as provided under the relevant provisions of the Land Revenue Act. Once this position is reached, the conclusion must follow that any order made under sub-sec. (3) of S. 94 is subject to an appeal or revision as provided under the relevant provisions of the Land Revenue Act. ( 6 ) THE next question that arises for consideration is whether an order made by the Tahsildar under S. 94 (3) of that Act would be appealable to the Tribunal. It is undisputed that if such an order had been made by the Deputy Commissioner, an appeal would lie to the Tribunal under s. 49 (c) of that Act. It is therefore to be seen whether an order made by the Tahsildar, as the one in question, can be equated to that of an order made by the Deputy Commissioner under the said provision. S. 195 of the mysore Land Revenue Act provides for delegation of the power exereisable by the State Government or any officer subordinate to it under that act to any officer or authority, subject to such restrictions and conditions as may be specified in the appropriate Notification issued for the purpose. ( 7 ) IN regard to the power exercisable by the Deputy Commissioner under, that Section, the Government has issued Notification dt. 17-6-1966 Where by such power has been expressly delegated to the Tahsildars in regard to matters arising within their respective taluks. Hence the notice of eviction issued by the Tahsildar is one issued as a delegate of the Deputy Commissioner. Therefore the question whether or not such exercise of the power amounts to an act of the Deputy Commissioner himself and an appeal would lie to an authority which is competent to entertain appeals from the orders of the Deputy Commissioner under the Mysore Land revenue Act, is best answered by a. reference to an enunciation in the judgment of the Supreme Court in Roop Chand v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 1508. . The relevant enunciation occurs at paragraph 11 of the said report and reads thus :"the question then arises, when the Government delegates its power, for example, to entertain and decide an appeal under S. 21 (4) to an officer and the officer pursuant to such delegation hears the appeal and masses an order, is the order an order of the officer or of the government? We think it must be the order or the Government. We think it must be the order or the Government. The order is made under a statutory power. It is the statute which creates that power. The power can, therefore, be exercised only in terms of the statute and not otherwise In this case, the power is created by s. 21 (4 ). That section gives a power to the Government. It would follow, that an order made in exercise of that power will be the order of the Government for no one else has the right under the statute, to exercise the power. No doubt the Act enables the Government to delegate its power but such a power when delegated remains the power of the Government. for the Government can only delegate the power given to it by the statute and cannot create an independent power in the officer When the delegate exercises the power, he does so for the Government. It is of interest to observe here that Wills J. said in Huth v Clarke ( (1850) 25 QBD 391) that the word delegate means little more than "agent' An agent of course exercises no power of his own but only the powers of his principal. Therefore an order passed by an officer on delegation to him under S. 41 (1) of the power of the Government under S. 21 (4), is for the purposes of the Act, an order ol the Government If it were not so and it were to be held that the order had been made by the officer himself and was not an order of the Government and of course it had to be one or the other-' then we would have an order made by a person on whom the Act did not confer any power to make it That would be an impossible situation. " ( 8 ) FOLLOWING the above enunciation. I am clearly of the view that the order of eviction made by the Tahsildar is tantamount to an order of the Deputy commissiner himself and that being so, an appeal would lie to the Tribunal only. It follows from the above discussion, that the impugned order of the mrat has to be set aside. It is accordingly set aside. I am clearly of the view that the order of eviction made by the Tahsildar is tantamount to an order of the Deputy commissiner himself and that being so, an appeal would lie to the Tribunal only. It follows from the above discussion, that the impugned order of the mrat has to be set aside. It is accordingly set aside. Since, as observed earlier, the main appeal is still pending consideration before the said tribunal, the matter will stand remitted for disposal in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made herein. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. --- *** --- .