JUDGMENT : P. Govindan Nair, J. 1. The short question arising for determination in this appeal is whether the appellant before us is entitled to the benefit of sub-rule (b) of rule 2046 (F.R. 56) R 11 of the Indian Railway Establishment Code, Vol. 11 as the rule stood after its amendment on 11-1-1967. That rule is in these terms: “2046 (F.R. 56 (a) Except as otherwise provided in this rule, every railway servant shall retire on the day he attains the age of fifty eight years. (b) A ministerial railway servant, who entered Government service on or before 31st March, 1938 and held on that date: (i) a lien or a suspended lien on a permanent post. (ii) a permanent post in a provisional substantive capacity under clauses (d) of Rule 2008 and continued to hold the same without interruption until he was confirmed in that post, shall be retained in service till the day he attains the age of sixty years. Note: For the purpose of this clause, the expression “Government Service” include service rendered in ex-company and ex. state Railways, and in former provincial Government.” 2. The appellant was appointed, we will assume for the purpose of this appeal, to a permanent post but in a temporary capacity, on 8.2.1937. That is the case of the appellant. He was admittedly confirmed only on 1-10-1938. If the appellant held on the 31st of March, 1938 a permanent post in a provisional substantive capacity and continued to hold the same without interruption until he was confirmed in that post, he would be entitled to be retained in service till he attained the age of 60 years. The appellant attained the age of 58 years on 17.7.1972; that was the date on which he should retire if he was not entitled to the benefit of sub-rule (b) (ii) of rule 2046. 3. The question therefore is whether the appellant was appointed in a substantive capacity and held a post in that capacity on the 31st of March, 1938. 4. The Indian Railway Establishment Code and the Indian Railway Establishment Manual contain rules framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution has been accepted by the Supreme Court ( AIR 1969 SC 118 ) Rule 2301 of the Indian Railway Establishment Manual is in these terms: Temporary Railway Servants. 2301. 4. The Indian Railway Establishment Code and the Indian Railway Establishment Manual contain rules framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution has been accepted by the Supreme Court ( AIR 1969 SC 118 ) Rule 2301 of the Indian Railway Establishment Manual is in these terms: Temporary Railway Servants. 2301. Definition-A “temporary railway servant” means a railway servant without a lien on a permanent post on a Railway or any other administration or office under the Railway Board. The term does not include “casual labour”, “a” contract or “part time” employee or an “apprentice.” 5. Lien has been defined in rule 2006 of the Indian Railway Establishment Code, Volume 11, in these terms: “2006. (F.R. 12A) Lien - Unless in any case it be otherwise provided in these Rules a railway servant on substantive appointment to any permanent post acquires a Hen on that post and ceases to hold any lien previously acquired on any other post.” 6. It appears to us that it being admitted that the appellant was only appointed in a temporary capacity though to a permanent post, he was not substantively appointed to that post. This seems to be clear from the definition “temporary Railway Servants” which we have read (rule; had no lien, it cannot be said that he had been substantively that post and such an interpretation would clash with the definition of the term 'lien' contained in rule 2006. 7. What we have said above seems to us to be in consonance with principles applicable generally without reference to the wording of the specific rule. Chief Justice S.R. Das in Parshotam Lai Dhingra vs. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 36 dealt with three kinds of a permanent post in paragraph 11 of the judgment; appointment in a substantive capacity, appointment in an offiiciating capacity and a probationer and made the following observations: “(11) The appointment of a Government servant to a percent post may be substantive or on probation or on officiating basis. A substantive appointment to a percent post in public service confers normally on the servant so appointed a substantive right to the post and he becomes entitled to hold a “lien” on the post. This “lien” is defined in Fundamental Rules S. 111, Ch. A substantive appointment to a percent post in public service confers normally on the servant so appointed a substantive right to the post and he becomes entitled to hold a “lien” on the post. This “lien” is defined in Fundamental Rules S. 111, Ch. 11 R.9 (13) as the title of Government servant to hold substantively a permanent post, including a tenure post, to which he has been appointed substantively. The Government cannot terminate his service unless it is entitled to so (1) by virtue of a special term of the contract of employment, e.g. by giving the requisite notice provided the contract or (2) by the rules governing the conditions of his service, e.g. on attainment of the age of superannuation prescribed by the rules, or on the fulfilment of the conditions for compulsory retirement or subject to certain safeguards, on the abolition of the post or on being found guilty, after a proper enquiry on notice to him of misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or any other disqualification. An appointment to a permanent post in government service on probation means as in the case of person appointed by a private employer, that the servant so appointed is taken on trial. The period of probation may in some cases be for a fixed period, e. g., for six months or for one year or it may be expressed simply as “on probation” without any specification of any period, such an employment on probation, under the ordinary law of master and servant, comes to an end if during or at the end of the probation the servant so appointed on trial is found unsuitable and his service is terminated by notice. An appointment to officiate in a permanent post is usually made when the incumbent substantively holding that post is on leave or when the permanent post is vacant and no substantive appointment has yet been made to that post. Such an officiating appointment comes to an end on the return of the incumbent substantively holding the post from leave in the former case or on a substantive appointment being made to that permanent post in the latter case or on the service of a notice of termination as agreed upon or as may be reasonable under the ordinary law. Such an officiating appointment comes to an end on the return of the incumbent substantively holding the post from leave in the former case or on a substantive appointment being made to that permanent post in the latter case or on the service of a notice of termination as agreed upon or as may be reasonable under the ordinary law. It is therefore, quite clear that appointment to a permanent post in a Government service, either on probation or on an officiating basis, is from the very nature of such employment, itself of a transitory character and, in the absence of any special contract or specific rule regulating the conditions of the service, the implied term of such appointment, under the ordinary law of master and servant, is that it is terminable at any time. In short in the case of an appointment to a permanent post in a Government service on probation or on an officiating basis, the servants so appointed does not acquire any substantive right to the post and consequently cannot complain, any more than a private servant employed on probation or on an officating basis can do, if his service is terminated at any time. Likewise an appointment to a temporary post in a Government service may be substantive or on probation or on an officiating basis. Here also, in the absence of any special stipulation or any specific service rule, the servant so appointed acquires no right to the post and his service can be terminated at any time except in one case, namely, when the appointment to a temporary post is for a definite period. In such a case the servant so appointed acquires a right to his tenure for that period which cannot be put an end to unless there is a special contract entitling the employer to do so on giving the requisite notice or the person so appointed is, on enquiry held on due notice to the servant and after giving him a reasonable opportunity to defend himself, found guilty of misconduct, negligence, in efficiency or any other disqualification and is by way of punishment dismissed or removed from service or reduced in rank. The substantive appointment to a “temporary post on probation or on an officiating basis, that is to say, terminable by notice except where under the rules promulgated in 1949 to which reference will hereafter be made his service had ripened into what is called a quasi-permanent service.” 8. In a recent decision of the Supreme Court in The Director Panchayat-Raji, U.P. and Others vs. Babu Singh Gaur and Another, AIR 1972 SC 420 there are the following observation in paragraph 10 by Justice Hegde: “10. It is clear from the rules as well as the order of the Governor that they merely dealt with leave and increment. That order has nothing to do with the nature of the appointment. The fact that for certain specified purposes those temporary appointments were to be considered to be in a substantive capacity, does not mean that the appointees were holding the posts in question in a substantive capacity for all purposes. For purposes other than mentioned in the order, their appointments continue to be temporary.” 9. In paragraph 22 of the judgment in Ramanatha Pillai vs. State of Kerala and Another, (1973) 2 SCC 650 at p. 657, there are the following observations: “22. The ruling in Dhingra case (supra) is that the protection of the Article 311 is afforded to permanent as well as temporary posts or officiating in any of them. Where a person has a substantive appointment to a permanent post he has a right to hold the post until, under the rules, he attains the age of superannuation or is compulsorily retired after having put in the prescribed number of years' service or the post is abolished and his service cannot be terminated except by way of punishment for misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or any other disqualification found against him on enquiry after due notice to him. This is the statement of law in Dhingra case (supra) as well as Moti Ram Deka case (Supra). An appointment to a temporary post for a certain specified period give the servant a right to hold the post for the entire period of his tenure cannot be put an end to during that “period unless he is, by way of punishment dismissed or removed from the service. An appointment to a temporary post for a certain specified period give the servant a right to hold the post for the entire period of his tenure cannot be put an end to during that “period unless he is, by way of punishment dismissed or removed from the service. Except in these two cases the appointment to a post, permanent or temporary, on probation or on an officiating basis or a substantive appointment to a temporary post gives to the servant so appointed no right to the post and his service may be terminated unless his service had ripened into what is, in the service rules, called a quasi-permanent service. (See Dhingara case (supra).” 10. These observations of the Supreme Court also indicate that appointment on a temporary basis is not a substantive appointment. The appellant therefore has no lien and the requirement in rule 2046 (b)(ii) is not satisfied. The appellant cannot continue till the age of sixty. 11. We must acknowledge our gratitude to Shri P.C. Balakrishna Menon who assisted us amicus curiae and invited our attention to the relevant rulings of the Supreme Court. 12. We dismiss this appeal but direct the parties to bear their respective costs.