( 1 ) THIS petition is directed against the orders made by the Deputy Commissioner, dharwar, in No. LBP (C) SR. 2546 dt. 21-8-1968, and by the divisional Commissioner, Belgaum, in RB. CTS. SR. 675 dt. 12-2-71. The last of the above orders is one made in a revision preferred against the earlier order of the Deputy Commissioner. ( 2 ) THE relevant facts are as follows : in respect of a site situated in Annigeri village, the petitioner made an application for grant of 306 square yards on 13-7-1966, to the Asst. Commissioner, concerned. The site is CTS. No. 2354 of Annigeri, taluka navalgund. After the said application was processed the Assistant Commissioner granted the site on 2-7-1967 in his order No. CTS-NL-SR. 593. It is also alleged that pursuant to such grant a 'kabulyath' was executed by the petitioner on 7-8-1967 on payment of amounts aggregating to about rs. 1000, as per the said order. It is also alleged that he took possession of the site on that date. Some five months after that order it was discovered by the. Deputy Commissioner of the District that the said order and several orders passed by the Assistant Commissioner were clearly in contravention of Rule 93a of the Land Revenue Rules of 1966. He, therefore directed issue of notices to all the parties concerned including the present petitioner pursuant to S. 56 of the Land Revenue Act. The notice served on the petitioner in that behalf is dt. 6-2-1968. After hearing the petitioner, and examining the cause shown by him, the Deputy Commissioner on 21-8-1968 passed orders cancelling the grant, and directing the refund of the, amount paid by the petitioner. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner went up in revision to the Divisional Commissioner, who dismissed it. Hence, this petition challenging the said two prders. ( 3 ) ON behalf of the petitioner, Sri B. G. Sridharan, the learned counsel, urged that the order of the Deputy Commissioner clearly discloses that there was some representation by the villagers to the, effect that the site in quesion contained grain pits used by them, for quite some time past. Hence, this petition challenging the said two prders. ( 3 ) ON behalf of the petitioner, Sri B. G. Sridharan, the learned counsel, urged that the order of the Deputy Commissioner clearly discloses that there was some representation by the villagers to the, effect that the site in quesion contained grain pits used by them, for quite some time past. This material according to the learned Counsel had not been put to the petitioner and therefore the order of the Deputy Commissioner suffers from the vice of breach of principles of natural justice, as the functions performed by the said authority in the matter on hand were of quasijudicial nature. I do not think that this contention should prevail. It is seen from the order of the Deputy Commissioner, that the operative portion of the said order which contains the reasons for the cancellation of the grant, does not at all rely on such a representaion made by the villagers. The reference to such a matter is to be found only in the preamble portion of the order, presumably on a note put up by the office or something else of that kind So long as such extraneous material has not been used by the Deputy Commissioner, for the purpose of coming to the conclusion adversely to the petitioner. I do not think it would be reasonable hold that there has been any violation of the principles of natural justice. ( 4 ) I now turn to the main ground urged by the learned Counsel. The contention is that reading S. 56 of the Land Revenue Act as a, whole, with special reference to sub-sec. (3) thereof, it would be clear that there is no power in the Deputy Commissioner to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him under S. 56 of that Act, unless and until there is an application filed for the purpose by any one interested in the matter. He further contends that haying regard to the period of limitation prescribed under sub-sec. (3) thereof, which is tour months from the date of the order, any such application should further satisfy the said period of limitation. In the absence of any such application, which fact, on the facts narrated earlier, cannot be disputed, the Deputy Commissioner could not exercise the pawer. On a careful consideration of the matter, in my view this contention has also no force. In the absence of any such application, which fact, on the facts narrated earlier, cannot be disputed, the Deputy Commissioner could not exercise the pawer. On a careful consideration of the matter, in my view this contention has also no force. ( 5 ) IT is seen from sub-section (1) of S. 56 that the authorities specified therein, which include the Deputy Commissioner, have been empowered to call for and examine the record of any inquiry or the proceedings of any subordinate officer under that Act for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself, as the case may be, as to the legality or propriety of the proceedings of such officer. Sub-sec. (2) thereof provides tor the exercise of the power by the Authority, in cases where such records have been called for under sub-sec. (1), with a view to pass any order as it thinks fit. The proviso thereunder requires the affording of an opportunity to any person who is likely to be affected by any such order of the authority. It seems to me that reading sub-sees. (1) and (2) together, the topic of the exercise, of power by the authorities named therein suo motu is complete. The power exercisable by the authorities under these sub-sections is clearly not made dependent on the provisions of sub-sec. (3) thereof which reads-"no application for revision under this section shall be entertained and no power of revision on such application shall be exercised against any order from which an appeal lies under this Chapter and no application for revision shall be entertained unless such application is presented within a period of four months from the date of such order. "it seems to me that the above provision merely enables the authorities mentioned under sub-sec. (1) of S. 56 to exercise the) power conferred therein even on an application made by any person interested in or affected by any order made under this Act. In other words, it is clear that S. 56 enjoins the exercise of the power by the authorities on their own, whether it is referable as suo-motu exercise or otherwise, and also at the instance of a party aggrieved by any order made under this Act. This is not to say that in all cases there shall be an application as provided for under sub" sec. This is not to say that in all cases there shall be an application as provided for under sub" sec. (3) of S. 56, far the Authorities named therein to exercise the power of calling for records or for making appropriate orders therein. To hold otherwise, as contended on behalf of the petitioner, would lead to anomalous results as can be illustrated by the facts of the present case itself. It is seen in the instant case that there is no one who is interested in challenging the order, as it was a matter almost exclusively left between the assistant Commissioner and the applicant (petitioner ). Once. an order of this nature is made in contravention of the procedure enjoined under rule 93-A of the Land Revenue Rules, the Assistant Commissioner cannot be said to be an aggrieved person. In this state of affairs, the order made by the Assistant Commissioner although opposed to rules, which have been conceived in public interest, will have to be allowed to stand notwithstanding the fact that public interest is affected thereby. It is perhaps to meet such an anomaly, that the first part of S. 56 has been enacted. I am not, therefore, persuaded to agree with this contention. ( 6 ) IT is next contended by Sri Sridharan that the power under. 56 would not b. e available in respect of an order which is expressly made appealable under S. 49 of the Land Revenue Act, having regard to the provisions of sub-sec. (3) of S. 56. As observed by me earlier, sub-sec. (3) is in a- way independent of sub-sees. (1) and (2) thereof, and is concerned with the conferment of power to apply for revision on a, party who, might be aggrieved by any order made by any of the authorities under the Act. The condition referred to by the learned counsel occurs in sub-sec. (3 ). That being so, it is a condition, which would apply only to a case oi revision squght for and on behalf of a, party, and has no, reference; to the power exercisable by the authorities under sub-sec. (1) of their own accord. Hence this contention has also no force. No other contention is urged. In the result, this petition is dismissed. No costs. --- *** --- .