Judgment :- 1. This appeal is against the judgment of a learned judge of this Court dismissing in limini O.P. No. 5339 of 1972 which sought to quash Exts. P-1 to P-3 orders, suspending the contract carriage permit held by the petitioner appellant, in respect of the vehicle K. L. R.4502 for three different and distinct contraventions. The learned judge was of the opinion that the appellant had been afforded a sufficient opportunity before the impugned orders were passed. He rejected the contention that S.60 of the Motor Vehicles Act, conferred an arbitrary and uncanalised power on the Transport Authority to cancel or suspend a permit, without furnishing any guidance as to when action has to be taken under R.161 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, which permits the Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, to deal with cases of suspension alone. 2. Before us, counsel for the appellant relied on a Division Bench ruling of the Madras High Court id Batcha Saheb v. Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, North Arcot at Vellore and another AIR. 1969 Madras 223 which held sub clause (xi) of R.134-A of the Madras Motor Vehicles Rules practically identically worded as R.161 of the Kerala Rules, as violative of Art.14 of the Constitution. The argument advanced to strike down the rule is thus noticed in the judgment: "As will be clear from a careful study of S.60 (1). clauses, (a) to (f) and the proviso this is a total scheme for dealing with categories of default, in respect of stage carriage per" mils the power itself being broadly divided into two, firstly, a power to cancel the permit and, secondly, a power to suspend the permit for a discretionary period. The proviso itself shows that the first power was regarded as being much graver in character, so that the statute made it essential, apart from the principles of natural justice, that the power must not be exercised, without the holder of the permit being afforded an opportunity to explain. Where there are two such powers of punishment, one of which is much graver than the other, and the Transport Authority alone could impose the graver punishment, every case before it essentially would involve a judgment, whether the graver punishment need be considered, or otherwise. This is also clear from S.60 (3), which I have earlier set forth. Where there are two such powers of punishment, one of which is much graver than the other, and the Transport Authority alone could impose the graver punishment, every case before it essentially would involve a judgment, whether the graver punishment need be considered, or otherwise. This is also clear from S.60 (3), which I have earlier set forth. The argument is that this discretion or judgment cannot be delegated; if the lesser power is to be delegated, no doubt, such a partial delegation may be valid. But. in that case, there must be some classification in respect of categories (a) to (f), as to which categories would fall within the scope of the lesser delegated power and which would not. If there is no such relationship between the categories of default and the delegation of the lesser power to the Secretary, and there is no division of the categories of default, then, in a word, it implies that the judgment that I have referred to earlier, is itself being surrendered. It is argued that this is not proper, as the delegate, in any event, cannot exercise the power to cancel the permit. 13. I might immediately state that it has been a very difficult matter to trace any authorities, which would throw light on the principle embodied in this form, in the argument of the learned counsel. But there are certain cases of considerable interest, in the United Kingdom, which may afford some oblique illumination " The learned judges accepted the argument thus presented and held that the rule patently violated Art.14 of the Constitution. 3. With respect, we regret our inability to agree. S.44 (5) of the Motor Vehicles Act reads:. "44(5). The State Transport Authority and any Regional Transport Authority, if authorised in this behalf by rules made under S.68, may delegate such of its powers and! functions to such authority or person and subject to such restrictions, limitations and conditions as may be prescribed by the said Rules." S. 68 of the Act gives power to make rules to carry into effect the provisions of Chapter IV of the Act; Among the powers thus conferred, is the power to make rules with respect to the conduct of business of the Regional Transport Authority. S.60 allows the Transport Authority which granted a permit to cancel or suspend it, on any one or more of the grounds listed in clauses (a) to (f) of the section. Sub-clause (3) of S.60 is as follows: "Where a permit is liable to be cancelled or suspended under clause (a) or clause (b) or clause (c) of sub-section (1) and the Transport Authority is of opinion that having regard to the circumstances of the case, it would not be necessary or expedient so to cancel or suspend the permit if the Holder of the permit agrees to pay a certain sum of money, then, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the Transport Authority may, instead of cancelling or suspending the permit, as the case may be, recover from the holder of the permit the sum Of money agreed upon." Rule 161 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules provides for the power of the Regional Transport Authority to delegate its functions to the Secretary. Sub-clause (q) of clause (1) of R.161 reads as follows: "Power of Regional Transport Authority Delegation to Secretary.- (11 The Regional Transport Authority may, for the prompt and convenient despatch of business, by general or special resolution, delegate to the Secretary, any or all of the following functions. (a) to (p) x x x (q) power under S.63 of the Act to suspend a permit and the power under S.63(3) of the Act to suspend counter signatures of permits." Neither S.44(5) nor S.68(1) of the Act has been attacked before us, and without attacking them, it is not possible for the petitioner to canvas the constitutionality of R.161(1) sub-clause (q) which seems to be quite within the purview of the sections noticed supra. That apart we are unable with respect, to accept the ratio of the Madras decision in Batcha Saheb's case AIR. 1969 Madras 223. As we understand, S.60 provides for cancellation and suspension on certain specified grounds, and R.161 only provides that for the prompt and convenient despatch of business, it is open to the Regional Transport Authority to delegate to the Secretary, the power to suspend a permit under S.60 of the Act. On principle, we are unable to agree that without a rational classification of the classes of default, a delegation of the power of suspension would be unconstitutional. On principle, we are unable to agree that without a rational classification of the classes of default, a delegation of the power of suspension would be unconstitutional. An earlier Division Bench ruling of the Madras High Court in Dhanmull Sowear v. Secretary, R.T.A. Vellore AIR. 1957 Madras 387, noticed the provisions of S.44(5), and S.60(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, and R.134 (A) (xi) of the Rules. It was held that the provision made in S.44(5) for delegation, inclusive of the power under S.60(1) does not offend any well-recognised concept of jurisprudence. It was also held that S.44(5) was quite valid. Regarding R.134(A) (xi), it was ruled that it would fall within the scope of the last clause, namely, "any other matter which is to be prescribed", and that it would also fall within S.68(1) of the Act, as being a rule prescribed for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of Chapter IV. The decision of the Andhra High Court in Krishnan v. R.T.A., Chitoor AIR. 1956 A.P. 129 upholding the validity of the rule was noticed. In Asnar Pillai v. Secretary S.T.A. 1962 KLT 659, a Division Bench of this Court, surveyed the provisions of S.44(5) and S.60(1) of the Act read with R.133 (xi) of the Motor Vehicles Rules, and held that in view of the provisions of S.44(5), the power of suspension under S.60(1) can be delegated. It was ruled that R.133 had therefore, to be given full effect. R.133 of the then rules is practically the same as R.161 of the present rules. This Court noticed the decisions in AIR. 1956 Andhra Pradesh 129 and AIR. 1957 Madras 387, in the course of the judgment. 4. It is true that in none of these decisions was there any pointed or any specific attack against the rule based on Art.14, which prevailed with the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Batcha Saheb's case AIR. 1969 Madras 223. But giving the matter our careful attention, we are unable to accept the reasoning or the conclusion of the Madras High Court in the said decision. 5. The appellant's counsel then complained that there had not been due compliance with the provisions of R.217-A of the Motor Vehicles Rules before passing the impugned order. 1969 Madras 223. But giving the matter our careful attention, we are unable to accept the reasoning or the conclusion of the Madras High Court in the said decision. 5. The appellant's counsel then complained that there had not been due compliance with the provisions of R.217-A of the Motor Vehicles Rules before passing the impugned order. The order is an appealable one, and the petitioner's counsel seems to have carried up the order straight away to this Court, under the cloak of attacking the validity of R.161, clause (q). The merits' of the order ought really to have been attacked in an appeal. That apart, we are unable to find any substance in the contention urged. It was argued that the fixation of compounding fee can only be with the consent of the appellant. But what has been done by the impugned orders is to pass the order of suspension subject to an option to the appellant to avoid the consequence, if so desired, by offering a particular amount fixed as fee for compounding. We do not think this offends the provisions of S.60 (3) of the Act, or of R.217A. 6. It was then said that the considerations mentioned in sub-clause (b) of R.217 have not been taken into account. We cannot agree. The mere fact that these have not been recited in the impugned order, is quite immaterial. 7. It was complained that the impugned orders have relied upon the check-report, and that this offends the principles of natural justice. The only part of the check-report on which reliance seems to have been placed by the impugned orders, is that the petitioner's contract carriage contained at the time of check, thirty adult passengers as against the full complement of the fifteen, which was the maximum allowable for the carriage. We notice that the order sets out the check-report, and the charge memo at the top of it. The charge memo was read out by the learned Government Pleader from the files, and it refers to the check-report, and indicates with sufficient particularity, the relevant part of it. Neither in his explanation, nor at the hearing, did the petitioner have any case that the particulars or details of the check-report had not been disclosed; nor did he ask for the same. Neither in his explanation, nor at the hearing, did the petitioner have any case that the particulars or details of the check-report had not been disclosed; nor did he ask for the same. We are unable to entertain the present grievance that the non-disclosure of the check-report has contravened the principles of natural justice. 8. It was feebly argued that there is nothing to show that the maximum passengers allowable in respect of the vehicle had been fixed at fifteen as stated in the order. These are matters which ought to have been agitated before the State Transport Authority; or if the petitioner had been prompt and diligent, before the appellate authority. We are unable to entertain this contention in these proceedings under Art.226 of the Constitution. 9. We dismiss this appeal, but make no order as to costs. Dismissed.