T. U. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) [his Lordship after narrating the facts on the case which led to the death of one person and injury to another who were alleged to be connected with smuggling of silver further observed: ] ( 2 ) THE next day i. e. on 21st February 1971 the investigation proceeded further and during the course of this investigation the accused is said to have given a cross complaint as found at Ex. 102. One of the questions which is debated in this appeal is whether this cross complaint amounts to a statement recorded by the police during the course of the investigation of this case and if so whether it is admissible. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 3 ) ANOTHER controversial point which is involved in this appeal is as regards the admissibility of the cross complaint found at Ex. 102. Here the contention of the defence is that this document is really speaking a statement of the accused recorded by the investigating officer during the course of the investigation of this case and therefore it is not admissible in evidence. On this point the learned trial Judge has held in favour of the prosecution because according to him this document does not amount to a statement of the accused but rather amounts to an independent cross complaint made by the accused when he was in police custody. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ His Lordship further observed: ] ( 4 ) THE last question which remains to be considered is about the admissibility of the complaint of the accused found at Ex. 102. The question is whether this is a genuine complaint or merely a statement of the accused recorded during the course of the investigation. In other words the objection which is raised by the defence against its admissibility is only confined to sec. 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 102. The question is whether this is a genuine complaint or merely a statement of the accused recorded during the course of the investigation. In other words the objection which is raised by the defence against its admissibility is only confined to sec. 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Sec. 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code says that no statement made by any person to a police officer in the course of an investigation under Chapter XIV shall if reduced to writing be used for any purpose at any inquiry or trial in respect of any offence under investigation at the time when such state. ment was recorded. This section therefore prohibits the use of a police statement at a trial if the said statement is recorded daring the course of investigation of the offence in question under Chapter XIV of the Code. It is now a settled position in law that the expression person which is used in sec. 162 includes even a person who is subsequently accused of the offence for which he is tried. Therefore a statement made even by an accused to a police officer in the course of investigation under Chapter XIV of the Code would be hit by sec. 162. Therefore if the cross complaint in this case is found to be a statement made in the course of investigation of the offence for which the accused is tried it cannot be received in evidence as it would be covered by the bar contemplated by sec. 162. However if it is found to be a genuine complaint which has nothing to do with the course of investigation undertaken under Chapter XIV of the Code sec. 162 has no application and hence it must be received in evidence. The reason is that even a person accused of an offence has a right to set the law into motion under secs. 154 155 and 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the offences committed against him. ( 5 ) THEREFORE the real controversy between the parties is whether the document in question is a genuine complaint or merely a police statement which is given a false garb of a complaint. It need not be emphasised that a statement does not become a complaint merely because it is couched in a particular language or is given a particular form or because it is described as such. It need not be emphasised that a statement does not become a complaint merely because it is couched in a particular language or is given a particular form or because it is described as such. In order to decide whether it is a genuine complaint or is a statement hit by sec. 162 Criminal Procedure Code the court has to take into account not only the intrinsic character of the statement but also the circumstances under which it was recorded. If these circumstances show that it was recorded in the course of investigation of the offence under Chapter XIV then the bar comtemplated by sec. 162 would obviously come into operation. ( 6 ) THEREFORE the crucial question which arises to be considered at this stage is what is the meaning of the expression in course of investigation. This question assumes greater importance in this case because it is an admitted position that the statement which in this case the prosecution wants to be treated as a complaint is recorded by the investigating officer at the time when the investigation of this offence was actually in progress. Investigation of a cognizable case is started under sec. 156 Cri. P. C. on receipt of an information under sec. 154 thereof. Such an investigation was already undertaken in this case on 20th February 1971 but the statement under dispute was given by the accused on the following day i. e. on 21st February 1971 Can it therefore be said that this statement was a statement recorded in course of investigation?. In our opinion the expression is in course of has a reference to the progressive stages of investigation and not to the period of time taken in completing the investigation. In a given case the investigation of an offence may take months and even years to be completed and so before completing that investigation the officer concerned would be required to attend to investigations of various other offences. The statements recorded by him during the course of these intervening investigations can therefore by no stretch of reasoning be considered to be the statements recorded in the course of investigation of the offence in question. It is therefore obvious that in order to be hit by sec 162 Cri. P. C. the statement in question must be one which is nothing but a step in the pending investigation. It is therefore obvious that in order to be hit by sec 162 Cri. P. C. the statement in question must be one which is nothing but a step in the pending investigation. In order to decide whether it is a step in the pending investigation one important test is to consider whether standing by itself the statement throws any light on the offence which is being investigated. If standing by itself it throws no light on the offence under investigation we 8 a conclusive evidence of it being quite independent of the pending investigation because it is not designed to promote any pending investigation but to start a new one for unearthing altogether a different offence. This is not to say that the statements which throw light on the offence under investigation would necessarily be the statements recorded in the course of investigation of that offence because even in such cases there would be some other circumstances which would show that the statement in question amounted to a genuine complaint which was not recorded in the course of investigation within the meaning of sec. 162 of Cri. P. C. We however do not find it necessary to detain ourselves on consideration of this later aspect of the matter because the statement Ex. 102 with which we are concerned in this case is found to be quite independent of the pending investigation and standing by itself it throws no light upon the offence for which the accused is tried. This statement is neither inculpatory nor exculpatory and contents thereof reveal altogether a different offence at a different place committed on the accused by some unknown persons at a time when the incident for which he is tried occurred. It is undoubtedly true that when appreciated in light of the facts admitted or proved in this case it gives good deal of corroboration to the prosecution case but that aspect of the matter would not render it a statement recorded in the course of the investigation of this offence. ( 7 ) IF a reference is made to this statement it will be found that it first makes a grievance against complainant Ratilal and witness Lalu @ Laxman Govind by making an allegation that 8 to 10 days before the incident they had abused the accused and had threatened him that he would be killed through some goondas from Bombay. After making this allegation this statement makes the following relevant complaint. English version of it is as under :"yesterday on 21-2-71 at about 8. 30 p. m. I closed my shop and went to see the health of my brother-in-law Bhana Bhikha who was sick. I however could not meet him as he had gone to Kundiana dispensary to take medicines. When I was returning home I passed through a small street via Dhebaria Fali. At that time one man came in that street from the opposite side and struck me over my left eyebrow. With an electric torch light with the result that the skin over my eyebrow was broken and blood came out. I became unconscious and fell down. When after a while I regained consciousness I did not find anyone there. I felt nervous and went home. Immediately I went to Surat in my jeep car and met Rijasinghani Saheb at Navsari Bazar Police Chowky. I thereafter went to Surat Civil Hospital along with him and have been treated there. The person who has injured me over my left eye must be Ratilal Devabhai or Lalu alias Laxman. I therefore lodge this complaint for further proceedings according to law. "these averments clearly show that they have absolutely no direct bearing on the facts of the incident with which we are concerned in this case. The averments on the face of them speak about some other independent incident during the course of which the accused was beaten by some unknown person. It is apparent that the recording of this statement is not a step in promotion of the investigation of the offence of murder for which the accused is charged. In our opinion therefore this statement is nothing but a complaint and cannot be treated as a statement recorded by the investigation officer under sec. 164 of Cri. P. C. The document ex. 102 therefore can be taken into account and can be given proper appreciation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 8 ) THE result of these findings therefore is that the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial Judge is found to be unsustainable at law. We are of the opinion that the learned trial Judge has given undue importance to many trivialities which has rendered his own approach to the facts of the case quite superfluous. We are satisfied that the evidence recorded in the case is quite sufficient for coming to the conclusion beyond reasonable doubt that all the three shots were fired by the accused through the revolver for carrying which he possessed no licence. Under the circumstances the respondent-accused is found to have committed offences punishable under secs. 302 307 I. P. C. and sec. 25 (1) (a) and 27 of the Arms Act. ( 9 ) HE is also charged with an offence punishable under sec. 201 of I. P. C. This charge is put against the accused because the revolver through which he is found to have fired three shots is not found. However there is no evidence in the record of the case to show that it was the accused who has concealed or destroyed this revolver. We therefore see no justification for convicting him for the offence contemplated by sec. 201 I. P. C. ( 10 ) FOR the offence under sec. 302 I. P. C. the respondent-accused is sentenced to life imprisonment. For the offence under sec. 307 I. P. C. he is sentenced to suffer R. I. of 5 years and fine of Rs. 1000/in default of which he is ordered to undergo further R. I. of 6 months. For the offence under sec. 25 (1) (a) of Arms Act 1959 he is sentenced to suffer R. I. of one year and a fine of Rs. 200/in default of which he is ordered to undergo further R. I. of one month. For the offence under sec. 27 of Arms Act he is ordered to undergo R. I. of 3 years and fine of Rs. 25 (1) (a) of Arms Act 1959 he is sentenced to suffer R. I. of one year and a fine of Rs. 200/in default of which he is ordered to undergo further R. I. of one month. For the offence under sec. 27 of Arms Act he is ordered to undergo R. I. of 3 years and fine of Rs. 500/in default of which he is ordered to undergo further R. I. of 2 months. All the substantive sentences of imprisonment passed above under different sections ordered to run concurrently. The respondent-accused is ordered to surrender to his bail and to serve out the sentences passed as above. Orders accordingly. .