Judgment :- 1. The first of these petitions under S.561-A Cr.P.C., is to quash the entire proceedings conducted by respondents 1 and 2 (the Inspector, Puthur Circle and the Sub-Inspector, Vittal Police Station, Karnataka State) by their search, seizure and transport of 10,976 Kilograms of sandal wood out of the premises of the petitioners' factory in Chemnad village of the Kerala State holding their conduct as High-handed, incompetent and unenforceable in the absence of any prima facie case against them either under S.379 or 411 of the IPC. The other petition is to re-deliver the entire stock of sandal wood so seized at the instance of respondents 1 and 2 to the petitioners. 2. The petitioners are a partnership concern of which accused 1 and 2 are partners. The first accused is the Managing Partner. The third accused is the Manager of the concern. The petitioners' factory is located in Chemnad village of the Kasaragod taluk in the Kerala State. Their main business is extraction of oil from sandal wood. They conduct oil extraction from sandal wood under a licence issued by the joint Director of Industries and Commerce, Government of Kerala. They have been making purchase of sandal wood required for extraction of oil from accredited timber dealers. However, for the purchase of less than 10 kilograms of sandal wood, no permit is required. They made a purchase of 8,732.500 kilograms of sandal wood from Abdulla Kunhi. He was a registered owner of a valid property mark seal. The Divisional Forest Officer, Tellicherry, permitted 263 sandal wood trees (made up of 3015 pieces of roots, 1976 pieces of stem and 3501 pieces of branch) to be cut and removed out of survey Nos. ,675-1A and 643/2 of Cheruthazam village and transport the same to the petitioners' factory on the basis of Ext. P1 permit dated 6 3 72 which was issued to Abdulla Kunhi for the aforesaid purpose. The intimation of the issue of the permit was given not only to the subordinate forest officers but also to the Income-tax and Sales-tax officers. On the basis of Ext. P1, a pass had also been issued to Abdulla Kunhi to transport the identical quantity of sandal wood to the petitioners' factory to be completed before 9 3 72. Ext. P2 was the pass issued for that purpose. On the basis of Ext. P1, a pass had also been issued to Abdulla Kunhi to transport the identical quantity of sandal wood to the petitioners' factory to be completed before 9 3 72. Ext. P2 was the pass issued for that purpose. The petitioners had also got registered C.E.O. property mark under Sandal Wood Transport Rules On the basis of that property mark which was valid upto 313 73, the identical consignment of 8732.500 kilograms of sandal wood were permitted to be stored in the factory. Ext. P3 was the order by which the property mark of the petitioners was registered. They were directed to keep an account of the sandal wood they purchased and stored in the factory with further direction to intimate the District Forest Officer if fresh stock arrived at their premises. Ext. P6 affidavit was sworn to by Abdulla Kunhi that be transported the identical consignment of sandal wood to the petitioners' factory. The petitioners claim exclusive right and possession over the sandal wood which they stocked under Exts. P1 to P3 permits. 3. While so, respondents 1 and 2 visited the factory premises on 31-8-72. They were alleged to have visited the premises on suspicion that the sandal wood trees belonging to the Government forest in Karnataka had been stolen and stored in the factory premises. They took action on the basis of Ext. P4 letter dated 2i 8 '72 from the Divisional Forest Officer, Mangalore, Karnataka, wherein he alleged that some theft of sandal wood standing trees was reported from their forest in Veerakambba and Kolajim ale and, that, therefore, the police shall be more vigilant on the border area between Kerala and Karnataka and seize the illicit transport of sandal wood. However, the second respondent recorded Ext. P4 as first information in the case and registered a crime as crime No. 139/72 of the Vittal Police station. The petitioners alleged that respondents 1 and 2 took action on the basis of a false report made by the third respondent, who was their rival in the business, without any manner of right or bona fides and, therefore, they searched the premises of the petitioners on 318 72 on the basis of which they seized 5746 kilograms of sandal wood on 19 72. After the seizure, they carried away the sandal wood to Mangalore. While so, the petitioners filed OS. After the seizure, they carried away the sandal wood to Mangalore. While so, the petitioners filed OS. 285/72 in the Munsiff's Court, Kasaragod on 1912 for a perpetual injunction restraining respondents 1 and 2 from seizing the remaining stock of sandal wood they, had In their custody. The Munsiff passed a. temporary injunction. During the pendency of the suit, one Harippa Bhatt was appointed as an Advocate-Commissioner. He visited the premises of the petitioners under the orders of the court and prepared Ext. P5 report. Ext. P5 gave details of the stock the petitioners had in their possession as well as the account in support of the stock. The remaining stock of sandal wood was found sealed, with property mark seal of the petitioners. The Commissioner also found that they had 7104 kilograms of sandal wood in stock in the premises of the factory. However, the temporary injunction was vacated and, therefore, respondents 1 and 2 came to the factory over again on 22 91972 and seized 5230 kilograms of sandal wood more in spite of the protest by the petitioners. According to the petitioners, the entire stock they had in the factory belonged to them and the respondents 1 and 2 had no manner of right to seize the stock on hand. 4. Pending the above petitions for enquiry, the respondents 1 and 2 wanted to complete the investigation in the case. So they were permitted by an order of this court dated 10 8 73 to complete the investigation with the direction to file a report of the charge under S.173 Cr.P.C. However, they were further directed that during the pendency of those petitions, the accused persons shall not be arrested or seized the remaining stock of sandal wood which were in the possession of the petitioners. The conditional order was passed as the search and seizure were in dispute between the parties. On the basis of the above order, the police filed a charge-sheet under S.173 Cr.PC., at the Munsiff - Magistrate's Court, Bandwall, Carnataka against the three accused persons. During the investigation, they questioned the relevant witnesses and on completion of the investigation, subject to the above conditions, charges under S.379 and 4111. P. C., were laid against them. 5. On the basis of the above order, the police filed a charge-sheet under S.173 Cr.PC., at the Munsiff - Magistrate's Court, Bandwall, Carnataka against the three accused persons. During the investigation, they questioned the relevant witnesses and on completion of the investigation, subject to the above conditions, charges under S.379 and 4111. P. C., were laid against them. 5. The question for consideration in this case is whether from the materials placed on record, the prosecution could sustain a prima facie case either under S.379 or 411 IPC., against the accused persons. The first respondent pending these petitions has filed a counter-affidavit alleging that the search and seizure were made bona fide and in exercise of the right with the help of the Kerala Police. 6. In the absence of any material on record from direct eye-witnesses, there could be no scope for holding that the accused persons in this case committed theft of sandal wood from the Karnataka forest or that they received the sandal wood in their possession as stolen property. So in a case like this, the prosecution has to rely upon the presumption which is covered by the illustration (a) of S.114 of the Evidence Act. Under that section, it is permissible to presume that a person in possession of stolen property soon after the theft is either the thief or a receiver of stolen property. But if the explanation of the accused of his possession is plausible, no such presumption could be allowed. The presumption that arises under illustration (a) is one of fact and whether a court ought to draw it or not must depend on the circumstances of each case. But the onus on the prosecution to prove the guilt does not change. 7. Before we consider the materials placed in this case to prove a prima facie case against the accused persons, it is necessary to point out that it is a well-settled position that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in appropriate cases either to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Ordinarily, a proceeding instituted against an accused person must be tried by a competent court under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Ordinarily, a proceeding instituted against an accused person must be tried by a competent court under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In such cases, the High Court will not be justified to interfere with the proceeding especially when the charge is not laid by the police after the investigation. And the Supreme Court in R. P. Kapur v. State of Punjab (AIR. 1960 SC. 866) stated: "It is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction." 8. Even as early as in Emperor v. Nazir Ahmad (AIR. 1945 Privy Council 18), Lord Porter in affirming the decision of the Madras High Court in AIR. 1938 Madras 129 stated: "No doubt if no cognizable offence is disclosed, and still more if no offence of any kind is disclosed the police would have no authority to undertake an investigation and if they do so the High Court may interfere under S.561A Cr. P. C." 9. In Chidambaram Chettiar v. Shanmugham Pillai (AIR. 1938 Madras 129), the proposition laid down is as follows: "The High Court has inherent jurisdiction under S.561 A, Cr. P. C., to pass any order necessary to prevent abuse of the process of any Court." The Privy Council made it clear that the power under S.561A Cr. P. C., is exercisable when there is misuse of the power by the police, and when the High Court if it considers necessary to exercise its inherent power, can do so to secure the ends of justice. 10. The decision relied on in State of West Bengal v. S. N. Basak (AIR. 1963 SC. 447) does not run counter to the decision reported in R. P. Kapur v. State of Punjab (AIR. 1960 SC. 866). The former was a case where the police investigation was quashed by the High Court of Calcutta on the ground that the prosecution was incompetent. The police was not given an opportunity to file their charge-sheet against the accused person who was said to have appeared in court after the first information was lodged in respect of a charge under S.420 of the I. P. C., against him and then filed a petition under S.561A to quash the investigation by the police. The police was not given an opportunity to file their charge-sheet against the accused person who was said to have appeared in court after the first information was lodged in respect of a charge under S.420 of the I. P. C., against him and then filed a petition under S.561A to quash the investigation by the police. It was in that connection, that the Supreme Court said: "There was no case pending at the time excepting that the respondent had appeared before the Court, had surrendered and had been admitted to bail. The powers of investigation into cognizable offences are contained in Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure. S.154 which is in that Chapter deals with information in cognizable offences and S.156 with investigation into such offences and under these sections the police has the statutory right to investigate into the circumstances of any alleged cognizable offence without authority from a Magistrate and this statutory power of the police to investigate cannot be interfered with by the exercise of power under S.439 or under the inherent power of the court under S.561A of the Criminal Procedure Code." The facts are different in this case. The police filed a report under S.173 Cr.P.C., on completion of the investigation except the arrest of the accused persons and the recovery of the remaining stock of sandal wood in their possession in respect of which the question is in dispute between the parties. 11. Ram Narain v. Mool Chand (AIR. 1960 Allahabad 296) has also been relied upon but that decision did not lay down any new law beyond the pronouncement made by the Supreme Court in R. P. Kapur V. State of Punjab (AIR. 1960 S.C. 866) referred to above, Yet the Allahabad High Court restricted the scope and application of S.561A to the fulfilment of three conditions: (1) the injustice which comes to light should be of a great character and not of a trivial character; (2) the injustice which is noted is of a clear and palpable character and not of a doubtful character and (3) there exists no other provision of law by which the party aggrieved could have sought relief. These conditions are derogatory to the observations of the Supreme Court though they may be useful as a guide in general with reference to facts and circumstances of a particular case. These conditions are derogatory to the observations of the Supreme Court though they may be useful as a guide in general with reference to facts and circumstances of a particular case. The Supreme Court has stated that "It is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction." 12. On facts also, it cannot be said that the question involved in the instant case is trivial so far as the petitioners are concerned. There was also no room for doubt as to the petitioners' right or possession of the goods in question. There was also no other provision of law by which the petitioners could get their grievance redressed. There was, therefore, no bar for the application of S.561A Cr. PC., in the instant case. 13. In the light of these observations, it can be said that under S.561 A. if the allegations made in the first information statement and the case diary statement of the witnesses during the investigation under S.161 Cr. PC., as well as the charge laid by the police under S.173 Cr. PC., do not disclose any offence against the accused, the High Court can interfere at any stage of the proceeding. Interference to quash proceedings, however, can be resorted to only on two conditions: (1) if the prosecution allegations even when accepted as true do not establish any offence against the accused and where an offence against the accused is established if the allegations are believed but there is no evidence at all to support the allegation. It is always open to the High Court to interfere where the facts are preposterous that the High Court feels satisfied that on the admitted facts, there is no case against the accused and when the High Court is clearly of the opinion that further prolongation of the proceeding would amount to harassment, it is in the interest of justice that the High Court should interfere. It is undoubted law that the High Court, with a view to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice can in the exercise of its inherent power, quash any criminal proceedings pending before any court. It is undoubted law that the High Court, with a view to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice can in the exercise of its inherent power, quash any criminal proceedings pending before any court. This power can be exercised In any case where the complaint or the police-charge sheet, as the case may be, disclose no offence at all against the accused. 14. In the Supreme Court ruling already referred to (reported in R. P. Kapur v. State of Punjab (AIR. 1960 SC. 866)), the interference of the High Court under S.561A. Cr.P.C., is made applicable to three categories of cases. One such category was the nature of the allegations made against the accused persons without constituting an offence and where there is either no legal evidence in support of the case or evidence clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. On an examination of the facts of the case in hand, it is clearly established that the petitioners are the owners of the stock of sandal wood kept in their premises on the date of seizure first on 1-9-72 and the other on 22-9-72. The stock was well maintained in their ledger and stock register vide Ext. P5, the report of the commissioner. They came into possession of the stock of sandal wood through legitimate purchases vide Exts. P1 to P3 and P6. It would be idle to suggest that the cut end of the logs seized in this case would be same in size and circumference to that of the stumps of the trees left in the forest even if the logs had been dressed up in proper form after they were cut and removed and that, therefore, the identification of logs as Government property could easily be made. In that case such identification will be possible in respect of any other trees which could be cut and removed from non-reserved forests. If that argument is allowed to prevail, no one will be able to cut and remove trees from private forests. There was no direct evidence to connect the accused persons either with theft of sandal wood or with the receipt of the sandal wood as stolen property. 15. If that argument is allowed to prevail, no one will be able to cut and remove trees from private forests. There was no direct evidence to connect the accused persons either with theft of sandal wood or with the receipt of the sandal wood as stolen property. 15. It would be seen from the case diary that the theft of the standing trees out of Veerakambha forest was on 27-2-72 and that of Kolanjimale forest was on 25-4-72. Yet until Ext. P4 dated 21-8-72 no step was taken to trace out the thief. It was not known bow the police happened to suspect the petitioners who were not directly or indirectly connected with the theft of either on 27-2-72 or on 25-4-72. After the purchase of the stock, the petitioners had their seal affixed on them. Now it would be difficult for any one to suggest that the petitioners' stock of sandal wood looks like the sandal wood extracted from the Karnataka Government. There is no scope for any presumption that they are thieves or receiver of stolen property. 16. In the light of these conclusions, the proceedings undertaken by respondents 1 and 2 in searching and seizing the sandal wood from the premises of the petitioners are illegal and unenforceable. Respondents 1 & 2 had no right whatsoever to cross over to Kerala and seize the sandal wood in question without any manner of right. The search and the seizure effected on 1-9-72 and 22-9-72 are both set aside. The petitioners shall apply to the concerned Court where the charge is laid and get back the sandal wood which were seized from them. No further action shall be taken against the petitioners in respect of the stock of sandal wood found to be in their possession on 1-9-72 and 22-9-72. The petitions are allowed. A carbon copy of this order may be issued to the State Prosecutor as well as to the petitioners. Allowed.