Judgment :- VEERASWAMI 1. The appeal arises from an order of Ramaprasada Rao J., who dismissed the appellants petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution to quash an order of the Board of Revenue dated 16th September, 1972. The appellant had obtained a lease from one M.C. Chockalingam and two others of a site for a period of three years from 19th August, 1969 and had also obtained a licence in Form C for running a cinema thereon. After expiry of the term, he refused to hand over possession of the building and equipment to the respondent but applied to the Commissioner of Police for a renewal beyond 19th August 1972. The Commissioner accepted his claim to be in lawful possession and granted him a licence. The respondent has made representations before him after the expiry of the lease. On appeal preferred by the respondent, the Board of Revenue cancelled the licence on the view that, since after expiry of the lease the appellant was no longer in lawful possession in terms of R. 13 of the Cinema (Regulation) Rules, he would not be entitled to a renewal. Ramaprasada Rao, J. having declined to quash the Boards order, this appeal is before us. 2. Two contentions are urged for the appellant (1) The appeal to the Board of Revenue by the lessor was incompetent. (2) R. 13 will have no application to renewal. In respect of the first contention, we are of the view that it cannot be upheld. S. 5(7) of the Madras Cinemas Regulation Act 1955, after its amendment in 1961, has provided for an appeal by any person aggrieved by the decision of the licensing authority granting or refusing to grant a licence. The date for determining an aggrieved person for the purpose of this provision are not, in our opinion, necessarily confined to those to whom the right of representations has been specifically granted by S. 5(1). In granting or refusing to grant a licence, the licensing authority under R. 13 will have to satisfy itself whether the applicant for a licence is in lawful possession of the site among other things. The primary task of satisfying the licensing authority in that matter will be that of the applicant by producing documentary evidence. In granting or refusing to grant a licence, the licensing authority under R. 13 will have to satisfy itself whether the applicant for a licence is in lawful possession of the site among other things. The primary task of satisfying the licensing authority in that matter will be that of the applicant by producing documentary evidence. But, since the obligation is on the licensing authority to satisfy itself as to the lawful possession of the site by the applicant, it is implicit that the authority can properly receive representations from the owner of the lessor of the land relative to the question of lawful possession. Though such a person is not specifically mentioned Sec. 5, it is obvious that, before, granting or refusing a licence, the licensing authority can properly hear representations from the owner or the lessor. If not with standing such representation made by the lessor or the owner the licence is granted, we consider that the person who made representations can well be regarded as a person aggrieved for the purpose of Sec. 5(7). A case of renewal is, as we think, not different. A renewal is a new licence, though the procedure for a licence may be different in the sense that the renewal is normally granted for the asking unless there are reasons to deny it. It may be noted that a renewal is granted in exercise of the same power as the power to grant a licence under S. 5. We notice that Part VI of the rules deals with renewals. This part contains provisions which provide how and when an application for a renewal can be made and the requirements therefor. A renewal will depend, as in the case of an initially granted licence, on the Chief Electrical Inspectors certificate in respect of the matters mentioned in R. 94 and the period of renewal will correspond to that mentioned in the Inspectors certificate. R. 96 says that, on receipt of the Chief Election Inspectors certificate duly renewed, the licensing authority shall inspect and satisfy ‘that all the rules including R. 53 in part IV and Rr. 80 and 81 in part V for sanitation are observed before the licence is renewed”. It follows, therefore, that even for the purpose of a renewal, all the rules relating to the grant of a licence, including R. 13, will have to be satisfied. 80 and 81 in part V for sanitation are observed before the licence is renewed”. It follows, therefore, that even for the purpose of a renewal, all the rules relating to the grant of a licence, including R. 13, will have to be satisfied. That being the case, we are of the view that the respondent lessor whose representations had not prevailed with the licensing athority in respect of the question of lawful possession of the site is a person who is competent to maintain an appeal under S. 5(7). 3. On the other question of applicability of R. 13 to renewals, as we indicated, R. 96 speaks of the obligation of the licensing authority to inspect and satisfy himself that all the rules, including R. 55 in Part IV and rules in part V in sanitation, are observed before the licence is renewed. It is pressed upon us that this language does not comprehend R. 13. We are unable to agree. All the rules are not confined or merely relate to those for sanitation. It seems to us that the requirement of R. 96 is t hat the licensing authority should satisfy himself that all the rules relating to the grant or refusal of a licence or renewal are complied with. R. 55 in part IV and Rr. 89 and 81 in part V for sanitation are mentioned for the purpose of special emphasis. It may be that there are rules other than Rr. 55, 80 and 81 relating to sanitation. Even so, we are of the opinion that the words “all the rules” mean the rules they say, that to say, all the rules relating to sanitation. We have looked into the presc ribed form of application for the grant of licence or renewal and there is nothing in them which detracts from this view. 4. Another point is whether a lessee who continues in possession after expiry of the period of lease can be said to be still in lawful possession. On this, Chagla, C.J. speaking for a Division Bench in K.K. Verma v. Naraindas C. Malkani A.I.R. (1954) Bom. 950 stated that, under the Indian Law although a lessee has no right after expiry of the lease to continue in possession, his possesssion is still protected by law. On this, Chagla, C.J. speaking for a Division Bench in K.K. Verma v. Naraindas C. Malkani A.I.R. (1954) Bom. 950 stated that, under the Indian Law although a lessee has no right after expiry of the lease to continue in possession, his possesssion is still protected by law. This statement was approved by the Supreme Court in Incometax Officer, Tuticorln v. T.S.D. Nadar , A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 670. It is true that both the Bombay High Court and the Supreme Court were concerned with proceedings under S. 9 of the Specific Relief Act in those cases O.M. Prakash Gupta v. Commissioner of Police , (1960) 2 M.L.J. 50 -73 L.W. 788 (D.B.) was also a similar case. In Ouseph Lonan v. Pisharady, A.I.R. 1973 Kerala 76 Raman Nayar, C.J. expressed the view that, even though a tenancy had been determined by efflux of time or by notice to quit and decree obtained for recovery of possession of the property, the quondam tenant remaining in possession would get fixity of tenure by virtue of S. 13 of the Act. But when once there was an unequivocal demand for possession by the landlord after the termination of the tenancy either by efflux of time or by a legal notice to quit, the possession of the tenant, if he had no other valid claim to remain in possession, would assume the character of trespass. It seems to us that, in these decided cases, the question of lawfulness of possession in the hands of tenants whose lease had expired by efflux of time was approached in the context of the particular facts relating to it. In our opinion, they did not mean to lay down as a general proposition that, once there was a demand by the landlord for possession from the tenant whose lease had expired by efflux of time, the continued possession in the hands of the erstwhile tenant would be unlawful or that he would be considered as a trespasser. The continued possession in the hands of such a tenant is protected by law. Such possession is quite good against the entire world except the landlord himself. The landlord will be entitled to evict him by the appropriate proceedings. Until then we are of the view that the erstwhile tenant cannot be regarded as being in unlawful possession. We are inclined to think that his possession is wrongful but not unlawful. Such possession is quite good against the entire world except the landlord himself. The landlord will be entitled to evict him by the appropriate proceedings. Until then we are of the view that the erstwhile tenant cannot be regarded as being in unlawful possession. We are inclined to think that his possession is wrongful but not unlawful. It is wrongful, because the erstwhile tenant continues in possession beyond expiry of the period fixed in the lease. It is not unlawful, because the landlord cannot take the law into his own hands and evict him. He can evict him only by proper procedure and, that being the case, it cannot be said that the erstwhile tenant is in unlawful possession. We are of the view, therefore, that, for the purpose of the Madras Cinemas (Regulation) Act, 1955, particularly R. 13 of the rules, merely because the lease period had expired, the tenant who overstays cannot be considered to be in unlawful possession. In other words, even in such a situation, R. 13 is satisfied and such a tenant will be entitled to a renewal. 5. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. No costs.