( 1 ) IN these two petitions, a common question of law arises and therefore they are disposed of together. ( 2 ) THE petitioner, who is common to both the petitions, is aggrieved by a common order made by the District Judge at Belgaum in MA. Nos, 40 and 41 of 1970. By that order the learned District Judge, functioning as an appellate authority under S. 3 of the Mysore Village Offices Abolition act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Abolition Act), dismissed the appeals on the ground that they were barred by time. In doing so, he" rejected the, applications filed on behalf of the petitioner herein under Sections 5 and 14 Limitation Act. principally on the ground that the Limitation Act would not be applicable to the proceedings and that he was funcing as a persona designata for the purposes of that Act. Aggrieved by this common order, the petitioner has approached this Court in these two petitions. ( 3 ) ON behalf of the petitioner, it was not seriously disputed that the district Judge functioning pursuant to sub-sec. (2) of S. 3 of the Abolition act was indeed a persona designate and not a Court and in that view, the Limitation Act, unless expressly made applicable, would not be attracted. But the contention urged on behalf of the petitioner is that the provisions of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, which was the Code in force in the area concerned, would be attracted to the case. In that view, the limitation Act, having been made applicable to the proceedings under that Code, would be attracted to the instant case also. In support of such a submission, reliance is placed on the definition of the word 'code' occurring in S. 2 (1) (c), and Ss. 2 (2) and 5 of the Abolition Act. It is no doubt true that the 'code' has been defined as referring to the appropriate Land revenue Codes of the Mysore area, Bombay area, Hyderabad area, Madras area and Coorg District. Section 2 (2) lays down that in so far as the other words and expressions used but not defined in this Act were concerned, they shall have the same meaning assigned to them in the Code. Section 2 (2) lays down that in so far as the other words and expressions used but not defined in this Act were concerned, they shall have the same meaning assigned to them in the Code. " s 4 (3) provides for the applicability of the provisions of the 'code' and the rules and orders made thereunder in so far as it concerns the levy and payment of the land revenue , in respect of the lands dealt with by the abolition Act. S. 5 once again refers to the applicability of the provisions the 'code' in regard to the payment of the land revenue. But reliance is placed on a part of this section which reads thus :"----and all the provisions, of the Code and the rules and orders relating to unalienated land or ryotwari land shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, apply to the said land. "i do not think that this provision means to lay down that the provisions of the Limitaticn Act would be applicable to appeals concerned in S. 3 (2) of the Abolition Act. If S. 5 is read as a whole, it would be clear that the aforesaid provision becomes applicable only after the land is regranted. ( 4 ) IN the instant case we are concerned with the question of eviction of an unauthorised holder at the instance of the petitioner. The power to adjudicate on such a question has been specifically conferred on the depuly Commissioner of the District under S. 3 (1) of the Abolition Act. Further, the eviction cf such an unauthorised holder can be done only in accordance with the provisions of the 'code' by a, Deputy Commissioner. ( 5 ) THE argument is that by virtue of S. 3 (2) of the Abolition Act, the provisions of the Bombay Land Revenue Code would stand modified only. with regard to, the provisions made therein for appeals. Otherwise, the provisions of the 'code' would be clearly applicable in regard to all matters which have not been specifically dealt with by the Abolition Act. In other words, the contention is that so long as there is no provision in the Abolition Act, referring to the application of Limitation Act or otherwise, the prqvisions of the Bombay Land Revenue Code which provide for its application, would be attracted to the proceedings under S. 3 of the, abolition Act. In other words, the contention is that so long as there is no provision in the Abolition Act, referring to the application of Limitation Act or otherwise, the prqvisions of the Bombay Land Revenue Code which provide for its application, would be attracted to the proceedings under S. 3 of the, abolition Act. In that view, Ss. 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act would be available to the petitioner for the purpose of an appeal under S. 3 of the abolition Act. ( 6 ) ON a careful examination of the matter, I am of the view that this contention cannot be accepted. It is seen from the provisions of the abolition Act wherein there is a reference to the 'code', that the application of such 'code' has been limited to certain specific objects provided under the Act. In regard to the proyision in S. 5 reproduced earlier, it is clear that the provisions of the 'code' have been made applicable " subject to the provisions of this Act" (the Abolition Act ). ( 7 ) IN this view, and in view of the fact that a special provision has been made under S. 3 of the Abolition Act which also provide for the period of limitation within which an appeal is to be lodged, I do not think that the prqvision in the Bombay Land Revenue Code providing for the application of the Limitation Act would be attracted to the instant cases, i do not, feel, therefore, persuaded to agree with this contention. ( 8 ) IT is, however, contended by Shri K. I. Bhatta that these are fit cases wherein the District Judge should be directed to, examine the question of condonation of delay as has been done in several other cases. He particularly drew attention to an order made by this Court in WP. Nos. 282 cf 1970, the decision in which was rendered on 16-2-1971. Those were cases wherein the parties had approached this Court under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution on an erroneous understanding that no appeal lay to the District Judge, as the petitioners had done earlier. In the instant cases the petitioner has withdrawn his earlier writ petition and taken his chance in an appeal before the District Judge. It is no doubt true that the circumstances are rather unfortunate for the petitioner. In the instant cases the petitioner has withdrawn his earlier writ petition and taken his chance in an appeal before the District Judge. It is no doubt true that the circumstances are rather unfortunate for the petitioner. But I am unable tq issue a direction as prayed for, for the simple reason that such a, direction would have the effect of conferring power on a District Judge to condone delay, which is clearly opposed to the statutory provisions. It is one tiling to direct an authority, which has the pqwer under the statute to condone delay, to examine the question of condonation of such delay taking a favourable view of the circumstances pleaded on behalf of a, party, but it is a totally different thing to say that an authority should entertain a matter even though it has no power to do so. I am, therefore, unable to accede to this request. ( 9 ) BEFORE parting with the cases, I feel impelled to observe that a provision like sub-sec. (2) of S. 3 of the Abolition Aet might lead to great hardship in conceivable cases, and indeed might lead to a miscarriage of justice at times. I say so because the period of limitation prescribed thesein, viz. , 90 days, for an appeal is rigid and there is no provision made for condonation of delay even in cases where a party might not have been able to secure a, certified copy of the judgment or order, to be appealed against, within the period specified herein. ( 10 ) IN the result, these petitions deserve to fail and are accordingly dismissed. No costs. --- *** --- .